Is Cassava the Next Magic Solution to World Hunger and Energy Crisis? The Indonesian Experience

Abstract

This chapter addresses, from a legal (state law) perspective, the issue regarding the feasibility of using cassava as alternate staple food beside rice for the Indonesian people or, in the context of energy crisis, as source for biofuel. To do that, written formal law touching upon sustainable development, agriculture, food sovereignty-security and other relevant law and regulations will be perused and analyzed. Focus shall be given on the symbolic meaning of written laws and how government officials interpret and further develop it into policies. The main argument here is that while there are local-regional initiatives and even start up policies to develop cassava as flex crop, lessening Indonesian people dependence on rice as staple food, or magic solution to world hunger or as raw material for biofuel, those steps have not yet become part of the formal law and possessing symbolic effect.

1. Introduction

All countries, including Indonesia, being aware that they cannot avoid dealing with climate change, should also take into consideration the (direct-indirect) consequence of this global phenomenon: such as food crisis, mass hunger, rising sea levels, and all other socioeconomic problems that arise along with it. All these issues have mentioned as part of the SDGs and discussed extensively at the G-10 in Bali (2022). These global problems become worse in the face of armed conflicts (internal-international) occurring in many parts of the world, lastly the open war between Ukraine and Russia, February 24, 2022. The last named successfully disrupt the global production chain of instant noodles and other food products made from wheat flour.

Regardless, mass nationwide food crisis, whatever the cause, has the potential and in fact had led to the downfall of successive government regimes. In fact, Indonesia has experienced widespread nation scale food crises several times and each time it leads to political-social unrest and even the ruling governments downfall. In the 1960s, the regimes bad economic policies leading in fact to food insecurity and widespread hunger mostly in rural areas trigger social unrest and become the driving motivation behind the Three Demands of the People (Tri Tuntutan Rakyat).¹ Among other, in addition to the attempted and failed coup in 1965, it causes the Soekarno’s government loss of legitimacy. The New Order regime, replacing the Soekarno’s regime, prided itself to being able to reach and sustain rice self-sufficiency in the early 1980, falls also due to the impact if nationwide economic crises—causing food insecurity and lack of affordability—ending in a political crisis in the 1997–1998. Apparently providing and securing food becomes one of the main responsibilities of any government wishing to retain political power and legitimacy. Failure to do so, maintaining food security, which sometimes is understood to be interchangeable with food sovereignty, will affect the legitimacy of government to rule.

This chapter explores the Indonesian state cq. government response to the real possibility of food crises. The authors will search, trace, and look at policies, programs, and laws (providing the legal basis to such policies and programs) pertaining to the promotion of cassava as a flex crop, an alternative food source to rice—the Indonesian people supposedly main staple food—and which may be processed into biofuel, expected to help the general population decrease its dependence to unrenewable carbon-based energy sources.

For starters, the crop, cassava, has been known and used as alternative food source or supplement to rice and corn throughout Indonesia and has also been promoted as a flex crop, meeting various human needs outside being a food source. Based on general observation alone, cassava’s shoots and tubers in processed form were and still are utilized by people in various regions as side dishes or street food, especially on the island of Sumatera, Java-Bali, and other outer islands, among others the famous Bubur Manado (tinutuan) from North Sulawesi. Their shoots have also been processed as modified cassava flour (mocaf). The waste may albeit in an experimental or non-industrial scale has been processed into biofuel.

2. Research method

The research method used here to tackle the issue raised is a legal perspective or juridical approach. Meaning that formal legal sources (laws, government regulations, ministerial regulations, in short state law) as text will be analyzed. For matters related to Indonesian agriculture and food provision, a systematic analysis of the legal framework had been performed by Koerniatmanto [1] and his legal scholar approach will serve as the foundation to look at the general legal framework related to agriculture and from reading the legal text attempt to discern the changing (if any) policies related to food sovereignty and security, impacting the choice of prioritizing certain crops over the other. On the other hand, any written-formal legal text, albeit interesting from a lawyer viewpoint, may not reveal much. To compensate, legal text in the Indonesian context can and should also be viewed in its wider context. A socio-legal approach will be used here as well. Borrowing from García-Villegas approach, state law (and all other formal source of law) is to be understood as a political battle for the right meaning of legal text²:

Taking into consideration the above issue, specifically the author peruses and discusses existing laws, regulation or policy statements, or public statements of government officials serving as policy guidelines in the food sector and look at how and when cassava is being considered in terms of food sovereignty or food security or the stated government goal of providing and securing the availability and adequacy of nine basic commodities. This approach may allow us to take a quick look at how the government think and speak of the possibility and feasibility of developing cassava as a flex crop and what programs, policies, or government action plans result from it. The perspective used will also borrow from Tania Li’s insight [4] when she traces the persistence of the state’s will to secure societal prosperity through various development programs including those that are internationally sponsored. Her approach, on the other hand, seems to disregard the existing legal framework, the official language of the government and bureaucracy. To compensate, the author also borrows from Jaqueline Vel’s works [5, 6, 7] addressing the issue how development ideas behind any policy or programs intended to increase society’s welfare can turn into commodities in the context of global production chain.

