Is Metacognition ‘Just’ Imagination? Exploring the Relationship with Implications for Agency and Pedagogy

Abstract

This chapter presents research, findings and discussion which emerged from a theoretical exploration of imagination as cognition and metacognition. The researcher took a pragmatic stance in addressing a problem encountered in education practice: that an articulated understanding of ‘imagination’ is largely absent and its likely relationship with metacognition is little articulated, despite these being essential components of learning. Within an interdisciplinary approach, exploring theories across disciplines provided ideas to use in re-imagining imagination. This chapter describes and uses the model of imagination and metacognition which emerged through this process. The model suggests that imagination and metacognition are so inter-related that there is potential to consider them as one and the same, asking ‘is metacognition ‘just’ imagination?’. This question is discussed with the conclusion that it is better to acknowledge the complexity of this relationship than to reduce it to an ‘either/or’ claim. Discussion also includes consideration of a further, intrinsic relationship with personal and social agency, which led to an application of the model to inform and produce evaluative tools for a small research project: Imagination Agents. In conclusion, the chapter recommends that due to the close relationship between imagination, metacognition and agency, we should consider how to better support it within education systems where it is currently neglected.

1. Introduction

This chapter is grounded in theoretical research [1, 2] which attempts to set aside ‘magical’ perceptions of imagination in education and understand it instead, as a fundamental aspect of cognitive and metacognitive capacity. In turn, it offers a perspective of metacognition from the view-point of imagination. A theoretical exploration of the relationship between imagination, cognition and metacognition is cohered and conceptualised within ‘emergent models’ of imagination, (drawn largely from [1]). Through this exploration, a question arises of whether a combined focus on imagination and metacognition could be potent in developing personal and social agency. If so, we may hypothesise that educational support for the inherent relationships between imagination, metacognition and individual agency creates capacity for democratic agency. The emergence [3, 4, 5] of the models demonstrates a fundamental relationship between cognition, metacognition and imagination, with these latter two capacities overlapping to the degree that we arrive at the question of whether metacognition is actually, just imagination. The chapter concludes with discussion of a recent application of these ideas within a research project with young people Imagination Agents, before making recommendations for research and practice.

Few would disagree that imagination is essential for originality and for enabling us to see beyond our current state. It is therefore crucial in addressing a ‘posthuman convergence’ ([6], p. 3) of structural injustice, environmental crisis and a shift in what it means to be human in light of rapid scientific and technological change. Complex personal, local and global challenges require us to re-imagine ourselves and to use imagination to develop autonomy, empathy and the capacity to solve problems. This suggests the importance of nurturing imagination, however; some argue that this is not recognised by or reflected in current education. At the more critical end of the scale, Giroux [7] states that schools have become ‘disimagination machines’ which leave us ill-equipped for necessary innovation in a challenging world. Biesta ([8], p. 55) describes how education is steered in the direction of ‘the production of a small set of measurable learning outcomes’ and neglects students’ voice, creativity and unique identities.

Imagination is often regarded as a magical phenomenon, rather than as a cognitive or metacognitive capacity which can be educated. This is recognised from a psychological perspective by Ryle, who notes ‘…a quite general tendency among theorists and laymen alike to ascribe some sort of other-worldy reality to the imaginary.’ ([9], p. 232). Within neoliberal contexts, imagination is frequently seen as an escape from reality, often colonised and epitomised by global, corporate bodies such as Disney, Dreamworks and so on. Over the course of my professional and academic career in education, numerous teachers have told me ‘It’s all about imagination’. They have expressed concern that many children do not have access to the experiences which nurture it and struggle to apply it when it is required, for instance, in literacy or problem-solving activities.

Like many others, I have a love of and belief in imagination which can seem to imply it has an almost magical power. I have no desire to extinguish ideas of magical imagination (after-all, that would be unimaginative!); however, a lack of definition could restrict the capacity to nurture imagination in our contemporary, educational environment, where accountability can dominate (e.g., [10]). As my research into imagination progressed, I became interested in the proximity and overlaps within its relationship to metacognition and in how, by association with metacognition, (perhaps a more frequently defined and implemented concept in education), it is possible to advocate for practices which nurture imagination and cognition/metacognition. Meta-evidence suggests that children can increase their chances of educational success if they are supported to develop metacognition [11]. A strong relationship between imagination and metacognition implies that developing imagination is likely to be beneficial for metacognition and therefore for learning more generally. If this relationship is strong and is understood, we might better develop metacognition by better developing imagination, thereby improving individual learning, in particular, the capacity for self-regulation. Conversely, we might support imagination by educating for metacognition, since this would automatically require us to exercise our imagination. Either way, by developing metacognitive understanding and strategies for self-regulation, these approaches could generate confidence and lead to increased autonomy (Bonnett in [12], p. 156). In turn, this could lead to increased potential for democratic capacity, as described by Dewey [13] and Greene [14].

