Conflict of Interest and Think Tanks What are the Possible Challenges and Impact

Abstract

Conflicts of interest (COIs) have always existed in scientific research, but they were not widely recognised until the 1980s, when the relationship between private businesses and academic institutions became more intense, partly as a result, of legislative changes that promote technology transfer from the public to the private sector and as a result of innovation and growth in the fields of biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, computers, and other important technologies. Although most commentaries and guidelines concerning COIs in science focus on research sponsored by private companies, COIs can also arise in other contexts, for example in Think Tanks. Clifton and Freeman report that think tanks produce valuable research reports, opinion piece, and expert commentary, however, their work can be compromised by funders, lack of transparency, and COIs. This chapter will analyse and unpack COIs that may arise in a biotechnology based think tank and their possible impact on the public.

1. Introduction

Since transitioning into democracy in 1994, South Africa (SA) continues to experience major setbacks in the area of enduring racism, poverty and inequality. Although citizens have used a variety of coping mechanisms over years, racial hostility and widespread destitution still pervade. In the end, how political leaders contain, avert and manage these failures will determine whether any regime can overcome these difficulties [1, 2]. For this reason and in pursuit of these objects, as Nkrumah puts it, the supportive role of think tanks towards substantive political change and social equality (i.e., democratisation) is critical [3]. Moreover, the role of think tanks organisations becomes especially relevant in contemporary times as the platform for promoting socio-economic justice, with a report by Sulla [4] that substantiate these claims that, approximately 55.5 per cent (30.3 million people) of the population is living in poverty at the national upper poverty line of -ZAR 992. While a total of 13.8 million people (25 per cent) is experiencing food poverty. Whereas, one in five leave under the poverty line or GDP (gross domestic product) in South Africa. This makes the work and availability of think tanks a very important aspect of the country’s democratic growth, by influencing and impacting public policies.

Howbeit, think tanks are increasingly being dominated by advocacy and partisan agents who seek to drive their narrow agendas. Recently there has been a debate on one of the policies in South Africa, the Broad-Base Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) Act of 2003, which was implemented to narrow the socio-economic gaps and undo some of the injustices that were brought by the apartheid policies and legislations. The point of the BBBEE Act of 2003 is to ensure that those who were previously disadvantaged during the apartheid regime were being given a chance in a certain position, by ensuring that they would be chosen based on the potential of skills and educational training. The BBBEE Act 0f 2003 states that the policy is to ‘promote the achievement of the constitutional rights to equality, increase broad-based and effective participation of black people in the economy and promote a higher growth rate, increased employment and more equitable income distribution: and … to promote the economic unity of the nation, protect the common market and promote equal opportunity and equal access to government service’ [5]. Thus, companies would be given a score based on the number of black individuals employed in certain positions, and this score is important for obtaining funding and other benefits particularly if the company’s work is closely ‘associated’ with the government’s goals.

Conversely, due to the political landscape, this policy appears to have been working only in favour of those in high political positions or the ‘political elite’ individuals and not applied and implemented correctly, that is, for its vital purpose to historically undo the damage caused by the apartheid legislations- well more like a catalyst for change. For this reason, this BBBEE policy has come into lot of contestations and is now being reviewed to see its effectiveness in the country. Many have called for the policy to be scrubbed off; however, what is interesting is that these are usually the individuals in the political landscape who come from previously advantaged backgrounds (the Caucasians). They too seek to drive their own narrow agendas as the most claim that this policy is racist. Howbeit, they use the narrative that the current government are misusing the power that comes with this BBBEE Act of 2003 and now using that against the proper and correct implementation of this policy. The Nation has seen these same narratives coming through ‘particular’ think tanks and certain political party leaders. How can we disclaim such allegations when they indeed look as though they are facts and damage to democracy?

Yet, this begs the question of what exactly is the role and importance of think tank organisations in a country such as South Africa? Since there are very few concepts in the field of political and social sciences that are still as contentious as the term ‘think tank’. Generally speaking, these organisations can be thought of as private organisations that work to advance the public’s interest by producing ideas that influence the creation and implementation of policies [3]. Conversely, while looking at the example with the BBBEE policy it looks like this may not always be the case and that these organisations are working for another interest that may not always be the public’s interest. Yet their activities are tailored towards shaping policy and implementing ideas, in addition to their primary function, which is being knowledge hubs. With that said, Nkrumah states that some may perceive these organisations as neutral agencies responsible for using their research and capacities for the politico-economic advancement of the host state [3]. While others conceptualise them as playgrounds used by external actors, often termed funders.

The suspicion is further aroused by grants, which critics argue ensures that the development and implementation of research strategies by these organisations are shaped by the priorities of these funders [3]. Nkrumah further notes how these critics vehemently assert that these funders are those who drive the agenda of these organisations, decide on whose strategy should be used or what information may be gathered to monitor political development in the concerned state, in order to counter the widely held romantic notion of autonomous think tanks. In all fairness there may be a reason for this thinking, particularly when looking at the political landscape of South Africa and as well as historical, how these organisations may or may not have been used. Many of the funders may (or may not) have a ‘political agenda’ that seems to drive some of these organisations, while others may also have political associations with the same individuals being the researchers in these organisations. Therefore, this brings us to the question that how autonomous are these organisations? Do these political relations affect their decision-making and primary priority towards the host state public interest? If this is true, what type of conflicts of interest (COIs) do think tanks pose and/or have?

This chapter aims to analyse, unpack, and discuss the conflicts of interests (COIs) that may be experienced in think tank organisations. But first, I will start by looking at the history of these organisations in South Africa, because this may contribute to the operations of these organisations and perceived COIs. Then I will look at the notion of COIs, COIs as it relates to think tank in SA and later to how some of these COIs can be managed as well as challenges contributing to managing COIs.

