Perspective Chapter: Basic Rules of Air Supremacy in the Last Thirty Years

Abstract

Modern warfare has brought with it the Electro-Fire Battle and Electro-Fire Fight. These are the new forms and methods of operational actions with no clear boundaries and only higher level of them are related to war. Operation “Desert Fox” carried out by the United States and Great Britain in Iraq in 1998 can be considered as a prototype of electro-fire action (operational level action). It was a 73-hour operation, during which four rocket-aircraft strikes were implemented lasting 6–9 hours. These correct electro-fire strikes and operations can break an anti-aircraft system of any density and quality. We can see these kinds of patterns in the wars of the last half century in the Middle East, Artsakh and Ukraine. This study is based on the facts of the wars carried out based on scientific-technical and military-scientific developments taking place in the world in the last thirty years. The method of combining facts and results, sometimes numerical results, was used for the study. Certainly, in military science the measurability of justifications is always difficult to prove with numerical data, sometimes they occur directly with political acts and results, however, it becomes possible to bring out patterns from several examples.

1. Introduction

It is worth mentioning that after 1991 American air supremacy was more clearly manifested in Yugoslavia in 1999 and Iraq in 2003. They had certain dimensions, namely the American military school emphasized air superiority, giving great importance to digital control systems and precision weapons [1], p. 68; [2], p. 68; [3], p. 8.

The development of the American military-scientific school, which was justified especially after the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, has several fundamental features. They are as follows:

1. The center of gravity of wars has risen to the air and space domain.

2. Provision of air supremacy affects the development of all other types of weapons.

3. Conventional striking means are replaced by precision weapons.

4. Man should be replaced by technology and robot in all possible places.

5. Digital technologies develop control systems.

6. Good leaders should prevail in the culture of military control; management should be based on the principle of Mission Command.

All those innovations have made the wars fast and dynamic.

In several of our works in the form of articles and books, we have thoroughly described the provision of air supremacy, by which the American military–scientific culture achieves victory, especially over the ground Air Defense, in the form of six rules ([4], pp. 325–334).

2. Basic rules and patterns

In 1991, operations with precision air strikes lasted from 2 to 3 hours, while from 1999 to 2003, the duration of those strike operations reached 7 hours in a row. This became possible due to accurate strike means, quality intelligence, as well as effective management systems.

The speed of the enemy detection (its intentions), as well as information gathering and processing together with decision making, will be one of the decisive issues in the conflicts. Decision-making time will be further reduced making the commander’s decision not a reaction to the ongoing situation, but a preparation for the predicted situation. That is to say, a decision should be made for the expected action, for the future.¹ The combat operations will be carried out in parallel or in an interconnected way in all four dimensions with the same intensity, moreover, the operations of the virtual dimension will be more than the operations of other dimensions. The air dimension will reach cosmic heights, while the sea dimension will go down to a depth of kilometers. Distances will become smaller and the speeds will increase unprecedentedly. Most of the combat arms will be able to carry out operations not only in their dimension but also in the other dimension. The GTs (ground troops) will receive toolkits to operate in the air and sea dimensions. Weapons of the new generation, drones, such as “F/A-XX,” “FCAS,” “XQ-58A Valkyri” [5], “MQ-25,” etc., extended long-range missiles, such as “AARGM-ER” [6], “AIM-260,” “JASSM ER,” etc. will make air and anti-air operations “smarter,” more far-reaching and effective. The ground Air Defense is becoming more vulnerable. The main part of the operations of different dimensions will be combined, interconnected and not necessarily carried out at the same time. The leading armies will try to minimize the involvement of human resources during combat operations or at least it will be by remote intervention, which will be supported by various robotic military techniques, built on a modular basis, are designed to operate in different environments (on the land, in the air, in the water or combined), equipped with different fire, shock means, providing high fire density and accuracy, which will be endowed with as high artificial intelligence as possible minimizing the factor of human intervention (even if various international humanitarian laws are tightened) [7]. Robots will take a wide place along with people, especially in special combat arms. They will be created with modular 3D printers, which will allow to have a large quantity of them [8].

