Securing Cities in the Global War on Terrorism: The Case of Oslo

Abstract

In the global war on terrorism, cities worldwide have implemented a multiplicity of urban counterterrorism measures to protect buildings, public spaces, and citizens against terrorism. Since few previous studies have examined the historical development of urban counterterrorism measures in a concrete city, we examine the development of urban counterterrorism measures in Norway’s capital Oslo from 1993 to 2023. This chapter contributes with knowledge of the exogenous and endogenous factors that influence implementation of urban counterterrorism. Five different periods of urban counterterrorism are identified, which are associated with different potential targets and different forms of attack modus. During each period, new layers of urban security measures have been added while those already implemented persist. The conclusion is that there is a dissonance between the aims and realities of urban counterterrorism measures that impact the security and freedom of citizens. Future research should further investigate the impacts of urban counterterrorism on cities.

1. Introduction

Guaranteeing security from terrorism in cities has become a worldwide challenge, and securing cities and their citizens against terrorist attacks has become an essential part of the global war on terrorism. Over the last two decades, cities worldwide have implemented a multiplicity of security measures to protect buildings, urban public spaces, and citizens against terrorist attacks. Scholars have referred to this as “the insecure global city,” which refers to the local responses to the global threat of terrorism [1, 2, 3]. The urban security regime in cities worldwide is not without challenges. Urban counterterrorism measures are not just directed at potential terrorists. They impact citizens and thus, these counterterrorism measures have broader implications than counterterrorism measures that are directed towards potential terrorists because they affect not only possible terrorists but also the citizens and the cities themselves [4].

During the more than 20 years since the onset of the war on terrorism, the threat from terrorism and their modus operandi has comprised different potential terrorist groups and perpetrators using diverse forms of weapons when targeting cities. This causes a major problem for those responsible for securing cities; the threat of terrorism to a city is not static and consequently, counterterrorism measures must change accordingly. Several scholars have examined the relationship between the change in modus operandi and counterterrorism measures, and the effects that counterterrorism measures have on the city [see for example Refs. [2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8]]. Moreover, some researchers have studied how specific terrorist attacks lead to urban counterterrorism measures [1, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15]. These scholars demonstrate that there is a relationship between terrorist motivation, weapons, and target selection and that terrorist attacks often lead to counterterrorism measures, although this relationship is complicated. However, these studies focus on the character of terrorism or a specific event and not on how the terrorist attacks, the threat of terrorism, and associated counterterrorism measures have changed over time in a concrete city. In this book chapter, we want to fill this research gap by further expanding on this research through the prism of a concrete city, the Norwegian capital of Oslo. In this chapter, we examine the following:

• the development of urban counterterrorism from the 1990s to the present in Oslo

• factors that have influenced the policymaking of urban counterterrorism

• and finally, the dissonance between the aim and realities of urban counterterrorism measures.

The structure of the chapter is as follows. First, we elaborate on the theoretical foundation of urban counterterrorism measures. Second, we describe the Norwegian capital Oslo as our case and the data used in this book chapter. Third, we examine the development of urban counterterrorism from the 1990s to the present in Oslo, by analysing five periods of urban security measures in Oslo. Lastly, we discuss the dissonance between the aim and realities of urban counterterrorism measures that impact the security and freedom of the citizens.

2. Theorising urban counterterrorism measures

For decades, scholars and practitioners have defined and discussed the concept of terrorism and how the concept of terrorism by nature is a highly controversial concept and phenomenon [16]. By definition, terrorism is a form of political violence that focuses on politics, which by its very nature is about rivalling powers and morality [17, 18, 19]. Seen from this perspective, how society understands the phenomenon of terrorism, what concepts are used to talk about prevention, and what measures are considered legitimate vary over time and space. This means that a society’s perception of the phenomenon is not just dependent on an actual threat but, to a large degree, dependent on the perception of terrorism as a threat and the policy responses to it [20]. As such, counterterrorism measures are never neutral, they are always culturally, historically, and socially contingent.

Although the concept of terrorism has received massive scholarly attention, the same cannot be said about the term “counterterrorism” where conceptual work beside from a few exceptions [see for example Refs. [9, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27]] has been almost absent. Renard [25] claims that little research has been conducted on counterterrorism to determine its evolving contours and to better understand counterterrorism and the drivers behind these measures. According to Renard, counterterrorism measures should be seen as a form of public policy stemming from complex policy-making environments influenced by exogenous and endogenous factors. Exogenous factors are usually outside the realm of public policy actors such as an event, for example a terrorist attack or a threat. Endogenous factors are variables, such as ideas, interests, and institutions that consistently influence the information available to policymakers [28]. From this perspective, counterterrorism measures, in general, including urban counterterrorism measures, are influenced by several factors such as actual terrorist attacks and the perception of threats in addition to societal factors such as values, norms and beliefs, along with institutional factors such as formal and informal rules, routines, cultures, and resources.

The aim of this chapter is not specifically to investigate the public policy of counterterrorism but to examine the connection between urban counterterrorism measures in Oslo and the perception of modus operandi of those who are deemed potential terrorists, and the implication of such measures for the citizens and the city. In our analyses, we build on the understanding of counterterrorism as policy and decision-making, particularly the relevance of events (terrorist attacks and perceived threats) and discourses on terrorism. As illustrated in other studies, urban counterterrorism measures are often implemented as a reaction to a specific attack or a perceived threat [2, 3, 4, 8, 11, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35], but the variations of implemented urban security measures across countries also indicate the relevance of national or local values, beliefs and norms [27, 36].