2. History of think tanks in South Africa (SA)

South Africa (SA) has the largest number of think tanks, with approximately 102 registered think tanks making it the highest country with think tanks in the African region and number 15 in the World [6]. Before I continue with the history of think tanks in SA, let me first start by defining what is meant by a ‘think tank’ organisation. ‘A think tank is a public policy research analysis and engagement organization that generates policy-oriented research, analysis and advice on domestic and international issues, thereby enabling policymakers and the public to make informed decisions about public policy’ [6]. Furthermore, think tanks may be affiliated or independent institutions that are structured as permanent bodies, not as an ad-hoc commissions. These institutions often act as a bridge between the academic and policymaking communities and between states and civil society, serving in the public interest as an independent voice that translates applied and basic research into a language that is understandable, reliable, and accessible for policymakers and the public [6]. Therefore, these organisations are crucial for societal development and upholding the norms and ethics of their society and thus may be expected to evolve over time. Since, if these organisations serve between the academic and policymaking community it means that as societal needs and wants develop or change or increase there is an equal need for the think tanks to evolve with that society. Therefore, it becomes crucial to then look at the history of think tanks to understand some of the COIs that may be posed by these types of organisations.

Post-1994, think tanks in SA were used or were key instruments in addressing social issues such as racism, poverty, and inequality. Even after the transition into democratic SA in 1994, SA is still faced with racial tension and a large scale of deprivation abounds [3]. Therefore, ‘the ability of any regime to transcend these challenges is dependent on what measures and how well political figures contain, forestall and manage these setbacks’ as Nkrumah puts it. It is for this object that the supportive role of think tanks become important to substantiate political change and social justice, thus contributing to democratisation [3]. Conversely, it is noted that local think tanks do not have the same impact or influence across the policy sphere, albeit they all might pursue a common agenda of contributing towards the promotion of democracy. According to Nkrumah, think tanks in SA are embedded in two social movement theories known as the political opportunity structure (POS) and resource mobilisation (RM) [3]. He further explains that for one to know and understand the emergence and role of think tanks one must familiarise themselves with these theories. Since a practical illustration of POS may be traced to the gradual emergence of think tanks in the early 20th century when the apartheid regime somewhat relaxed strict regulations that were governing the formation and funding of such bodies. While this was due to an increased international pressure for the apartheid regime to transition towards democratic governance and enhance race relations. Nonetheless, between the 1970s and late 1980s, there was an escalation of human rights abuse that equally fostered RM, which was used as a strategy by think tanks to check on the powers of the government [3].

Subsequently, given the internal problems that were faced by SA at that time, the focus of the majority of think tanks was first virtually entirely internal despite the immense difficulties the nation faced as it moved to democracy. Howbeit, many of the think tanks then began to concentrate on their niche area and continent as it was obvious that SA was on the way to a negotiated settlement [7]. The transition to democracy meant an improved political, financial and legal environment that has fostered and encouraged the growth of think tanks and collaborative engagements with the government. As Nkrumah point outs that ‘in most instances, those who receive support from the state, and those outside this bracket, but with relevant expertise, are often approached by the state to provide advice on a social problem or to undertake monitoring and evaluation of projects’ [2]. Obviously, with these undertaking organisations or private consulting firms to carry out a similar exercise that would supplement the effort of the State. This has strengthened and improved the activities of think tanks activities, in which the scale and the needs are such that all maintain important and differing niches, partnerships and modus operandi [7].

On that background, think tanks that often serve the State directly or are State-based think tanks have directed their resources to three activities: knowledge creation, policy advice, and monitoring of government programs [3]. Howbeit, a much-needed assistance and redirection in the system were needed after post-1994 to provide needed resources to struggling think tanks as noted by Nkrumah [3]. As a result and to try and solve this problem, the parliament adopted the 1997 non-profit organisation (NPO) Act as a means of assisting those think tanks that had valid audit records. Nevertheless, this is not enough as both Cristoplos, Moran & Bjarnesen and Nkrumah’s studies reports indicate that the majority of think tanks in SA receive most of their funding outside of SA [3, 7]. This is one of the top ethical issues including that of the so-called ‘cordial’ relationships between think tanks and their states, and/or politicians and/or funders, which may result in a conflict of interests (COIs). Due to the nature and structure of the think tank, these relationships and funding matters cannot be avoided, albeit come with ethical concerns, matters of integrity, and COIs.

These issues are then further exacerbated by the work that think tanks do, the research that they work on and the impact and influence it has on policy decision-making and development. Therefore, it is important to understand how, even based on the history of these organisations, think tanks often find themselves having to address and manage COIs more often than the ‘general’ research institution. How COIs in think tanks can be challenging and controversial too. Therefore, is COI the same for think tanks as it is for academic institutions and or policymakers (as public officials)? Before we understand the challenges and impact of think tanks in the next session, I will unpack the definition of COIs and try to define COIs for think tanks if permissible.

3. Attempting to define conflict of interest for think tanks

Conflicts of interest have always existed in research but did not come to the public’s attention until the 1980s, when the relationship between private companies and academic institutions have become more strenuous, partly as a result of legislation that encouraged technology transfer from the public to the private sector and also due to innovation and growth in biotechnology, pharmaceutical companies, and other pertinent technologies [8]. This has become also true and relevant for think tanks across the globe, recently there has been a call on think tanks to be more transparent and to basically think about the ethics in think tanks, which include mostly COIs. This shows the importance of think tanks being able and having to deal, address and manage COIs. However, before we address some of the COIs in think tanks, let us first attempt to define COIs specifically for think tanks, this is crucial as it will make the definition more ‘personal’ to the work, activities and operations of think tanks.