3. Paper outline

The first part of this chapter takes a quick look at the findings regarding cassava’s potential as staple food (substituting rice) or as an alternative food source. Relevant policies made by international bodies regarding food sovereignty or security or sustainable development will be traced to the extent these have been adopted and translated into national law regulations at the national–local level. In particular, attention will be given on how the provincial government of West Java responds to the call to hail cassava as flex crop, solution to end hunger, or rising energy demand in Indonesia. Here fact shows that this province for long serving as the national rice basket (now being renamed food estates) experienced rising rate of wet paddy field conversion to other uses. The conclusion ends with a summary about how the presence or absence of national-provincial government policies and regulations or at least agriculture improvement programs relates to the success or failure of marketing cassava as the new hype.

4. Cassava as prime commodity or raw material for biofuel?

Most urban-rural people in Indonesia, experienced cassava-tapioca-cassava plant [Manihot Esculenta], especially its tubers, as processed food, served as a snack or even street food. The leaves, cooked in various ways, are used as salad or mixed with other ingredients served as side dish. The rest, non-edible parts, or waste product can be processed for animal (sheep-goats) fooder.

In some areas, as an exception, processed cassava root is used as a staple food. It was recorded, for example, that people in Cirendeu, a small village in a remote part of West Java, during the colonial period, opted to refuse eating rice as staple food and chose instead to rely on cassava. This was done as a social movement protesting the Dutch colonial government policy of making rice the staple food of the indigenous population. Producing and consuming cassava become a symbol of resistance. During the Japanese occupation (1942–1945), the occupying army mostly confiscated the rice harvest for their own consumption and left village people around central Java and Yogyakarta—surroundings without enough food to survive. The indigenous population were forced to turn to cassava and innovate. What they did, in the end, was mixing cassava with rice, a combination, named Tiwul.

The result was that, even today, food made from cassava products, at least in central-east Java, is considered only for poor people. The rich or well to do prefer rice and show their higher social-economic status that way. Cassava was thus not considered to be on par with rice, a symbol of the well to do segment of the population. This said taken into consideration the exception of Cirendeu people mentioned above and the fact that in the formal-informal market’s in a number of regions in Indonesia, cassava products (raw or processed) can be found being offered for sale but again, not as staple food.

Notable is also that, during the Dutch Indies period, Japanese inter regnum (1942–1945), and post-independence (1945 to present), cassava was never cultivated on a large scale and only incidentally as a commercial crop. In general, speaking only for Java-Madura-Bali, cassava plantations covering large area are never to be found. That is in contrast to wet/dry rice or paddy fields surrounding small hamlets. Cassava is up to present planted on small plot of land not suitable for rice fields or deliberately planted as hedges or in small plots of land behind houses in rural areas. One big issue, endangering food security (at least sustainable rice production) in Indonesia now is the high rate of conversion of rice fields to other uses. Data show that (Table 1)³:

