Perspective Chapter: Higher Education in Arab Minority in Israel – Challenges and Struggles

Abstract

Education plays a critical role in building community and contributing to cohesion in society. Arab society views education as one of the main challenges in its shaping, development, promotion and preservation of its character and heritage, and therefore its involvement in increasing educational matters. For many years, the education system and especially higher educational institutions in the Arab society has suffered from neglect and discrimination, manifested in large gaps between it and the education system in the Jewish society, both in resources and achievements. This chapter will focus on Arab society higher education institutions challenges and struggles in light of the complex relationship between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority in Israel. Arab society in Israel operates in the context of a Jewish majority state. This leaves it in the hands of the majority, while the minority group has limited involvement in its contents. This article also attempts to clarify the collective rights of the Arabs while discussing the relationship between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority in Israel. Moreover, the article paints a picture of the current situation of the Arab population, while emphasizing the changes that have taken place since the establishment of the State (1948) until today.

1. Introduction

The Arabs in Israel are a numerical minority and a sociological minority at the same time. They are a sociological minority because this is a population society that is not represented in the political elite, neither in the military elite nor in the country’s economic elite, and therefore deprived of the national dominant group. The Arab population, as mentioned above, constitutes a numerical minority, since the Arab population today numbers more than 1.8 million people, 21.10% of the total population [1], and the Arabs became more than two-thirds of the population. The Arab citizens were forcibly isolated from Palestinian culture and from the Arab world, causing total destruction of their urban centers, the middle class, and the educated elite that might have continued to nurture Palestinian Arab culture were expelled and their communities destroyed [2]. In 1948, 150,000 students studied, two-thirds in a state school, and one-third in a private school The Arab population was left with no infrastructure for the creation and nourishment of Arab culture and without channels for the Arab mother culture, the first channel for the Arab world was opened after the 1967 war after the opening of the borders and additional channels were opened following the peace agreements (Table 1) [3, 4, 5].

Population group	Size	% of total Israeli population
Jews	6,873,910	74.00%
Arabs	1,957,270	21.10%
Arab citizens of Israel	1,595,300	17.20%
Others*	458,580	4.90%
Total	9,289,760	100.00%

Table 1.

Population of Israel by population group [6].

^*

The category “others” includes non-Arab Christians and citizens with no religious affiliation.

The Arab population is heterogeneous (Muslims, Christians and Druses), very diverse and needs are different within the education system, as well as in other areas. Arab society consists of urban populations living in Arab and mixed cities and villages (some of which are not recognized by the authorities for national political reasons), and groups with different socio-economic levels, different cultural norms, different levels of religiosity and tradition, and different levels of education and higher education In terms of geographical distribution in 2020, approximately 51.6% of the Arab society residents live in the northern part of the country - the Galilee and Haifa districts, 19.7% in triangle region, 17.5% in the Negev District and the mixed cities 8.5% (Table 2) [6].

Region	Arab population (thousands)	% of total Arab population
Northern Israel	823	51.60%
Triangle region	314	19.70%
Negev	280	17.50%
Mixed cities	132	8.30%
Jerusalem corridor (including west Jerusalem)	17	1.10%
Rest of Israel	29.5	1.80%
Total	1,595.30	100%

Table 2.

Arab citizens by area of residence (End of 2020 and not including East Jerusalem).

Haddad et al. [6]. Statistical report on Arab society in Israel. The Israel democracy institute, Center for Democratic Values and Institutions.

The interests of Israeli governments are primarily the result of political and security problems, primarily the conflict with the Palestinians, which is manifested in frequent violent confrontations. As a result, successive Israeli governments have reduced their ability to act, and especially their budgetary capabilities. The result is a decline in social services provided by the state: education services, higher education, health, welfare and social security. The government expenditure (including local authorities), which includes 41.2% of gross domestic product in 2014, places Israel in close contact with countries in Eastern Europe and countries with a tradition of low government expenditure such as New Zealand and Canada, and the unavailability of long-term plans To increase the rate of entitlement to a matriculation certificate, to increase the student population or to include it among the general population of Israel, and especially the Arab population that is disadvantaged by the “start-up nation” [7].