For scientific research, COIs may be defined as: a researcher has a COIs if and only if he or she or they have a personal, financial, professional, political or legal interest that has a significant chance of interfering with the performance of his or her or their ethical and/or legal duties [8]. The definition obviously addresses or exposes the number of things a researcher may focus on, and it is often thought that financial interest is the only interest that can potentially cause COIs. Conversely, this definition makes one realisation that there are many other interests that an individual can have, which may cause COIs. While this definition focuses on the individual researchers and could be used for think tanks, however, it is not adequate since think tanks are also often ‘public’ organisations and thus their employees often have a dual duties and responsibilities, that is, professional (research) one and a public official one (serving the public, i.e., policy making). Therefore, when looking at COIs definition by organisation for economic co-operation [1] extended for public officials, their definition is as follows: a conflict of interest involves a conflict between the public duty and the private interest of a public official in which the official’s private -capacity interest improperly influence the performance of their official duties and responsibilities. Thus, public duty may be understood to be the duty one has to fulfil its obligation and purpose based on its primary role.

So based on the OECD definition, an individual knowing the relevant facts would conclude that think tanks’ ‘private-capacity’ may have an impact and influence their duties and responsibilities and affect their primary role as an organisation that ‘serves’ the public’s interest, albeit it has a private interest. As a result, should a think tank organisation¹ find itself in a position where they have a conflict between fulfilling its primary role (which is also linked to public duty) versus its private role, then that think tank is experiencing COIs. This may be a little complex and challenging to even understand what conflicts and which conflict even lead to COIs for think tanks and, therefore, there is a need to extend both the researcher’s and public official’s COIs definition for its application for think tank organisations. To deal with COIs in think tanks it will be valid to have a COIs definition that may be specific to think tanks and could be easily understood by such organisations and be adopted by them. Otherwise, it may appear like COIs are only caused by ‘personal’ matters while this may be a fallacy because the causes of COIs in think tank organisations are much more complex than meets the eye. This is the proposed definition, which is a combination of both the researcher’s and public officials’ (by the OECD) definitions, so an expanded definition. ‘Think tanks or employees thereof have a conflict of interest if and only if its researchers or employee or as an organisation has a conflict between his or her or their or its primary role and private roles where the researcher’s or employee’s or organisation’s private interest may involve a personal, professional, financial, legal, and political interest may and could improperly influence the performance of either the researcher or employee or organisation as set out’. By “its” in the definition I mean the think tank as an organisation², as an organisation that is made up of moral agent and carries some form of ‘business’ interest. It is important to also include think tanks in this definition for the organisation to be held responsible and accountable by the public and others if needed. Especially, since many of the decisions may not necessarily be taken by an individual researcher or the team but may come from a much higher authorisation within the organisation.

This definition not only does include the researcher (individual person) but also the organisation and makes this conflict of interests feel not only like they are an individual responsibility but also an organisation’s responsibilities. The definition allows think tanks to define their primary roles based on their own vision and niche areas they work in, as well as what would be generally considered private roles in their organisations. Moreover, as OECD show in their own report and the users of their definition may be used to test for COIs, which is important since COIs can be rather vague, especially for think tanks [8]. Apart from being able to define COIs and using the definition to test them, the definition may also be applied to further define the type of COIs specific to the think tank’s experience. Therefore, being able to have a definition and understanding that definition that is specific to think tanks can assist think tankers in understanding, preventing and managing COIs, and what causes COIs for think tanks.

3.1 Types of COIs

Many scholars have defined the types of conflict of interest; however, I will focus on the OECD’s ones as in my opinion they are well-defined and easily clarified [1]. Table 1 provides a summary of these COIs.

Types of conflicts of interest	Summary or definition and examples
‘Actual’/‘Real’	‘Actual’/‘real’ COIs are when the private interests are interfering with the primary interest, that is, private interest becomes a priority over secondary interest These are also known simply as conflicts of interests Are much more identifiable Example: The think tank organisation only hires people from a certain political party and its research and work is seem to mostly aligned with the party’s vision or mission and strategies
‘Apparent’	This type of COIs looks like there is or could be there based on certain factors, i.e., it is and assumed COIs These may be as dangerous as apparent for the integrity of the organisation and work It can over time become either a ‘potential’ or ‘actual’/‘real’ COIs For example the organisation leader has relations with a particular political family or business family (influential)
‘Potential’	This type is formed when the primary interest is there but not relevant enough to be considered a COIs Just because they are not relevant does not mean they will not become relevant and end up being ‘actual’/‘real/ COIs Example: A particular funder donates a lump sum of money to the think tank organisation and works closely with them, and he, she or they becomes interested in a particular policy matter related to their majority of business. He/she/they may start to influence the think tanks’ work and decision-making as they may have leverage over them.

Table 1.

Types of conflict of interests (COIs), definition or summary and examples.

3.1.1 Actual or real COIs

Since all think tanks have a primary interest, they also have a private interest of some kind, because no organisation can only have a primary interest without having some sort of private interest. It is necessary to identify and manage conflicts of interest, whenever they arise, to maintain trust. Because trust within can be seriously damaged by suspicion of any activities by the think tank with either the state and/or funder, etc. Therefore, trust must be protected and improved to make sure that there are no improper connections between the stakeholder (these being the state, political organisation and funders) relationships, for instance, by making the funders’ interest affect the way the research is conducted and/or data is reported [1]. This could happen if the relationship between the think tank and the funder (for instance) becomes affected by the amount of funds and/or the relationship between them that may influence the think tank’s primary role. Thus, shifting the think tank’s focus and causing a conflict of interest. This type of conflict of interest is named by the OEDC as the ‘actual’ or ‘real’ COIs. This type of COIs may result in a breach of trust or public trust, and this type of breach of trust by the think tank can happen when the think tank uses data from the research study and improvise to either have leverage based on these results or possibility of the results, to attract more or higher funding or to suit the funder or state or politic organisation’s request or rather as an influenced at the expense of the public interest [1]. This type of COI is very evident and must not be confused with the other, albeit at times this type of COIs may start as either an ‘apparent’ COIs and/or a ‘potential’ COIs. The second type of COIs is the ‘apparent’ COIs.