Urban counterterrorism measures fall under the category of counterterrorism measures often referred to as “homeland security” [22, 24, 26]. The category of homeland security regards terrorism as a manageable threat that can be mitigated by enhancing society’s ability to withstand, delay, or respond to a terrorist threat. This is typically done through enhanced emergency preparedness, critical infrastructure protection, or securing high-profile targets and public places [22]. Homeland security measures build on “Situational crime prevention theory,” which is a preventive strategy attempting to reduce the opportunities or incentives to carry out crimes or terrorism by changing the physical environment, for example by making it more difficult to carry out terrorist attacks by utilising locks, fences, bollards, etc., or increasing the chance of being discovered by the police, security guards or ordinary people [37, 38, 39]. Situational crime prevention theories assume that crime is created by the opportunities that exist in the physical environment and how potential offenders perceive this environment. Consequently, criminals or terrorists are considered rational actors who will make a rational decision about whether to commit an offence determined by situational contingencies and constraints [7, 40, 41, 42]. The popularity of situational crime prevention theory is probably related to the inherent promises that terrorist attacks can be prevented, and that some measures can have immediate and measurable effects. Measures can be effective when the measures are in correspondence with a potential terrorist group’s target selection and when they align with the modus operandi in which they are designed to protect [43, 44]. For instance, securing a parliament with fences, bollards, and other access control measures might reduce the opportunities for terrorists to attack the specific parliament with bombs, vehicles and vehicle-borne explosives but will not protect the same building from drones, suicide bombers, firearms or knives.

Situational prevention measures also have significant limitations and side effects. Firstly, situational prevention measures cannot independently solve the problem of security in the city, since the measures are designed to prevent specific actions against specific targets, and do not affect terrorists’ general motivations. These measures will not necessarily cause perpetrators to refrain from other types of acts of terrorism against other targets [33, 43]. The displacement effect of target selection is one of the core criticisms against this type of prevention, although the extent of the displacement effect is disputed [40]. Critics claim that since target hardening makes it more difficult to attack some types of targets, terrorists will aim their attacks at less protected “soft” targets since terrorists have shown considerable creativity in reassessing targets and methods influenced by situational conditions [40, 41, 45]. Hemmingsby’s [45] analysis of militant Islamists’ choice of targets and methods shows that these perpetrators primarily direct the attacks at public spaces and public transport, while well-protected targets, such as public buildings, are avoided. Accordingly, this change is partly caused by the extensive security measures of public buildings [45].

Second, situational prevention measures always require troublesome trade-offs [11, 33]. They affect the physical landscape, including streets, squares, libraries, shopping malls and buildings, and they entail values discrepancies regarding aesthetics, legal and ethical issues, environmental considerations, safety, convenience, cost and social inclusion. To what extent these passive security measures benefit the aims of either openness or security is rarely evident because it is hard to prove the effectiveness of such measures [33]. If preventive counterterrorism measures in a city are effective, nothing happens, the city is safe and not the scene of a terrorist attack which makes it impossible to tell whether this is because of the security measures or whether there never exited a threat in the first place.

Lastly, such measures have been criticised for bearing unnecessary costs for a low probability event based on worst-scenario planning, and they change the urban landscape to a more hostile environment [2, 3, 13, 14, 29, 46, 47]. The limitations of the urban counterterrorism measures based on situational crime prevention theory illustrate the complexity of protecting a city from terrorism, and the aim of this chapter is to investigate how terrorist attacks and the perception of the modus operandi have entailed different layers of urban counterterrorism measures in the city of Oslo despite the shortcoming of such measures.

3. Case and data

Oslo is the capital of Norway. Since 2011 it has been the location of three terrorist attacks. The first attack took place in 2011 when Oslo experienced one of the largest right-wing terrorist attacks in the Western world. On 22 July 2011, Anders Bering Breivik parked a van in front of the main government building in Oslo, housing the Prime Minister’s office. A few minutes later, a 950-kilo fertiliser-based bomb exploded, causing massive material damage and immediately killing eight individuals. Later that day, 69 people, mainly adolescents, were executed on the Island of Utøya by the same perpetrator [48].

The second attack occurred on 10 August 2019 at the Al-Noor Islamic Centre Mosque in Bærum, about 20 kilometres west of Oslo. The perpetrator, Philip Manshaus, shot and killed his adopted stepsister at their home before he drove to the mosque and shot his way through the glass door before opening fire. He was subdued by three worshippers and turned over to the police and as a result, there were no casualties at the mosque [49].

The third terrorist attack in Oslo was a mass shooting in the city centre of Oslo on 25 June 2022. Two people were killed. The target is assumed to be the Oslo LGBTQ pride event. The Police arrested Zaniar Matapour, a Norwegian citizen from Iran. Police are treating the incident as an act of Islamist terrorism. According to the police, Matapour had been radicalised into Islamic extremism. However, he also had a history of violence and mental health issues [50].