During 2020 the Azerbaijani Air Force applied the above-mentioned Western military-scientific achievements and technologies, with which it overcame the Armenian Air Defense. In particular, mainly Israeli “Harop,” “AirStriker,” “Orbiter” strike UAVS, long-range anti-tank “Spike-NLOS” missiles, long-range rocket artillery, ballistic “LORA” missiles with the supervision of reconnaissance and air control points and extensive use of fake targets launched massive and combined airstrikes over the control points of the Artsakh Defense Army, large depots of weapons, Air-Defense means [9], and the heavy military equipment and artillery ([10], pp. 163–191) still being in permanent deployment locations. The Azerbaijani airstrike, with certain exceptions, was planned in accordance with the specified standards. All the reserves and military targets of the Defense Army were simultaneously subjected to intensive strikes, that is, a deep strike operation was carried out, which was implemented for the first time in the post-Soviet area from the perspective of operational art. During this strike, the Azerbaijanis necessarily used old Soviet “Аn-2” airplanes² instead of the extremely important fake targets, and they used UAVs and other “F-16” fighter jets instead of expensive American air control points. “E-7A (AEW)” airplanes of air control of the Turkish Air Force were also used during the combat operations [12]. REW (Radio-Electronic Warfare) disruptions were actively used so that the Armenian Air Defense means could not fight effectively. The Israeli experience ([13], 209–211) of 1982 and the American experience of 1991 were required for the Azerbaijani Army to paralyze the Armenian Air Defense system. This piece of the operation was carried out at a high level, which seriously paralyzed the control system of the Armenian Army[14]. This strike, the success of which is often exaggerated, in any case caused a lot of damage to the Armenian Air Defense, while it gave a free hand to the Azerbaijani troops. It is true that some planned target points were hit unnecessarily, for example, no damage was caused when striking the headquarters of the Defense Army or the divisions. Here the problem was not related to one or two massive strikes, taken separately, but the fact that in real time the Azerbaijani Air Force saw the theater of the operation on the entire front and almost in full depth, therefore, it had the opportunity to strike everywhere, along the entire front and depth of the front.

The Azerbaijani helicopters started to use “Spike-NLOS” missiles to launch long-range strikes even on separate armored vehicles and other vehicles.³ The Turkish “Bayraktar TB2” UAVs gained more popularity in this case, but still, the Israeli missiles did the main job. The long-range missiles started to launch precision strikes also on the Armenian logistics network and the newly discovered command points and the Air Defense means.

During the 44-day war, the Armenian Air Defense Forces did not have the strength, means, skills and mastery to disrupt the highly competent Azerbaijani air operations, even if they were local. In fact, Azerbaijan used the above-mentioned concept at the local level, where the air management points, intelligence striking complexes, fake targets and direct striking means broke down Armenian Anti-aircraft defense, which had been based on the Soviet Union model.

In September 2023, the Azerbaijani Armed Forces again used these technologies and solutions towards the population of Artsakh which had been in blockade and had been suffering hardships already for several months. They launched the first strikes over the Air Defense and REW installations of Artsakh, and in order to ensure the great effectiveness of those strikes, they used the Israeli “LORA” ballistic missiles. In a short period of time the Azerbaijani Armed Forces launched intensive strikes on the Air Defense means, artillery divisions and heavy equipment of the Armenian Army. The battles of the ground troops were very tough and intensive, but they lasted very short. The months-long blockade had yielded its results, the Armenian population, which had relied on the Russian peacekeepers, but was completely disappointed, was exhausted and not ready for persistent resistance.

Achieving success within a short time they depopulated Artsakh with the tools of crimes against humanity.