3.1.2 Apparent COIs

Although ‘apparent’ COIs may sound like they are unimportant or maybe not as relevant as the ‘actual’ or ‘real’ COIs. However, OECD warns that this type of COIs can be as damaging as the ‘actual’ or ‘real’ and should be treated as though it were an actual conflict until such time as the doubt is removed and the matter is determined, after investigation of all the relevant facts [1]. Therefore, relevant facts about the think tank’s “private” interest and their primary responsibility must be established accurately so judgement can be made about whether the think tanks have a real COI or not. For example, the example given above for the ‘actual’ or ‘real’; let us say the think tank has a close relationship with a particular political party with the same interest as the organisations’ niche areas and, therefore, public perspective may give doubt to the results and as they are reported by that think tank. This is why it is crucial that ‘apparent’ COIs be treated as ‘actual’ or ‘real’ COIs, they can become ‘actual’ or ‘real’ since these may cause public mistrust in science and damage the integrity of think tanks in general. Although this may not be ‘actual’ or ‘real’ because of the assumptions that it may cause damage, it could evolve into an ‘actual’ or ‘real’ COIs if for some reason the relationship moves from a plutonic one and thus a mix with business ‘favours’. The relationship could cause ‘apparent’ COIs.

3.1.3 Potential COIs

When think tanks have a private interest, which is currently not regarded as a relevant interest, because its duties are currently unrelated to its private interest [8] but could eventually become a relevant interest that may be considered a COI in the future. This can be called a potential COI. This type of COIs often happens mostly among start-up think tanks. The potential here is not in the moment or the present relevant interest but could in the future develop into either an apparent COI or an ‘actual’ or ‘real’³ COI, irrespectively. ‘Potential’ COIs become relevant once the ‘private’ duties start to affect the primary role and responsibility of the think tank towards the public. An example of a ‘potential’ COI could be understood when a start-up think tank forms relationships with various stakeholders, and due to their focus on becoming influential in policy development and gaining relevant resources, they may be ‘easily’ influenced by the funder or funds or a new and forming relationship between them and the state. Therefore, it is crucial to have a look and learn to deal with these potential COI before they become ‘apparent’ and then possibly later be ‘actual’ or ‘real’ COIs. These relationships, in this case, create ‘potential’ COIs while these may not be there since the relationships are basically creations of business networks.

On that background, it is of paramount importance that think tanks not only use the definition of COIs to define COIs and see which type they fall into but to also find and develop methods to test these COI since the definition makes provision for such tests. These tests will help in defining and making it clear if there is a COIs or not and what type it is, prior to addressing it and how it can be addressed. Because COIs can be confusing and vague, thus, think tanks can further establish a test that can be applied to evaluate and distinguish the type of COIs to assist in determining between their different types of COIs. Therefore, these tests can be generated for either the seniors in the think tank organisations, such as the executive and/or managers. Therefore, these tests can be tailor-made by the think tanks to suit their preferences based on the operational structure of the think tanks. Conversely, think tanks should try to develop these tests for themselves because the integrity of the think tanks also lies in how these COIs are addressed and managed. Therefore, it may be advisable for every think tank to establish a strategic COIs plan that will pen out how they will deal with these COIs, if or when they occur.

4. The importance of managing COIs: looking at think tank challenges

As seen throughout this chapter, think tanks may have COIs, therefore, there are various reasons to be concerned about them. Let us look at one or two of these reasons to be concerned about COI⁴, particularly relating to research studies in think tanks. The first reason is that COIs can compromise the integrity of the research and that of the organisation. Secondly, it can undermine the public’s trust in science [8]; and thirdly and lastly the organisation or other organisations who do the same type of work.⁵ What is troubling, as Resnik puts it, is the evidence that companies sometimes bend or break the rules of science to achieve favourable results [8]. Another troubling issue, however, more specifically in Africa that can compromise their research, as assessed by the Think Tanks and Civil Society Program is that 60 per cent of think tanks are highly susceptible with a major risk of disappearing based on data collected on think tanks in Africa. These factors include unstable funding, high staff turnover, and brain drain [9]. A major risk to sustainable African reform is the nature and scale of the think tank crisis. Indeed, during the past 20 years, the perception of Africa has changed from one of ‘permanent crises’ to one ‘Africa rising’, in part because of the efforts of African think tanks, which have provided a richer and more sophisticated understanding of and policy alternatives for strengthening policy and governance. Past examinations find that think tanks in Africa shared challenges around four prominent themes—funding, independence, quality and impact [9]. All these may have the potential of causing some type of COIs.

