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Small Armaments Non-Proliferation and Terrorism Security Dilemma Smuggling in Aegis of the Asymmetric Warfare

Written By

Vakhtang Maisaia

Submitted: 01 September 2023 Reviewed: 01 September 2023 Published: 13 November 2023

DOI: 10.5772/intechopen.1003052

Gun Violence and Prevention - Connections, Cultures, and Consequences IntechOpen
Gun Violence and Prevention - Connections, Cultures, and Conseque... Edited by Jack Eller

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Gun Violence and Prevention - Connections, Cultures, and Consequences [Working Title]

Jack David Eller

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Abstract

The topic will reveal how armaments proliferation effects on terrorism developments cases and how is possible to correlate new type of terrorism, like Jihadist Terrorism with small armament proliferation issues. All of these factors are linked to asymmetric warfare provisions and attacks perception. The regime of non-proliferation recognizes only large arms and armaments restrictions and proper international law provisions are provided that deal with collective security prerequisites. The small arms and armaments proliferation is limited only with national legal, even sometimes non-binding provisions that makes possible increase scope of terrorism activities at any level. Small armaments are good case for promoting hybrid attacks and guerilla operation and even urban combat wagging by terrorist and aggressive non-state violent actors that easily transformed into security dilemma modality from national to international level. All of the activities are being performed in military scientific terms in aegis of the Fourth Generation Warfare Strategy.

Keywords

  • disarmament
  • non-proliferation regime
  • geopolitics
  • Jihadist terrorism
  • security dilemma
  • non-state violent actors

1. Introduction

With regard transformation of military strategy concept in conjunction with new realms of contemporary international security environment and threat perceptions, it should be considering fresh approaches in military analysis, forecast, planning and conducting combat operations aiming at demoralizing and debilitating of enemy forces by military and political means. Having considered the transformation in field of Military Strategic Thoughts that is connected with new strategy of the Fourth-Generation War (FGW), getting accustomed to processes of 20th and the 21st century processes. In aegis of academic conceptualizations – FGW strategy is linked with concrete military conflicts that foreseen the following components:

  • sophisticated technological developments

  • warfare with terrorist attack elements

  • a non-national nature of warfare

  • a threat toward culture of enemy

  • psychological warfare and media manipulation

  • imposition a sense of vulnerability and debilitation toward enemy with short-run attack and counter-strike [1]

It necessary to identify that whilst performing FGW operations, the ones contain also non-military elements. Among others, one of such elements is being considered – Arms Illegal Smuggling pattern as Asymmetric Challenge case (see below Jihadist Arms/Drug Transit case). In this regard, new security challenge classification could be perceived in case of Actor-Centered Challenge – having clarification of new type of threat emanating from such actors as are international terrorist organizations or networks and international criminal organized groups. In this retrospect is important take into consideration new approach in waging a war and its criteria in conjunction with FGW format. Since 18th century till 21st century military strategy has been changing drastically from classical into modern type of modality origin. Nowadays, in case of the FGW strategy planning is possible to consider elements of Asymmetric Warfare tactics that are necessary sought for waging wars in the 21st century. There are several approaches in identification of the Asymmetric Warfare doctrine, including academic ones. One of the identifications defines that: Asymmetric Warfare – a war between belligerents whose relative military power differs significantly from each other and who have disparate military strategies [2]. It drastically contradicts to so-called “symmetric” or conventional warfare strategy where parties engaged in the warfare game possess equal and similar military capabilities and resources and only they are differ in details of execution [3]. There are various examples of waging asymmetric wars at regional levels, for instance in the Central Asia and in the Caucasus ones. The FGW strategy as new military doctrine plays vital role in transformation of modern military conflicts that characterized with high dynamics of combat activities and so-called “blitzkrieg” oriented provisions. Hence, namely, the asymmetric warfare is being considered as central-pillar pattern in contemporary war games. Due to geostrategic implications, one of the type of asymmetric warfare is sought newly emerged so-called “Jihadist Asymmetric Warfare” strategy demonstrated in conflicts developed in Syria, in Afghanistan and in Iraq and reflected as a decisive factor at regional level too, on case of the Caucasus region. Therefore, namely the strategy exploited by various Jihadist military groups and organizations similar to “Al-Qaeda”, “Islamic Caliphate” (DAESH) or even “Taliban” in Afghanistan made possible for dragging out the NATO ISAF mission for more than 20 years followed up with complete withdrawal of the NATO and USA Forces in 2021. Initially, the NATO ISAF mission de-facto completed when “Al-Qaeda” leader Osama Bin Laden was killed in Pakistani city Karachi and all “Al-Qaeda” network moved to Pakistan territories not controlled by the Pakistani government. Naturally, if the “Al-Qaeda” and DAESH problem were be dissolved, the “Taliban” could not be considered as a challenge to the western community. However, the situation in Afghanistan is still stalemate and is undermining security conditions not only at regional but also at global levels. The geopolitical situation over Afghanistan remains as very unstable and is caused to penetrate into security dilemma of geopolitical dialectics.

