Perspective Chapter: Historical Experience of Governments of Pre-Revolutionary Russia to Overcome Individual Political Terror

Abstract

Terrorism has become a prominent feature of the social and political life of Russia in the second half of the nineteenth early twentieth centuries. Its most dangerous form was political terrorism, with the help of which the opposition, extremist forces sought to bring confusion to the government camp, revolutionize their supporters in order to seize state power or achieve serious political concessions from the government. This was manifested to the greatest extent in the 1970s and 1980s of the nineteenth century in the activities of the Narodnaya Volya and at the beginning of the twentieth century in the activities of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and anarchists. As the danger grew, the government was forced to look for ways to contain and suppress this dangerous type of state crime: it sought to strengthen and develop law enforcement agencies, direct public efforts to isolate and curb it.

1. Introduction

Terrorism in its various manifestations has become one of the most acute problems of the modern world community. Concerned about the growing danger, government agencies in many countries are taking practical steps to contain and suppress it. Among them are the development of software and legal support, the creation of anti-terrorist centers and special police units, the establishment of closer international cooperation, etc.

The problem of combating terrorism is attracting more and more attention of researchers—philosophers and historians, sociologists and jurists.

A number of authors, when considering the formation and development of political investigation in pre-revolutionary Russia, touch upon the historical aspect [1]. Unfortunately, not everyone managed to go beyond the traditional historiography of the Soviet period, which denigrated and caricatured the historical past of Russia, especially the activities of law enforcement agencies.

Truthful and impartial coverage of pre-revolutionary law enforcement activities is an integral part of the overall task of not only re-creating an objective approach to national history, but also extracting instructive lessons from it for the present. In this regard, the experience of previous anti-terrorist activities is of considerable interest.

As is known, terrorism became a noticeable feature of the social and political life of Russia in the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Its most dangerous form was political terrorism, with the help of which the opposition, extremist forces sought to bring confusion to the government camp, revolutionize their supporters in order to seize state power or achieve serious political concessions from the government. This was manifested to the greatest extent in the 1970s and 1980s of the nineteenth century in the activities of the Narodnaya Volya and at the beginning of the twentieth century in the activities of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and anarchists.

Rampant terror seriously destabilized the political life of society and to a large extent contributed to the country’s involvement in the abyss of anarchy and bloodshed in 1905–1907. As the danger grew, the government was forced to look for ways to contain and suppress this most dangerous type of state crime: it sought to strengthen and develop law enforcement agencies, direct public efforts to isolate and curb it, and so on. At the same time, serious difficulties arose. First, the country was essentially not prepared to face this kind of crime. Law enforcement agencies had no experience in anti-terrorist struggle. Second, they were opposed by well-organized, carefully conspiratorial, terrorist centers, groups and communities, who were well equipped with technical means and financial resources. Third, the terrorists enjoyed the sympathy and often the support of a significant part of Russian society, as supposedly disinterested fighters for the happiness of the people. A vivid illustration of this was the acquittal of the terrorist Vera Zasulich, which was greeted with enthusiasm and jubilation in wide circles, the so-called progressive public. Fourth, Russian terrorists, as a result of targeted propaganda, found some protection and support from a significant part of the European public. All this complicated the deployment of an effective anti-terrorist struggle and required considerable sacrifices, additional efforts and funds.

2. Prevention and suppression of terrorism during the activity of the III division

Priority attention in the prevention and eradication of terrorist plans and actions was given to increasing the efficiency of the work of the higher police, who were in charge of the timely detection and suppression of the most dangerous crimes against the state. For more than 50 years (since the speech of the Decembrists), III Department of SEIVK (III Department of His Imperial Majesty’s Own Office) was the supreme state body here. It was the think tank of the entire state security system. All the most important information about the internal political situation in the country came here. Here, operational plans for detective activities were developed, instructions and circulars for local security agencies came from here.

The gendarmerie, which had previously performed the functions of the highest military police and was part of the army, became the executive body of the III Branch in the field.

The government sought to create exemplary, elite units from the new military-police formations through a careful selection of personnel, especially officers. Increased salaries, favorable conditions for life and work, almost complete independence from local authorities made the gendarme service quite prestigious, which contributed to the constant influx of the best personnel into it. At the same time, the requirements for these units also grew from year to year. They had to promptly report on all important incidents in the country, know the mood in society, timely disclose and suppress any manifestations of disobedience to the authorities, anti-government actions and thoughts.

In the detective work of the III Branch, secret agents began to be widely used, the perusal of correspondence became widely practiced and denunciation was encouraged. According to the chief manager of the III Department, Count A.Kh. Benckendorff, persons suspected of anti-state actions “in most cases are included in the surveillance lists” [2].

Possessing great powers and the most qualified personnel, using increased attention and comprehensive support from the government, the high police bodies for a long time (until the mid-1970s) successfully coped with their duties—to uncover and prevent crimes against the state system, the emperor and his environment, focusing on the prevention of political crime. If Europe in the middle of the nineteenth century was shaking under the blows of violent revolutionary upheavals, accompanied by outbreaks of bloody terror, then in Russia for several decades after the speech of the Decembrists, relative calm reigned.