Imagination as a concept ‘has been relatively neglected in our current age’ [15]. Little research has been carried out into the condition of imagination in education, perhaps because little has been done to find a way to conceptualise and assess it. The same cannot be said of metacognition, which continues to be well-researched and supported pedagogically through an array of programmes, strategies and curricula. It has been suggested [16] that metacognition may be considered to be a form of imagination, described in terms of Mead’s ‘generalised other’ in which the individual internalises a ‘general systematic pattern of social or group behaviour’ and applies these ‘towards himself, just as he takes the individual attitudes of others.’ ([17], p. 158). Such an act is imaginative in requiring a leap of thought in order to consider how the ‘generalised other’ might respond in a given situation. For Kant, imagination is a means of connecting and synthesising sense perceptions with existing knowledge, making imagination the ‘hidden condition of all knowledge’ ([18], p. 167). One might also argue, based on Kant, that imagination is a kind of cognitive transcendence and is akin to metacognition. How far do these theories account for the characteristics of metacognition and how else might imagination influence the metacognitive process? By modelling this relationship we might better understand both imagination and metacognition and improve support for learners across both (or perhaps the same) kinds of thought.

To consider metacognition (e.g.; [19, 20, 21, 22, 23]) in relation to imagination, it makes sense to explore it as specialised, self-awareness applied to personal thinking and learning and to acknowledge imagination as a critical factor in species-wide human development which enabled the emergence of consciousness of our own existence (e.g.; [24, 25, 26]). Literature which is concerned with the relationship between imagination and metacognition, (except through a focus on creativity, e.g., Runco [27], Kaufman and Beghetto [28]). Authors have discussed that there are multiple definitions of metacognition (e.g., [21]). Discussion in this chapter requires a pragmatic, essential yet comprehensive definition, to provide a foundation for relating it to imagination, hence it adopts Flavell’s definition in which “Metacognition” refers to one’s knowledge concerning one’s own cognitive processes and products or anything related to them.’ ([29], p. 232). Flavell produced a framework including metacognitive knowledge, experiences, goals and actions ([19], p. 906).

2. Methods

I undertook a theoretical journey towards emergent models of imagination within cognition and metacognition. This research was undertaken from a pragmatic stance (e.g., [30]). It aimed to address a problem which arose within my education practice as a museum and gallery educator: that an articulated understanding of ‘imagination’ is largely absent and its relationship to metacognition seems little considered.

An interdisciplinary approach to data collection was adopted in order to ensure that the new models are well-grounded, not limited by subject discipline and therefore; robust. The integration of theoretical data from multiple fields of knowledge was designed to enable a novel contribution to education practice due to its roots lying in perspectives emerging from beyond that practice. A method analogous to ‘grounded theory’ ([31], p. 491), was used inductively in the selection and analysis of literature, which constituted data within the study. Theory emerged from the identification and cohering of themes from the data, in conjunction with the interpretive capacity of the researcher, as an education practitioner. Exploring theories across disciplines unearthed ideas to use in re-imagining imagination. This enabled a conceptual escape from what can be a restrictive, educational perspective which can simply serve ‘to facilitate a “ready-made” political or moral (normative) purpose’ ([32], p. 2), as opposed to creating a means of supporting the productive transformation of our thinking and learning.

The resulting, cognitive and metacognitive models of imagination (see [1]) constituted the basis for the further research which is described in this chapter. This was an action research case study ‘Imagination Agents’.

3. Findings: key themes emerging

Two themes emerged strongly. The first, transcendence, is concerned with imagination and self-awareness, in a species-wide and individual sense. The second is imagination as cognition, which is concerned with imagination as being fundamental within all or almost all of our thought.