In accordance to the classical military theoretical assumptions provided by Carl von Clausewitz – any kind of war is a real chameleon because it changes its nature in every concrete case and notable the phrase is becoming true content withregard the Black Sea Regional Security. The contemporary content of war defines inclusion of asymmetric threats that provides implementation of sophisticated national security politics by the actors of the global security system and envisages the following components: power, chance, astonishment with involvement of national Armed Forces and their doctrines and armaments. The conventional and asymmetric military conflicts are vital to be recognized at the regional level, including with involvement of so-called “Non-State Violent Actors” (“DAESH, “Al-Qaeda”, etc.). After the Russian annexation of the Crimea of Ukraine, the Black Sea Region has already transformed into a global conflict zone. The International Community witnessed that there are two regional hegemons: Russia and Turkey pursuing their own geopolitical and economic interests in the region and the area around the Caspian Sea. Recently, new challenger, China, as a global power, with its “One Belt and One Road” Initiative (OBOR), expresses its own interests toward the region, including from the asymmetric threat perception points of view. Suffice it, the Asymmetrical wargame scenario has been demonstrated precisely in Tskhinvali Region (wargame between Russia and Georgia) and in Crimea (hybrid war between Russia and Ukraine) cases. Namely the scenarios have been occurred in aegis of the Black Sea Region. It was clearly demonstrated asymmetric threats in a Military Strategically and Operational levels.

A political jargons, mainly used in strategic studies, “asymmetry”, “asymmetrical threat” or “asymmetrical warfare” refer to counter diction to methods exploited in conventional battles and employed by terrorist groups and organizations of different origin (including mainly Jihadist ones). According to some academic scientific assumptions, asymmetry is an opposite to symmetry, i.e. causing of an imbalance. This imbalance could be reviewed in various forms. There are five components of asymmetries:

  • the promote imbalance condition,

  • the distinct motivation,

  • the different content of statehood or legal status-quo of actors

  • the different methods used by the parties

  • the different resources and methods quality

In this sense, a conflict is always asymmetrical when there are significant differences in terms of the forces, means and methods used, but also in terms of the motivation and morality of the opponents [4]. “The terms Asymmetric Warfare and Asymmetric Threats are used for the type of security threat that is directed against political, strategic, military and economic structures in a form that does not correspond to the typical conventional threat scenarios. Asymmetry always exists when one of the conflicting parties behaves unexpectedly differently, for example through a new form of tactic, with an unexpected use or a different use of existing weapons, or through attacks against ,,other targets” [5]. Asymmetries of strength arise from the fact that one side gains a lead over its opponents through permanent innovations in military organization and weapons technology, which can no longer be made up within a foreseeable period of time. Tried doing it the superior side of shooting up new spheres and new spaces for the purposes of warfare, into which the other side cannot follow to technological inferiority [6].

Asymmetry of strength is opposed to the asymmetry from weakness, where the loser tries to evade the superior side with the help of creative strategies and tactic. A classic form of strategic asymmetry out of weakness is the partisan war, the aim of which is not to reveal oneself, to evade open combat, and to act from behind the scenes, attack like a raid and then go into hiding again. The asymmetry based on the idea that the fighters tend to be unrecognizable. The aim is to extend the war over space and time, and to wear down the superior enemy [7]. The guerilla war doctrine was considered one of them that applies to the asymmetric strategy with implication of defeating superior opponent by offering technologically and organizationally resistance methods and techniques. It casual that key mission of the guerilla war was to get transformation into state-actor status and by doing so achieving rebalancing. The most important difference between guerilla struggle and terrorism is that guerilla struggle is basically of a defensive nature, while the terrorism strategy also offers offensive options for the defeated opponent [8].

At time being, there is no any precise lines between war and peace, mainly in conjunction with key actors of the international security – states. The states are destabilized from inside, for example by inciting minorities perhaps that indicate that the hybrid warfare has a mission to achieve political goals. The hybrid warfare doctrine indicates some kind of flexibility mode that included mixed form of components – open and covertly applied actions, regular and irregular, symmetrical and asymmetrical, military and non-military means of conflict transformation with the purpose of blurring the threshold between the binary states of war and peace, particularly in aegis of the international law.