The growth of the opposition movement in the country since the 1960s, persistently promoting terrorist actions, required an expansion of the scope of detective activity, a qualitatively new approach to its forms and methods. The staff of the III Division and the number of secret agents were significantly increased.

In 1867, a new Regulation on the Corps of Gendarmes was issued, according to which the district gendarme departments were abolished. All provincial gendarme departments, including transport departments, began to report directly to the Main Directorate of the Gendarme Corps [3]. Under the law of 1871, the ranks of the Gendarme Corps were given the opportunity to openly investigate these crimes together with representatives of the prosecutor’s office as judicial investigators in criminal cases. Thus, in addition to the body of observation and denunciation, the gendarmerie also became the body of the judicial investigation of the most serious political crimes.

During these years, increased attention was paid to the qualitative composition of gendarmerie personnel, educational training, moral and business qualities. All departments were tested for professional compliance. Schools were established for the training of officers and noncommissioned officers, where, in addition to legal and general political sciences, advanced domestic and foreign experience in detective work was studied. Service in the gendarmerie enjoyed growing popularity among the youth of that time.

The work carried out to strengthen the bodies of political investigation made it possible by the mid-1970s to significantly strengthen the rule of law and order in the country, and to stop the activities of dangerous anti-government groups and communities. The largest search cases related to terrorism were the disclosure and suppression of the activities of secret communities under the leadership of N. Ishutin and S. Nechaev. And in total, according to the results of detective activity in the 1970s, 86 political trials were held [4].

3. Responding to terrorism at the end of the 1970s and 1980s of the nineteenth century

A serious test for the political search services was the populist period of revolutionary struggle, which began in the second half of the 1970s, when the boundaries of political confrontation expanded unprecedentedly and its most dangerous forms began to be widely used up to mass terror against statesmen, especially law enforcement officials. By this time, the terrorists had improved their tactics, adopted more effective equipment in the form of explosive devices, acquired the skills of deep conspiracy and began to master the methods of neutralizing sent agents.

Analyzing the new criminogenic situation, the composition and structure of crime, law enforcement agencies developed appropriate measures to counteract, prevent and suppress especially dangerous types of state crimes. In July 1878, by order of the emperor, a Special Conference was convened with the participation of the leaders of the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of the Interior, the III Branch and the Gendarme Corps to determine a strategy for combating state crime. The meeting supported the proposal of the chief manager of the III Division and the chief of the Gendarme Corps N.V. Mezentsov about the more effective use of secret agents in suppressing the activities of terrorist organizations and about the need to apply tougher measures to the speeches of opposition, extremist elements [5].

In 1878, an additional 400,000 rubles were allocated to strengthen the gendarmerie corps [6]. In detective work, the main emphasis was increasingly placed on the use of professional agents of internal and external surveillance, perusal of correspondence became widely practiced, detailed card indexes and forms were compiled for known state criminals with their photographs.

Provisional rules, adopted in early September 1878, gave the gendarmes the right to arrest citizens “for participating in street riots or gatherings of a political nature,” as well as “politically unreliable” persons. This made it possible to isolate and prevent the transition of many criminal elements to the commission of more serious state crimes. Cases against the most dangerous terrorists were recommended to be sent for consideration in military courts under the laws of war [7].

After the assassination attempt on the tsar by A. Solovyov (April 1879), the whole country was divided into six temporary governor-generals. Each of them was headed by the most authoritative governor-generals who were endowed with additional powers, especially to combat dangerous state crimes: to arrest and submit dubious persons to administrative exile, to send cases for consideration in military courts and approve their sentences, etc.

After the assassination of the head of the III Division and the chief of the Gendarme Corps, General N.V. Mezentsov (August 1878), an imperial decree “On the temporary subordination of cases of state crimes and certain crimes against officials to the jurisdiction of a military court established for wartime” was issued. The proceedings in the military courts were carried out according to an accelerated, simplified procedure.

Investigative activity on terrorism not only became more complicated from year to year, but also became more and more dangerous. The disclosure and detention of terrorists were increasingly accompanied by armed resistance, and law enforcement officers became the main targets of terrorist attacks. Nevertheless, powerful barriers of police countermeasures increasingly stood in the way of criminal forces, their activities were blocked and often promptly suppressed by preventive measures.

Much, for example, was done in this regard in the 1970s. At the same time, these years also revealed significant shortcomings, miscalculations and omissions in the formulation of a political investigation related to anti-terrorist activities. Outdated approaches to organizing the work of these services often had an effect, and in some places the necessary professionalism was lacking.

Part of the miscalculations and omissions of law enforcement agencies in the fight against terrorism in the late 1970s and early 1980s should be attributed to the relatively lighthearted attitude on the part of the governing bodies to the danger, the sociopolitical consequences of this type of state crime and the underestimation of the strength and potential capabilities of terrorist organizations. As a result, the number of victims of terrorist acts increased. Separate daring attempts were committed with impunity, the criminals often managed to escape, as happened in the cases of the murders of N.V. Mezentsov, adjutant of the Kiev gendarme department G.E. Geiking, Kharkov governor D.N. Kropotkin, with the explosion in the Winter Palace and some other cases.