3.1 Transcendence

First, the theme of transcendence is concerned with a species-wide, evolutionary perspective. What emerged within the theme is a proposal that by evolving a sufficiently sophisticated imagination, our capacity to develop and use a transcendental ‘vision’ developed. A significant evolution and enlargement of human brains (which evolutionary psychologists generally accept as taking place about 1 million years ago (e.g., [25], p. 48)) enabled us to develop theories of mind and to be able to consider our place within, whatever we then conceived as the universe. These transcendental theories led to our further evolutionary development, with ‘This perception of one’s individual existence in space and time…[becoming] a driving force in the evolution of the human animal.’ ([26], p. 8). In developing such an understanding of ourselves and of our situation, we could also develop empathy for other humans by imagining their thoughts, feelings and needs.

This capacity for self-awareness and empathy is surely a basic condition for personal agency and from this, social/democratic capacity. For example, self-awareness of how we learn, personally, might lead us to recognise that the holistic well-being of a social group depends on ensuring that others can also learn and need to be cared for in this respect through an empathetic approach to their learning needs and accompanying efforts to accommodate these. Thus, concepts of education for the social and democratic good might arise. Additionally, we see that from the outset of this argument, there is an implied closeness between imagination and metacognition if we consider metacognition to be a special kind of self-awareness, which, in its application to thinking and learning, is perhaps a particularly powerful kind of self-awareness in relation to species-wide development.

There is an interesting role for arts and culture within this evolutionary (as applied to the species) and developmental (as applied to the individual) theory, which has implications for the development of pedagogies to support imagination and metacognition. Montell argues ([26], p. 17) that the evolutionary adaptation of imagination was driven by awareness and fear of death. This had been provoked by the development of our sophisticated capacity for imagination. It may have been advantageous for us to externalise this fear in the form of artefacts ([25], pp. 49–50), with the proliferation of these leading to the development of culture and cultural practices which involved them. These cultural artefacts acted as cognitive anchors for concepts, set outside of ourselves, where they could be contemplated and shared and built upon. This externalisation of ideas as physical objects freed up ‘…cognitive ‘space” [24], allowing us to over-ride existing mental categories and to develop our ways of thinking, socio-culturally (Ibid). A cycle emerges: evolved imagination leads to self-awareness, leading to socio-cultural dialogue, which further expands social and individual imagination. Considering this in a current, pedagogical context, we might come to understand the special, cognitive value of arts-based experiences and their potential in supporting social dialogues which can lead to individual and social agency. This idea is infused within the Imagination Agents project, described towards the end of this chapter. While the application of imagination need not only be concerned with supporting agency, it is fundamental to this task, since it is what enables us to consider ourselves reflectively, to consider the perspectives of others and what all of this means for successful co-existence.

Kant’s philosophical theory of ‘transcendental imagination’ (Critique of Pure Reason, 1781) asserts that imagination is an innate human faculty which underpins and structures our thinking. Imagination enables us to group and synthesise new, sensory impressions with pre-integrated mental images. Transcendental imagination performs a basic, classifying function, without which we would be left to respond to experiences which would seem chaotic and meaningless. The idea of imagination as a kind of driving, cognitive force towards the progressive development of our understanding emerges, expanding the Aristotelian idea of imagination as the ‘movement’ of stored mental images, driven by ‘desire’ for meaning (De Anima, 3, 10, 433a).

Kant’s use of the word ‘transcendental’ then, means that imagination ‘comes first’ and drives us to transcend what would otherwise be a mess of dis-ordered experiences. Without imagination, we could not synthesise our perceptions into concepts. If we experienced buildings, we could not conceptualise them as part of the environment or consider that, in greater number, they would constitute a city. We could not apply concepts of urban development or compare buildings to other buildings with different purposes. Each experience of a building would be unconnected with any idea which enabled a broader ‘sense-making’ about them and their place in the world. Likewise, without transcendental imagination about ourselves as humans, we could not understand the relationships between self, species and the universe. This transcendental deficit would negate possibilities for personal and/or social agency, since we could not understand self or social concepts and by extension, how to support self or society.

So far we have considered imagination in the context of cognition but this has strayed into ideas of self-awareness and theories of mind, which could be considered to be related to metacognition, albeit that these are broader concepts. Within metacognition, imagination enables a more focused transcendence, concentrated upon our thinking and learning.

To summarise what has emerged from this theme of ‘transcendence’ then, there are two key aspects, one evolutionary and the other, philosophical/psychological. First, imagination enabled our self-awareness at an evolutionary level. We then had to cope with the imaginings that this brought. The need to externalise our thinking prompted our cultural development and from that, our further, social development as a species. Considering transcendence at an individual level, it is the organising factor within our thinking. Through this, we are able to synthesise and organise ideas about our own thinking and learning, which constitute metacognition. We can conclude that, based on these ideas, imagination is fundamental to cognition and metacognition, as well as to individual and social development.