The hybrid wars included three different areas as so-called “front-lines”:

  • conventional battlefields;

  • population and public society of the attacked state;

  • the international public community

Hence, the hybrid war participants are both state and non-state actors. Both of them are using multimodal activities at operational and tactical levels aimed at achieving synergy effects in the physical and psychological dimensions of the conflict [9]. It concludes that any type of hybrid wars could be wagged with exploitation of both conventional and irregular combat modes, not characterized only in the military but also in the economic senses and with intensive use of the media to wage an information war too. A shift transformation takes place in realms of contemporary century warfare doctrinal planning and the transformation has already implicated of identifying new type of warfare strategy – asymmetric war with representation of hybrid warfare that contributing in re-shaping a grand strategy that allows policymakers to steer through the uncertainties of a complex international security environment. By the way, recalling the definition, information warfare consists of activities that deny, exploit, corrupt, destroy, or protect information. Traditional means of conducting information warfare include psychological operations, electronic warfare, military deception, physical attack, and various security measures.

Arms smuggling and asymmetric warfare concept are inter-correlated as providing basics for inspiration of military conflicts and terrorism attacks performed mostly by new global actors – Violent Non-State Actors.

1.1 Chapter one: asymmetric warfare and terrorism and geopolitical implications

In the 21st century, the theory and concept of hybrid war have become one of the types of military conflicts that have a great impact on international political processes. In a general formulation, hybrid war is a pre-planned process of influencing (or) and changing the government, and an indirect way of overthrowing the government of another country using military and non-military methods and techniques. In contrast to full-scale conventional warfare, during hybrid warfare, more attention is paid to the use of non-military methods, among which the following can be distinguished:

  1. Methods of economic influence (economic sanctions, economic blockade, and economic war), the purpose of which is to weaken and destroy the economic potential of a given country (i.e. a hostile state);

  2. Methods of influencing the internal political system (disturbing the stability of the political system using various open and hidden methods), the purpose of which is to influence the government of another country and change the government. In parallel with this, the influencing the foreign-political course of the given country is being implemented;

  3. Methods of foreign political discrediting, the purpose of which is to shake the prestige and positive image of the mentioned country on an international level. At this time, diverse methods of disinformation are used.

The above-mentioned non-military methods of hybrid warfare combine the following specific tools: terrorist acts, the use of elements of psychological warfare, cyber-terrorism, disinformation, assistance to separatist groups within a given country, and the establishment of proxy governments (for example, the occupied Donetsk and Lugansk regions of Ukraine), covert support for international terrorist organizations, etc. [10]. The Reporter Lord Jopling (Great Britain) from the NATO Parliamentary Assembly provides a credible identification of term “hybrid warfare”. By his definition: “Hybrid warfare is a special tactics aimed at testing and determining the weakness of an adversary via non-military capabilities (namely, political, informational, economic and manipulation provisions) that is pushed through symmetric and asymmetric military tools” [11]. It is the existence of the information war component that represents the constituent part of the so-called “Fourth Generation War” (FGW) concept. On the other hand, part of the information war is considering the theory of psychological warfare with aiming to achieve military goals. In that regard, it is considering holding a propaganda campaign as a necessary part of the hybrid war in order to cheat and manipulate with people as prescribed by propaganda. The propaganda becomes an integral part in realizing military deception and as a part of the hybrid warfare plays important role as a tool [12]. Herewith, having considered military analysis pattern, so-called “Kinetic Operation” is indispensable part of the hybrid war. Under the concept it is meant involvement of professional militaries as civilian personnel with the effect of so-called “little green men”. In contemporary cases, “hybrid war” strategy envisaged involvement of private military company representatives with different military missions and goals as it were demonstrated on case of the so-called “Wagner” group in Syria and in Libya, which are personally supervised by the personal Vladimir Putin’s, the President of the Russian Federation, famous Russian tycoon Yevgeniy Prigozhin who was killed in 2023. Here are some identifications of “hybrid war” modality that are to be revealed within the scope of this definition:

  1. The factor of “hybrid war” plays great role in shifting contemporary international security system in most phase of instability. Moreover, the war concept implies two specific approaches: theoretical-conceptual and realistic ones.

  2. The theoretical-conceptual approach recognizes is represented by the fact that the actors of the existing international order have already recognized the importance of “hybrid war” and the extent of its influence and have made appropriate compact in their strategic documents – for example, the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, approved the military strategy of the country in 2014, where the basic elements of hybrid war strategy mentioned – for example, according to Article 32 of the new military doctrine adopted on December 28, 2014, one of the main tasks of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in peacetime is the protection of the economic interests and strategic communication and transport nodes of the country [13]. As for NATO – at the 2014 summit in Wales, the leadership of the alliance identified four specific asymmetric threats that include the following:

    • Cyber war and cyber-attack – The non-conventional threat that was mentioned as a response provided in aegis of the Article 5 of the NATO Washington Treaty, with an appropriate response given to it;

    • Energy security – Uninterrupted energy supply carriers in the Euro-Atlantic space, protection of critical infrastructure, and security of energy reserve potential is the main pain points for the member states of the alliance, and in this direction the use of its military potential at the appropriate level;

    • Terrorism – In the document of the declaration, the asymmetric threat of terrorism is presented quite widely with special geopolitical spatial implications (for instance, Afghanistan and Iraq);

    • Hybrid war – Under the jargon is perceived new type of threat that was identified at first time in the NATO lexicon. The mentioned asymmetric threat refers to what is currently taking place in Ukraine – that is, the fight against military separatism, which may have global dimensions [14].