Province		Rice fields (hectares)
	2013	2014	2015
Aceh	300,808.00	294,129.00	290337.00
North Sumatera	438,346.00	433,043.00	423,465.00
West Sumatera	224,182.00	225,890.00	226,377.00
Riau	93,338.00	87,594.00	71,910.00
Jambi	113,546.00	101,195.00	94,735.00
South Sumatera	612,424.00	616,753.00	620,632.00
Bengkulu	93,382.00	88,756.00	85,131.00
Lampung	360,237.00	363,055.00	377,463.00
Bangka-Belitung	5358.00	7490.00	10,654.00
Riau Islands	487.00	405.00	246.00
Jakarta	895.00	778.00	650.00
West Java	925,042.00	924,307.00	912,794.00
Central Java	952,980.00	966,647.00	965,262.00
Yogyakarta	55,126.00	54,417.00	53,553.00
East Java	1,102,921.00	1,101,765.00	1,091,752.00
Banten	194,716.00	200,480.00	199,492.00
Bali	78,425.00	76,655.00	75,922.00
West Nusa Tenggara	253,208.00	254,298.00	264,666.00
East Nusa Tenggara	169,063.00	172,954.00	177,238.00
West Kalimantan	330,883.00	323,959.00	330,724.00
Central Kalimantan	225,836.00	215,545.00	196,553.00
South Kalimantan	440,429.00	431,437.00	450,152.00
East Kalimantan	63,323.00	55,485.00	57,000.00
North Kalimantan	21,762.00	21,775.00	21,448.00
North Sulawesi	56,157.00	60,475.00	52,820.00
Central Sulawesi	146,721.00	141,448.00	128,323.00
South Sulawesi	602,728.00	623,139.00	628,148.00
South East Sulawesi	95,378.00	96,826.00	103,812.00
Gorontalo	32,239.00	32,116.00	32,058.00
West Sulawesi	61,070.00	62,312.00	61,292.00
Mollucas	15,042.00	13,519.00	13,394.00
North Mollucas	10,510.00	10,516.00	11,802.00
West Papua	9587.00	9587.00	10,126.00
Papua	42,350.00	42,843.00	44,462.00
Indonesia	8,128,499.00	8,111,593.00	8,087,393.00

Table 1.

Rice field conversion per province.

With some rare exception in certain provinces (as the number shows above for Papua, West Papua, North Mollucas, South and South East Sulawesi, South Kalimantan, East Nusa Tenggara, Bangka-Belitung and Lampung, which must be compensated with loss of forest land), the alarming trend is the decrease of wet rice (paddy fields), which may lead to a disruption in the rice food supply chain or national food (rice) sovereignty-security. The trend does not stop at 2015. In 2020, the Minister of Agriculture acknowledges the continuing annual decrease of wet rice field throughout Indonesia.⁴ Reportedly Ministry of Agriculture, Dr. Ir. Suswono, MMA, stated that up to 2025, the demand for food estates may reach 13.17 million ha. (…) From existing agricultural land (70 million ha), only 45 million is efficiently used. (…) rice-paddy fields are declining with the rate of 50/70 thousand hectares-annually as compared to the making of new rice fields, estimated to 20–40 thousand hectares-annually.

Facing with that threat, the government responded by issuing Presidential Regulation 59/2019 re. control of land use conversion.⁵ This regulation is the legal basis for the establishment Tim Pelaksana Pengendalian Alih Fungsi Lahan Sawah (ad hoc team authorized to control the wet rice field conversion) headed by the Director General of Land and Spatial Control and Order at the Ministry of Agrarian Affairs and Spatial Planning/National Land Agency (ATR/BPN; Direktur Jenderal Pengendalian dan Penertiban Tanah dan Ruang Kementerian Agraria dan Tata Ruang/Badan Pertanahan Nasional). Nonetheless, all this effort seems to be in vain as the government fails to employ the monetary incentive-disincentive mechanism⁶ to induce regional governments or farm-land owners not to convert productive wet-rice fields. On the other hand, the regional government, specifically those who want to industrialize, are more prone to side with investors and allow productive farm land to be converted into industrial estates.

In addition, the same government also enact and enforce Law 11/2020 (job creation law, replaced by Government Regulation in Lieu of Law no. 2/2002) containing a ruling enabling the government to convert farm or agricultural land (including those productive wet-rice paddy fields found in the so-called food estates (lumbung pangan)) of Indonesia in the name of public interest and the realization of national strategic development projects (pembangunan proyek strategis nasional). The Law 11/2020 added these new criteria for land acquisition in the public interest as found listed in Law 2/2012 re. land acquisition for development in the public interest.⁷ Here, two different policies, protection of productive agricultural land and support more economically and profitable land use, seem to be conflicting.

In any case, spatial and land allocation for cassava was and is never an issue, considering the relative unimportance of the crop in terms of food sovereignty or security. In comparison, by looking at existing government policies, rules and regulations regarding the procurement, supply and maintenance of reserves for the so-called 9 basic commodities, similar remarks may be made. These are rice, sago, and corn; sugar; vegetables and fruits; beef and chicken; cooking oil and margarine; milk; egg; kerosene or natural gas for household-domestic use. The task to manage this state responsibility is entrusted to the State Logistic Agency (Badan Urusan Logistik/BULOG).⁸ It is telling the absence from the list of staple food (rice, sago, corn), cassava (as raw food or processed: modified cassava flour).