4. Imagination as cognition

In De Anima, Aristotle provides foundational ideas of cognitive imagination. For him, imagination mediates our sensory perceptions and our judgement. Without imagination, our sensory perceptions would be unavailable to our thought processes and therefore, we could not think properly or function as conscious individuals.

For Aristotle, imagination is ‘movement’ (De Anima, 3, 3, 428b), concerned with transporting sensory perceptions into the cognitive realm, where they are stored for further use. This ‘image store’ support us to deliberate and self-regulate by recalling ‘images’ (while this implies visuality it includes all kinds of sensory perceptions, smell, touch taste etc.) to enable us to reason and self-regulate. According to Aristotle, we are driven by a ‘desire’ (De Anima, 3, 7, 431b) to understand or make meaning. Within this driven process of cognition, imagination connects sensory perception with our existing thought, enables us to make choices and to think backwards and forwards in time (ibid). applying Aristotle’s ideas to metacognition: driven by the desire to learn, we make choices and self-regulate our thinking and learning by manipulating stored mental imagery which relates to this. The mental image can be considered as a ‘building block’ of the imagination which is critical within our thinking.

Jumping forward in time, Hume and Kant developed understanding of imagination as cognition which seems to have laid foundations for more recent, psychological approaches. Hume’s [33] philosophy of imagination as a kind of existential keystone, holding together a coherent understanding of the world by filling in gaps in our understanding is resonant with Piaget’s, psychological understanding of the role of imagination for young children. For Piaget, imagination compensates for a deficit in material experiences [34]. Kant’s ‘transcendental imagination’ has resonance with Piaget’s theory of schema and the accommodation and assimilation of experiences into these (1952).

Vygotsky concurs with Piaget that our thinking is based on storing, manipulating and applying sensory images, conceptualising this not as ‘gap filling’ within the act of discovering pre-existent truths (in a positivist sense) but as a creative, constructive activity [34]. This implies an agental role for the learner as a constructor of meaning and therefore as a potential change-maker. This function can be applied to the development of metacognition and our capacity to make sense of and strategise our thinking and learning. Furthermore, the implication is that we can create new knowledge, which can provoke thinking about new possibilities in relation to the complex challenges which we face individually and socially.

5. Findings: an emerging model of cognitive imagination

Having described what emerged from the research process as significant themes in relation to the study, I will now go on to summarise the models of imagination and cognition and metacognition which were major findings. These were initially described in detail in [1] and are briefly re-presented here, illuminated by new examples of how they might manifest in experience.

The premise of the model of imagination in cognition is that imagination consists of various manipulations of mental images, which we recall from a kind of ‘store’ or an ‘allusionary base’ ([35], p. 18), in order to cohere ideas. This premise can be traced back to Aristotle, who described this concept of storage and recall, driven by ‘desire’, in ‘De Anima’. To consider how the model might manifest in our thinking, I will relate the types of imagination to a concept and apply them in the context of a child learning. With reference to Jerome Bruner’s chapter ‘Possible Castles’ [36], I will use the concept of ‘a castle’ (Table 1).

Tye of imagination	Definition	Example
Imaging	Evoking images of what is not present, to support our thinking	A child brings to mind an image of a castle which they have experienced, in person or as a sensory representation
Productive	Combining images	The child considers and connects physical attributes from a variety of castles which they have experienced
Creative	Connecting images towards the production of a relatively original idea (relative to the individual)	The child produces an idea of a castle which they have never experienced first-hand but which could, theoretically, exist materially
Fantastical	Bringing to mind things which have not been/cannot be directly, materially experienced	The child brings to mind the ‘Castle Greyskull’, from the animation He-Man

Table 1.

Types of imagination: Definitions and examples.

Note that fantastical imagination is ‘fantastical’ because the child imagined something materially impossible, yet not original. Fantastical Imagination may or may not be creative. For instance, it could be said that bringing to mind a dragon requires fantastical imagination since a dragon is not ‘real’ in a material sense (as far as we know!). This is not necessarily Creative Imagination because dragons will usually not be a relatively original imagining. On the other hand, Fantastical Imagination could include Creative Imagination if the impossible scenario being imagined is original to the person imagining it. Fantastical Imagination, while it may or may not involve Creative Imagination, like Creative Imagination, will also rely on Imaging and Productive Imagination.