    As for the realistic approach, it is expressed by the fact that after 2014, following the occupation and then annexation of the Crimean Peninsula of Ukraine by the Russian Federation, a new geopolitical era has already begun – the “New Cold War” and the conditions of the world order have shifted into multipolarity model with involvement at least three global power actors [15].

  3. Certainly, the strategy of “hybrid war” with involvement of certain types of actors (for example, the USA, Turkey, the Russian Federation, “DAESH”, Taliban, etc.) influences on realms of the regional security processes and there are several specific examples of the one in case of the MENA (like situation in Libya, Syria and Iraq) and the Caucasus region. On case of the Caucasus region (notable South Caucasus area) demonstration of hybrid war strategy against Georgia in a way of so-called “creeping occupation” becomes Russia’s military offense action since August of 2008;

  4. The formulation of “Information war” conducted at the national level is manifested in formation realization of specific propaganda initiatives tailored with manipulation and disinformation media flows in order to influence on public opinion trends, and through the establishment of so-called “Reflexive Control”, which precisely corresponds to the strategy of hybrid warfare. The method aims at bringing the desired government to the power in respective states [16]. The concept of “Information war” includes very interesting components such, for instance, cyber-attacks, disinformation, surrogate informal and formal structures, cyber sabotage, etc. It should be noted here that a new version of hybrid war may also appear – by conducting cultural-educational and special dissertation research and special studies, in the post-Soviet space, to implement informational-psychological influence and covert neurolinguistic influence. The Chinese military leader and philosopher Sun Tzu wrote about this kind of tactic [17].

It is important to formulate conceptual and even theoretical identification and classification of jargon “terrorism: and review it from scientific background. Initially, a distinction between terms of “terrorism” and “terror” is necessary to clarify and accept. The two ones are referring quite different modalities.

The term “Terror” appeared in political vocabulary as a modality of political behavior in time of the “Great Revolution” in France. The definition implied by eradication with coercive measures, including formal killing, mainly political opponents to the Revolution. It is agreed that both jargons “Terror” and “Terrorism” include both involve settle any kind of political problems by forceful means. It possible figure out several cases in world history where state exploited fierce measures against its political foes and opponents as well as contrary, various underground groups committed brutal activities against the ruling political elite and state structures. Hence, the definition “terror” refers repression and persecution its citizens and political opponents that performed by a state governmental structures and the definition “terrorism” envisages an activity carried out by opposition radical political groups against state institutions and the ruling political elite.

Considering some geopolitical aspects of terrorism, is possible defined the following models:

  • Political Terrorism

  • National terrorism

  • Social terrorism

  • Religious terrorism [18].

Those models clearly underscores of rapid transformation of terrorism phenomenon from political into ideology formats starting from 19th century. However, contemporary forms of terrorism emerged in Europe during the epoch of the enlightenment, namely in the nineteenth century. In that respect, even at scientific and academic levels, there are not precise definitions either to “terrorism” or “international terrorism” that could be acceptable to qualified specialists. Nevertheless, problems linked with terrorism still reflects enormous security dilemma in the 21st century global politics. For instance, in accordance to international law provisions: “terrorist act is a killing of a head of government or a member of diplomatic missions and any other interference with the intention to influence the politics of a particular state” [19]. At present, terrorism has much more large identification and transcends its original definition and scope of activities demonstrated by the various international terrorist organizations.

In global security modality, terrorism is also correlating with arms smuggling development and mostly, in recent time, small arms smuggling and illegal transfers are being popular, including 3D printed weaponry. The ultra-left terrorist oriented organization members also have a few high-qualified terrorists in Africa who are capable to deal with modern weaponry systems. As for, 3D printing weaponry elements, it is noteworthy to mention that some the ultra-left oriented terrorists can quickly adopt technological advances with data encryption in order to terrorize population.

It illustrates how the small armaments smuggling could be considering as the asymmetric threat, even non-military identification, however, in case of the terrorism and mostly, new terrorism combat cases, it could be transferred into the military identification cases, mainly in aegis of the “Al-Qaeda” and “Islamic Caliphate” terrorism examples. The cases demonstrate that any kind of arms smuggling is to be enlisted in the asymmetric attack and threat dimension modality.

