Emotive Quality Transformations in Music: The Psychoaesthetics of Emotion Polarization

Abstract

The author investigates if musical modes have definitive emotive contents and following this, if certain modes have affective potentials that are targeted and specific to forms of appraisal. Do certain note clusters occupy emotive loops in accordance with certain basic emotion types - and so what may be, therefore, the general rule for valence appraisals of basic emotions activated by targeted note clusters. The co-existence of connectionist circuits or engram activation routes would have to be conjectured. Finally, a multidisciplinary approach shows us that a new pattern of a psychoaesthetic valence-aggrandized happy or positive version of emotions would have to be considered. There is no such existing proposal for a ‘version’ theory of basic emotions. We propose that a psychoaesthetic version of basic emotions exists. Next, we also defend the possibility of polarization of emotions through entrainment. Music may have the ability not just to evoke any given emotional state or state of feelings in the psychoaesthetic spectrum but also to polarize basic emotions to create a value-added experience. Conclusions from the discussion suggest that music appraisals may have far-reaching implications for the understanding of the ontological quality of music and its relations to well-being and mental health.

1. Introduction

Music consists of patterns of emoted vocal (or instrumental) sounds – as such it is a product of behavioral practice that arouses and appropriates feelings. These feelings are usually oriented toward appraisals of happy, felicitous, and positively energetic character [1, 2]. More philosophical proponents in the field of psychology and neuroscience opine that music has its origins in the neuro-ecological ‘body–mind’ continuum [3], which refers to the impulse from the environment inducing the specific sonic patterns which embody and modify human feelings [3, 4]. The literature also suggests that the sound [sonic] frequency at the base of musical articulation [a] already evolved ethologically as emotively understood modulation of audited frequencies [5, 6], and as such manifested itself through two possible axes: (i) namely, as a momentarily integrated ‘note’ with its expectancies and its recourse to episodic memory [7], and (ii) second, a sequence of notes (i.e. peaks or nodes of frequencies) creating temporal modulation or what we more commonly call ‘progression’, ‘melody’ or ‘rhythm’ indicative of the time game of musical performances [8]. Both processes ([a] i and [a] ii) help coopt formal elements from collectively intelligible expression or audition that occur within the context of any articulate culture. Anyone willing to arrive at the well-springs of music must feel this integrated moment that we call ‘music’ where the musical tendency is always inspiring human subjects to emote out states of pleasure through notes that combine in harmony, pleasure, and the energetic take on life.

Secondly, the consumer of music must find recourse and patience in this idea of music as a profoundly auditory expression or articulation of a sonic note, executed either in a series, and as an emission of notes such as generates an ‘esthetic’ category for a context of listeners [9, 10, 11]. Music emotion is esthetic emotion. Esthetics constitutes an area of psychological speculation which still crawls in its infancy. But recent studies on neurodynamic changes of ‘core affect’ better explains – how music emotions are manipulated through the system to elicit these specific types of esthetic- emotive states – what we may properly designate esthetically ‘charged’ (or polarized) emotive states. Henceforth, it should be logical to associate music emotions with esthetically satisfactory perceptions in emotion induction and appraisal rather than as a simplistic or ‘primary’ emotion consciousness [9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15]. A strong case for music emotions is made by Flaig and Large [9].

Entrainment is believed to be a cause of emotive triggers in experiences of musical harmony [16]. In general, however, the literature on musical emotions, with a few exceptions, reveals a lack of emphasis on cognitive appraisal of music effects, like that of esthetic arousal, etc. [17]. Indeed, there might be various types of music emotion – which indeed is what appears to be true from common sense observation, although here we are considering the possibility or overarching music emotion – ‘esthetic music’. Could we set up standards of measurement for such themes [18, 19, 20].

Earlier observations on musical emotions lead to a fecund intellectual discussion on the necessity of recognizing first, the esthetic state elicited in the process, alone. This is tentatively articulated by Ekmann in his early inconclusive studies on esthetic emotions as Extra Basic Emotional State (henceforth EBES) – some of that foundation of a separable and hierarchically organized or vertical-integrative state gives way to explaining the moment of any esthetic emotional experience. Now, music is not compared to or assumed to be an ‘esthetic’ state per se, although it is one [21, 22]. As just mentioned, in consultation psychology, and in applied psychology in general “esthetics” has not been defined in the literature. First, esthetic emotions of a psychologically sound subject – are a kind of EBES, an extra basic emotion. Ekmann speaks of Basic Emotion types and hence external stimuli elicit basic emotions like anger, sadness, disgust, or happiness [12]. But esthetic emotions are not categorized within the ambit of Basic Human emotions. In the literature, psychologists have referred to emotions of “awe”, “pleasant surprise”, or “admiration” Ekman. Unfortunately, although all these characteristics define esthetic emotions, they are not able to explain the range and extent of esthetic emotions as a visible emotional state. Even as emotional states are considered to be reflexive conditions of the body, and thus as embodied cognitive behavioral perceptions, there is no embodied esthetics of the esthetic emotions - such as are elicited in theater, performances, movies, art galleries, or by the presence of art, or esthetically satisfactory installations – or especially, as discussed here. Levinson, Juslin and Slobodan and Juslin, Flaig and Large, Scherer, Scherer, and colleagues all do mention and bring music esthetics to the forefront of research.