2. Majority and minority relations

Smooha argues that the difficulty in Jewish-Arab relations in Israel stems from the fact that the Arab minority is a well-defined national and religious minority that cannot be assimilated in the Jewish majority, and even a minority is discriminated against by dividing most of society’s resources [8]. Israeli security, surveillance and Control policies toward the Arabs, discrimination and discrimination, and above all the sense of exclusion, have instilled in the Arab population feelings of fear and insecurity [3, 5].

Many economists and scholars agree that the policy of successive Israeli governments is a major factor in discrimination, inequalities and socio-economic gaps between Arabs and Jews. The democratic and modern states in the world tend to combine two models out of four basic models that exist for drawing the relationship between the majority and the minority:

1. Model nation building (assimilation): full rights in return for voluntary renunciation of their separate identity as a minority [8].

2. The model of egalitarian pluralism: harmonious and egalitarian coexistence between majority and minority (autonomy arrangements).

The basic principles of both models are recognition of the minority and its full rights. In contrast, the State of Israel does not recognize these two models and combines two other models.

1. A model of unequal pluralism: the method of control, recognition of the cultural and linguistic diversity of the minority without granting them equality.

2. Model of pushing out: The majority seeks to expel the minority from the territorial framework or even to destroy it physically.

Khayder notes, among other things, this policy, which is expressed in the expropriation of economic resources and the transfer of property (for example, through the Absentee Property Law), as well as the expropriation of land from Arab owners and their redistribution for national Jewish needs [9]. The extent of the resources invested by the State in the development of the Arab localities is considerably smaller than the amount invested in the Jewish localities. Therefore, the differences between the status of the Jews and the status of the Arabs derive mainly from ethnic, national and geographic affiliation and the policy of control and repression mentioned above [5, 10]. In other words, the status of the citizen is closely related to belonging to a nation. These intertwined factors draw the map of the gaps between Jews and Arabs in Israel. As these gaps continue to deepen and deepen, social unrest may arise, and in combination with political and national circumstances, this unrest may deteriorate relations between Jews and Arabs [11, 12]. However, vigorous action by the government in conjunction with the Arab population and in partnership may reduce pressures, create a stronger sense of belonging of Arab citizens to the state, and serve as a basis for equal and equal citizenship.

Jews and Arabs alike agree that the Jewish-Arab divide is profound and influential in the development of Israeli society. This has always been true and the tension has intensified since the events of October 2000 [4, 5]. Such a deep rift in Israel has led to civil war and the collapse of the regime in several countries around the world. In some respects, the case of Arabs in Israel is similar to that of minorities in other bi-ethnic countries that have a cultural and political connection with neighboring countries, such as Tamils in Sri Lanka, Catholics in Northern Ireland, and Turks in Cyprus [13].

Smooha argues that the difficulty in Jewish-Arab relations in Israel stems from the fact that the Arab minority is a well-defined national and religious minority that cannot be assimilated in the Jewish majority, and even a minority is discriminated against by dividing most of society’s resources [8]. It should be added that Israeli security, surveillance and Control policies toward the Arabs, discrimination and discrimination, and above all the sense of exclusion, have instilled in the Arab population feelings of fear and insecurity [3, 5].

3. Economy, employment and the labor market

The socio-economic situation of the Arab population in Israel is very low relative to the Jewish population. Most of the Arab localities are ranked in the lowest socio-economic clusters according to the Central Bureau of Statistics ranking: There are significant gaps in gross labor income per capita relative to the majority population, where the rate of poverty and poverty is much higher: Arabs constitute 18% of the working age population [1]. The employment rate is lower than that of the Jewish population, and a gender segmentation reveals that there is a significant gap in employment rates among Arab women (33%) compared to 76% among Jewish women [14], and there are significant wage gaps Among the various groups in Israeli society, and especially among the Arab wage earners The lowest average wage was found among Arab employees: their income was about two-thirds of the average income of all salaried workers in Israel, and less than half of the average wage of Israeli-born persons [15].

There is a large gap between the average years of schooling between Arab and Jewish students. When the number of years of education in the modern society has a direct and far-reaching effect on the chances of integration into the labor market and progress in it, and according to recent studies, the acquisition of education improves the status of employment [16, 17, 18, 19]. According to the Central Bureau of Statistics for 2016, Less than one-tenth of the Jewish population studied at primary and junior high schools, and is therefore likely to find itself in the lowest socio-economic stratum in the country since the employment opportunities that are appropriate to its level of education are low [1]. The gaps in the level of education between the two populations are prominent among graduates of post-secondary and academic institutions: the proportion of Jews who studied in an academic institution was 14.2 times higher than among Arabs [1]. Arab experts explain that many Arab students prefer to acquire higher education in Jordan or the Palestinian Authority [20]. One of the reasons being the difficulty in passing the psychometric test, which they claim is linguistically biased toward Jewish students and makes it difficult for Arab students to be admitted to universities [21].