1.2 Chapter two: small arms smuggling and influence on geopolitical processes - Conceptual and theoretical methodology

Having considered new realms of the security globalization, there is new tendency in unification of the threat matrix perception. Currently, as asymmetric threat for contemporary international security perspective, namely the illicit trade in small arms that is a part of the global arms business that transcends realms of such criminal transnational activities as are: civil conflict, corruption, terrorism, and random acts of massive violence. Originated in 19th century, the illicit arms trade has been composed of serious problem for international society. Being not a large in scope of global arms illegal transfer, the small arms illegal transfer remains infamous and dangerous. The small arms illicit transfer has character of less transparency and being incomplete and inadequately substantiated. Suffice it to say, the form of criminal transactions, is very well-scrutinized and researched. Despite of the fact, that in some cases, trade in small arms and light weapon are accepted by the governments as legal provision, there is a consensus among the levels of government, business and civil society that the activity is illegal and contains elements of aggressive remedial behavior [20].

Having considered the scope of small arms smuggling cases and their illicit arms trade, is important to identify three levels of the “market” perspectives that is being conducted with involvement of the concrete actors – state and non-state actors. The actors are diversified by the its political origin, geopolitical implications, foreign and defense policy priorities and political system stability provisions. One of the United Nations definitions of illicit trafficking is from a 1996 UN report. The report deals with conventional arms transfers, which states that” illicit arms trafficking is understood to cover that international trade in conventional arms which is contrary to the laws of States and/or international law” [21]. Due to the contemporary international security realms, at present, provision of the small arms illicit trade and smuggling, together with global and regional arms smuggling cases, could be considered via current military conflict occurrence and development ones and reviewed via the geopolitical and geostrategic landscape perspectives. The conflicts of the 21st century mainly gone between the state and non-state actors and are more dynamic rather than the conflicts held in Cold War period. Free and ability to get access to official and historic records and information, including governmental sources, provide credible assistance to those groups engaged in illegal activities. Namely, these three groups, including arms illegal transit, consider to be a proper actors vis-à-vis their geographical locations, ideologies, government opposition and relatively high public visibility.

By and large, there are three types of the “Market” geopolitical modality that is linked with transfers of firearms, weaponry systems and global arms. The scheme is divided into three main market type perspective and it has very clear geopolitical identity. The classification is very general and needs some kind of sophistication however the scheme is acceptable from security study provision (see in detailed Figure 1).

  • “Gray Market” (Illegal) – Illicit gray-market transfers: the illegal transactions include, mainly in way of covert operations, transfers conducted by a government of a state (in hidden policy agenda provision), or brokers/entities sponsored by (or acting on behalf) of the government. The pattern of the “Gray Market” relies on state and non-state actor interaction behaviors where the armaments are key phenomenon for pursuing concrete, in most cases, asymmetric military mission achievement. The market size is predominately concise and small in scale. It mainly oriented on small arms illegal transfer or trade transactions, like hand-made construction of simple weapons or copies of existing ones in private workshops or homes without legal authorization. Generally to say, these transactions could have legal origin albeit is possible to act in illicit manner, mostly in conducting authorized import and export trade operations. In any case, “Gray Market” examples are possible to take place when the governments and their representatives are seeking to avoid any legislature and legal provisions and could easily violate the law. It is worthy to note that the term “gray market” would be used to clarify the illegal procurement of arms from such kind of semi-governmental entities, as are representatives of Armed Forces and other governmental actors. For example, arms transfer occurs between governmental forces and rebel ones as well as seizure arms during the combat actions and looted weapons from governmental and law enforcement caches are cases of the arms illicit seizure and transfers. Those weapons which are classified as “Gray Markets” ones could have identification of non-registered origin, aimed at used for concrete criminal transactions purposes and considered as illicit market products” [22]. These kind of transactions are performing when the governments, their agents, or individuals exploiting loopholes or intentionally circumventing national and/or international laws or policies. The type of the market could also linked with so-called “State Sponsored Terrorism” example when on the territory of a country with consent of the hosted government or authority providing shelter to a terrorist group leadership to complete, equip and train para-militarized grouping for performing special terrorist attack or mission at any desirable direction (for example, “Laphankuri Special Operation” Case on August 28, 2012 see below). The market orientation is more prone toward so-called “southern” or developing country cases and oriented toward more small arms smuggling or transfers;