The empirical data in this book chapter is based on are built on several empirical sources. The empirical data consists of media articles, official documents, research publications and interviews, including 10 interviews in 2018 with representatives from the municipality of Oslo, Oslo Police District and other stakeholders about urban counterterrorism measures in Oslo. One of the authors of this book chapter has previously engaged in several projects regarding the security of the Government Quarter [11, 51, 52] and the Norwegian understanding and conceptualisation of terrorism and counterterrorism [16, 20, 22, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57], which this book chapter is also based on. In the data analysis, we examined the development of urban counterterrorism from 9/11 to the present in Oslo. However, to understand how the event of 9/11 and the war on terrorism influenced urban counterterrorism, we also describe how terrorism and counterterrorism were perceived before this attack. The empirical data covers the period of 1993–2022. The data were analysed by looking for descriptions of the perceived dominated threat, which security measures the threat legitimated, and the description and argumentation behind the implementation of urban counterterrorism measures in Oslo. The analysis focused especially on how exogenous factors such as the terrorist attack on 11 September 2001 (9/11) and the three terrorist attacks in Oslo in 2011, 2019 and 2022 influenced urban security. The data analysis led to the identification of five periods of urban counterterrorism measures that entail different threats of terrorism, including different forms of modus operandi, which led to various urban security measures.

4. Analysis: five periods of urban counterterrorism measures in Oslo

We have identified five periods of urban counterterrorism measures in Oslo. For each of these periods, we first describe the perceived dominated threat at the time, which security measures the threat legitimates before we describe how this has affected urban counterterrorism measures in Oslo.

4.1 The pre 9/11 approach to urban counterterrorism: reluctance

9/11 was not the starting point for discussions on counterterrorism in Norway or other countries. To understand the impact of this event and the global war on terrorism has had on urban counterterrorism we start with a description of how terrorism and urban counterterrorism were perceived before 9/11.

Before 9/11, terrorism was primarily presented as a political problem in countries other than Norway. The terrorist threat against Norway was neither a topic in the media nor an issue that concerned authorities or scholars [22, 53]. Acts of terrorism were understood as a form of communicating political messages [20], and it was portrayed not as an extraordinary threat but more as an ordinary criminal activity that could be handled with dialogue, international cooperation and within the ordinary legal framework.

If terrorism was discussed as a threat to Norway, it was often related to big events where foreigners who could be a target for political assassination were present such as the extradition of the Nobel Peace Prize or foreign state visits. Counterarguments against why Norway would be considered a legitimate terrorist target existed in the media, in research and official documents in the 1990s; it was claimed that Norwegian society was geographically remote, homogeneous, inclusive and transparent: all factors that made Norway less of a probable target for terrorism [22, 53].

Before 9/11, urban counterterrorism measures in the city of Oslo were not an issue that the media, the public or civil servants were concerned with. There was almost no interest in protecting entire systems or sectors from terrorism, nor was the focus on specific objects in Oslo that could be a target of terrorism. Urban counterterrorism measures in this time period were primarily temporary and related to specific events aimed at protecting a potential target of political assassination such as bodyguarding, metal detectors, fences, bulletproof windows and surveillance of possible perpetrators [57]. It was rarely described what these measures were to the public since these measures were part of a classified regime. At the time, there was an underlying scepticism against counterterrorism measures in general. This scepticism is important to keep in mind to understand the effects of 9/11 and the following war on terrorism and its associated urban counterterrorism regime.

4.2 9/11–22/7: al Qaida and Islamic terrorism: international compliance

The 9/11 attack marked the start of the perception of a developing terrorist presence that could affect the security of cities as safe places. The assumption was that Norway would be vulnerable to terrorism if adequate counterterrorism measures were not implemented.

The attacks on 9/11 led to an enormous increase in attention to the topic of terrorism and counterterrorism measures in Norway, as in most countries worldwide. Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda had attacked the United States and this terrorist network was described as a threat against all democratic societies, including Norway. Consequently, Norwegian security was no longer related to specific characteristics of Norway and was now intertwined with the US and the West’s security. The media, research and Norwegian authorities now had a clear picture of potential perpetrators. The terrorism threat description was narrowed down to almost exclusively including Islamic terrorism, and it was the motivation, target selection and potential weapons from these perpetrators that were in focus.

Terrorists were described as religious extremists and the focus was on mass-causality terrorism either as turning aircraft into weapons like the scenario in the US on 9/11, or suicide bombers like the attacks in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005. There was also an international concern that Al Qaida was attempting to obtain weapons of mass destruction such as biological or nuclear weapons. However, the official authorities mostly described the risk level of terrorism in Norway as low in the first years after 9/11, and some questioned whether Norwegian targets really were potential targets for Islamic terrorists. Key objects deemed to be terrorist targets were primarily oil and gas installations, governmental buildings, foreign embassies in Norway and aviation and shipping.

9/11 led to a change in the aviation and harbour security regimes internationally and in Norway. It is undoubtedly this security regime that led to the most drastic change in the urban landscape in Oslo after 9/11. Since the airport in Oslo is located outside the city centre, the aviation security regime implemented in the aftermath of 9/11 did not have any direct consequences for the urban landscape of Oslo. However, Oslo is a city located at the sea with multiple harbours and ports in central Oslo. In the years following 9/11, Oslo implemented the international ISPS code which closed off areas to the public to protect cruise traffic and other vessels from terrorism which drastically changed the urban landscape of the seaside of Oslo. Measures that were implemented were security checks of people and goods, fences and surveillance. The argument behind these measures was not necessarily a heightened threat to Norwegian security, but that Norway needed to comply with international regulations because the terrorism threat had become international.