The policy of control and repression, as noted, causes the participation in the civilian labor force of the Arab population to be smaller than that of the Jewish population [22, 23, 24, 25]. Thus, for example, in 2017 the proportion of those aged 15 and over in the civilian labor force was 4.41%, compared to 59% among the Jewish population [26]. The rate of belonging to the civilian labor force in the Arab population increases as the level of education rises. According to 2007 data, the lowest rate of belonging to the labor force was among those with 4–4 years of education (4.8%), while the highest rate was among those with 16+ years of schooling or 3.76% [7]. For example, in 2014/15, 14.0% of persons aged 20–29 in Israel studied in universities and academic colleges. Their distribution according to localities was very unequal: in affluent localities, the majority of which are Jewish localities, the rate was 21.5%, compared with only 9.1% in Arab localities [15].

One of the main reasons for this is the lack of suitable opportunities for employment: many Arab academics find it difficult to find jobs in occupations suitable to their level of education compared to their Jewish counterparts. As a result, unemployment rates and unemployment rates are higher than those of Jewish academics, as are those who have despaired of finding work suited to their qualifications, and are therefore no longer among the civilian labor force. These gaps in education have implications not only for Arab citizens’ prospects of entering the workforce, but also for their potential earning power and working conditions [15]. Between 1995 and 2002, employment rates among Arab men declined steadily by more than 10 percentage points. In 2020, rates for Arab men dropped sharply to a low of 69.3%. Similarly, employment rates for Arab women rose steadily from the mid-2000s. Between 2001 and 2018 the rate almost doubled (Figure 1) [6].

Figure 1.

Employment rates (ages 25–64), by population group and gender (%, 1995–2020). The Israel DEMOCRACY Institute. “Statistical Report on Arab Society in Israel: 2021”. https://en.idi.org.il/articles/38540.

According to the findings of the Socio-Economic Index of Local Authorities in Israel for 2014, about 90% of the Arab localities are ranked in the first three clusters, which are characterized by the lowest values. For example, these localities are the poorest and are at the top of the list of unemployment centers in Israel, and in the four high clusters, there is no representation of localities [14].

Public investment in infrastructure in Arab towns is lagging behind investment in Jewish localities. Only a few Arab communities have been granted the status of development areas as they have received nearby Jewish settlements, and therefore private initiative in Arab communities has no equal chance of succeeding. Approximately 70% of the Arab employed persons work outside of their localities, in Jewish localities. As a result, Arab communities have not benefited from economic development; instead, they became “sleeping cities” because there was no economic growth [26]. This policy causes poverty that has a very negative effect on everyday life. One of the manifestations of the severe economic situation, which stems from high levels of unemployment and poverty, is the rate of waiving basic necessities such as food and clothing, housing and infrastructure, medical treatment and the purchase of medicines. The gap between Arabs and Jews takes on a tangible form: the difficult economic situation dictates more concessions among Arabs than among Jews in various spheres of daily life. The depth of the gaps is especially evident in health care: about one-third of the Arabs give up the purchase of medicines and supplementary medical insurance, compared with only one-tenth of the Jews; about two-thirds of the Arabs give up dental treatments or reject them due to the difficulty of providing them [27, 28, 29, 30]. In light of the fact that the salaries of Arab employees are very low and are less than two-thirds of the national average. In the largest Bedouin town of Rahat, the rate of job seekers stood at 14.4% in November 2016. A similar percentage was also recorded in some of the largest Arab towns: Mg′ar (14.8%), Sakhnin (14.7%) and Umm al-Fahm (14.6%). In contrast, in most Jewish localities the unemployment rate was less than 5% [15].