The situation with the protection of Emperor Alexander II was clearly unsatisfactory, despite the additional measures taken after the assassination attempt by Karakozov and Solovyov. The assassination attempts of 1879 and 1880 showed that often only a happy coincidence saved him from death.

Bold and dangerous in conception and execution, the attacks testified not so much to the strength of the fans of the bomb and the revolver, but to the revealed weakness of law enforcement, its inconsistency with the changed situation. Based on strict centralization, weakly connected with local administrative bodies, having no reliable support in society, the high police system was unable to successfully fight in the new conditions with well-organized and carefully secretive groups and communities. Therefore, the government began to seriously reform it.

The most cardinal step in this direction was the abolition in August 1880 of the III Branch with the transfer of all protective functions, together with the Gendarme Corps, to the reorganized Ministry of the Interior, headed by Count M.T. Loris-Melikov. All management of political investigation, including those related to the fight against terrorism, was concentrated in the State Police Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which existed with some reorganizations until 1917.

The most experienced specialists of law enforcement agencies, who have proven themselves in gendarmerie-detective, forensic-investigative activities, were involved in the leadership of the Police Department and its subdivisions.

On the ground, along with the gendarmerie departments, new police formations, the search departments, began to actively engage in search activities for political crimes under the auspices of the Police Department. Local detective agencies were not only expanded numerically, but also significantly improved in terms of quality.

All this was not long in affecting the results of anti-terrorist activities. Particularly sensitive blows were dealt to the main terrorist organization—the party “People’s Will.” In November 1880, its leader, Alexander Mikhailov, was arrested, and 3 months later, his successor Andrei Zhelyabov. In January 1881, while crossing the border, Nikolai Morozov, a major terror theorist and participant in many terrorist attacks, was caught. By the spring of 1881, such active militants of Narodnaya Volya, members of its Executive Committee, as A. Barannikov, N. Kolodkevich, S. Shiryaev, A. Zundelevich, S. Ivanova, N. Bukh and S. Zlatopolsky were tracked down and arrested. The discovery and arrest (January 1881) of N. Kletochnikov, a terrorist agent who served in the Police Department, who disrupted the implementation of some operational plans of the detective agencies and protected many criminals from retribution, must be considered a major success of the investigation.

Unfortunately, the restructuring of the protective organs, its first tangible results, did not prevent such a grave state crime as the assassination of Emperor Alexander II. The roots of this crime must be sought in the miscalculations and omissions of the previous security agencies, which showed carelessness and liberalism in relation to inveterate state criminals. According to the gendarmerie general A.I. Spiridovich, “the protection of the sovereign was set criminally carelessly” [8].

The regicides and their accomplices were quickly caught and severely punished. Meanwhile, the government drew conclusions from the tragic events of March 1 about the need to further strengthen the police and detective services, and especially about strengthening the protection of the emperor and major statesmen. Moreover, the Police Department began to receive numerous reports about impending assassination attempts on the new Emperor Alexander III [9].

Strengthening the detective and punitive functions of state bodies was facilitated by the Regulations issued on August 14, 1881 on measures to protect state order and public peace.

With the coming to the leadership of D.A. Tolstoy, an additional post of Deputy Minister of the Interior was introduced, who directly carried out the general management of the State Police Department, the Gendarmes Corps, and also coordinated the activities of governors and mayors on the prevention and suppression of state crimes. Until 1887, this post was held by General P.V. Orzhevsky. The directors of the Police Department at that time were V.K. Plehve and P.N. Durnovo.

To develop measures to strengthen the protection of Tsar Alexander III, a temporary council was created under the leadership of the newly appointed St. Petersburg mayor, Major General N.M. Baranov. The protection of the king was strengthened by increasing the number of palace guards, which in 1881 was headed by Adjutant General P.A. Cherevin. The departure of the emperor for the coronation in Moscow was postponed for 2 years.

In the 1980s, there was a noticeable increase in the number of personnel of the Gendarme Corps and provincial gendarme departments. In the fight against dangerous state crimes, the role of governor-generals, governors and city governors became increasingly important. Since the 1980s, the leading role in political investigation has increasingly shifted to the departments for the protection of public order and tranquility, which have been successfully confronting political terrorism in St. Petersburg, Moscow and Warsaw, often extending their influence to the periphery. Their experience was approved in the Regulations on the organization of the secret police in the empire, published in December 1883. These regulations recommended, as necessary, to establish similar offices in other parts of the country [10].

In the early 1880s, the work of the St. Petersburg search department, headed by Colonel Georgy Porfirievich Sudeikin, who had previously proven himself well by serving in the Kiev Gendarmerie Department, had excellent results. Using well-chosen internal agents, the employees of the St. Petersburg detective managed to thwart a number of terrorist acts, isolate and neutralize many dangerous criminals. In 1882, Sudeikin was simultaneously appointed inspector of the secret police of the empire, heading the entire political search in the country.

A particularly major success of Sudeikin was the recruitment of an active Narodnaya Volya, the former staff captain Sergei Degaev, with the help of whom he intended to completely put an end to the main terrorist organization, Narodnaya Volya.

At the end of their criminal activities, the surviving militants of the Narodnaya Volya managed to deal with G.P. Sudeikin, whose name was quite reasonably associated with their tragic ending. He was brutally murdered in December 1883. It was a serious loss for the detectives.