  • “Black Market (Illicit)” – Black Market Transfers: This illegal transactions and market segment contains transfers (including small arms) that clearly violate national and international laws. All transactions are taken place without any official or covert government consent and control. The “Black Market” with small arms illicit transfers has very evident global scope and indeed is a product of the globalization. Certainly, it is important to make clear clarification of organizational chart of the arms illicit arms transfer encompasses segments of “Black Market”, “Gray Market” and industrial production. The itinerary of small arms transfers starts as the legal action and later transforms as illegal conduit. It could be considered various examples how is possible to transform legally organized small arms deal into illegal transfer. There are many types of indications of the transactions. Like, corruption, arms seizure in military conflict zones, plunders, delivery via unsafe paths, etc. [23]. Albeit the “Black Market” is being considered as part of the global illicit trade network, the main feature remains of operating beyond the official governmental structures and entities. Certainly, when is being considered the role and mission of the governments in these transactions, it is noteworthy mention that their involvement in it is illegal, even without their knowledge, control and consent. In case if it occurs in anyway, the motivation of the official governmental actors links with matters of corruption, personal gains and even having no idea where the ones engaged with. Ironically, when the illegal small arms transfers take place, even without awareness of the governmental actors, the “Black Market” is anyway a matter of business of great deal and have much more big scope and volume of transfers [20]. The “Black Market” with arms smuggling cases are worldwide known and main case was linked with Viktor Bout example, the Russian Arms “Black Dealer”. It is also interesting point that the type of the market are intertwined such asymmetric challenges providers as are the terrorists, drug smugglers and arms illegal traders. The interconnection could be visional at any regional level and in the European one. There were several facts of arms illegally seizure and smuggle in France. At the national level, the majority come from thefts from individual gun owners, which represents approximately 9000 weapons stolen each year [24]. At international level, main channel of illegal arms supply foreseen in Balkans. In aegis of the terrorist threat, arms trafficking considered as an element of organized crime, and mainly drug traffickers, in order to protect and extend their drug trading territory are seeking to obtain these arms. In conjunction with sophisticated underground criminal and illegal networks and via their interconnections with drug traffickers, many terrorists have managed to arm themselves before carrying out their acts, equipped with long guns that give them a much greater operational capacity [25]. Another case where these three asymmetric challenges – drug smuggling, arms illegal trade and terrorism are intertwined and operated in common is Sahel area in the African continent. Namely, the Sahel has been transformed into territory which is considering as a “black” hub between Sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa for two decades. Exactly above-mentioned asymmetric challenges really subverted social security background in the region. It has become a key link in the geopolitics of organized crime. Mainly illegal arms and drug trafficking promote strengthening criminal economy and subvert development of financial and social prosperity and cause of demonstration of weakness of the State to cast these challenges [26]. All type illegal arms delivery, drug smuggling and terrorism become dominant factor in these zones are driving force for creation of holistic organized crime networks. For instance, drug trafficking organized groups in the Sahel has transformed the area into hub for the global network.

Figure 1.

The illegal arms smuggling “Market” geopolitical identification.

As for how is possible that two asymmetric challenges are to be intertwined and have common roots, meaning arms and drug smuggling.

The asymmetric challenges, including small arms smuggling and “Black Arms Market” promoters are indeed so-called “Non-State Violent Actors”. Violent Non-State Actors (VNSA) – Aggressive non-state actors – politically motivated groups operating independently from states that have corporate interests and are carrying out collective violence against victims. The VNSA are product of decolonization [27]. The VNSA include eleven categories:

  1. Para-military Religious Movements (Al-Qaeda terrorist organization

  2. International Criminal Organized Network (“Camorra “, “Coza Nostra”, “The Institute of Lawful Thieves”)

  3. Radical Tribal Movements (“Taliban” movement in Afghanistan)

  4. Warlords

  5. Clans exploit kleptocracy power (Father-son “Duvall’s Clan” in the Dominican Republic)

  6. Private Military Companies (“Wagner” Group)

  7. Ecological fighters and activists (“Greenpeace” union)

  8. Radical Nationalistic Movements (“Sinn-Fein” party)

  9. Private Secret Intelligence Companies (Russian tycoon Boris Berezovsky’s private security service “Atoli”)

  10. Private Military Companies of the multinational corporations (Russian “Gazprom”)

  11. Narcomafia (Drug smuggling “Medellin” Cartel in Colombia)

Namely the non-state actors are really consumers and suppliers of the “Black Arms Market” segments and their operational capabilities are predominantly high and compatibility with posing concrete and real threats to the international society;