Economists and researchers agree that government policy is a major factor in inequality and socio-economic gaps between Arabs and Jews [16, 17, 31]. Among other things, Hyder describes the policy of expropriating economic resources and transferring property, for example, through the Absentees’ Property Law, as well as expropriating lands from their Arab owners and redistributing them for national Jewish needs [17]. In 2001, for example, Arabs owned only 4% of the state’s land, and the share of Arab local authorities in controlling land was even smaller—only 5.2%, while the percentage of the Arab population was 8.18.42%. Of Arab localities is significantly smaller than the amount invested in Jewish localities [13].

Because of the policy of control and repression in the economic sphere of employment, socio-economic gaps have emerged, which are also reflected in the level of health. Health level reflects quality of life and, more generally, general class differences: quality of nutrition, environment, quality of residence, level of awareness of health risks, quality of transportation, quality of employment, distance from medical centers and more. The differences in quality of life are reflected in two main indicators, which are used all over the world to indicate health disparities: infant mortality and life expectancy. For example, the infant mortality rate in Israel in 2014 was 3.1. This rate ranked it 15th among the OCED countries, a rate that has fallen considerably since 1970, both among Jews and among Arabs. However, the current infant mortality rate among Arabs (6.4) is much higher (2.6) than among Jews [15].

The same is true for life expectancy at birth, which is relatively high in Israel: in 2014, the life expectancy of men in Israel was 80.3 years, placing the country in sixth place among the total of the OCED countries. The life expectancy of women stands at 84.1, although it is higher than that of men, placing Israel 12th among all the OECD countries. Moreover, overall life expectancy in Israel is on the rise. Nevertheless, the life expectancy of Jewish men is 80.9 higher than that of Arab men (76.9), while the life expectancy of Jewish women is higher than that of Arab women (81.1), which, as noted, cannot be separated from the prevailing policy of control toward the Arab population. The current infant mortality rate among Arabs (6.4) is much higher (2.6) than among Jews [15].

4. The socio-linguistic patterns

The socio-political context in general and political conflicts in particular has an impact on the linguistic-social (sociolinguistic) patterns in any given society. Language, therefore, is part of the socio-political reality, and not only reflects it, it also shapes it. An in-depth discussion of the role of the Arabic language in the Israeli public sphere in general and in the academic sphere in particular makes it possible to learn a great deal about the place of Arab culture in Israel, the power relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel, and the major difficulties that hinder a positive change in the situation [32]. As for the Arabic language, it is an official language in Israel, and the Arab citizens of Israel who speak it are an indigenous minority. Nevertheless, Arabic is a marginal language in almost all areas of Israel, inferior to its status in Hebrew and often from English, and sometimes it is completely absent from the linguistic landscape and the Israeli public space. Her absence from public space attests to the attempt to push her legs away. Although Arabic is an official language in the country, although many Israeli Arab students study at universities in Israel, and despite the importance of Arabic to create a shared and egalitarian space, the status of Arabic on the Israeli campus is still inferior. The academic space, which is mostly conducted in Hebrew, is not perceived as a common academic space for Arabs and Jews, but is identified as a space belonging to only one group. Since the challenges involved in promoting the Arabic language do not concern only the academic space, but also other spaces, a broad perspective is needed, which takes into account the cognitive resource and its connection to other spaces [33].

Language is a major barrier to employment in Arab society. Lack of knowledge of the language is a major barrier to the absorption of Arabs in the Jewish labor market, and a low level of Hebrew proficiency is also a major barrier to the success of Arabs in higher education alongside their absorption barrier in the employment market [32, 34]. The Arab students who study in higher education encounter all sorts of language-related difficulties that cause fear, pressure, indecision and frustration, and difficulty in integrating with Jewish students. Moreover, Arab students have problems with the ability to express themselves and express themselves in comparison to the Jewish students. This has many negative implications, and this affects how they appear to the lecturers and to the dominant population. You can feel the pressure and fear of their ability to speak that affects their grades too and often causes their failure in school [33, 35, 36].

Language is also a barrier in the psychometric test, the examination written in Hebrew, reflecting the Hebrew culture and translated into Arabic (often translating does not accurately reflect the questions) and weighs at least 50% in admissions to institutions of higher education in Israel. In some circles, it is even higher. The gap in the scores of examinees between those who came to it in Hebrew and those who came to it in Arabic today exceeds 100 points on average [1]. This leads many young Arabs to acquire their education abroad, mainly because of their inability to cope with this discriminatory examination, and unfortunately, when they return to Israel after completing their studies, these young people find it difficult to integrate into the local labor market. From the periphery, and especially to the Arab society, to acquire higher education and to be accepted as equals by society [21].