As a result of detective and interrogation activities in the 1980s, 17 Narodnaya Volya trials were held, at which 74 death sentences were pronounced [11]. This, in fact, meant the complete defeat of Russia’s main terrorist organization.

However, the defeat of the Narodnaya Volya party did not mean the end of the Narodnaya Volya terror: in the 1980s and partly in the 1990s, terrorist groups and circles operated revived and re-created in various parts of the country, considering themselves followers of the First March. During 1882–1883, 78 people’s volunteer circles were opened throughout the country [12].

In view of the continuing threat of terrorist attacks against the most prominent statesmen, including Emperor Alexander III, his coronation in Moscow (May 1883) required the adoption of special security measures. The validity of the emergency measures taken to protect the emperor was confirmed when in 1887 in St. Petersburg the terrorist group of P. Shevyrev-A. Ulyanov, which was preparing regicide, was discovered and neutralized.

All this indicated that even after the liquidation of the main terrorist organization, the internal political situation in the country did not allow weakening the fight against the most dangerous types of state crime and required further strengthening of the relevant services. The gendarmerie departments and detective departments not only received additional replenishment of qualified, capable workers, but were also better equipped technically, more fully mastered the best domestic and foreign experience in detective work.

The basis of detective activity increasingly became work with secret agents within underground organizations and external surveillance. In the 1980s, there were more than 1000 agents of internal surveillance, of whom about 100 were in St. Petersburg [13].

In connection with the increasing use of various types of explosives in terrorist activities, the government issued a number of decrees on measures to tighten the procedure for storing, using and transporting explosives and components for their manufacture. In 1883, more stringent regulations were introduced for transporting explosives across the border [14].

By the end of the 1980s and in the 1990s, investigative departments became more and more active in the search for terrorism. The instruction of the Police Department dated May 23, 1887 significantly expanded the rights and powers of these departments and regulated their interaction with the gendarme departments [15].

At the turn of the century, the effective investigative activities of the Moscow Security Department were implemented under the leadership of talented political detectives N.S. Berdyaeva, A.S. Skandrakov and especially S.V. Zubatov, whom contemporaries called “the genius of the detective.” Gendarme General P.P. Zavarzin, a colleague and follower of Zubatov, wrote about him: “Zubatov was the first to set up a search in the empire on the model of Western Europe, introducing systematic registration, photography, conspiracy of internal agents, etc.” [16].

The system of interrogation of arrested revolutionaries introduced by Zubatov is characteristic. He never resorted to intimidation or coercion, but sought to convince his opponents of the fallacy of the chosen path, and thanks to his erudition, his polemical gift, he often succeeded: the revolutionaries who fell under his influence, having been released, broke with their terrorist past.

Zubatov’s activities unfolded in close contact and full mutual understanding with the then Moscow chief police chief, Major General D.F. Trepov.

In a short time, the Moscow Security Department, under the leadership of Zubatov and Trepov, became exemplary and carried out tasks of an all-Russian scale. Former head of the Special Section of the L.A. Police Department Rataev wrote: “The Moscow security department … in those days was considered a school of secret agents and surveillance” [17].

The Moscow security department under Zubatov and Mednikov uncovered a group of terrorists “Narodnoye Pravo” led by the Narodnaya Volya members M. Natanson and N. Tyutchev (1894), I. Rasputin’s group, which was preparing an assassination attempt on Tsar Nicholas II (1895), the heads of the Narodnaya Volya printing house in Petersburg (1896), hunted down groups of Narodnaya Volga people in the Volga region (1899), a group of Social Revolutionaries led by G. Gershuni was arrested in Minsk (1900), an attempt on the tsar was prevented in 1895, etc. In 1902, Minister V.K. Plehve appointed Zubatov head of the Special Section of the Police Department, subordinating to him all the security departments of the empire. Thus, the experience of the Moscow detective was transferred to other regions of the country.

The investigation and mass arrests of terrorists in Russia have led to an increase in their emigration to European countries. Their leading centers settled there, publishing activities were intensively developed, weapons and explosive devices were purchased and manufactured, and cadres of militants were trained. Many of the prominent Russian political émigrés carried out an active propaganda campaign abroad in defense of Russian terrorism.

Abroad, since the 1970s, quite a few Russian agents have been spying on the revolutionaries. However, due to the growth in the number and increased activity of Russian political emigrants, this work became more complicated from year to year.

In 1881, the Police Department established a permanent secret agency in Europe with centers in Paris and Geneva, and later in Berlin. For about 20 years, it was led by General P.I. Rachkovsky. A high-profile case was the defeat in November 1886 by a group of foreign agents under the leadership of Rachkovsky of a printing house in Geneva—the basis of the revolutionary activities of the Narodnaya Volya group abroad [18].

In 1890, Rachkovsky’s agent A. Gekkelman revealed to the French authorities a terrorist group of Russian emigrants who, in the vicinity of Paris, were improving explosive devices to assassinate the Russian emperor.

P.I. Rachkovsky had a serious influence on one of the leaders of the “Narodnaya Volya” Lev Tikhomirov, who was in exile, helped him break with the revolutionary environment, receive an imperial amnesty and return to Russia in 1889.