Funding (and resource) are often on the top when it comes to reasons why think tanks may compromise their integrity and cause a lot of ‘actual’ or ‘real’, and/or ‘apparent’, and/or ‘potential’ COIs. Because many think tanks in SA often lack the resource and financial capacity required to conduct their activity. McGann, Signè and Muyangwa elaborate further in their findings that the lack of sustainable funding is one of the greatest issues think tanks in Africa deal with. As these think tanks are disproportionately reliant on foreign funding, funding is frequently erratic, inadequate and unevenly distributed in this sector. Competition for international financial resources among countries, think tanks and government officials, as well as the restricted participation of the private sector, all contribute to this shortage [9]. Therefore, these challenges posed by funding matters can influence how a think tank operates and/or can impact, it can use its resource in a feasible and effective manner and it can influence policy change. An example of the issues associated with funding is one reported by Bennet Lourie in 2013 in a report titled ‘think tanks are hardly quaking in their boots’, where ‘they’ make claims on the issues concerning think tanks’ transparency when it comes to funding. They are of the view that this matter has largely been ignored partly because of larger concerns regarding ‘questionable’ money in politics; largely as a result of journalists’ and media’s reliance on think tanks. Furthermore, newer think tanks (possibly start-ups) in particular often are partisan [10]. While another example given by Tbilisi on a research report by McClenaghan Maeve in 2012 titled ‘Finance lobby: big banks and think tanks’, discussing the financial sector’s donations to think tanks in the United Kingdoms (UK), noted that many of the think tanks refused to disclose their donor, and some others also declined to provide any information regarding their sources of support [10]. Both cases indicate why think tanks have to be transparent about their finances or donations and sponsors. Although, there are no specific research examples in SA (or Africa), yet in my point of view funding has been one of the biggest threats and challenges for many think tank organisations in SA. This lack of research and understanding of the depth of funding as seen in Tbilisi’s report is also required in SA to estimate how funding influences and affects COIs in such organisations.

The second challenge that poses an important reason for managing think tank as mentioned by McGann, Signè and Muyangwa is independence. Because many of the think tanks in SA mostly depend on international funding and funders their independence may be questionable [9]. This doubt may pose some form of COIs for the think tank, even the dependence of the country’s think tanks on the state. Thus, I agree with McGann, Signè and Muyangwa finding that the first challenge of think tanks’ independence is the risk of co-optation either by governmental agencies or the political opposition [9]. If they are not already active members or executives of political parties, certain think tank leaders are frequently offered posts or contracts by state officials or the opposition in non-competitive regimes and emerging democracies, where this risk is especially significant. Furthermore, some citizens distrust think tanks because they think they are affiliated with the government or the opposition [9]. Especially when the think tank lacks a clear independence and compliance strategy, the think tank could run the risk of becoming an agent for the promotion of the special interests of certain funders wanting to advance their policy agenda. Finally, when the funding and/or amount and kind of contracts they get have an impact on their capacity to pursue an independent research agenda, think tanks run the risk of turning into consulting businesses [9]. Sadly, this dependence can affect the think tanks’ ability to produce quality and impactful work. Therefore, they can try to diversify their sources of funding and come up with projects that can also add financial gain and help make the think tank more independent. Gaining independence is important for think tank organisations to be able to fulfil their obligation and serve the public’s interest, thus, democracy depends on this independence. Co-dependence carries a lot of burdens that often lead to COIs.

The third challenge that is notable as expressed by McGann, Signè and Muyangwa is the quality and capacity of the think tank. This can pose a serious problem and more so since most think tanks often have limited staff who can carry out the projects, which can affect the quality or the outputs. McGann, Signè and Muyangwa say that the sustainability of some of the think tanks in Africa is threatened since the calibre of their outputs occasionally falls short of the recognised global standards [9]. Some think tanks find it difficult to produce work that meets the highest industry requirements for quality. This is typically due to the low availability and quality of highly educated researchers, communicators, development specialists and think tank administrators [9]. This lack of enough staff and/or qualified and/or experienced staff can also exacerbate the COIs that often come with think tanks and research in general. Moreover, this can also have an impact on how a think tank impactfully and effectively engages with policymakers. In the same token, this quality of standard or not finding qualified researchers is exacerbated by payment issues, many experts or ‘highly skilled’ individuals come with a much higher price and if they compromise and come in as a consultant, this may also cause other types of COIs not only for the organisation but also for them. Sometimes there are just not enough ‘highly skilled’ individuals, and some may have to consult several think tanks and thereby causing COIs. There is definitely a need to try and lessen the gap of skill needed in think tanks and find more sustainable competitive payment options.

Thus, the impact and effective engagement with policymakers and the public are the last and fourth challenge that McGann, Signè and Muyangwa note in their report that may be a challenge to think tanks, which in my view may also result in COIs [9]. Thus, think tanks face a problem in ensuring a real impact through efficient public and policymaker engagement. The inability to communicate, the lack of media exposure and networks, the lack of access to policymakers, their lack of interest, their mismatched priorities, their lack of responsiveness to urgent needs and a lack of trust are all obstacles to having an impact [9]. Therefore, think tanks could find ways in building trust with both the policymakers and the public, respectively. While this may be a challenging task, particularly for a start-up think tank it will be important if these think tanks would also consider ways of managing (retrospective) COIs as this could in the future results in some COIs. All these challenges that are faced by think tanks (in Africa and South Africa) may also be exacerbated by other notable COIs that are often found in scientific research. These could include issues of research design, data fabrication or falsification and analysis and interpretation of data. Every research has a risk of research bias and, therefore, with research data think tanks may be biased based on any of their challenges by distorting the design of a study towards yielding particular results [3], that is, by designing the study so as to yield the desired results or design the study question to have desirable answers. During research data falsification and fabrication, bias can be formed by reporting on data based on the desires of either the influence or relationship they have with the State or funders and/or funding received (the so-called ‘dark’ money). Nkrumah in his study, he/they, gives an illustration of how this may be possible, he/they states that, by being recipients, think tanks may embark on research that is commissioned or mandated by the state, which in most cases will seek to justify rather than critique the government’s (in)action on particular social issues [3]. This example can also be linked to another manner in which think tanks can be biased through data analysis and interpretation. When it is determined or influenced by the funder, sponsor or state and thus think tank may have to find ways to justify the results to suit the funder, sponsor or State’s desires. Resnik cites the ways in which this can be accomplished, thus, he says think tanks can suppress the results altogether (unfavourable results) if the results are not manipulated or delayed [8].