The American embassy was regarded as a potential terrorist target because 9/11 and other worldwide terrorist attacks against American targets had demonstrated that terrorists were willing and able to attack American targets abroad. The embassy’s central location in downtown Oslo caused extensive debates about its heavy perimeter and security regime that was implemented after 9/11 and whether central downtown Oslo was the optimal location for such a high-profile terrorist target. Consequently, it was primarily American or foreign targets and high-profile terrorist targets that were considered potential terrorist targets in the first years following 9/11. At the time, foreign targets were deemed more likely targets than Norwegian ones.

Before 9/11, terrorist attacks in other European countries never prompted discussions on whether Norway had the necessary security. This changed with the subsequent terrorist attacks against mass transportation systems in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005 carried out by Al Qaida affiliated groups. These events triggered concerns as to whether Norway had the necessary means to deal with similar attacks against the mass transportation system. Moreover, the anthrax attacks in the USA led to the Norwegian authorities’ purchase of protection and cleaning equipment to deal with chemical weapons. This also caused a swing in the media’s focus on the possibility of terrorists using CBRN weapons. There was a general expectation that Norway should have the necessary emergency resources to handle a terrorist attack, including attacks using weapons of mass destruction which was also discussed in relation to the security of public transportation in Oslo. Moreover, the focus was predominantly on emergency preparedness, surveillance and detection systems.

The urban counterterrorism measures implemented in Oslo in the decade following 9/11 were primarily related to compliance with international regulations such as within aviation and harbour security or threats to foreign targets, such as the American embassy [55]. Undoubtedly, urban counterterrorism measures were disputed at the time generating massive debates in the media on whether these measures were necessary in a low-risk city as Oslo. These debates and the scepticism as to whether Norwegian targets were potential terrorist targets existed until the terrorist attack in 2011, and few other objects or public spaces were protected with visible physical security measures, even though some objects or public spaces were recognised as possible targets for terrorism. For example, the Government Quarter was mentioned as a possible target in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Two months after 9/11, security personnel in the Government Quarter started the process of evaluating the security measures and emergency plans for the area because they considered the current security regime unsatisfactory and outdated [48]. Despite this assessment by the security professionals working in the Government Quarter, these measures had yet to be implemented when the terrorist attack took place on 22 July 2011. Except for the closing of the public streets, these discussions were primarily kept within the security community and did not reach the public before 22 July 2011.

The closing of the streets outside the prime minister’s office followed ordinary procedures for regulation and led to media debates around the necessity of closing the streets because of a potential terrorist threat. The newspaper Aftenposten, which had its main office in the Norwegian Government Quarter, wrote in 2007 that:

Closing the street (Grubbegata) because of a terrorist threat is both hysterical and hypothetical and a mindset we should be spared from [58].

This quote illustrates that, although terrorism was considered a potential threat, for many people in Norway, the idea that terrorism could happen in Norway attacking a Norwegian target was still distant. Urban counterterrorism measures were a controversial and disputed topic, framed within the dichotomous value dilemma of freedom versus security, where freedom was frequently considered more important than security.

4.3 22/7 – ISIL; islamic and right-wing terrorism: protection of government and ministries

Breivik’s twin attack remains the deadliest far-right terrorist attack in the Western world since the Oklahoma City Bombing in 1995. As such, the 22 July 2011 terrorist attack on Utøya triggered massive media coverage and was a shock to Norway. In stark contrast to the Islamic-inspired terrorist attacks of 9/11, Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005, which linked local terrorist attacks to international terrorism and its political motivations on a global scale, the Norwegian media portrayed the incident as a sole event conducted by a single perpetrator which meant that the event primarily was analysed on the individual level and not on a political, societal or international level [59]. The official threat assessments were no longer exclusively focused on Islamic terrorism. They now also described right-wing terrorism as a threat [59]. The modus operandi in focus was the car bomb and the shooting that had taken place during the 22/7 attack and how Norway could avoid this attack from happening again.

The attack on Utøya and the Government Quarter triggered massive discussions about whether the attack could have been prevented, and a commission was appointed to investigate this matter. In 2012, this commission [48] concluded that the attack could have been avoided, among other things through the permanent closing of the streets close to the prime minister’s office to traffic, the integration of bollards, etc. Underpinning the conclusion of this commission was a strong belief that physical security measures could have prevented the attack, not considering that physical security measures could have led to a displacement effect. According to the commission, if preparedness plans developed in the years after 9/11 had been implemented, they would have been enough to thwart the attack [48].

The 22 July attack had proved that Norway could also be a target for terrorists. However, despite the acknowledgement that terrorism could happen in Norway and that there was a necessity for some sort of homeland security regime, urban security measures in the Government Quarter were still a disputed topic. Since the bomb attack, the Government Quarter reconstruction process and its security regime have been the target of massive and continuous criticism from many different actors. This criticism has been directed at the demolition of buildings, the architectural features, the costs and the decision to gather all ministries except the Ministry of Defence in one location and of the perimeter around the Government Quarter.