Quite often, the Police Department also received valuable information about the movements of émigré revolutionaries, their actions, plans and intentions through the channels of the Russian diplomatic services.

On the issues of detention and extradition of terrorists, the Russian government sought closer cooperation with foreign countries, although it did not always meet with the necessary understanding.

Thus, strengthening and improving detective activities, extending its influence not only to all major regions of the country, but also beyond its borders, the Police Department by the mid-1980s had practically liquidated the main terrorist organization—the People’s Will party. All the main activists of terror were arrested and punished.

4. Fighting mass terrorism at the beginning of the twentieth century

The experience gained in the fight against people’s will terrorism was used by law enforcement agencies at the beginning of the twentieth century in the confrontation with an even stronger and more insidious enemy—the Social Revolutionary (SR) terror, reinforced by the revolutionary terror of other political parties and organizations. This confrontation was complicated by the generally unfavorable political situation in the country, caused by the defeat in the Russo-Japanese war, and the growth of the mass opposition movement, which resulted in the first Russian revolution.

The current situation required the expansion of the scope of detective and investigative activities, greater professionalism and creative search for new approaches to its organization. A significant contribution to the improvement of this activity was made by the new Minister of Internal Affairs V.K. Plehve, who in 1902 replaced D.S. Sipyagin.

Convinced that “the strength of the revolutionary parties only reflects the weakness of the police,” V.K. Plehve directed his main energy to strengthening law enforcement agencies. Particular attention was paid to the formation and strengthening of search departments, both in the capital centers and on the periphery. Plehve sought to turn them into the main and most authoritative divisions of political investigation.

The Special Department of the Police Department, established in 1898, coordinated the activities of security departments and gendarmerie departments. Its first leader was a real state councilor, L.A. Rataev, who was replaced in 1902 by Colonel S.V. Zubatov. Along with the security departments, the role of the gendarmes also increased during the period under review.

Improving the structure of law enforcement agencies, the government sought the main thing—to increase their effectiveness, especially in the suppression of the most dangerous types of state crime. The mechanism of search activity to neutralize terrorism in the work of local police and gendarmerie bodies was built mainly in two forms: the identification and capture of the entire group or the arrest of its individual members for the gradual liquidation of the entire organization.

The expansion of the activities of the security departments, their close interaction with the gendarmerie departments, the arrival of young, enterprising workers in the detective service and the introduction into practice of advanced methods of detection made it possible at the very beginning of the new century not only to put an end to the remnants of the Narodnaya Volya terror, but also to deliver the first sensitive blows to the terrorism of the new waves. So, in Tomsk in 1901, the first Socialist-Revolutionary printing house was opened and party activists were arrested. In 1902, the head of the “Northern Union” of the Socialist-Revolutionaries A. Argunov was arrested in Yaroslavl. In Kiev, the security department under the leadership of Colonel A.I. Spiridovich managed to track down and neutralize the main SR terrorists, and by 1903 the main leaders of their Combat Organization (BO)—G. Gershuni, P. Kraft and M. Melnikov were arrested here. As a result, an agent of the Police Department, E. Azef, came to the leadership of the BO SRs.

Unfortunately, the successes achieved could not be consolidated and developed in subsequent years, and the rise of the revolutionary terrorism of 1905–1907 was met by law enforcement services that were largely weakened. Miscalculations and underestimation of the growing danger, inconsistency and softness of the highest power structures, and serious personnel losses have affected here. A particularly heavy loss was the tragic death of Minister V.K. Plehve.

Plehve’s successors as Minister of the Interior P.D. Svyatopolk-Mirsky and A.G. Bulygin, director of the Police Department A.A. Lopukhin and head of the Special Department of the Police Department N.A. Makarov turned out to be insufficiently firm and consistent leaders, unable to oppose anything serious to the growing wave of terror. The replacement in 1902 of Rachkovsky by Rataev noticeably weakened the activities of foreign agents. Serious damage to detective work was caused by the unreasonable removal from service in 1903 of S.V. Zubatov.

The general weakening of the political leadership in the country negatively affected the state of law enforcement agencies. By 1905, government policy was showing inconsistency, lack of system and dangerous complacency. The rulers clearly lacked statesmanship. And farsighted people with a subtle state instinct were not given a go.

The so-called “spring” of Svyatopolk-Mirsky cost the country dearly, costing a lot of blood and disasters. Appointed in 1905 by the St. Petersburg Governor-General, D.F. Trepov recognized the state of the capital’s security department as unsatisfactory. The instability of the internal political situation in the country, the well-known destabilization of law enforcement activity is also evidenced by the frequent change of heads of the Police Department. After the assassination of the Minister of Internal Affairs Plehve in July 1904, five directors of the Police Department were replaced until 1906 (A.A. Lopukhin, S.G. Kovalensky, N.P. Garin, E.I. Vuich, M.I. Trusevich) and several heads of the Special Section of the Department.

Since the first targets of the terrorists were police and gendarmerie officers of various ranks, their losses in this regard increased from year to year. According to the materials of the State Duma, only from October 1905 to April 1906 more than 670 employees of the system of the Ministry of Internal Affairs suffered (were killed or injured) at the hands of terrorists [19]. The security agencies not only lost valuable personnel, but in an atmosphere of escalated fear they often experienced difficulties in recruiting workers for the service.