Therefore, it is important to take these challenges and notable research issues that may cause COIs into consideration for developing a strategy for dealing COIs. Because if these challenges are not taken into consideration, then the COIs will increase and cause further damage to both the scientific integrity and the ‘personal’ integrity of these organisations.

5. Strategies for think tanks to deal with COIs

There are various ways and forms in which think tanks could develop to deal with COIs. Ultimately, think tanks should have a process and procedure, that is, creating a COIs Policy for dealing with COIs. This can be in detail and include the definitions and types of COIs, tests for each type, self-test by think tanks’ staff, ways to address and manage COIs and required training for think tank staff. Scholars have reported on some notable methods, and these include disclosure, managing COIs and prohibition.

5.1 Disclosure

Disclosure involves informing all the relevant parties about the interest that creates the COIs or may cause appearance of COIs [8]. Institutions will carefully consider any actual or apparent conflicts of interest and reputational harm that specific funders may create before deciding whether or not to accept their support once they are aware of the funding sources. Additionally, funding transparency gives members of the public and decision-makers the chance to assess whether a think tank’s funding sources may present potential conflicts of interest. Think tanks that fail to comply with this new norm will stand out and come under more scrutiny as it gradually becomes the norm for think tanks to reveal their funding source, creating a kind of positive feedback loop [2].

Disclosure is often done voluntarily and advocated that think tanks make these disclosures of COIs voluntarily to build public trust in science and in these organisations, and for the organisation’s integrity. This voluntary disclosure may be done by adding the funders, partners, and other relevant relationship(s) to a list that is easily accessible on the think tanks website. Some think tanks have this list in a dedicated section on their website while others would mention them based on the projects, that is, per project. This method of dealing with COI works for projects where there are low to minimum COIs and disclosure is enough.⁶ Conversely, another situation requires more in-depth COIs management. Albeit, disclosure is often concerning the think tank and their funder(s) or relationship(s), there is a need to consider not only voluntary but also involuntary procedures of disclosures, particularly for think tank staff, because they too come with their own private interest when it is deemed necessary. Therefore, it will be important to define and address when it is necessary for staff to disclose and as well as when will involuntary disclosure be required, in which cases or in what type of cases.

5.2 Process for COI management

Therefore, when COIs are challenging or disclosure is not the best strategic option for dealing with COIs then a process and procedure for managing COIs may be needed. It is for this reason that the OECD developed a toolkit for managing COIs, but for public officials. Conversely, this may be adopted or extended for think tanks [8]. The toolkit consists of several points, a checklist, tests and possible training for COIs. I think this would be the type of toolkit that may be designed for think tanks to deal with COIs, a generic toolkit for think tanks in managing COIs could be helpful. Nonetheless, the OEDC toolkit is still good enough and consists of important points and COIs issues and could be used even by think tanks in dealing with COIs. Thus the OECD‘s generic checklist for Identifying ‘at risk’ areas for COIs covers issues of COIs under: 1. additional ancillary employment, 2. Inside information, 3. contract, 4. official decision making (could be think tank staff decision making), 5. policy advising, 6. gifts and other forms of benefits, 7. personal, family and community expectations and opportunities, 8. outside concurrent appointment and 9. business or non-profit organisation activity after leaving public office [8]. These are explained in Table 2.

Areas of conflict of interest risk	Possible questions to ask
Additional ancillary employment	Has the organisation defined a policy and related administration procedure for approval of additional/ancillary employment? Is all the staff made aware of the existence of the policy and procedure? Does the policy identify a potential conflict of interest arising from the proposed ancillary employment as an issue for managers to assess when considering applications for approval? Is there a formal authorisation procedure under which staff may apply in advance for approval to engage in additional employment while retaining their official position? Is the policy applied consistently and responsibly, so as to discourage staff from applying for approval? Are approvals reviewed from time to time to ensure that they are still appropriate?
Inside information	Has the organisation defined a policy and administrative procedure for ensuring that inside information, especially privileged information that is obtained in confidence from private citizens or other officials in the course of official duties, is kept secure and is not misused by staff of the organisation? On particular: Commercially sensitive business information Taxation and regulatory information Personally sensitive information Law enforcement and prosecution information Government economic policy and financial information Is all staff made aware of the existence of the policy and procedure Are all managers made aware of their various responsibilities to enforce the policy
Contract	Does the organisation ensure that any staff/employed official who is or may be involved in the preparation, negotiation, management or enforcement of a contract involving the organisation has notified the organisation of any private interest relevant to the contract Does the organisation prohibit staff, etc. from participating in the preparation, negotiation, management or enforcement of a contract if they have relevant interest or require that they dispose or otherwise manage the relevant interest before participating in such a function? Does the organisation have the power to cancel or modify a contract for its benefit if it is proved that the contracting process was significantly compromised by a conflict of interest or corrupt conduct on the part of either an official or a contractor Where a contract has been identified as compromised by a conflict of interest involving an official or former official of the organisation, does the official in his/her official capacity ensure that they were not also similarly compromised
Official decision making	Does the organisation ensure that any staff/employed official who makes official decisions of a significant kind involving the organisation, its resources, strategies, staff, functions, administrative or statutory responsibilities (for example, decision concerning a draft law, expenditure, purchase, budgetary allocation, implementation of a law or policy, grating or refusing a licence or permission to a citizen, appointment to a position, recruitment, promotion, discipline, performance assessment, etc.) has notified the organisation of any private interest relevant to a decision, which could constitute a conflict of interest of the part of the person making the decision. Does the organisation prohibit staff, etc. from participating in the preparation, negotiation, management or enforcement of an official decision if they have a relevant interest or require that they dispose or otherwise manage the relevant interest before participating in such a decision? Does the organisation have the power, either by law or by other means, to review and modify or cancel an official decision if it is proved that the decision-making process was significantly compromised by a conflict of interest or corrupt conduct on the part of a member of its staff/an official?
Policy advising	Does the organisation ensure that any staff/employed official who provides advice to the government or other public officials on any official matter, concerning any kind of policy measure, strategy, law, expenditure, purchase, the implementation of a policy or law, contract, privatisation, budget measure, appointment to a position, administrative strategy, etc., has notified the organisation of any private interest relevant to that advice, which could constitute a conflict of interest on the part of person providing the advice Does the organisation prohibit staff, etc. from participating in the preparation, negation or advocacy of official policy advice if they have a relevant interest or require that they dispose or otherwise manage the relevant interest before participating in preparing or giving such policy advice? Does the organisation have the ability and process to review and withdrew official policy advice if it proved that the advice-giving process was significantly compromised by a conflict of interest before participating in preparing or giving such policy advice?
Gift and other forms of benefit	Does the organisation’s current policy deal with conflict of interest arising from both traditional and new forms of gifts or benefits? Does the organisation have an established administrative process for controlling gifts, for example by defining acceptable and unacceptable gifts, accepting specified types of gifts on behalf of the organisation, disposing or returning unacceptable gifts, advising recipients on how to decline a gift and for declaring significant gift offered to or received by official?
Personal, family and community expectations and opportunities	Does the organisation recognise the potential for a conflict of interest to arise from expectations placed on individual public officials by their immediate family or by their community, including religious or ethnic communities, especially in a multicultural context? Does the organisation recognise the potential for conflict of interest to arise from the employment or business activities of other members of an employed official’s immediate family?
Outside concurrent appointments	Does the organisation define the circumstances under which a public official may undertake a concurrent appointment on the board or controlling body of an outside organisation or body, especially where the body is or may be involved in a contractual, regulatory, partnership or sponsorship arrangement with their employing organisation? For example: A community group or NGO A professional or political organisation Another government organisation or body Does the organisation, and/or law, define specific conditions under which a public official may engage privatised body, while still employed by the organisation?
Business or NGO activity after leaving public office	Does the organisation, and/or law, define specific conditions under which a former public official may, and may not, become employed by, or engage in the activities of, an outside organisation? Does the organisation actively maintain procedures, which identify a potential conflict of interest where a public official who is about to leave public employment is negotiating a future appointment or employment, or other relevant activity, with an outside body? Where an official has left the organisation for employment in a non-government body or activity, does the organisation retrospectively assess the decision made by the official in his/her official capacity to ensure that those decisions were not compromised by an undeclared conflict of interest?