6. Findings: an emerging model of metacognitive imagination

Having modelled the fundamental role of imagination in cognition, it is safe to assume that imagination also supports metacognition [19]. Metacognition requires the application of our cognition, within a focus on our cognition; therefore it involves imagination. Within a metacognitive process, the kinds of imagination identified in the cognitive model would be applied to the issue of our own thinking and learning.

Basically, to model imagination and metacognition we need to recall and objectify the cognitive model in order to gain a ‘meta’ view. While focussed on our thinking and learning, imagination within our metacognition is likely to perform in basically the same way as it does within our cognition, however, the relationship is more complex in requiring a more demanding role for self-awareness, which, as discussed above (and in [1]), is dependent on imagination. Imagine a child, metacognitively reflecting on how they produced a story about travelling back in time. The categories of imagining are interacting within a self-transcendent lens, as the child reflects on how they incorporated experiences from a visit to their local museum to create their vision of the world of a child living 200 years ago. Using imaginative, self-awareness the child metacognises that drawing on personal, material, experience inspires their creativity. They decide that this is a helpful, future learning strategy, thereby developing their metacognitive skill. They have used their cognitive capacities in the context of their transcendental capacity for self-awareness. Both capacities were supported by imagination, within a metacognitive process.

Table 2 attempts to summarise the role of each kind of imagination within metacognition. To provide some tangible insight into how the metacognitive model might apply to a piece of thinking, we will use the example of a child faced with a challenging exam including the topic of photosynthesis.

Type of imagination	Definition of role in metacognition	Example
Imaging	Bringing to mind images about thinking and learning	A child brings to mind an experience of struggling to comprehend the idea of photosynthesis
Productive	Cohering imagery of experience to imagery of concepts related to thinking and learning	The child recalls comprehending the idea of evolution after seeing a visual representation of this online and copying it with pencil and paper
Creative	Applying relevant concepts in order to reason about one’s own states—necessarily a relatively novel piece of thinking	The child reflects that seeing information presented visually and making a visual copy helps with their comprehension of big ideas like photosynthesis. For the first time, they find visual representations of photosynthesis online and make their own diagram which summarises these
Fantastical	Bringing to mind ideas about thinking and learning which have not/cannot be materially experienced	The child imagines that everything they could possibly learn about is presented visually in school, which becomes a kind of infinite learning ‘gallery’. The idea of this inspires them to produce further images, as a strategy for comprehension, which they display on their bedroom walls

Table 2.

Types of imagination in metacognition: Definitions and examples.

If we see self-awareness as the foundation of metacognitive knowledge, we might expect imagination to have an amplified role in metacognition. The deliberate application of our thought to our unique and individual thinking implies novelty and requires Creative Imagination. The role of imagination is increased if we cross, conceptually, from cognition to metacognition. Creative Imagination is the key to unlocking metacognition. Imaging and Productive Imagination are of course required but metacognition is grounded in cognitions previously acquired through socio-cultural experience and turned into images relating to thinking and learning. We accomplish this by using Productive and Creative Imagination at the cognitive level. These capacities are now material for ‘meta’ reflection. Simultaneously, they are tools for metacognitive manipulation—the same thought processes applied to our concepts of thinking and learning. ‘Only when we have embarked on the creative task of developing metacognitive knowledge and skill do we continue to manipulate and combine imaging and products of imaging at this higher level, transcending and ‘looking down’ on our own learning, having accumulated a sufficiently sophisticated lexicon of symbolic language in order to achieve this’ ([1], p. 12). In Vygotskian terms, at this point our thoughts have been crystallised into mental tools which allow us to open up and construct thinking within a metacognitive realm.

The example in Table 2 is of course, simplified. The categories of imagination will interplay more, however; it provides a starting point for considering what are usually tacit processes. We can now speculatively ‘map’ imagination and its relationship with metacognition. Metacognitive knowledge and skill can be situated within a larger ‘pool’ of Imaging in relation to thinking and learning. From this pool, can bring to mind what is not present in relation to ‘learning’. ‘Ready-cohered within this pool of images is a range of cognitive tools which, when directed towards the concept of our own learning, enable us to manipulate and generate new thoughts which enhance metacognitive knowledge and skill’ ([1], p. 12). Metacognitive knowledge and skill need and feed each other. Skill requires knowledge as a foundation from which to construct successful strategy. To obtain metacognitive knowledge we need to apply metacognitive skill. Metacognitive knowledge uses Productive Imagination to recall existing and integrate new images. Creative Imagination is needed in order to synthesise these thoughts by making and applying ‘rules’ to organise them coherently.