Motivation for work is personal, the barriers are often community. The language problem is not a cultural barrier of individuals in the community, but rather a community barrier that prevents many people in Arab society from going to work. The Hebrew language is an employment need and an important component in the ability to enter the job market successfully, since it is used for communication in the workplace. Lack of sufficient control in Hebrew leads to a lack of self-confidence, and because of the language barrier, job seekers in the Arab population refrain from applying for certain jobs. Since most of the businesses in the Arab society are family, those who do not find work in their place of residence have to work in large factories where knowledge of Hebrew is significant [33, 35, 36].

5. Education and pedagogy

A look at Israel society reveals several deep divisions among the population of which the Arab and Jew division is perhaps the deepest, in part because of the ongoing Arab–Israeli conflict, in part because of the religious divide, and in part due to the hegemony of the Jewish state, which excludes Arabs [5, 37]. The Arab population is heterogeneous (Muslims, Christians and Druses), very diverse and needs are different within the education system, as well as in other areas. Arab society consists of urban populations living in Arab and mixed cities and villages (some of which are not recognized by the authorities for national political reasons), and groups with different socio-economic levels, different cultural norms, different levels of religiosity and tradition, and different levels of education and higher education [15]. Arab society in Israel operates in the context of a Jewish majority state. This leaves it in the hands of the majority, while the minority group has limited involvement in its contents.

Arab society views education as one of the main challenges in its shaping, development, promotion and preservation of its character and heritage, and therefore its involvement in increasing educational matters. Since the establishment of the State, there has been a significant increase in the level of education of the Arab population in Israel. In 1961 almost half of the Arab population was uneducated, in the 1970s their proportion dropped to about a quarter of the population, in the 1990s to one-tenth of the population, and in 2016 the percentage of the uneducated in Arab society was less than 5% [38]. The education system in Israel is composed of sectors according to nationality and degree of religiosity. The Arabic education sector is divided into four groups: Arab, Druze, Circassian and Bedouin, with each sector having a unique curriculum. One of the major changes taking place in the education system is the growing trend of the Arab student population, and in 2017 Arab students constituted 25% of all students in Israel [26].

For many years, the education system in the Arab society has suffered from neglect and discrimination, manifested in large gaps between it and the education system in the Jewish society, both in resources and achievements. The large gaps between the Arab education system and the Hebrew education system are due in large part to unequal distribution of budgets, lack of buildings, classrooms, laboratories in sports halls, and the inadequacy of existing structures and facilities in many Arab schools [3, 16, 17].

A comparative view of educational inputs shows that the Arab population actually receives very few resources compared to the Jewish population. The average number of students per class is higher in Arab education, the smaller the weekly hours per student and the lower the level of teachers, the average annual investment per Arab student is smaller than the average investment per Jewish student. In contrast, an Arab student receives only NIS 20,000 which reflect a clear preference for the Jewish population [7].

The geographical delineation of the government into national priority areas in education resulted in deliberate discrimination, Status of National Priority Areas For purposes of educational benefits; only four Arab localities were included Small seas. Therefore, the differences in educational inputs in the shadow of the achievement indicators in education, such as the percentage of those entitled to a matriculation certificate who meet university entrance requirements (23% in Arab education and 47% in Hebrew education), and the percentage of students in post-secondary institutions indicate deep gaps between Jews and Arabs. Thus, for example, in the 2014–2015 school year, 21.5% of those aged 20–29 studied in affluent Jewish localities for a first degree at universities and academic colleges, and the corresponding rate in Arab localities was 9.1%, the lowest among all the localities examined [15].

In the last decade, Arab society is getting along better and succeeding in closing the gaps in higher education. Students from Arab society currently excel at all higher educational institutions, a fact that reflect the Arab society’s ability to deal effectively with the policy of control and marginalization. Alongside doubling the number of bachelor degree students, are witness to impressive increases in students enrolled in advanced degree programs (more than 200% for master’s degree programs). Thanks to a comprehensive, holistic program, personal accompaniment and guidance, beginning in high school and continuing through advanced degrees, as well as a significant investment of resources, and thanks to the increase awareness of the importance of higher education, and especially the integration of Arab female students (the percentage of female students in higher education today among women is higher than that among men), and to the special support programs for Arab students in pre-academic preparatory programs and those studying for bachelor’s degrees, and social support, which were led by civil society organizations and associations that contributed successfully to remove barriers that have existed for decades (Figure 2) [6].