Table 2.

Generic checklist for identifying “At-risk” areas for conflict of interest (OECD 2005).

Therefore, think tanks can use this generic checklist as a skeleton to build from and upon it and tailor make them to suit their own business operations in developing their own generic checklist to manage COIs. An additional tool that may also be adopted by a think tank that is suggested by OEDC for public officials is the ‘generic ethics code provision relevant to COIs’ [1]. These are clauses that focus on key principles of the code of ethics and/or anti-corruption laws that are found in the country and think tanks can adopt them and expand them for their own business operations, and as linked with their own organisational values, with Table 3 indicating the EOCD generic ethics code provision relevant to COIs. One must note that these generic ethics codes should be appropriately adopted to suit the law and drafting conventions of the particular country and used to give effect to the definition of COIs. While at the same time providing a clear understanding of the relationships that can take place between these various forms of COIs and corruption, and/or integrity, and/or (un)ethical behaviour. So as to differentiate between what may be a COI versus a case corruption or versus a case of integrity or versus a case of unethical behaviour. Equally important to the above, these generic ethics codes must be developed so as to give clarity to think tanks’ country’s socio-cultural norms but also relevant to global ethical standards and norms. Meaning, they must be locally relevant and as well as globally relevant so as to have a balance between their local ethical standards and as well as global standards, respectively. An additional way to manage COIs is through a self-test for COIs for think tank staff, and this can be applied as a diagnostic measure, as a reminder for staff to be reminded of their role, responsibility, duties, targets and personal efforts, and to discourage the growth of COIs, corruption and research misconducts [1]. This self-test could be in a form of a survey questionnaire that is made available during, between and before wrapping up a project, and/or after COIs training by the organisation.

Principle	Fundamental definition
Serving	Civil servants and public officials are expected to maintain and strengthen the public’s trust and confidence in public institutions, by demonstrating the highest standard of professional competence, efficiency and effectiveness, upholding the constitution and the laws and seeking to advance the public good at all times.
Transparency and accountability	Civil servants and public officials are expected to use powers and resources for the public good, in accordance with the law and government policy. They should be prepared to be accountable for the decisions they make and to justify their official decisions and actions to a relevant authority, or publicly, as appropriate in the circumstances.
Integrity	Civil servants and public officials are expected to make decisions and act without consideration of their private interest. Public service being a public trust, the improper use of a public service position for private advantage is regarded as a serious breach of professional integrity.
Legitimacy	Civil servants and public officials are required to administer the laws and government policy and to exercise legitimate administrative authority under delegation. That power and authority should be exercised impartially and without fear or favour for its proper public purpose as determined by the parliament or the official organisation as appropriate in the circumstances.
Fairness	Civil servants and public officials should make decision and take action in a fair and equitable manner, without being affected by bias or personal prejudice, taking into account only the merits of the matter and respecting the right of affected citizens.
Responsive	As agents and employees of the elected government civil servants and public officials are required to serve the legitimate interests and needs of the government, public organisations, other civil servants and citizens, in a timely manner, with appropriate care, respect and courtesy.
Efficiency and effectiveness	Civil servants and public officials are required to obtain the best value in the expenditure of public funds, efficient use of assets deployed in or through public management and avoid waste and extravagance in the use of resources in public programmes and official activities.

Table 3.