Moving on to consider metacognitive skill, due to its focus on self-regulation and strategy, this is largely supported by Creative Imagination, ‘since these executive functions require the ability to reason and solve problems which are personal (therefore novel) to the learner’ ([1], p. 13). While it is likely to draw directly on Imaging and Productive Imagination, in allowing connections to be forged and thoughts to flow, it also draws on Productive Imagination which has been previously crystallised into metacognitive knowledge as imagery related to thinking and learning. It requires the ability to speculate about and create strategies for application and adaptation in different contexts. This metacognitive capacity for ‘adaptive intelligence’ ([37], p. 1) is essential for responding effectively to turbulent, socio-cultural environments and for enabling us to better address the significant challenges we face during the current. ‘convergence of crises’ [38] we face. By increasing our metacognitive skill there is the potential to increase our confidence and perception of ourselves as capable, democratic agents.

In summary of what is described above and more fully in Burns [1] as an emergent model of metacognitive imagination: metacognitive knowledge and skill dynamically interact with each other. They are dependent on and consist largely of imagination. Reaching a metacognitive state requires us to transcend into self-awareness (individually and historically, as a species), using Imaging and the other kinds of imagination described. Imagination enables us to construct knowledge. We can then apply creative imagination to cohere our unique, concept of self. With this in place, we are able to ‘step outside’ of our thinking, as if it were an artefact. We can then reflect and build on it, metacognitively, with imagination continuing to support those metacognitive processes.

7. Discussion

7.1 Just imagination?

Having explored and modelled imagination and metacognition let us return to the question which partially forms the title of this chapter ‘Is metacognition just imagination?’. First, it is important to address the fact that the word ‘just’ can imply lesser value for imagination. This author hopes that, in having made a case for and modelled imagination in such a way as to demonstrate its fundamental and pervasive presence within our thinking, we do not see it as a lesser faculty. We can also reflect that, while metacognition is necessarily concerned only with our own thinking and learning, imagination is a far broader concept in terms of its potential application to any given aspect of our world/universe. While this applicability is broad, it does not necessarily follow that it penetrates every aspect of our thinking or of our metacognition.

Next then, perhaps we can ask, what is left of metacognition without imagination? What seems to remain within metacognitive processes beyond imagination are any operations which do not require mental images (for instance, isolated verbal coding and perhaps, structures for thinking through, if it is possible for these not to depend on imagery). If this is the case, then imagination and metacognition are very, very close and we might argue that the terms are interchangeable.

What if, rather than using the word ‘metacognition’ in education, we had used ‘imagination’? As well as enabling us to work with metacognition, as a specific aspect of imagination, this would allow us to understand and would emphasise the need to nurture imagination more generally or to recognise it clearly as the foundation for metacognition, in addition to its further benefits for learning, beyond imagining concerned with the self. This might elevate imagination in education from being seen as a ‘fluffy’, magical and non-educable force into a cognitive/metacognitive capacity which it is vital to teach for. Given the accountability agenda which prevails in many of our current, global education systems and the impact this has on what and how children learn (for instance, the emphasis on STEM subjects and on measurable outcomes) we might concur with Giroux, that in neoliberal societies schools act as ‘disimagination machines’ and insist that we need to generate a healthier attitude to and provision for imaginative learning experiences. Ascribing the same importance to imagination as we do to metacognition might help to remedy this, with many educators understanding that the global and social issues we face can only be solved by imaginative individuals, communities and societies. This could be understood as an act of embracing multiplicity in order to address:

‘the posthuman convergence…[as] a multi-directional opening that allows for multiple possibilities and calls for experimental forms of mobilization, discussion and at times even resistance’ ([38], p. 9).

To some extent I am ‘resisting’ and playing devil’s advocate here, out of anger and despair at what I see as a lack of imagination in education (both in what learners experience and in how teachers perform or are allowed to perform), as well as for the purpose of emphasising the essential role of imagination for metacognition and more generally, for living a good life. Perhaps it is useful or necessary to retain ‘metacognition’ as a more specific concept, rather than to lose it to ‘imagination’. Ideally, we should have the language, conceptual understanding and indeed, the imagination to embrace both ideas and their relevance to each other, for application within our learning, for the development of personal and social agency and ultimately, for social justice and the good of our planet.