Music emotion first then may be considered empirically as belonging to the incipiently identified category of EBESs [21]. Just as Ekman speaks of such undefined or uninvestigated properties of emotion such as ‘admiration’ ‘awe’ or ‘surprise’ it would be possible to add the effects of ‘esthetic’ sensations like ‘thrill’ or additional ‘euphoria’ or general sense of happy well-being (Moors and Kuppens 2008; Robinson 2008). These value-added EBESs are always rapidly guaranteed in experiences caused by musical performances. Secondly, EBES holds a special import for musical emotions as the latter comprise direct, unmediated provocations of lifting (esthetic) emotive states. The ‘core affect’ precept of a constructivist architecture of musical esthetics requires a similar assumption of the underlying natural or instinctive and inner propensities of emotions [13]. Again, Levinson [23] and Juslin [11, 12] recognize the basic emotion reflex framework from which esthetic emotions - such as especially musical emotions are found to evoke their effects for listeners. In the vocabulary, this is referred to as the BRECVEM method of explaining how musical emotions are evoked. The psychoaesthetics of music, if explained especially from a psychogenetic point of view, are also understood as based on neural activation of emotive circuits that hold episodic musical memories that create expectancies and retinues of convention – indeed all conjointly believed to be carrying and releasing musical emotions as their point of a destined output.

But this by no means assumes that these musical emotions are also being part of the experience afforded in terms of ‘esthetic experiences’ as well.

As stated by Juslin for example the proposed nine-fold architecture of the BRECVEM – or Brain Stem Reflex, Rhythmic Entrainment, Evaluative Conditioning, Contagion, Visual Imagery, Episodic Memory, Musical Expectancy, and Esthetic Judgment [21] enumerate these steps in the process of esthetic appraisal of music. But Juslin’s conceptual framework of music emotion elicitation includes a reference to ‘Esthetic Judgment’ (See Figure 1 following Juslin 2017 [11]). Music itself is considered as an emotive trigger or as Juslin calls it “Emotional responses … [that] need to consider underlying mechanisms but it leads to an esthetic emotion which can blend or condition ‘everyday emotion’ as its appraisal mechanism” [24]. The point about aestheticity -deriving out of an assumed psychoaesthetic ‘mechanism’ (vide. Figure 1) of basic emotion materiality gives specificity and direction to questions arising in music emotions.

Figure 1.

Juslin’s model of “esthetic” emotion elicitation through music (Juslin 2017).

2. Musical affect leads us to believe more firmly in Esthetic emotions

Hence, music teaches us about the depth and power of esthetic emotions. Musical emotions are not just emotions - they refer to a specific way or polarization (Figure 2) which humans emote out within a range of musical affects. Sexual enhancement affect, dancing, physical emotions of release, and well-being are polarized toward vertical esthetic levels, of tranquilizing and more energy-arousing emotions. Levels must be recognized even in the case of musically evoked emotions [17]. The level change of energy [12, 14] or polarized happy feeling that is entrained in music elicitation must be recognized as inalienable element in the musical effect. Even if it were true that only a certain category of music was able to perform that kind of calming musical affective function. Yet music does it with the power and positive valence or charge - a degree of neural excitation that no other stimulus is able to provide.

Figure 2.

Proposed model of transformation of emotive qualia through neural polarization-based thematically on Juslin [11]. Consider Juslin’s model of “esthetic” emotion elicitation in the “MIXED EMOTIONS” state, which remains somewhat vague and indiscriminate.

3. The argument from intersectionality

Interdisciplinary methodology has the potential of demonstrating the complete circumplex trajectories of the emotion -of any emotion whatsoever but it appears to be more directly relevant for tracing the emotion extensions of emotions vis a vis emotion disorders. Any emotive condition or dysfunction is capable of being viewed through its affective other, or valence or alteredness: sad/happy; anger/tranquility, etc. I refer to the circumplex model only to suggest - as has been already considered in great detail by Frijda [25]. The studies of Frijda [25], have the most impressive till-date of basic documentation of what Frijda calls ‘arousal’. Indeed, arousal is an indispensable factor in the evocation of emotions, including that of basic emotion states like that of fear or anxiety. Barrett also speaks of an architecture of arousal - the point is to note what I have suspected about emotions based on insights provided in traditions of emotion studies from very different philosophical or analytical traditions [26]. The same emotional traumas could be aroused and contemplated in a positive state of affects -so that the emotion or affect may harbor an intrinsic potential to transform and get aroused in a polarized manner. Valence is of the essence here and is directly related to the practice of polarizing emotive self-esteem, and in general, the ability to negotiate with negative tendencies, closedness, depression, and traumatic withdrawal [27].