Despite continuous reluctance to urban counterterrorism measures, there is no doubt that the 22 July attack drastically changed the urban landscape of Oslo. In the direct aftermath of the attack, several of the ministries had to move their location elsewhere in Oslo because their offices had been destroyed in the blast. These ministries were secured by physical security measures, first protected by temporary little aesthetic measures, and then later replaced with more decorative security measures at different locations in Oslo. Moreover, numerous temporary physical security measures were placed in and around the Government Quarter immediately after the bomb. The decision made by the Stoltenberg Government in 2012 to rebuild the Government Quarter in the dense city centre with a necessary level of security also meant that physical security would be a permanent feature of the Government Quarter and the city of Oslo. Located in the middle of the dense city centre of Oslo, the Government Quarter consists of multiple buildings, hosting ministries, the prime minister’s office, local businesses, media houses, the supreme court, political parties, and two churches. It is also a part of the city centre through which ordinary traffic and people pass. Subsequently, the implementation of urban security measures at this location affected not only people working in the government and ministries but also the public and those whose jobs were located within the Norwegian Government Quarter. In 2018, it was estimated that the 75-metre standoff security distance from the buildings in the Government Quarter would have consequences for 340 private businesses, with 5500 employees located within the perimeter of the security zone of the Government Quarter. The security zone in and around the Government Quarter consists of multiple layers of security measures, such as surveillance cameras, bollards, control stations, security guards and probably artificial intelligence such as car sign recognition technology [51]. All measures are reactive measures aimed at preventing a similar attack from happening again.

For those who claimed that these urban counterterrorism measures constituted a hostile environment and a surveillance regime, these arguments were met by the authorities and security personnel as an old-fashioned view of urban security. In Norway, integrated security measures have broad support among architects, security consultants and public actors [60]. The idea was that by redesigning counterterrorism measures into practical or artistic features. These measures would not be perceived by the public as counterterrorism measures [61]. Consequently, urban security measures could be multifunctional and provide added value to the urban landscape. This idea is exemplified by a municipal employee who not only described urban counterterrorism measures as aesthetic but as serving a multifunctional purpose:

We aim to use proactive measures that also have other types of functions built into them. To the extent that we are going to set up security measures, it should not be just a security measure. There will be a bench, there will be a large granite-type flower box in which you can plant trees, there will be a type of standing table.

This approach to counterterrorism is an attempt to converge hard counterterrorism measures into softer and public acceptable measures. The multifunction of the measures hides the fact that they are counterterrorism measures, which illustrates that there remains scepticism about the homeland security approach in Norway, even for a government quarter that has been the scene of a devastating terrorist attack. Consequently, the dichotomous value challenge of freedom versus security that has been strong in the Norwegian public media debate is still present.

In the time after 2011, counterterrorism went from being a centralised responsibility to a local activity where municipalities and private companies played a crucial part. Both national, municipal and private owners were now concerned with securing their own buildings based on risk assessment. This caused an enormous focus on risk assessment tools and an increase in local actors’ responsibility to implement local protective measures [16, 62, 63]. This led to several uncoordinated security measures around different buildings and streets in Oslo. This tendency was further increased during the next period of the ISIL threat.

4.4 ISIL: protecting of crowded locations

With the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the threat of terrorist attacks significantly increased, new threats emerged and some specific types of modus operandi intensified [45, 64].

ISIL announced its caliphate in June 2014 and formally ended the caliphate’s claim to any territory in 2019. ISIL’s threat to the West was different than the threat posed by al-Qaida. While al-Qaida committed much of its resources to the global war on terrorism and to organise major operations in the West, ISIL’s main ambition was to establish a caliphate in Iraq and the Levant. ISIL called for sympathiser attacks triggering so-called “individual jihad” operations by unaffiliated sympathisers in the West [65]. Sympathiser attacks belonged to the lower end of the spectrum of organisational involvement where the attacker expressed ideological support for the group, leaving the target selection and the modus operandi to those in the front line. The consequence for the West was an extensive increase in terrorist attacks committed by sympathisers selecting a variety of targets by using different modus operandi. The attacks were primarily directed against soft targets and crowded places [45]. Explosives and firearms were used in mass casualties attacks targeting public transport, nightlife, concerts and media houses among others in Paris in 2015 and Brussels in 2016. Moreover, the terrorist attacks in Nice, Barcelona, London, München and Stockholm in 2016 and 2017 proved the lethal potential of large vehicles assaulting pedestrians [45]. The use of simple weapons such as vehicles or knives required little preparation. The broad selection and adjustment of targets in addition to the variations of modus operandi challenged urban security strategies. The extensive variety of modus operandi and target selection created an almost infinite need for protection in the city, at least in crowded places.

This wave of ISIL-supported terrorist attacks in Europe, especially the modus operandi of using vehicles to overrun pedestrians and the use of firearms towards crowded places, also triggered the question of new counterterrorism measures in Oslo. Urban counterterrorism measures were implemented in crowded streets and places in the form of physical barriers, aiming to prevent the use of vehicle attacks. Oslo Municipality, as owner of the streets in the city, deployed physical barriers at the main shopping street, Karl Johans gate. The municipality first implemented concrete pipes as temporary barriers, which were replaced by flower pots some months later. In addition, some shopping malls also deployed physical barriers outside their entrances.