Apparently, BULOG’s task refers to guaranteeing the availability and even affordability of those nine basic commodities by controlling the supply and demand. The importance of this government intervention in the market of nine commodities should be understood in terms of the state interest in securing food sovereignty or security. Both concepts used interchangeable in existing laws-regulations and government policies. In any case, it is widely believed that disturbances in the market (availability and affordability) may lead to social-economic unrest, which threaten national political stability. The importance of securing the price stability of nine basic commodities is a hard lesson the Old Order (1965–1967) and New Order (1997/1999) government experienced. The insecurity of those nine commodities is one of the contributing factors leading to the government collapse.

A similar picture emerges on the unimportance of cassava in relation to the effort to seek alternative-renewable energy source (biofuel). Though outside the BULOG’s scope of responsibility, the State (or other government agency) is entrusted with similar task: availability and affordability of energy source: natural oil and gas, coal and at present biofuel. The last named influences the support the government offers to big palm oil plantation companies throughout Indonesia. This fact may for a part explain the government dilemma of choosing—alternately—between maintaining subsidized natural oil and gas (for public and household use) and balancing the national budget by reducing or eliminating fuel subsidies. That said in the face of the undeniable fact that Indonesia national natural oil and gas reserve is declining fast, and Indonesia is now already a net importer of these energy source.⁹ This fact may also explain the rush in recent years to explore the potential and development of another source of biofuel beside palm oil (a flexible crop), including Jathropha which unfortunately proved to be an utter failure.¹⁰

The successful processing and development of palm oil as a raw material for biofuel has encouraged the development of large-scale oil palm plantations at the outer islands: Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi to Papua. The express expectation is that sustainable production may continuously supply basic materials, which in turn may be processed as biofuel, either for domestic consumption or for export commodity, substituting or eliminating dependence to petroleum or coal. In comparison, cassava products or even its waste are not yet known, or popularized as was Jathropha in the past, to be a potential material for biofuel, produced on a large-industrial scale. The language used to describe cassava is as a crop having the potential or to be developed in the future for other multiple uses. For example, it is expressly stated that¹¹:

Two types of biofuels being developed in Indonesia are: gasohol E-10, and biodiesel (B-10). Ethanol may be be procured by extracting cassava, a crop thriving all around Indonesia. While diesel oil is procured from palm oil, castor oil and coconut oil. Analysis conducted by BPPT stated that the market price of biodiesel B-10 is around Rp. 2.930 per liter, or Rp. 160, which is higher than the price of gasoline as subsidized by the government. The future advantage of producing biofuels is then the opportunity to reduce or even eliminate government subsidies, since addition of Rp. 160 may be acceptable.

In support of the above argument, reference can be made to the ongoing research on the potency of cassava waste (non-consumables) as raw material for ethanol (biofuel). In one abstract of a scientific journal from 2019 is mentioned [9]:

Cassave barks, as bio-waste, have the potential to be processed as energy source in the form of ethanol. Bioethanol may be procured through micro-organism fermentation. The result of which is glucose level of 9.9% with highest ethanol of 6.00 % if fermented 8 days.

The quotations above indicate the government low attention, at least at that period, 2018–2019, to cassava products as alternate staple food or raw material for biofuel. In other words, cassava, while being discussed in scientific circles as having the potential,¹² has not yet been taken seriously. In support of this observation, a quick peruse on legal materials or existing government projects or programs related to cassava, performed on line, showing minimal or casual attention to cassava as commercial crop, indicates the same. Is there any change to this attitude now?

5. Real and concrete threat of mass hunger or energy crisis?

Indonesia cannot but pay close attention to the impact of climate change, global warming, rising sea level, the potential extinction of various plants and endangered animals. Thus, not surprisingly the government decides to sign and ratify the Paris Convention.¹³ The policies, rules, and regulation developed or coming out of the decision to become a party to this international treaty are mostly focused on reducing carbon emission and developing programs to reduce or contain deforestation. The focus on protecting the remaining tropical rainforest (and its endemic biodiversity) seems to be a rational choice given that these are considered common heritage of mankind. On the other hand, as a developing nation, Indonesia is adamant to utilize to the fullest its natural resources based on the nation’s sovereign right to explore and exploit its natural resources.