The knowledge of these transforming valences of our physiologically built-in conditions (the EBESs) - the potential of emotive base change or neuronal replacement conditions are possibilities that remain to be labeled. Levitt asked in a very relevant manner: “Does the pattern of physiological reaction differs among emotional states; can these patterns be used to differentiate among the emotions?”

I believe that these are very important questions in the study of anxiety and fear - that is only being raised in a rather inchoate form in contemporary applied psychology and psychosocial behaviorism. They point to the need for a reconsideration of the basic emotion paradigm in psychology and to replace it with a basic circumplex emotions model which looks at emotion as its own medicine, and as a feeling that could be traumatized or impaired but then also cultivated to release and realize an altered, esthetically polarized, therapeutic level of normative well- being for itself.

The second question would be could emotive engrams actualize such esthetic trances? The proposition that certain emotions can undergo perceptual changes or alterations within the valence scale has not been extensively suggested. Musical emotions function in thematic musical variations of love songs, or music of love or yearning, music of desire, mating or union desiring musical moan are evident in popular love songs, articulate music, and instrumental melody that mime the desire or yearning or moaning provocations. If we were to consider the sad or love emotion in music alone, and in sibling art forms such as poetry: say in the songs of Widsith the far wanderer – the long peregrinatory yearning songs of a transcendental other – all even through variations in cross-cultural manifests of the archetypal love song – there is demonstrable truth of this assumption about the intrinsic emotive quality of the love song. The love qualia get propositionally visible, objectified, modulated, and appraised for emotive arousal and appraisal.

Hence, we might conjecture about the presence of a basic Ekmann emotional qualia (EBES) of the love song – it is a cross-cultural phenomenon and may also be identified under a certain emotive rubric of effects. The contention however is not related to whether a basic ‘moan’ or ‘yearn’ emotion is embodied and elected through music articulations of the love song. Certain aspects of this question are admittedly debatable -the fundamental assumption about the cross-cultural validity of basic musical emotions or types. Yet some rhythms are amenable or appraised as more sad emotional articulations and yet others as more comedic -these broad variations are evidently and obviously visible within the large gamut of desire moaning - as we are calling them here.

Extra Basic Musical EBES, may be similar to the distinctive component forms of the BRECVEM suggested by Juslin – that there is a sad to romantic range for the musical emotions of moaning or yearning love songs, or moaning calls. Could it be possible to review the neurodynamic or synaptic neurodynamism or neuroinhibitory history of these formations or qualia, at all? From a more speculative point of view - we could move toward a reconsideration of the qualitative characters of momentary feelings associated with a known or given musical emotion. The history of this research is indeed scarce and either egotistical or dismissive by virtue of exclusive philosophical stance-taking attitudes [21]. Juslin comes very close to stating the virtue of this question and yet his review of the literature turns out to be both falling out of focus [11]. He claims for example:

The psychological process through which this is achieved is referred to as ‘the underlying mechanism’. A description of the psychological process should not be confused with its neural implementation in the brain or with the phenomenological experience it seeks to explain [24]. Yet there is no adequate selection of the reference to this underlying mechanism. His citation of Dennett here is also misleading – Dennett’s speculative theorizing is based partly on personal observations with its lack of comprehensive and rounded analysis and its default assumption of cognitive categories that do not refer to emotion at all [28].

4. Do Esthetic engrams exist?

Thus, we may ask: What are the underlying emotional causes of the music emotions of moaning songs? More interestingly and fundamentally however we may ask how we could describe this “underlying mechanism” hypothesis of the musical emotions. Unless this description is available, we may not be able to suggest why music emotions like that of the love song with its objectification of the moaning call - the ‘desire-feeling’ evoked in love situations may be mixed or modulated with EBES-like moments of admiration, gratitude, awe, surprise, thrill and above all euphoria. A love song’s melody, despite its variations, will need to have a core affect proposition at its neurodynamic level, one that remains a core affect for the performer as well as the cultural participant of that music – and is, as such capable of being accessible to entrained episodic memory, as part of the paradigmatic engram at the CNS and ANS circuits of the given emotion. But that is not enough – there is very little literature or studies to guide us here. Unless we define and amplify the science of psychoaesthetic states the core affect proposal for exclusive esthetic types of emotions may fall apart.