A massive ideological attack on these bodies by all types of opposition also left a serious imprint. An opinion was instilled in society about the arbitrariness allegedly reigning here, sheer abuses, the use of unlawful methods of activity, etc. The opinion about the reprehensibility, the inhuman nature of this service took root in every possible way.

The situation was also complicated by the fact that the fighting parties were in unequal conditions in terms of moral and ethical principles and legal foundations. If the terrorists acted by any, often barbaric methods and methods, then law enforcement agencies worked, as a rule, within the strict limits of the law, using only permitted, civilized means. This was figuratively noted by the outstanding philosopher V.V. Rozanov: “Revolutionaries win by being frank. “I want to shoot in the belly” - and shoots … Before that, no one has the spirit. And they win … And the victory of the revolutionaries, or their 50-year success, is based on the fact that they are inhuman, and the “old system,” which, the “bastard,” they exterminate, remembers the “cross on itself” and does not dare strip off the image of man” [20].

In particular, the police services have never resorted to extrajudicial means of eliminating their opponents. For example, their work was seriously complicated by the ideologist of terrorism, publicist V. Burtsev, who repeatedly exposed secret agents. Nevertheless, the secret services treated him in civilized ways, allowed him to freely cross the border, distribute their publications and even entered into discussion correspondence with him. Burtsev’s closest assistant, former police officer M. Bakai, was treated liberally as well.

In April 1906, P.A. Stolypin, who took over the leadership of the Ministry of the Interior, with all his energy, was unable to quickly turn the tide, the wave of crime and terrorism grew for some time even under him. The friction that sometimes arose between the security departments and the gendarmerie departments, which were losing their former privileged monopoly position in the investigation, hindered effective work in terms of approaches to the search [21].

The enumerated shortcomings and mistakes, omissions and weaknesses in the activities of the security agencies came out most prominently against the backdrop of a growing revolutionary wave, especially such dangerous and disgusting manifestations of it as political terrorism.

Even before Stolypin came to the leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, significant changes were made in the personnel of law enforcement agencies. Moscow chief police chief D.F. Trepov was appointed in January 1905 as Governor-General of St. Petersburg, Lopukhin was replaced as director of the Police Department by S.G. Kovalensky and head of the St. Petersburg security department Ya.G. Sazonov was replaced by Colonel A.V. Gerasimov. To protect the emperor in 1905, the palace police was established, which was headed by an experienced detective worker, General A.I. Spiridovich.

Having entered high positions, first the Minister of the Interior, and then the Prime Minister, P.A. Stolypin began to take radical measures to improve the political situation in the country and, above all, to curb the rampant terrorism. The program was based on the strengthening of security departments, the elimination of duplication with gendarme departments, a differentiated approach to revolutionary parties, the wider introduction of modern means and methods of detective activity and the tightening of punitive measures against malicious criminals [22].

In the difficult fight against political terrorism, Stolypin relied both on experienced veterans of the detective service and on a new generation of capable workers. He put Maximilian Ivanovich (M.I.) Trusevich at the head of the Police Department, who became the author of a progressive system of political investigation that survived until 1917. When selecting employees, not their noble origin was taken into account to a greater extent, but their business and moral qualities, devotion to official duty and personal courage. Under Stolypin, the detective talent of the head of the St. Petersburg security department, Colonel A.V. Gerasimov, was fully developed. Stolypin showed particular concern for more effective moral and material incentives for law enforcement officers. More attention was paid to the professional training of political detectives. By 1907, the number of security departments increased to 27 [23]. In February 1907, the Regulations on Security Departments were issued, which determined the legal basis for their functioning, structure, scope and principles of activity. The Regulations spoke of the inadmissibility of interference in the affairs of these departments by other authorities, except for the Police Department. At the same time, the governors, gendarme departments and general criminal police were recommended to provide them with all possible assistance in carrying out the tasks of political investigation. It was especially emphasized that the main measure of the successful work of security departments “will always be not the number of liquidations they have carried out, but the number of prevented crimes …” [24]. The creation of a single registration department with a central information desk in the Police Department contributed to the increase in the efficiency of search activities. In the detective work of the period under review, internal and external surveillance were firmly established as the main methods of search. In 1907, the Police Department developed detailed instructions for organizing outdoor surveillance, in which it determined the basic requirements for the selection of persons for the spy service and formulated the main tasks and principles of their activities [25]. However, for all its importance, the spy service was of an auxiliary nature against the background of general intelligence and search activities. The leading role in the political investigation belonged to internal agents acting directly in underground organizations, aware of their goals and intentions, of the place and role of individuals in them. In the directives of the Police Department to the security agencies, the task of carefully selecting secret agents, their effective use, concern for protection and appropriate encouragement of their complex and dangerous service was persistently set. In 1907, a detailed Instruction on the organization and conduct of internal (intelligence) surveillance was developed. It formulated the basic principles of recruiting secret agents, organizing their work, guidance from security agencies, protection from “exposure,” etc. [26]. Secret agents expanded from year to year. Not so long ago, Gosudarstvennyy Arkhiv Rossiyskoy Federatsii (GARF) (State Archive of the Russian Federation) employees found that in 1880–1917 there were about 10,000 people [27, 28]. Police Department agents worked in almost all underground organizations. Many of them were not disclosed after October 1917. A number of researchers rank among police agents, for example, even Stalin [29], although, in our opinion, there are no reliable data for this. Colonel A.V. Gerasimov, head of the St. Petersburg security department, organized work with secret agents. Subsequently, he recalled: “My most important task was to establish well the apparatus of the so-called secret agents in the ranks of revolutionary organizations. Without such agents, leading the political police is the same as without eyes” [30]. The first major search case of A.V. Gerasimov against terrorists was the arrest in St. Petersburg in March 1905 of the main composition of the Fighting Organization of the Socialist-Revolutionaries [31]. Evno Azef, who in 1893 became a secret agent of the Police Department, proved to be an exceptional, truly legendary personality among Gerasimov’s secret collaborators. Azef worked in foreign agents, then in the Moscow and St. Petersburg security departments. At the same time, having gained confidence in the leadership of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, he became one of the leading persons in their Combat Organization.