Basic code of ethics provisions relevant to conflict of interest—Generic ethics code provisions relevant to conflict of interest.

(OEDC 2005)

Other methods as noted by Resnik in managing COIs could include developing licencing agreement where necessary, confidentiality agreements [8], benefit-sharing agreements and material or data-transfer agreements. Many of the COIs that can be noted by think tanks can be managed through these tools, howbeit, there are some COIs that cannot be easily managed and can require a different method for dealing with them. In such cases, the next and last method of dealing with COIs can be applied.

5.3 Prohibition

Prohibition is the most extreme strategic method for dealing with COIs [8] and also may be difficult or challenging for most think tanks to decide when they should prohibit and what processes and procedures to follow when prohibiting. Resnik suggested the following processes and procedures, albeit for research studies, but can be applied to think tanks [8]. These are:

5.3.1 The significance of the COI

What is the probability that the interest(s) will affect or interfere with think tank duties, if the probabilities are low, the situation may not create COIs but an apparent or potential COI [8]. This does not mean that it would always remain in this manner and, therefore, it is crucial to always keep track of these and make follow-ups to ensure that things still remain the same.

5.3.2 The ability to manage COIs

It is important that before prohibition of any COIs think tanks first see if these COIs are manageable, this includes low, minimum and high COIs.

5.3.3 The consequences of prohibiting COIs

Sometimes prohibiting COIs does more harm than good notes [8] because it denies science or society important benefits. For example, when an organisation prohibits a staff from being part of an industry committee or board or association, it may enhance scientific trust, but it might also deny industry important advice and reduce collaborations. Thus, prohibition is something to be taken with strict caution because while dealing with COIs we still want to maintain scientific freedom. The only time prohibition may be strongly argued for is when managing COI is low and the significance of the COI is higher, then prohibition is not bad.

Prohibition is when the COIs are very high and there is no way of managing them. All strategies are not just for COIs caused by finances, or resources, but also include staff and other factors associated with the think tank organisations. Even though it is often thought that COIs are financial interests, these interests are broad, therefore, it is imperative that think tanks become more transparent in COIs disclosure, management and prohibition, and not only disclose because of financial interest as it is often the reason. Other private interests that may affect COIs need to be established and equally prioritised as to when and how they must either be disclosed, managed or prohibited, respectively.

6. Conclusion

In conclusion, there are many challenges that think tank organisations (particularly in South Africa, Africa) face, which may often create opportunities for a lot of COIs. I have not come across a set of South African policies or procedures and processes on how they deal with COIs from any of the think tank organisations, and this is very concerning. Unless, otherwise, they are applying international rules and laws on dealing with these COIs and/or using local universities’ policies. But how about those that are not linked to the university? How do they then deal with COIs? This chapter shows that the history of think tank organisation and its evolution have some form of influence on what would be deemed as ‘apparent’ and ‘potential’ COIs. Since many of the think tanks in SA, Africa, struggle with sustainability they mostly rely on ‘cordial’ relationships with the State and/or political parties and/or politicians and/or international agents/bodies for funding, and for them to have an impact and influence in the policy development space. (This has evolved historically from the inceptions and evolution of think tanks in SA). These relations could jeopardise the integrity of these think tanks and exacerbate the COIs in the think tanks. Thus, think tanks may be financially and/or have their ‘power’ (to have influence and impact) influenced by these outside bodies in their work and decision-making. Hence, there has been a global outcry for think tanks to be more transparent and honest, especially when it comes to funder disclosure. Conversely, this is not enough, and more is needed to be done by think tank organisations to deal with COIs effectively. Both OECD and Resnik have some ideas on how organisations can alleviate COIs. Therefore, based on what has been unpacked and discussed in this chapter, these are some of the recommendations for think tank organisations to be able to deal with COIs:

• Develop organisational COIs procedures and processes, that is, Policy;

• Develop a tailored OECD ‘Generic Ethics Code Relevant for COIs’ that will be aligned to the organisation’s values and their local socio-cultural values;

• Have a dedicated integrity office (in-house);

• South Africa to have a centralised independent think tank organisation integrity office that forms part of the state, it can serve all other NPO organisations too;

• Define the types of COIs and create tests for them;

• Provide and facilitate COIs training to think tank staff;

• Create in-house COIs self-tests; and

• Develop a variety of agreements as mentioned in the chapter such as licence agreement, confidentiality agreement, benefit-sharing agreement, material and/or data agreement.

Acknowledgments

The author would like to acknowledge the staff at Khaca (Pty) Ltd. for their support in writing this chapter.

Conflict of interest

The author declares no conflict of interest.

Notes/thanks/other declarations

Fikile Muriel Mnisi has a Doctorate in Philosophy (i.e., Bioethics and Health Law) from the University of Witwatersrand, with a background in Biotechnology (i.e., Regenerative or Tissue Engineering). She has worked in both the academic environment and private companies. She has founded a company called Khaca (Pty) Ltd., which focuses on biotechnology policies, research and ethics training and consultation. She has recently founded an NPC called Inkanyeti Foundation that focuses on addressing stigmas around mental illness. She is currently serving as an Animal Ethics Committee Member at the Tshwane University of Technology and the chairperson for Edenvale Regional Hospital Board. She is a biotechnologist, bioethicist, ethics educator, ethics consultant, researcher, early entrepreneur and early community developer. Her main focus is on the field of Biotechnology, Bioethics and Legal and Social issues. She is interested in working in a multi- or trans-disciplinary environment to analyse, create and implement innovative solutions. Her passion is social justice (i.e., harmony) whether it is allocative and/or distributive justice pertaining to matters in biotechnology, medical or health, Ethics, Legal and Social Issues (ELSI,) and bio-politics to influence policy and decision making.

Ethics

No human participation or animal, biodiversity or indigenous knowledge was used for this paper.