The REDD and REDD+¹⁴ are developed as G to G cooperation under the pretext of implementing parts of the Paris Convention. The basic idea seems to be that to reduce or stop carbon emission, states should cooperate and may trade quota. Arguably this kind of cooperation between developing and developed countries—in trading carbon emission quotas—are considered manifestation of the principle of common but differentiated responsibility.¹⁵

Paris Convention specifically addresses environmental problems stemming from global warming, climate change, rising sea levels, etc. But the impact or consequence thereof are not directly addressed. To know more about that, the list of global issues mentioned in the Millennium Development Goals and Sustainable Development Goals should be perused.¹⁶ At the theoretical level, the solution to these global problems is said for nation-states to follow the precepts of sustainable development, a huge abstract and general idea found enshrined in the Stockholm Declaration 1972, Agenda 21, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, and the Statement of principles for the Sustainable Management of Forests.¹⁷

The option to adopt the basic principles of sustainable development, balancing the need to push economic growth with environment protections and other social-economic concerns, as a national policy or guiding principle, moreover, has for long been taken. The principles have been the guiding principle found in laws embodying national planning (The People’s Consultative Assembly Decree on Broad Guidelines of State Policy, National-Provincial and District development plannings: short-, mid- and long term), basic laws relating to environmental protection, such as Law 24/1982 re. environmental management as amended by Law 32/2009 re. environmental protection and management), and the spatial planning law (Law 24/1992 as amended by Law 26/2007 and partially amended by Law 11/2020 re. Job Creation).¹⁸ The last-named law, practically embodying the government policy on national economy, focusses not on the issue of hunger (food security or sovereignty) but more on the threat posed by unemployment-poverty due to Indonesian losing its competitive edge in attracting foreign investment, that is compared with its close neighbors (ASEAN countries or within the Asia Pacific region).¹⁹

The above general law (addressing broad issues) may be compared to how the lawmakers perceived the issue of food availability. Law 18/2021²⁰ (rescinding Law 7/1996 re. food (pangan) have as its purpose securing food sovereignty, understood as the state’s and nation’s right to autonomously determine its food policy for the people and granting the people the right to determine their own food system, in accordance with local food potential. Thus, the end goal is food autonomy: the state and nation’s ability to produce a variety of foods and attaining food security.²¹ But then again, it should be noted that during the deliberation of the law before the parliament, the focus was more on: (a) meaning of food sovereignty, (b) position of imports to support food availability, (c) national food institution establishment, and (d) halal food issues.²² The good news is that the above Law on food is going to be revised and the Parliament had already begun to recognize the need to amend said law in the context of capacity building of small- and medium-scale farmers.²³ Simply stated the law should be read and revised in conjunction with Law 19/2013 re.²⁴ protection and capacity building of farmers (perlindungan dan pemberdayaan petani), Law 13/2010²⁵ on Horticulture (Horticultura) and lastly Law 22/2019 re. agriculture system (sistem budidaya pertanian).²⁶

This perspective on what to prioritize (economic growth above all else) may well be a dominant factor influencing how sustainable development (and Millennium Goals or SDGs) is understood and being realized in Indonesia. Regardless, the main purpose of this law apparently is to ease doing business by using a package of rules-regulation intended to deregulate and de-bureaucratize the government. But this law should be read in conjunction with 3 other laws (embodying government official policy on that field), i.e., empowerment of small-, middle-scale economic enterprises, taxation law and lastly the law, providing the legal basis for the development of the new capital city at Kalimantan. Arguably the last-named policy (relocate the capital city) is made purportedly to ease environmental pressure put so long on the current capital city (Jakarta) and Java island, which house approximately 80% of the Indonesian population on 20% of the whole land mass comprising Indonesia.

In contrast, the general threat of shortage of food, mass hunger, or other possible impact of global warming has not been responded with the making of nationwide policies or rules-regulations. The impression emerges that the one solution offered by the government is support continuing economic growth. That is not to say that the government, or at least academians, does not pay attention to the possibility of global warming resulting in threat to food security or sovereignty. For example, in the concern has been raised²⁷:

The Dean of the Agriculture Faculty of GajahMada University-Yogyakarta, Ir Jaka Widada, MP, PhD, refers to FAO’s statement reporting the possibility of mass hunger in 2050. This prediction is very real for the world and Indonesia. World population growth which at that year is expected to reach 10 billion people is one of the triggers. Another factor is climate change.

As to be read from the above quotation, climate change has not been considered serious enough a threat. What is more urgent, but it is predicted to be years away, is how to provide and secure food for the world-national growing population.

Arguably FAO does not fully focus on climate change but more on food security, which uses two different measurement: Prevalence of Undernourishment (PoU) and the Prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity in the population, based on the Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES).²⁸ Both criteria are used as stick yard to measure the extent SDG2 goals has been meeting, i.e. a world without hunger, food insecurity, and malnutrition. Regardless, policies or programs developed in the context of attaining food security mention cassava more as a footnote. Note that FAO would be expected to spend too much time and effort in discussing the merits of cassava as the solution to world hunger.