Figure 2.

Multiyear view over a decade: The number of students from Arab society in higher education. Council for higher education. “Higher Education Accessible to Arab Students”. https://che.org.il.

The higher education system is the key to integration into society in general and the Israeli market in particular. Doubling the number of Arab students, including in leading fields of study, is a revolution resulting from intense efforts on the civil organizations and associations, and in turn leads to narrowing gaps and integrating them into the workforce. The civil organizations and associations in Israel Arab minority expanded their support and programs for integrating Arab students over the last years with emphasis being placed on the directing young people toward self-realization and toward professions for which there is market demand: Sciences, high-tech, psychology, and other fields, which are underrepresented in Arab society (Table 3).

Years	Bachelor’s degree	Master’s degree	Doctoral degree	Total
2008/09	21,142	2855	380	24,377
2009/10	22,268	3270	413	25,951
2010/11	24,346	4243	457	29,046
2011/12	25,843	4847	467	31,157
2012/13	28,481	5233	511	34,225
2013/14	30,969	5692	556	37,217
2014/15	33,571	6165	615	40,351
2015/16	35,758	6929	624	43,311
2016/17	37,441	8197	694	46,332
2017/18	39,160	8708	759	48,627
2018/19	41,087	9247	828	51,162

Table 3.

Arab Students by Discipline (2008–2018): Council for higher education site.

Council for higher education. “The accessibility of higher education to the Arab society”. https://che.org.il.

Among the reasons for the significant gap that still exists between the two populations is the teaching methods and learning skills of schools in Arab society relative to schools in Hebrew education. In general, the teaching method does not encourage critical and independent thinking patterns. In addition, the study societies in Arab schools lead to the expectation of the Arab student to receive assistance from teachers in coping with learning difficulties [7, 11]. These characteristics become a double obstacle in higher education - once in the study itself, when the nature of the learning in the schools does not prepare the Arab student for the skills required in the higher studies, and once again the expectations of the students from the institution and the lecturers [38].

Therefore, a gradual transition to pedagogic innovation is required, which means a fundamental change in the perception of teaching and learning, and a change in the relationships and relationships between the teacher, the student and the knowledge, which become one network in which each person learns and contributes his abilities. This transition should include school renewal, that is, re-examination of the school space and its adaptation to changing learning methods, and the creation of spaces that expand the boundaries of the classroom and enable the creation of diverse learning processes [39]. The situation in the vocational and technological education in Arab society is much more difficult, and although in recent years, there has been a demand, especially by industrialists, to expand vocational education at the high school level. This demand creates the impression that vocational education is a world that is disappearing. It is true that today’s vocational education is smaller than it was until the 1990s, when it comprised about half of all high school students in Israel, but even in last years (2015/6) it is a very significant track, which 36% of the Arab student’s study, and 45% of the students Middle Jews. The vocational track is a main track in high schools in the periphery and today also in Arab localities [15].

The vocational track is largely run by the state, but by non-governmental networks that have specialized in professional education over the years. These networks became a central factor in the early years of the state, when the Ministry of Education found it difficult to provide adequate educational services in the periphery and Arab communities. Schools in these localities suffered from high dropout rates and very low rates of high school education [40]. The vocational education underwent many changes in Hebrew education. Today, in many of the technological tracks one can study for a full matriculation certificate; For example, the list of subjects in which a matriculation certificate can be examined at the level of five units is now increasing, thus expanding the possibilities of admission to institutions of higher education. On the other hand, the criticism of professional education in Arab society is great, and especially the high dropout rates in these schools. Students’ achievements are much lower than those of the same track compared to Jews (40.7% of all high school graduates of the academic track in the Jewish society began academic studies until 2015, compared to only 18.8% of the same track in Arab society [15].