In addition to the physical barriers, an important measure to encounter the modus operandi from ISIL was to strengthen the police’s emergency response by arming the police. In Norway, the police are generally unarmed, but the Ministry of Justice can approve temporary arming in exceptional cases. The threat from ISIL sympathisers was deemed exceptional, and the Ministry repeatedly approved temporary arming of the police. Arming the police was argued as a measure to strengthen the police response capability, particularly against low-tech attacks with firearms and bladed weapons independently of the location in the city.

In contrast to previous, events that were considered high risk were protected by extensive security measures, often with a combination of physical security efforts and strengthened police emergency response. The most visible example was the Norwegian National Day children’s parade in Oslo, usually attended by around 30,000 pupils. Due to the threat posed by ISIL, the 2017 parade was for the first time heavily protected by security measures. Streets were blocked by physical barriers, mainly buses or police vehicles, and by a high number of armed police officers. From being a children’s parade with limited visible security measures, the parade was now heavily protected by armed police, police vehicles, trucks and buses.

The implementation of these extensive security measures illustrated an increased acceptance of urban counterterrorism measures during the ISIL period. However, the debate for each of these measures demonstrated that the legacy of the Norwegian reluctance to urban counterterrorism was still vibrant. Although the police were more frequently temporarily armed, the Norwegian police were still generally unarmed. Oslo municipality deployed the physical barriers at the main shopping street as late as November 2018. This was more than a year after the attack in Barcelona, Stockholm and London, and more than 2 years after the attacks in Berlin and Nice. It was first in 2018, Oslo Municipality established a working group of employees from several municipal agencies to assess counterterrorism measures in Oslo city. Interviews with these employees demonstrate the perceived reluctance of the Norwegian population against counterterrorism measures:

The danger is that we get far too many measures. If we implement bollards all over the city, granite blocks, more guards and police in the cities, and the police are armed at all times. We get ICCT surveillance and someone who constantly monitors video screens. Is that the kind of society we actually want? I don’t think we want that.

The statement of this municipal employee represents an extensive opinion among those interviewed employees in the municipality and in the police, which was aligned with the criticism in the public debate. The employees’ scepticism was also related to the uncertainty of the actual effectiveness of the measures:

When we start talking about permanent security of the entire urban area, how extensive should this be? Yes, we secure Karl Johans gate, but what about adjacent streets that are almost the same size? Are you then moving the risk elsewhere? This is terribly difficult. […] In addition, there is the dilemma that the threats are constantly changing. Now, the threats are big white vans and trucks. A few years ago, there were men with machetes and knives. Next time it’s drone attacks we must protect ourselves against, or it’s white powder, or something chemical or something biological (Employee at Oslo Municipality).

The displacement effect of measures and the continuous change of type of targets and modus operandi caused doubt among employees about the effect of the security measures, and whether such security measures could be legitimised. This reduced the willingness to implement physical measures although the threat was significant. Moreover, municipal employees emphasised the limited knowledge on whether physical barriers in cities increased or decreased citizens feeling of safety [31, 33, 66, 67]. Additionally, they experienced limited knowledge regarding the effects of urban counterterrorism which reduced the legitimacy of the measures. The municipalities’ strategy was to seek closer partnership with the police, aiming for the police’s support for their decisions on implementing security measures [42]. Finally, securing streets and public areas entailed obstacles for various demands in Oslo, for instance, the need to deliver goods to shops, bars and restaurants, as well as the rescue vehicles’ requirements of access to streets and areas. These practical challenges of implementing physical measures limited the implementation of urban counterterrorism measures.

The comprehensive and diverse threat posed by ISIL resulted in new layers of invasive security measures in Oslo city. The arming of the police, the physical barriers at shopping streets and in front of shopping malls, as well as the extensive security protection of vulnerable events, were each one a considerable new security measure, and together a substantial extension of invasive counterterrorism measures in Oslo city. This illustrated at least a manifestation of the increased acceptance of urban counterterrorism measures in Oslo after 22/7. Conversely, the maintenance of the police as generally unarmed, and the slow and limited deployment of physical security barriers in the streets of Oslo illustrated the persistent reluctance to urban counterterrorism measures.

4.5 The Bærum mosque attack and the pride shooting; further strengthening of implemented measures

With the fall of ISIL, the number of terrorist attacks and the threat to the West was reduced [64]. The dissolvent of ISIL’s “caliphate” had a strong symbolic power and limited the terrorist organisation’s appeal, which also reduced the organisation’s influence on sympathisers in Europe. However, the number of right-wing terrorist attacks in the West increased in 2018, and in the national threat assessment from 2020, the Police Security Serviced assessed the terrorist threat posed by extreme Islamists and right-wing extremism as equal describing potential weapons for both groups as vehicles, firearms, and simple improvised explosives [68]. Despite the use of similar weapons, the potential targets were different. Accordingly, extreme Islamists could attack ideological opponents or individuals insulting Islam, uniformed police or military personnel, or crowded places. Right-wing terrorist attacks could be directed at Muslims or non-Western immigrants, dignitaries, politicians, Jews or the LGBTQ+ community. This complexity of potential target selection and modus operandi posed a significant challenge to urban security which was confirmed in the two terrorist attacks in Oslo.