Many of those who knew Azef well for terrorist activities highly appreciated his business, intellectual qualities. At the same time, there was not yet such an agent in the detective agencies of pre-revolutionary Russia, on whom such a stream of curses fell upon in the Socialist-Revolutionary, and then the Soviet press, so many labels would be hung. The main accusation was that he simultaneously served two opposing camps. Frustrating the plans of the terrorists, he at the same time contributed to a number of terrorist attacks: he provided weapons, finances and took part in the development of plans, although he personally did not participate in any of the assassination attempts. With such activity, he gained confidence among the Socialist-Revolutionary leadership, and after the arrest of Gershuni, he actually headed their Fighting Organization. Having become the most valuable employee of the detective agencies, Azef ensured the conduct of many major operations to neutralize terrorists. A.V. Gerasimov, under whom Azef ended his activity as an agent, wrote in his memoirs: “Azef turned out to be my best employee for a number of years. With his help, I managed to largely paralyze the activities of terrorists” [32].

Only in 1905–1908, with the help of Azef, such major terrorist attacks as assassination attempts on the Moscow Governor-General P.P. Durnovo, Nizhny Novgorod, Baku and Irkutsk governors, as well as two assassination attempts on Emperor Nicholas II took place.

The massive scope of the revolutionary movement and the growing role of internal agents in the fight against it also affected the change in the tactics of detective activity. Gerasimov later wrote about this: “My task was to protect, in certain cases, from arrests and preserve those centers of revolutionary parties, in order to keep the existing revolutionary center under careful and systematic control, not to lose sight of it, to keep it under a glass cap. – limited mainly to individual arrests. Here, in general terms, is the scheme for setting up a political search and organizing a central agent, which I carried out and which, for all its complexity and danger, had a positive significance in the fight against the renewed individual terror” [33].

Foreign agents demanded increased attention from the security agencies, because the number of Russian political emigrants increased from year to year. Only in European countries, according to the Police Department, at the beginning of the twentieth century. Their number reached 20,000 [34]. Many of them not only hid from retribution for their crimes, but also launched active revolutionary, including terrorist, activities.

The main center of foreign agents was still located in Paris. However, by the beginning of the twentieth century, its branches operated in a number of countries and large regions of Europe. In 1905–1909, the talented political detective Abram Harting successfully led all foreign agents. During the period of the first Russian revolution, the agents of Harting largely contributed to the disruption of the mass transportation of weapons and explosives for the militants to Russia.

In the fight against dangerous state crime, especially in the form of terrorism, contacts and cooperation with the governments and special services of European states continued and developed in the years under review. In March 1904, Russia signed agreements with Germany, Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Romania, Serbia, Sweden, Norway, Turkey and Bulgaria on a joint fight against anarchism, providing for the assistance of the authorities in the detention and extradition of criminals [35]. In 1907, an agreement was signed with Finland, according to which the detective authorities of Russia received the right to freely search for and arrest their political criminals on its territory. This agreement was of great importance for the fight against terrorism, because in Vyborg in 1907 there was the headquarters of the Central Committee of the Social Revolutionaries, and in the “Hotel of Tourists” (on Imatra)—the headquarters of their Combat Organization. However, the search and arrest of terrorists in Finland were still difficult due to the noticeable anti-Russian sentiments of a significant part of Finnish society.

Along with the strengthening of search activities, the government, given the difficult and dangerous situation in the country, has significantly tightened its punitive policy against especially dangerous criminals. Issued on August 19, 1906, the Law on the establishment of courts-martial in areas declared under martial law or in a state of emergency protection provided for the consideration of cases of malicious terrorists, robbers and pogromists in courts-martial according to a simplified procedure.

Explaining the essence of these measures at a meeting of the State Duma (March 1907), Stolypin said that when solving important state issues, the government “has to go between the bomb and the Browning. And where the argument is a bomb, there is, of course, a natural response - the mercilessness of punishment!”