Unfortunately, advanced weapons also enable dictators to target the civilian population, and they achieve their goals by violating the world order. Aliyev committed a new crime in the 21st century with advanced Israeli, Turkish and other weapons. The tyrant of Baku forcibly depopulated Artsakh using Syrian mercenaries, targeting the Armenian civilian population and destroying Armenian millennial culture. Even after the war of 2020 Armenians relied on the Russian peacekeepers, who, however, could not or did not want to perform their duties. Even the death of the Russian officers did not change anything [16].

During the 2020–2023 Russian-Ukrainian war, both sides were actively using accurate means, which are often decisive for solving the main challenges in military operations, but both sides, due to the lack of accurate means—used more conventional means rather than accurate ones. Even though the Russian side also has strategic long-range cruise missile defense systems and other means, their effectiveness is low, due to the lack of their number, as well as the lack of tools to ensure their use, particularly, the lack of reconnaissance strike complexes. By the summer of 2023, the Russian army had used about 2475 long-range missiles, mainly air and sea weapons, on the territory of Ukraine. According to Forbes experts, the value of this amount is 12.5 billion dollars. At the same time, the Russian army spent about 2300 operational and tactical long-range missiles, mainly Iskanders, the cost of which was 3.5 billion dollars.⁴ The number of released missiles is also confirmed by other sources.⁵ The reason why such a large number of missile strikes are ineffective is mainly the result of not using combined, complex and mass strikes due to the low efficiency of reconnaissance strike complexes. At best, the Russian side launches a dozen or two missiles at a time, one of two types. The number of launches of Persian UAVs by the Russian army is certainly increasing, but it cannot be considered as a part of a complex combined air attack. In May 2023, 413 UAVs were launched, after which the numbers decreased significantly. However, in September, they increased again, making 503 units, of which, according to Ukrainian sources, 396, that is 78.7%, were damaged [19]. The real number of wounded UAVs is not as important as the significance of how many UAVs were launched. The increased number of launched UAVs does not have an influence on the strategic number and importance. The Russian Air Force and Navy are unable to carry out large-scale military operations, especially with two or three branches of service. Later we will refer to the complex American strikes lasting 6–9 hours. In the Ukrainian war, the Russian side also tried to disrupt the small, local multi-layered strikes organized by the Ukrainian side, in which a small number of airstrike tactics, fake targets, etc. were included. With the help of air control points, fighter air force and anti-aircraft warfare division the Russian Air Force tried to disrupt these attacks, in which several units of quality cruise missiles and/or reactive volley-fire system missiles were included. However, it was enough for the Ukrainian side to use several units of fake high quality, equally cheap and low-quality fake targets, cheap strike UAVs and properly plan everything. Nearly all Ukrainian local strikes achieved their goals and implemented effective strikes. Because of those strikes, the Russian “Moscow” cruiser, several other important ships, the building of the Black Sea Command, several strategical bridges, several Russian airports were sunk, as a result of which dozens of high-quality aircraft and anti-aircraft warfare divisions were destroyed.

Contrary to that, the Russian side tried to implement mixed multi-layered strikes from the beginning of the war, which later became poorer in terms of means. Cheap Persian UAVs were replaced by cruise missiles, but they did not have much effectiveness, because the organization and provision of strikes failed seriously. Before and during the strikes, the organization of the constant intelligence process, the accompaniment, the radio-electronic support, the same type of tactical tricks, the poorness of strike means, and the deficiencies in the organization of the interaction of the military forces make these strikes ineffective. The help of the American reconnaissance means allows the Ukrainian high-quality anti-aircraft defense to hit most of these means on the way, even though these anti-aircraft means are not quantitatively sufficient.

Today it is evident that significant revolutionary changes take place in military affairs. For example, unmanned aerial vehicles and strike devices of various sizes have been created. Another important step in the management system is that every soldier should be visible on the commander’s screen. After the C4 I and C4 ISR command and control systems, the US military uses new, more advanced digital command and control systems ([20], p. 260).