6. Summary and outlook for the future

Despite the conflict between Jews and Arabs in Israel, in recent years, the issue of the national rift and its impact on the relations between the Arab minority and the Jewish majority has not been repressed. Civil society associations prepare memos for the public and the government, and basic studies are written in institutes and universities. The crop of all this activity is presented in books published in recent years on an impressive scale. The conclusion reached in all these works is uniform and, without a doubt, worrisome: it becomes apparent that the gap between the two sectors is widening and the tension between them is worsening. Therefore, the main objective of the state’s actions must be to achieve genuine equality for the Arab citizens of Israel, and to find ways that will enable them to express in their public life their culture and identity in a proper and dignified manner. The importance of the state’s official recognition of the cultural and national uniqueness of the Palestinian Arab minority in Israel, and the granting of the state’s legitimate legitimacy to its unique identity and needs in this context as well [5, 41, 42].

Civil society in Israel is showing signs of increasing activity in the field of employment of the Arab population. The main activity of the civil society is focused on the employment of Arab women, the promotion of Arab employment in the public and private sectors, and the promotion of the establishment of Arab industrial zones [41, 43]. The resources available to civil society organizations that deal with the employment of Arabs are limited. The result is a partial activity with a limited overall effect. The activity relies mainly on limited funding in terms of its scope, which derives from donations [5, 6, 41, 42]. Cultivating and strengthening civil society in Arab society strengthens the status of the Arab population. The activity in the field of civil society seeks to promote values of social responsibility and moral commitment in all areas related to Arab society. This activity takes place in forums of various types: research groups, discussion groups, round tables on key issues on the agenda for social change, local and international conferences, as well as evening seminars open to the public. This civic organization creates power levers and long-term changes in Arab society in all its diversity and diversity.

In conclusion, it emerges from the above that the differences between the status of the Jews and the status of the Arabs derive not only from socio-economic factors, but also from ethnic, national and geographic affiliation, and from the policy of control and repression against the Arab population. In other words, the status of the Arab citizen is closely related to belonging to a nation. These intertwined factors draw the map of the gaps between Jews and Arabs in Israel. Therefore, this policy should be changed to the policy of the modern democratic and modern countries - a policy based on egalitarian pluralism, at the center of which is a harmonious and full equality between majority and minority. Such a policy will lead to an investment in the Arab human capital, education and education of the Arab population. The education of the Arabs in Israel has a decisive influence on their employment status - in terms of wages, the rate of participation in the labor market and the rate of unemployment, as well as the level of occupation and productivity. In addition, it is important to significantly upgrade the investment in education in the Arab society, which as mentioned currently suffers from under-investment at all levels of education, from daycare centers and kindergartens to higher education. In addition, emphasis should be placed on content that will help in future integration into employment, such as strengthening the control of Hebrew and English and providing necessary skills in the high-tech industries. There is room for many policy measures in this area. Efforts should be made to increase financial resources at all levels of education, with an emphasis on considerable investment in early childhood and primary school. In addition to increasing resources in the Arab society, it is important to increase integration with the Jewish population, which will in the future help the Arab society become more successful in the labor market. This can be done by meetings between students and teachers and by integrating Jewish teachers in the Arab system and Arab teachers in the Jewish system. Such measures will act to reduce the cultural barriers and prejudices that exist in both sectors.

The main objective of the Israeli state’s actions must now be to achieve genuine equality for the Arab citizens of Israel, and to find ways that will enable them to express in their public life their culture and identity in a proper and dignified manner. The importance of the state’s official recognition of the cultural and national uniqueness of the Palestinian Arab minority in Israel, and the granting of the state’s legitimate legitimacy to its unique identity and needs in this context as well. The differences between the status of the Jews and the status of the Arabs derive not only from socio-economic factors, but also from ethnic, national and geographic affiliation, and from the policy of control and repression against the Arab population. The status of the Arab citizen is closely related to belonging to a nation. These intertwined factors draw the map of the gaps between Jews and Arabs in Israel. The policies in Israel should evolve to the policies of the modern democratic and modern countries - a policy based on egalitarian pluralism, at the centre of which is a harmonious and full equality between majority and minority. Vigorous action by the government in conjunction with the Arab population and in partnership will work to reduce pressures, create a stronger sense of belonging of Arab citizens to the state, and serve as a basis for equal and equal citizenship.

Farther more, the policy should lead to deeper educational transition and to school renewal, that is, re-examination of the school space and its adaptation to changing learning methods, and the creation of spaces that expand the boundaries of the classroom and enable the creation of diverse learning processes. In addition to increasing resources in the Arab society, it is important to increase integration with the Jewish population, which will in the future help the Arab society become more successful in the labour market.