Stolypin demanded the harshest punishments for attempts on the ranks of security agencies, who, as you know, were the first to be attacked by terrorists. During the years 1900–1910, for example, 33 governor-generals and governors, 16 town governors, police chiefs, prosecutors and heads of gendarmerie departments [36], not to mention a large mass of servants of a lower rank, were victims of assassination attempts.

A successful fight against terrorism would be impossible without the correct understanding and support of it in society. The government supported in every possible way those organs of the press and those publicists who objectively reflected the essence of this struggle and exposed the ideologists of terror who tried to pass off state criminals as national heroes and martyrs.

The decisive measures of the Stolypin government, together with the further improvement of the activities of detective services, support in society, made it possible by 1909 to bring down the wave of mass terror, arrest and bring to trial the most dangerous militants, and significantly improve the entire domestic political situation. There was a noticeable decline in SR terrorism: if in 1906 they committed 74 terrorist attacks, in 1907—1957, then in 1908—only three and in 1909—two terrorist attacks [37].

Following the Social Revolutionaries, the militants of other political parties and groups gradually stopped the terror. The improvement of the situation in the country was evidenced, in particular, by the active departures of the emperor, both to various regions of the country and abroad.

Against this background of the widespread fading of political terrorism and the stabilization of the domestic political situation, the assassination in September 1911 of the outstanding statesman P.A. Stolypin took place.

Investigating the murder of Stolypin on behalf of the emperor, Senator M.I. Trusevich, and then the Senate Commission under the leadership of N.Z. Shulgin noted that, despite the appropriate measures taken to protect distinguished guests in Kiev, those responsible for their safety made major miscalculations and omissions, which were the result of negligence and carelessness.

The tragic events in Kiev highlighted the general shortcomings of the security system, which were further exacerbated after the death of Stolypin: duplication and unhealthy rivalry between different types of police services, intrigues, nepotism and hostility between senior leaders, treason and direct cooperation of some of them with the criminal environment.

Personnel losses incurred in the fight against terrorism often turned out to be irreparable, not compensated by the influx of sufficiently trained, honest and energetic workers.

The work of the security agencies was complicated by the increased discrediting of their activities by the liberals of the revolutionary opposition, who, as a rule, resorted to its gross distortion and falsification. At the same time, a campaign in defense of the victims of government repression became widespread in society, sowing unhealthy sentiments of sympathy and even support for extremist, terrorist elements.

All this complicated and weakened the activities of security agencies in the fight against the most dangerous type of state crime—political terrorism. However, the noted shortcomings—weakness and miscalculations in the work of their services—do not give grounds for negating the positive that they have done in the name of a just cause—protecting the legitimate interests of the state and society.

In a difficult and uncompromising struggle, which cost considerable efforts and sacrifices, a large galaxy of faithful servants of the Fatherland of various ranks showed their energy, will, talent and high sense of duty. Their noble deeds are a worthy example for all employees of relevant services in modern conditions.

Thus, the historical experience of the struggle of the law enforcement agencies of pre-revolutionary Russia with political terrorism comes down, in our opinion, to the following main provisions.

As terrorism unfolded, the government rebuilt the system of political investigation in the direction of greater efficiency, flexibility, close interaction of its various links, timely and most complete information support. The transfer of senior management of detective and inquiring activities in the field of combating state crime to the III Department of the SEIVK, and then to the Police Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the establishment of security departments and the establishment of their interaction with gendarme departments, the expansion of the rights of governors and mayors ensured the successful performance of the assigned functions by law enforcement agencies at the relevant historical stages in anti-terrorist confrontation.

The decisive condition for the containment and suppression of terrorism was the careful selection, placement and renewal of employees of the relevant services, taking into account their educational and intellectual levels, professional suitability, moral qualities, ideological stamina and devotion to official duty. Constant attention to the improvement of the style and methods of detective work, the development of advanced domestic and foreign experience and the introduction of the latest means of political investigation are the most important components of success in this area.

During the period of mass deployment of terrorism, external and internal surveillance became the main methods of political investigation. The security and detective agencies tried to carefully select secret agents, especially internal surveillance, recruiting them mainly from members of a terrorist organization.

In connection with the increase in political emigrants among the terrorists, the Ministry of Internal Affairs established a permanent agency abroad, systematically replenishing it with the best agents of domestic special services and recruited foreign citizens. Along with the detection and suppression of terrorist plans, foreign agents did a lot of work to objectively inform the world community about the political situation in Russia and about the nature of the ongoing anti-terrorist struggle.

An indispensable condition for a successful anti-terrorist struggle was the formation of a correct attitude toward terrorism and the removal of the romantic veil from members of terrorist groups. An important role in this direction was played by publicistic speeches in the press, as well as religious sermons. At the same time, decisive measures were taken to suppress any form of terror propaganda.

Prompt, severe, but fair punishment for terrorism is the most important condition for its prevention and suppression. All historical experience shows that liberalism in this matter only stimulates its development. The use of the death penalty as a punishment for the most cynical crimes, especially in cases of recidivism, is a completely justified measure of retribution and punishment.

On the issues of preventing and overcoming political terrorism, the Russian government sought to strengthen and develop international cooperation: to conclude treaties and agreements on the detention and extradition of terrorists, meetings were held between representatives of special services to exchange experience in detective work.