  • “White Arms Market” (Legal) – Legal Arms Transfers: this is absolutely legal binding transactions carried out by the international law actors – states among themselves and the manufacture, production, transfer and transit operations of any kind of armaments conducted in accordance and with respect to national and international laws. The market provisions are being reviewed and controlled by strict legal binding regulation of the inter-governmental international organizations and various international and national legal acts. Even special Arms Control Registration envisaged to get under control all formal provisions among and between the states in arms trade transactions in accordance to the UN Charter. In conjunction with several international law documents (for instance, the Firearms Protocol and the Arms Trade Treaty), the jargon “arms transfer” mostly affiliates with international transfers. According to the Protocol “arms transfers” are the cross-border movement (import, export and transit) of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, and their unauthorized movement from or across at least two State territories, as well as to the movement of firearms without proper marking as illicit trafficking. As for, the Arms Trade Treaty, it outlines the term “transfers” to refer to the international trade in general, which comprise a broader category of transfers, namely “export, transit, trans-shipment and brokering, hereafter referred to as ‘transfer’” [28]. The other regulations on the “White Arms Market” was adopted in 1990. In 1990, two very important legal bounding documents were adopted – the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (Paris Charter) and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Vienna Document 1990 that reinforced international security environment. Having compared the two previous documents that were negotiated within the framework of an antagonistic division between East and West, it should be mentioned that both of them played positive role in approaching peace and stability at regional and global levels [29]. A key provider in globalized arms trade sector transparency adherence and promotion are international global think-tanks which aim are to provide credible informative coverage of the legal arms deal transactions and arms treaties (one of the key provider is being considered Stockholm International Peace Research Institute – SIPRI). Generally to undermine, the “White Arms Market” takes place with direct or indirect involvement of a government or its affiliated agents and the action is congruent with national and international law criteria.

Taking into consideration the scope and range of the arms trade and arms smuggling transactions and deal-makings is possible to identify and classified the ones with geopolitical diversification varieties and framed them into four main categories:

  • Small Arms Range Trade and Smuggling (for instance, pistols, hand-made weaponry elements, automatic guns, 3D printed weapons, etc.)

  • Medium Arms Range Trade and Smuggling

  • High Arms Range Trade and Smuggling

  • Global Arms Range Trade and Smuggling

The classification is correspond to conceptualization framework of the Arms Smuggling and Trade cases and indeed provide good basis for promotion of its analytical modalities and forecast frame missions.

Regarding the theoretical methodology platform for such specific area of security studies and international relations as are arms trade and smuggling with arms control and transfer transparency could be considered the following theoretical school approaches, like:

  • The concept of network security governance

  • The Securitization theory or “Copenhagen School”

  • The “New Wars” theory

  • The Political Realism

  • The Regional Security Complex Theory and Security Dilemma

The most acceptable are two of them that indicated the political, cultural, social and even economic parameters of the area of research. Dr. Mary Kaldor’s theory, reflects conflict transformation not on a state-on-state basis, but more on non-state origin (as for example, low-intensity conflicts, civil wars and insurgencies). Additionally, the theory reviews those conflicts developing within states rather than between them. Notable, such components as are: particular ethnic diversity, sociopolitical inequality, class systems are parts of the new types of wars. Having considered so, so-called “New War” theory scrutinizes civilians and non-combatant as key targets by insurgent and non-state groups as a primary mean of their combat attacks. Therefore, the “New War” theory is relatively one that could be applicable to this field of studies and practical researches as are arms smuggling and transfers [30].

The other concept also linked with security studies is to be the “Securitization” theory, promoted by so-called the “Copenhagen” school. The theory reviews the conditions that affect the object and lead to its politicization, as well as the process of assigning the status of a security threat to an object. It becomes interesting point that a new approach toward security problems do not automatically rise the list of threats, which include, apart from military, non-military threats [31]. The main example of such “macro-securitization”, the USA government fight against terrorism [32].

The Regional Security Complex Theory is very unique modality in security studies. The theory created and promoted by Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde who belong to the so-called “Copenhagen School” of security studies. The theory framed its origin in 1983–2003 and considered security as a social construction (securitization). The theory describes that international security should be reviewed as a phenomenon from a regional perspective in order to provide a theoretical justification for constructing world politics in regional frames. The authors defined a security complex as “a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another” [33]. Those mentioned complexes are exposed of special relations between enmity and amity as main preclusions between states in aegis of the security dimensions. As for amity, it is viewed relations ranging from friendship to expectation of protection or support. On its turn, enmity reflects a relationship based on suspicion and fear [34]. In some cases, namely arms smuggling also could be considered as one of the complexes of the regional security that transcended into security dilemma puzzle in geopolitical game at regional and global levels. Mainly military conflicts taken place in 21st century are conducted namely in aegis of the two theories provisional frames forecast promotion of asymmetric challenges or threats.

1.3 Chapter three: arms and drug smuggling and terrorism correlation cases – Pankisi/Laphankuri Gorge Event-Analyze (Georgia)

New dimension scope of the modern global security architecture determines globalization of the not only positive tendencies but also negative ones. Among negative tendencies could be inspired of merging and intertwined such asymmetric challenges and threats as are arms illegal transfers, drug smuggling and international terrorism. As for how the globalization effects to transformation of the challenges into new realities is possible to identify on case of so-called “Jihadist Terrorism” case-study with involvement such dangerous militant groups as are” “Taliban”, “Islamic Caliphate-DAESH” and “Al Qaeda”.

