About the book
Health insurance is the mechanism used to respond to uncertainty and risk aversion of people. Health systems are the umbrella structure that accommodates health insurance in each country. There are public and private health insurances, voluntary or compulsory, financed by taxes, social contributions, or direct payments. Health insurances face two major problems of asymmetric information, moral hazard, and adverse selection. Moral hazard causes excess use of health care services and excess health expenditures; adverse selection, in the limit, collapses the market. Health insurance uses different approaches to limit moral hazard intensity and to deal with the risk selection of people. There is another form of asymmetric information which arises from doctor-patient relationship which could also result in excess use of resources due to induced demand. Differences in health insurance are significant between low-, middle- and high-income countries. This book is about these set of issues concerning health insurance in different health systems around the world.