Fighter jets of the new generation already operate in the system of “C5 ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Combat Systems, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance).” These systems ensure unity of the brigade and air component control systems and together form the control component of network-centric warfare. In the case of NPCW (network platform-centric wars), these systems even give the opportunity to control joint or separate wars that are factually going on in one strategic network but are actually being waged in different operational and strategic theaters. In 2021, the name of that system was fixed as “Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control (CJADC2)” ([21], p. 8).

Some experts believe that simultaneously horizontal and vertical integration systems will give the opportunity to increase the accuracy of destruction, as well as enhance the control of actions, etc. [22].

Here the theory of “Prompt Global Strike (PGS)” is important. Thanks to the new type of airstrike means systems, the American armed forces will have the opportunity to strike at any point in the world after a maximum of 1 hour. Now within the framework of 48 hours, the American army can accumulate the number of airstrike means systems needed to provide the necessary superiority at any point on the planet.⁶ The “Prompt Global Strike (PGS)” project is being promoted in parallel with the network-centric war theory, it is a highlighted toolkit for “Multi-domain battle,” “Multi domain operations/Joint All-Domain Operations (MDO/JADO)” concepts. War is the set of simultaneous actions in all dimensions and domains ([24], p. 14). It is the highest display of means employment and operations management, a finished version of American military culture which has been developing over the decades. The latest doctrinal document of the US Army “MDO/JADO” clearly states that there are a lot of dimensions and domains of wars and military operations, the separations are often artificial, and cognitive and cyber domains are as important as the physical ones [21]. In May 2023, the third operational group of the US Army, built according to the “MDO/JADO” concept, reached the appropriate level of operational readiness [25].

3. Conclusion

The conclusion can be made that at the operational and strategic levels of the war, air supremacy will remain a decisive factor. However, this does not mean that traditional, classical military types and weapons will be pushed into the background.

Today we can clearly see all this in Ukraine, where no large-scale offensive operation is carried out without ensuring air supremacy, but ground troops and especially artillery are widely used.

The Russian Air Force is constantly trying to carry out complex air operations in Ukraine, but they have never been of a high level. The maximum number of aircraft that were simultaneously involved in the military operations did not reach a hundred. As a rule, they were used with very poor coordination, sometimes with intervals of two to three hours, while the maximum launches during the same operation generally amounted to no more than a hundred means of airstrike, of which about a quarter were striking unmanned aerial vehicles. This is a result of the limited possibilities of implementation of the six rules that we have previously mentioned. The Russian Air Force does not have sufficient space and air reconnaissance and control capabilities, the accuracy of the strike means and the coordination of complex strikes is weak. The most massive strike was carried out on November 29, 2023, when a total of 158 means of airstrikes were launched, about 40 were striking UAVs, and the rest were mainly air defense cruise missiles. There is a very small number of aeroballistic missiles that are difficult to shoot down. Two days later, on the second day of January 2024, 100 similar means of airstrikes were launched, 10 of which were the well-known “Kinzhal” aeroballistic missiles. According to some information, they are launched in the following sequence, first the UAVs with a small number of anti-radiolocation missiles, then various cruise missiles, after which aeroballistics and ballistic missiles are launched, which are also accompanied by old anti-aircraft missiles, used as ballistic missiles. In total, during the five days, according to Ukrainian official data, more than 500 means of airstrikes were launched, 300 of which were cruise missiles and aero ballistic missiles, and 200 were attack UAVs, a very small number of anti-radiolocation and other means of airstrikes. Before that, the record of the Russian army was 50–60 striking UAVs and other cruise missiles per day, or about 500 cruise missiles per month, most of which were striking UAVs. In May 2023, the Russian army launched 400 “Shahed/Geran” type striking UAVs and a very small number of means of airstrikes with good quality. In September of the same year, they launched more than 500 of the same UAVs and again a small number of means of airstrikes.