This said considering that FAO official website,²⁹ expressly mentions the Country Programming Framework (CPF) which sets out four government priority areas to guide FAO partnership and support with the Government of Indonesia (GoI), i.e.:

Priority area 1. Support disaster risk reduction and improved resilience to climate change; Priority Area 2. Sustainable natural resource management for crops, livestock, forestry, and fisheries; Priority area 3. Improved agricultural productivity, value chain development and competitiveness and Priority area 4. Strengthen the enabling Policy, Legal and Institutional Environment to Improve Livelihoods, Food Security and Nutrition.

A different and more important issue is how both criteria as developed by FAO and other programs may be used and translated into food or agricultural policies at the national level. Reading the official website of the Ministry of Agriculture, a thought on a global strategy existing or to be followed in the future can be discerned³⁰:

All agricultural development programs being carried out has as purpose not only to secure availability of food nationwide but is directed at improving farmers welfare [statement of Agung Hendriadi, head of the Food Security Agency (Badan Ketahanan Pangan]. The Minstry of Agriculture strategy for agricultural development and attaining national food security is by implementing various breakthrough (programs), such as procurement of 180 thousand units of agricultural machinery and equipment, rehabilitation of existing irrigation networks covering 3.05 million ha, increase crop index, developing agricultural insurance (675 ha), increase meat production through SIWAB project (all female livestock should be made pregnant), construction of 3771 units of long storage/dam-irrigation trenches, procurement of superior seeds (rice, corn, soybeans, chilies, onions and others), controlling strategic food imports and stabilizing food prices through TTI (Toko Tani Indonesia; Indonesian Farmer Store). These policies (breakthroughs) has produced positive results and this serves as the basis for future policies intending to enable Indonesia, develop food estate and become the world bread basket in 2045 (lumbung pangan dunia).

Aside from the difficulty of ascertaining whether policies mentioned above had been implemented with good result or are going to be implemented as breakthrough, what is striking is that all those goals (past or future) are not made based on calculation of PoU or FIES. The explicit strategy seems to be empowering small-scale farmers with the end goal Indonesia should, in the future, become the world bread basket. Except broad guidelines or programs found hidden between the wordings found in laws, rules and regulations issued by the government or various ministries, it is difficult to find any express reference to policies or programs made based on hard data as prescribed by the FAO. Or it may well be worded not in legal language.

It is telling though that the same FAO awarded the Indonesian government with: Acknowledgment for Achieving Agri-food System Resiliency and Rice Self-Sufficiency during 2019–2021 through the Application of Rice Innovation Technology. This proves again that in terms of food sufficiency, sustainable rice production is and continues to be prioritized.³¹

In any case, apparently, the issue of world or national hunger does not fall under the scope of authority of the Ministry of Agriculture. Instead, this issue and how to solve falls under the scope of responsibility of the Ministry of Health, as may be observed following news (including rules and regulations issued from time to time by the Ministry) on hunger and malnutrition. A specific public health issue is tackled by the Directorate General of Maternal and Child Health and Nutrition Development (Dirjen Bina Gizi dan Kesehatan Ibu dan Anak/KIA) Ministry of Health³² or managed by cross sections—divisions of the local government as happened in Yogyakarta.³³ Mentioned that three different government agencies (health, agriculture-food security, and maritime and fishing) are to work together to manage the problem how to prevent hunger and malnutrition.

While it might not be fully correct, it can be safely assumed that at present there is no specific program, in the field of agriculture development or related to food security-sovereignty targeting cassava as prime agricultural commodity or proposing the development of this crop as alternate food source (substituting rice) or as product industrially feasible to be processed into biofuel. These being important to determine whether the hope pinned on cassava (as flex crop) may be feasible realized, in contrast to what happened to the dream of cultivating Jathropha at industrial level to solve the problem of energy shortage.³⁴ It may also be possible that all the talk or discussion emerging about the potential of cassava, to end world hunger or alternate source of biofuel, will become a serial of government or private development projects—development projects to be sponsored by government loans and international donors. Or it may become a part of continuing government effort to do something good for society’s welfare, the many failure of which described eloquently by Tania Li? That in consideration of the fact that cassava along with other edible plants (corn-palm oil, etc.) are being discussed, introduced, and promoted as flex crop. Meaning crop with multiple uses (food, feed, fuel, fiber, industrial material, etc.) that can be easily and flexibly inter-changed and therefore are attractive for investors because the flexibility allows investors to be flexible in deciding what to produce and sell based on price signals, vis à vis in diversifying markets for their investment while dealing with a single crop.³⁵