In August 2019, a 21-year-old Norwegian right-wing extremist shot and killed his adopted stepsister at their home before he attacked a local mosque in Bærum, a suburb of Oslo. In June 2022, a 40-year-old Norwegian-Iranian extreme Islamist conducted a mass shooting directed at the bars of LGBTQ+ communities at the Pride festival. In both cases, the perpetrators were assaulted by civilians. The public debate as well as the appointed evaluation commissions in the aftermath of the attacks focused on the police’s inability to prevent the attacks by discovering the radicalised perpetrators beforehand and whether the emergency response had been adequate. Security measures were also debated afterwards, and some mosques implemented fences, surveillance and other security measures. The LGBTQ+ community wanted physical barriers to prevent vehicles from driving in the street where the attacked LGBTQ bars were located, but due to public transport, the tram rails passing the street, the need for delivery of goods to bars and shops, and emergency vehicles need to drive through the street, physical barriers were not considered feasible. The municipality has only traffic signs forbidding driving in the street [69, 70]. This illustrates the usual practice of securing the target of the previous attack, as well as the challenges of the practicalities of urban counterterrorism.

In the post-ISIL period, Oslo municipality and the established working group continued assessing the dominating modus operandi from the ISIL-period; vehicles overrunning pedestrians. Although some crowded streets or places were identified as vulnerable, the reduction of the threat posed by ISIL and the uncertainties of the effects of physical barriers prevented the deployment of several physical barriers to protect specific streets or urban places in the city. In this period, few new counterterrorism measures were installed in Oslo, except the securing of the Royal Castle with bollards which was finished in 2023, and the ongoing reconstruction of the Government Quarter which still causes debates regarding the current and future security regime.

5. Discussion

Over the last two decades, the city of Oslo has implemented a multiplicity of urban counterterrorism measures to protect buildings, public spaces, and citizens against potential terrorist attacks. The analysis shows that the five identified periods of urban counterterrorism are associated with various dominant terrorism threats, different potential targets, and diverse forms of attack modus in addition to an increased acceptance of urban counterterrorism measures. Each period has led to different types of urban counterterrorism measures, and in total increased the number of locations protected against terrorism. The first period up to 9/11 was dominated by the reluctance to urban counterterrorism measures. The second period after 9/11 was characterised by the protection of foreign and international regulated sectors. In the third period after 22/7, the focus was on protecting ministries and the Government Quarter. The fourth period was dominated by the terrorism threat of ISIL which led to the protection of urban crowded places and the strengthening of the emergency response, and the fifth period reinforced these ongoing trends. While the threat has changed and evolved, new layers of urban security measures have been added while those already implemented endure. This means that an increased number of locations in Oslo have become the site of urban counterterrorism measures.

The analysis clearly illustrates that urban counterterrorism measures are initiated and implemented reactively after terrorist attacks in Norway or other countries relevant to Norwegian security to protect the targets of the previous attack, or when the terrorist threat is perceived as extraordinary and the measures are a direct response to a specific threat, that is the use of vehicles overrunning pedestrians. This demonstrates that exogenous factors, factors usually outside the realm of public policy actors such as an event, are important aspects for when to implement urban counterterrorism measures. However, as highlighted by Renard [28] complex policy-making environments are influenced not only by exogenous factors but also by endogenous factors. The case of Oslo illustrates how endogenous factors such as a country’s history, traditions and values are important for urban counterterrorism policy. This is clearly visible in the scepticism to urban counterterrorism that has been present in all time periods, even for the urban counterterrorism measures that were implemented in the Norwegian Government Quarter after the attack in 2011. Despite the massive implementation of urban measures, civil servants and security experts emphasised the uncertainty of the effectiveness of the security measures. They argued that the risk-reducing effects of the measures were low and only protected the city of Oslo from terrorism to a specific target and a specific modus operandi. Moreover, they were also concerned about the other negative side-effects of such measures, for example how they limited the citizens’ freedom to use the city, increased the polarisation between citizen groups and could lead to fear or a hostile environment. The acknowledgement of the limitation of the implemented security measures was also evident in the public discourse. The reluctance to security measures was also visible in the ongoing debate of arming the police, in which the police, are still only temporarily armed on extraordinary occasions.

The implementation of a multiplicity of urban counterterrorism measures in the city of Oslo over the last decades indicates an increased recognition of the necessity for urban counterterrorism measures. However, many of the measures were implemented late. This shows that the historical reluctance to urban counterterrorism measures still is present and that the Norwegian traditions and values to such security measures are still dominated by a caution against implementing physical security measures in the urban landscape.