7.2 Applying the findings

Recently, the author applied the models, along with a model of individual ‘agency’ [39] in research with young people in a Scottish, inner-city secondary school. The project was called Imagination Agents and was funded through a Royal Society of Arts Catalyst Grant. At the time of writing, data collection has only just been completed, so while it is not yet possible to report with rigour on the findings, it is useful to describe the application of the models (above) here, with some minor speculation as to the results. Led by an artist, Imagination Agents aimed to support young people to develop personal agency through an experiential process designed to nurture metacognition of their imagination and through this, their sense of personal agency. The hypothesis we worked with was that imagination enables the originality for creativity, which enables us to create unique, personal understandings of and strategies for metacognition, with metacognition enabling confidence for taking action, or, in other words, personal agency.

The project took a ‘grass-roots’ approach, identifying pertinent issues within the local environment of the school and encouraging the young people to respond to these artistically. This artistic challenge acted as a ‘vehicle’ for them to develop their sense of agency. In having no ‘right answers’, the subjectivity of art as a discipline allowed the young people to make their own decisions within an imaginative and creative process. The artistic outcomes of this included the production of sculptures, cast in plaster from discarded packaging and situated within the local environment and alternative signage, which the young people took out into their local streets and park.

Data collection tools were embedded within the pedagogic approach. They were ‘catalytic’ [40] in providing research data whilst simultaneously enabling the young people participating to reflect on and develop a metacognitive perspective of their imagination and agency. These tools (seeFigure 1) took the form of handbooks, which included axial tools related to the models of imagination (above) and a model of ‘ecological agency’ [39]. Within the art-based context, these self-evaluation tools were designed to be as visual as possible and to minimise the need for writing, in order to engage young people who had chosen to join the project because of its artistic focus. The handbook also included opportunities to visually represent imagination and agency at the start and at the end of the project by drawing metaphors for each of these. Additionally, there were sketchbook-style, blank pages and further activities relating to the project focus on local sustainability, so that the handbooks might work both as data collection tools and in supporting the pedagogy. They were designed in collaboration with the artists who worked on the project to ensure that they served these combined purposes.

Figure 1.

Tool for self- evaluating imagination.

While the handbooks worked well, despite our best efforts, they still seemed to be and ‘add on’ to the main project activity. The young people completed them but really, they would have preferred to stay with their personal, art making and told the researchers so. They also said that they did not want to write at all, even though this was a minimal requirement, within the context of an art project. We did explain that this was necessary since the handbooks would also constitute data which we wanted to interpret correctly, in accordance with participant intentions. In this communication, the young people were of course, exhibiting agency. The axial tools were quick to complete and as such, yielded participation and useful data. Importantly, the young people (aged 12–13) were easily able to comprehend the models of imagination and agency presented to them, which is an encouraging finding in relation to the practicality of the models presented within this paper.

As mentioned above, data has not yet been fully analysed but what can be said is that in yielding hand-made signs on a walk around the local area, the young people certainly exhibited confidence and agency, as they selected appropriate settings in which to photograph them and were happy to be photographed with them. The nature of these signs and the slogans the young people created on them was usually humorous and friendly, playing with ideas of dictatorial instructions in relation to the environment, such as ‘LOOK at the nice ducks!’ (Figure 2). While, superficially, this can be interpreted as light-hearted fun, it can also be seen as an attempt at social influence by democratic means. By reminding people to focus on the positive, the young artist hoped to stimulate appreciation of and empathy for the environment. As discussed above, this capacity for empathy is based on the capacity to imagine the perspective of others, in this case, the ducks and the people who have the opportunity to experience them. From a posthuman perspective (e.g.; [6, 38]), this can be seen as an important philosophical step towards de-centralising our position as human beings within environments, re-imagining the place of fellow species, their connection with us and the environments we make and share. Such an approach chimes with concepts of ‘The Imaginary Institution of Society’ [41] in which, ‘What we call ‘reality’ and ‘rationality” (p. 3) are works of imagination and as such, can be changed.

Figure 2.

Image of young person’s artwork.

8. Conclusion

The emergent models imply that imagination is fundamental to cognition, metacognition and is at the root of our potential for agency. Imagination must be recognised as a critical means of supporting personal and democratic agency. This implies that imagination, along with metacognition, should be considered as an educational priority which need to be effectively supported by curricula, teachers and pedagogy.