6. Is cassava going to be upgraded: being potential to necessary and feasible?

At the same time, a significant trend emerges indicating the rising attention given to the future potential of cassava (especially its tubers) both as a food source (staple food) and more importantly as raw material to be processed into biofuels or for other industrial needs (processed into ethanol).³⁶ In response to the positive reports on the potential of sorghum and especially cassava as food source (lessening dependency on rice), the Minister of Defense, Prabowo Subianto, proposed, at the Global Food Security Forum in Nusa Dua Bali, Sunday (13/11), the development of cassava as main food commodity of the future. The question here is then why should the Indonesian Defense Minister proposed this idea, what cassava to do with defense issues? A quick answer to this kind of queries was offered by a political and intelligence communication observer, Susaningtyas Nefo Handayan. She argued that³⁷:

Food security is a key component of the People's Defense and Security System (system pertahanan dan keamanan rakyat semesta). The history of the struggle for the independence of the Republic of Indonesia proves that, in each battle to do so, logistical resilience is a determining factor.

She further argues that therefore it was a right decision of the President to appoint the Ministry of Defense as the leading sector handling the issue of food crisis. The incumbent Minister of Defense in that context stated³⁸:

Our goal is (for Indonesia in the future) to be able to feed 8 billion people (…) the government's task is to ensure the availability and affordability of food to achieve the target of zero hunger. This target is mentioned as number two in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

The Minister of Defense, Prabowo Subianto, before the G20 forum held in Bali (2022) also confidently asserted that³⁹:

(…) cassava is the most efficient crop as it could produce 250,000 calories while only needing 65 cubic meters (cbm) of water per tonne, which was far less than rice, which needed 1139 cbm, wheat needing 954 cbm and maize needing 815 cbm. (…) Indonesia can become the foremost producer of cassava. […] Cassava is now a strategic food crop. (…) Indonesia is currently producing instant noodles and pasta from cassava. On top of that, cassava could also be processed into bioethanol, alcohol, vitamins, bioplastics, glue, explosives and cattle feed while being 100 percent gluten-free with a low glycemic index, high in iron and calcium.

The above idea arguably should be read in conjunction with the incumbent President’s plan to make Central Kalimantan (Kapuas and Pulang Pisau) the bread basket of Indonesia intended to replace Java which lost this position as this island experience massive loss of agricultural land due to rapid urbanization and industrialization. Available land in Kalimantan, considered to be still in abundance and underdeveloped, should be cultivated as food estate, strengthening the national food security in the context of national sovereignty. The development plan or program is designed as a cooperation between the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Public Works and Housing (PUPR),⁴⁰ Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Environment and Forestry and Ministry of State (owned) Corporations (BUMN). The Ministry of Environment and Forestry has the responsibility to assure the smooth harmonization of this program with other programs purporting to restore wetlands.⁴¹ As for the reason why the President appoints the Minister of Defense as the program coordinator⁴²:

Defence does not only cover the responsibility of procurement and managing the availability and readiness of weaponry for the armed forces (alat utama system senjata tentara nasional Indonesia, alutista), but also food security.

Given that response, arguably what has been the basis for this policy (developing food estates) is not particularly the impact of harvest failure, mass hunger, and malnutrition from lack of food, all possible consequences of climate change, but something other issues, considered significantly more important. Possible cause or background for the above policy is the government plan to move the capital city from Jakarta to an area straddling two districts: Kutai Kartanegara and Penajam Paser Utara (both are situated at East Kalimantan).⁴³ To guarantee the success of this huge project, around the new capital city, expected to ease the environmental pressure borne by Java, the government at the same time must prepare food estates, to provide for the future residents populating the new capital. However, food estates are also being prepared and developed at other islands, with success or sometimes ending in failure.⁴⁴ Regardless, the basic assumption driving this program (and other government programs related to conversion of forest land) seems to be the general perception that forest (despite recognized importance in terms of environment, climate change prevention, etc.) are considered undeveloped and underutilized. Forest land should and needs to be converted to other more beneficial use for mankind or society’s welfare. The result is increasing rate of deforestation as the table for the period of 2017–2021 shows (Table 2)⁴⁵:

No	Name (of the main island in the archipelago)	Amount/hectares
1.	Kalimantan	−654.664
2.	Papua	−610.405
3.	Sumatera	−310.374
4.	Maluku	78.088
5.	Java	113.884
6.	Sulawesi	202.057
7.	Bali-Nusa Tenggara	225.156

Table 2.