Moreover, the case of Oslo illustrates a dissonance between goal and reality in urban counterterrorism. Endogenous factors such as ideas and interests do not only influence whether security measures should be implemented or not, but also institutions’ preferences on how to implement urban counterterrorism measures. In Oslo, the continuous reluctance to implement urban counterterrorism measures seems to have derived some specific preferences on how to implement such measures if they should be used. As previously described, it is an aim to use integrated security measures. By using benches, trees, water mirrors and hilly terrains, counterterrorism measures are redesigned into practical or artistic features. Instead of being perceived by the public as counterterrorism measures, these measures thus become a positive element in the urban landscape [61]. The integrated security approach is included in the international strategy of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) [39] and is not unique to Oslo. However, as previously described many actors in Oslo emphasised that the physical measures should have an added value to the urban landscape by being multifunctional. The ambition is for the security measures to make a positive contribution to the urban environment beyond increasing safety, for example an esthetical bench or water mirror. This principle of using integrated security design is included in Oslo Municipality’s guide to safeguarding streets and places in the city “Oslo Center - Street Use and Ground Protection” (2014). These principles are linked to the municipalities’ overall ambitions to create a pleasant and inviting vibrant city that people want to use.

The third goal is to use a holistic approach, which is explained by municipal security personnel as:

With a holistic approach, I mean that we have done some work and evaluated several different threats and assessed security in a larger area and not just an object or street. We have looked at several possible measures.

A holistic approach consists of three elements: assessing various types of threats, assessing the security of larger areas of the city and not just one street or object, and assessing the use of alternative measures. A holistic approach includes assessing various types of terrorist threats in a larger area of the city consisting of different protected streets, places, and buildings in the city. Integrated security measures are an essential part of this holistic approach. The holistic approach has the ambition of maximising the preventive effect of the implemented measures and reducing the potential negative side-effects of the security measures.

Although the actors have three goals for the implementation of urban counterterrorism measures, holistic approach, integrated security measures, and added value, the case of Oslo clearly illustrates the numerous challenges to achieve these objectives. Integrated security measures and added value require in many cases long-term spatial planning. The possibilities for designing integrated security measures with added values are strengthened by already assessing the security needs in the planning and design of urban spaces. However, in many cases, long-term spatial planning is often difficult due to the already existence of buildings and urban spaces. Also, as our analysis has illustrated, there already exist several urban counterterrorism measures in Oslo that have been implemented in accordance with previous periods of counterterrorism. Thus, there is no possibility to start from the beginning in a holistic planning process. Moreover, integrated security measures require a combination of knowledge about security measures and urban planning, which is limited in most municipalities in Norway.

A holistic approach with the use of integrated security measures also requires far greater holistic thinking and cooperation between various national, municipal and private actors than what has been seen to date. An important factor is the main principle within urban counterterrorism that the owner of the object or a function is responsible for their own security measures [71]. The city consists of fragmented ownership relationships, and there are different regulations for various objects. The ISPS code regulates port and maritime security. The Security Act regulates functions that are defined as national security interests or basic national functions [72]. The Planning and Building Act [73] regulates all other non-critical objects. For this type of object, it is the municipality, through its role as planning authority, which decides whether object owners can implement physical security measures. This means that there is no single regulatory authority with the mandate and permission to coordinate the implementation of security measures in the city. In Oslo, the reality is that national, municipal and private owners have been concerned with securing their own buildings or spaces based on separated and limited budgets. The city’s fragmented ownership and responsibility, different regulations and separate and limited budgets have led to a lack of holistic thinking about urban counterterrorism. This explains some of the dissonance between ambitions and realities in urban counterterrorism and that urban counterterrorism measures have been implemented despite the reluctance of many actors.

The consequences of this are several clusters of counterterrorism measures that mainly secure individual objects but to a lesser extent the city and its citizens. In Oslo, this is visualised by how certain objects such as the castle, the parliament and the main shopping street, are secured by physical measures, instead of securing larger parts of the city. The effect of such individual security measures is presumably more limited. In addition, there is a danger that several less integrated individual measures will lead to limitations in citizens’ accessibility to urban spaces and a weakening of the citizens’ perceived security. In the long term, it may reduce the democratic function of public space as an arena for social representation and cohesion.

6. Conclusion

Securing cities and their citizens against terrorist attacks is an essential element in the global war on terrorism. Over the last two decades, the city of Oslo has implemented an array of security measures to protect buildings, urban public spaces and citizens against possible terrorist attacks. There is a clear connection between the perceived changes in modus operandi of terrorism and the implementation of urban counterterrorism. Our analysis has demonstrated that implementation of urban counterterrorism measures is influenced by both exogenous factors such as terrorism threats and attacks and endogenous factors such as culture, values and historical discourses. 9/11 had a great impact on urban security measures in Norway. However, other events and threats regarded as relevant to Norwegian security have also had major impacts on the implementation of urban counterterrorism measures in Oslo.

Urban security measures have gone from being something that was almost absent before 9/11, to the protection of foreign and internationally regulated sectors after 9/11 and the threat of Islamic terrorism, to protect local objects, ministries and the Government Quarter after 22/7, and to secure urban crowded placed after other European and neighbouring countries had been attacked by ISIL. The analysis clearly illustrates that urban counterterrorism measures are reactively initiated and implemented after terrorist attacks deemed relevant to Norwegian security. The perception of the threat and the associated modus operandi have paved the way for different layers of urban counterterrorism measures that are not being removed when new urban security measures are added. Consequently, an increased number of locations have become the site of protective measures. The conclusion of this study is that there is a dissonance between the aim and realities of urban counterterrorism measures that influence the security and freedom of citizens. Future research should investigate the impacts of urban counterterrorism in other cities to assess the impact of exogenous and endogenous factors behind the implementation of urban counterterrorism.