Imagination is not a magical addition to our thought. Rather, it is intrinsic throughout. The necessity for imagination in metacognition is particularly important, given that metacognition supports achievement and attainment. In its close association with metacognition, imagination could share some of the credit for enabling our learning which is usually associated with the former capacity. Through this association it might be possible to raise the status of educational provision for imagination and increase opportunities for simultaneous, imaginative and metacognitive development.

The emergent models are offered firstly; as a basis for dialogue across the field of education. This may lead to their rejection, adaptation or even their replacement, as a means of progressing this area of education. I make no claim that they are comprehensive, complete or in any way ‘ultimate’. They simply offer a means of discussing what has often been considered to be largely inaccessible and indescribable, while also constituting a valuable part of our learning. Secondly; the models are offered to practitioners and researchers who are interested in exploring their potential within their areas of interest. The accumulation of findings from such explorations can help to establish how useful the models are and suggest pathways for their transformation.

The models can help us to establish the current state of practitioner understanding of imagination and the in/adequacy of support offered for this. They also offer a framework to support pedagogic design. They could be used to form criteria for the exploration of imagination in and across contexts, in relation to multiple factors and impacts (not to suggest a solely deductive approach; the models might complement inductive methods). A priority is to expand understanding of the imaginative meta/cognitive processes which support capacity for personal and democratic agency.

If we have tools available to us which can even evidence the development of imagination and through this; metacognition and if we are able to engage in dialogue about how best to support these capacities through the presence of a practical language and framework, it may be more likely that we can encourage serious, focussed approaches to imagination in education. If we can accomplish this, not only will we support metacognition and learning; we might help to secure a better future for our planet by equipping learners to confidently address the complex, global and local problems which we face.

9. Recommendations

Since the initial conclusion of the research described above, further ideas and philosophies of imagination have come to the authors attention as being relevant within a consideration of imagination in education, particularly in terms of its co-relation with agency. Costariadis’s ([41], p. 146) ideas of the radical imaginary, in particular, have resonance here, in positing imagination as the basis of social-historical concepts. This suggests that those concepts can be re-imagined, within a ‘universe of significations’ which are constituted by imagination. This reimagining and subsequent action relating to it might be considered to constitute social agency. Relating this to an individual, metacognitive perspective and focussing specifically on learning, by this argument there is continual potential to re-imagine ourselves as learners. We might otherwise refer to this as creative, metacognitive strategy. While Costariadis’s theories were largely related to possibilities for societal change, they also seem to offer relevant insights in relation to imagination, metacognition and agency within the individual. The author recommends the pursuit of and will pursue these and other theories within attempts to ensure the continued emergence of understanding in these areas.

If we consider the example of the ‘nice ducks’ (above)art seems to be a good vehicle for reimagining, applied to any given focus. It may not seem surprising that art supports imaginative capacities; however, based on the arguments presented above, imagination is critical to rational thought, so, if art supports imagination better than some other subjects, it is worrying that it is so neglected in many curricula (see, for example NSEAD 2015), usually in favour of STEM subjects. We can also assume that, due to imagination’s close relationship with metacognition, the deficit in art provision might also impact negatively on opportunities to develop metacognition. After all, what is a work of art if not a ‘meta’ representation of or reflection on a chosen idea or set of ideas. As such, a recommendation arising from this work is to advocate STEAM (Science, Technology, Engineering, Art, Mathematics) rather than STEM.

A further recommendation is simply to continue with the process of finding ways to evaluate and self-evaluate imagination, perhaps in conjunction with the evaluation of metacognition. This could include the quantitative analysis and reporting of qualitative data, with this perhaps more likely to convince those who retain the idea that imagination is ‘magical’, unteachable, or too abstract to be evidenced. The ability to evidence imagination statistically could play into prevailing concerns with accountability, enabling recognition of its importance and thereby, its existence in education systems. This said, this author would hope that in evidencing its cognitive and metacognitive value, there might also be the possibility to illuminate the limitations of such instrumental regimes within education, which can act to negate important areas of learning (see [42]). Embracing imagination as cognition and metacognition enables creative possibilities beyond meeting pre-imposed learning outcomes and increases our chances of finding new solutions to complex problems in individual as well as social life. It allows individuals to be re-creators, rather than spectators (after [43], p. 56). This could include the reimagining and re-creation of our education.

All in all, the recommendations above cohere to suggest a much more substantial focus on imagination within education. Along with this we need to recognise and understand imagination’s close relationship with metacognition, with this relationship offering a route to personal and social agency.