In December 2023, 780 units of “Shahed-136/131/Geran” strike UAVS were launched.⁷

This ratio expresses the main trend of the last two decades, when many means of airstrikes are supported by not expensive and not high-quality means of airstrikes which we also saw during the second Iraq war. According to the Ukrainian and Western official data, as well as our personal sources, most of these means of airstrike systems, or at least more than half, are hit by anti-aircraft missiles, which occurs first as a consequence of the poor organization of strikes, and then the technical quality of means of airstrikes. These data are very impressive at first glance, never has the Russian air force carried out more strikes, but a detailed study of the strikes shows that as a military operation, they present several challenges, and they are not effective, in particular:

1. In terms of density, the strikes are not unprecedented in the art of war, however, they lasted for a long time, which means, that the synchronization was bad, which gives the Ukrainian Air Defense an opportunity to competently defend itself.

2. The strikes are not accompanied by many Radio-electronic struggle, distracting and fake means, and with many anti-radiolocation missiles.

3. The efficiency reduced significantly, as a result of the strikes being scattered over a large area.

4. Hits were made only against stationary targets.

5. Strikes were not accompanied by constant, guided intelligence.

In other words, the Russian side did not manage to ensure the six rules we mentioned by organizing unprecedentedly large strikes for them. It is not surprising that there are no accompanying videos of these strikes, evidence of their accuracy, and only eyewitnesses’ videos are cited as arguments for effective strikes, and sometimes there are ridiculous claims that, for example, a Ukrainian factory that used to produce uniforms was destroyed by those strikes.⁸

On January 15, 2024, the Ukrainian Air Defense, according to their claim, hit the air control plane “A-50” of the Russian Air Force over the Azov Sea basin.⁹ If this fact is confirmed, then it is unprecedented in the history of military art. According to some experts’ interpretation, the forces of the Ukrainian Air Defense acted in a very interesting and complex combination, used the Soviet “S-300″ division, discovered the Russian control airplanes, after which the hidden “Patriot PAC 2/3” station was started for a short time, presumably one launching station which launched the hitting missiles. At the same time the crew of the airplane “Su-34″ recorded the launch of the division “S-300.” Everything lasted for a very short time, during which the hitting means of the Russian Air Force did not manage to detect and suppress or hit the Ukrainian Air Defense means.¹⁰ This operation is also a complex operation with network control and delicate cooperation.

Russian authors like I. Popov and M. Khamzatov mentioned the failures of the Russian Air Force in detail in the work of “War of the Future” ([30], pp. 100–114).

All this proves that the claim of some theoreticians that UAVs will forever push back the classic tactical air force is not very valid. There are also such discussions in the USA, where, for example, theorists Lieutenant General Samuel Hainot, Colonel Maximilian Bremer, Kelly Grieco and others believe that the era of air superiority is ending [31]. They claim that UAVs are replacing conventional air forces wherever possible. We do not agree with these claims. In addition, we have appropriate arguments for that:

1. First of all, the striking UAVs, which are cheap, do not have much efficiency at the operational and strategic levels, get severely affected by weather conditions, as well as being weak due to the lack of complex equipment, etc.

2. They are effective at the tactical level, which is the domain of the artillery. For example, FPV attack drones replace mortars, but not always.

3. Although such cheap means are important, they satisfy the tight ranks.

4. Means of airstrikes are expensive, therefore, they require high-level technical and combat skills.

5. It is not possible to launch high-quality means of airstrikes from UAVs, for that you need fighters and bombers.

Contrary to that, the Air Force is transforming and becoming more flexible, all possible UAVs, being varieties of means of airstrikes, are integrated with the classic Air Force and complement each other. Modern means of airstrikes are getting smaller in size and perform high-level combat tasks. UAVs and helicopters supplement and often replace attacking aircraft. The capabilities of attack aircraft are approaching the tactical Air force, the American tactical air force has been conducting strategic strikes for a long time, and the new strategic bombers are shrinking in size, maintaining the capabilities of the previous ones. The American “B-21” bomber is almost two times smaller than the other types.