A brief review of the literature on neurodynamic oscillations reveals that there is very limited hypothesis testing in the field of experiments on psychoaesthetic modularity. Unfortunately, as a review article Wagemans’s summary assessment of psychoaesthetics [29]. Does not consider the art experience as a primarily emotional experience. But as objects mensurated in terms of symmetry and matching, to pre-existing models. It may be worth noting from Wagemans is with reference to Zajonc. As far as emotive experience making and consumption are concerned it is with Zajonc that we begin to compile the timeline for an adequate understanding of the emotive component [30]. Preferential emotional seeking is close to the heart of the question that also relates to musical appraisal. Here we shall refer strictly to music emotion causation. In traditional psychological approaches to musical emotions, or more properly speaking to the causal factors of music emotions, Levinson takes a lead role in defining what Levinson calls the “music moment” [28]. Levinson is however drawing attention to the structural architectures, and responses elicited by musical expectations. Levinson’s findings found support for the review assessments of Slobodan and Juslin [18] and Juslin [11]. Some very concrete help in this regard comes from neuropsychologists who have located and correlated the functions of amygdala to specific emotional reflexes elicited by music- Gosselin and colleagues have shown amygdala activation and impairment correlations to music emotions in the amygdala -and the independence of brain circuits for emotions from brain circuits that may be responsible for valence and arousal [31]. Zajonc and Panskepp’s pioneering research in neuroscience has enabled neuropsychologists to develop a clearer picture of emotion activation by means of music -and hence indeed music is incontrovertibly considered as an emotion tool for several levels of experiment in brain circuit projections [32, 33].

5. Could engram’s sources be conditioned or qualified?

Last but not the least, we should have to conclude with insights we have derived from a brief review of the approaches. The broad indications in the psychoaesthetic definition of music are as follows:

1. Levinson and Juslin’s methods of psychological appraisal structures including the BRECVEMA deconstruction of the component methods of musical appraisals [11, 23]

2. The structural approach to psychoaesthetics and emotions as it appears in Wagemans and colleagues [29]

3. Lesion analysis methods with also specific findings from investigations of impairment and responses (of the amygdala and midbrain) to musical emotions and appraisal processes such as that of Gosselin and colleagues [31, 34].

These three outlines in psychology, neuropsychology, and neuro-psychological lesion analysis impairment inferences suggest at least three important notions.

Musical emotions are engendered through the activation of engrams in the amygdala but findings such as Fritz and colleagues [22] and Gosselin [31] suggest that the amygdala does not itself impair valence function in music emotional appraisal architectures. If the valence is considered important - at least in positivizing – basic emotion experiences (EBESs) through music, then the co-existence of other circuits or engram activation routes would have to be conjectured [33, 35]. Finally, therefore the emphasis on a multidisciplinary approach as in Scherer and Coutinho [36] and Cochrane and colleagues [1] show us, the pattern of a psychoaesthetic valence-aggrandized happy or positive version of emotions would have to be considered. There is no such proposal for a version theory of emotions – as is possibly proposed in a psychoaesthetic approach which defends a theory of polarization of emotions through entrainment. Music may have the ability not just to evoke any given emotional state or state of feelings but also polarize itself to create a value-added experience. In that case, the neural architecture of music evocation must be revised. The lesion impairment methods could lead the way into this kind of investigation of the polarization or version theory of emotional alteration for which musically transformed representations of emotions remain strong evidence. The version-handling power of music implies a change of valence and positive polarization, such as the kind of energy state that anticipates satisfaction, gratefulness, admiration, and above all a sense of fulfillment that turns into well-being and relief from stresses of daily life. This signifies a search into the realm of psychoaesthetics where music helps in understanding precisely how multiple factors may be involved in a singular emotive appraisal.

6. Conclusions

In conclusion, we may attempt to explain the ‘underlying causality’ or ‘underlying mechanism’ that demonstrates how music emotions are generated in the scheme of environmental interactions of the human being, the one which creates humans like music emoters. Whether neurodynamic modularity is worth identifying may be justified by the fact that at least on the one physiological level embodied emotions reveal that changes in emotional quality are already self-evident perceptions – the mere corporeal entity remains a metaphor of the process which is mooted. The human body models emotive qualia both in its elicitatory trajectory as well as in its effects of change. The body may change in its expression of a certain primary emotion like anger or sadness, yet the same emotional symbols may be enjoyed in the subject’s body with mediated tonal peak, as, in an opera or recital. The entire organism finds its polarized otherness through the amygdala and the autonomous nervous system. It is only more than plausible that the same changes are wrought at the synaptic level, along with the retrieval of episodic memory through functional inhibitors. A spatial diagram of such synaptic polarization, as in Figure 2, should resemble a map of chemical responses on the ionic level. On every level emotive transformation of the same emotional impulse, the change in the character of qualia, and the induction of a specific or altered mood state following a change in the musical provocation, must all be understood as a fundamental dynamic quality of emotions circumplex.