Deforestation rate.

In line with the numbers above, the Central Statistic Bureau (Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS)⁴⁶ reported a loss of forested land amounting to 956.258 hektare (ha) (0.5% of Indonesian land mass) during 2017–2021—deforestation occurred in Kalimantan, Papua, and Sumatra. Increase of forested area is reported in Bali-Nusa Tenggara, Sulawesi, Jawa, dan Maluku, but the increase is slower than total loss of forested areas. The main cause of this deforestation is the government policy of supporting large-scale investment in palm oil plantation or conversion to other more lucrative enterprises, such as mining of precious minerals (coal, gold, nickel, etc.). Arguably, continuing deforestation is also justified by the so-called need to establish food estates, producing mostly rice.

In any case, what is even more striking is that even in the above grand scheme of relocating the capital city and in support of that effort developing new food estates (and the justification of deforestation of the area), cassava was never explicitly mentioned—only in passing and that only about its potential or possible development. A similar impression of the relative unimportance of cassava also emerges when tracing the wordings of the basic laws on food (Law 18/2012), food & nutrition security (Government Regulation 17/2015) or other laws and regulations pertaining to spatial planning (Law 26/2007), environment management (Law 32/2009), etc., which mention or become the basis for policies in the agricultural field or government programs related to establishment of food estates. The same could said when perusing the package of top down development programs embodied in laws and regulations, and other sectoral (forestry, agriculture, industry etc.) development programs.

Instead what is to be found is rather negligible, a passing consideration of cassava future potential. It is the Ministry of Agriculture who promoted cassava as local strategic food commodity. In this context, the Minister mentions the existence of a pilot project to establish—develop an integrated cassava estate.⁴⁷ In a similar vein (Zulkifli, Director of PT Permata Agro Utama) argues⁴⁸:

Cassava should not be underestimated. Within the next 25 year, it may become a strategic product. Cassava possess many advantages, it may reduce Indonesia’s dependence to wheat import, and may be used as raw material for pharmaceutical products, whereas as of today, Indonesia imported 96% of those materials. The society expect that the government develop cooperation programs, offering guidance to society and develop unproductive land into productive.

In the same news, the Director General Food Crops, Ministry of Agriculture, Suwandi, is reported to state that there are already circulated plans to develop cassava as part of the food diversification program at the local level. In realization of this plan, the Ministry had it performed a mapping project of cassava centers [small-scale plantations]. In 2019, it is recorded a total area of 628 thousand hectares, producing 16.35 million ton. Unfortunately, in 2022, there are no traces left of this ambitious plan or how it might have been developed.

Briefly stated, after perusing the existing laws and regulations, or looking at existing policy statements on development in general or cassava in particular—in terms of food security/sovereignty or in other context—arguably up to present there is no indication that the national government is really putting effort in the realization of so far fledging proposals related to cassava improvement or development as flex crop. This is said in consideration of some local government initiatives, as in providing (financial or other kind of) assistance to small-scale cassava farmers at Bangka-Belitung.⁴⁹ But this more concrete and real effort and attention to local farmers planting cassava apparently is limited to local (district) governments only. Such initiatives have yet to be developed further, only the condition if feasible, into national program and related to the effort of ending world hunger, battling climate change or lessening dependency on oil and gas as energy source.

7. Conclusion

Apparently, rice is still considered Indonesia staple food to which sustainable production must be guaranteed. The prevailing law and regulations, symbolic expression of development priority, still reflect this bias. In contrast, at the national level, cassava’s advantages and potential are still only discussed at scientific circles only. The promise of cassava as flex food, lessening Indonesia dependence on rice and possible development of cassava waste as biofuel has yet to be developed into feasible policies or development programs. The realization of which would then endanger various development programs, funded by the government or to be sold as a commodity of development idea with the best of intentions.

Development and enhancement of cassava, at present being produced, often incidentally to be consumed locally, into a commodity, produced and processed at the industrial level, has yet to materialize. Discussion of the potential of cassava, either as food crop or as raw materials for other uses, has yet to reach the level of being hype, as being experiences by Jathropha a decade earlier. While it is true that there is trace of hope or in Tania Li′s language the desire (wish) to make cassava a super commodity to solve multiple problems: from hunger, food security to energy scarcity, the efforts to do so is at most at a preliminary stage.