Upon some sources, the jargon “Jihad” became broad well-known for international society in aegis of the 9/11 tragic event in the USA albeit it was originated from mediaeval historic period of time. Several times, almost all level of politicians, from various nation-states are used to configure the jargon and conjure up with terrifying images of irrational foreigners coming to destroy American freedoms and whole the Western ones [35]. However, the term is being affiliated with as an ideological background with one of the sectarian trend in Islam with a Salafiyyah religious indoctrination. Namely, it is known that the “Taliban” movement in Afghanistan practices with so-called “Deobandism” trend of the Salafiyyah doctrine and as for the “Islamic Caliphate-DAESH” on Wahhabism trend. However, many jihadist groups with radical political orientation roots, are providing with different interpretation of the term and also another definition associate with Islamic Shariah (the term refers to God’s law in its divine and revealed sense. This is related to FIQH, which is the human process of understanding and implementing the law) principles and norms that are very common for the Muslim community. One of the main international political trend linked with asymmetric challenge and threat perception became so-called “Global Jihad” and its associated concrete challenges posing to global stability (including arms and drug smuggling cases).

Having considered above-mentioned, in some cases, the drug smuggling and illegal transit could be labeled as a part of “Global Jihad” strategy against “Crusaders and Jews” how the Salafiyst oriented terrorist organizations do claim with introduction new forms of asymmetric warfare elements with “biological terrorism” and “cyber-Jihad” tactics aiming to destroy rival society with “non-lethal” weapon capabilities. Therefore, drug smuggling and illegal transit, as the asymmetric challenge, has not only mission to gain much financial revenue flows to successfully attain “Global Jihad” strategic goals, but also implies to reach concrete ideological and political subversive missions with culturally and morally destroyed enemy will. Namely, the strategy are exploited by such Jihadist terrorist groups as are “Taliban” and DAESH.

According to some information sources, DAESH controlled terrorist groups intruded in Afghanistan in those territories that were under the control of “Taliban” in 2010–2015 years. In order to get under their control those territories where cultivated Afghani heroin, mainly in south and south-eastern provinces of the country, both terrorist movements engaged in sever combat clashes. The revenue of drug smuggling and transit accumulated more than roughly $5–8 billion pure net revenues. It is interesting to note that the DAESH terrorist combat units came from Iranian Khorasan Region, consisted mainly the North Caucasian fighters.

As it is known, ‘Taliban” intensively used the drug illegal transit routes, crossing by the whole Caucasus area, including the Georgian territory. In 2014 the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia disclosed interesting information leaflets, saying that –” 2.79 tons of liquid heroines was seized from a cargo truck that entered into Georgia from Azerbaijan, the Georgian Interior Ministry said on July 11. The seizure represents the biggest ever drug hauls in Georgia, according to the Interior Ministry. It said that two citizens of Georgia were arrested. The truck, according to the Interior Ministry, was carrying 30-liter 92 plastic barrels filled with illegal substance containing 80% of heroin. Drugs, worth of “hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars”, was intended for international transit and was en-route to Turkey, the Georgian Interior Ministry said” [36]. At the same time, the DAESH elaborated a “Caucasian Strategy” for waging Jihad. It was elaborated and coordinated by a jihadist warlord, from North Caucasus, jihadist “Black Ahmad”. However, another warlord, named Amir Suphyan, coordinated realization the strategy at regional level. The DAESH leadership allocated approximately $50–70 million for this mission [37].

Actually became evident that the Afghani “Taliban” movement used drug transit as part of its’ “soft power” and exploited so-called the “northern transit route” (see Figure 2) as the most shortest route to ship out original liquid heroine from Afghanistan to European direction in order to get a large amount of money to reinforce its military capability (hire more mercenaries, purchase armaments, etc.). The series of the transaction were done in conjunction with other international Jihadist groups as with Pakistani “Taliban” and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) from 2001 to 2014 period of time. The route probably run the following spaces: Afghanistan-Turkmenistan-Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey with last destination spot probable in the Southern European country where it had been manufactured at a special underground laboratory as a final product. The mission concluded probably in 2014.

Figure 2.

Jihadist Terrorist Group members’ illegal transfer and arms smuggling routes.

The so-called “Jihadist Drug” – named another as “Allah’s Tears” – was a source of threat emanated with reinforce pressure on the NATO ISAF Forces and gained financial revenue to continue military resistance. The “Taliban” leadership even created special local so-called “narco-cartel” networks (for example, Kandahar or Karachi “drug-mafia” with annual illegal profit of $2–3 billion). The network groups were closely cooperating with the “Taliban” special intelligence service “Mukhabarat” in order to provide safe deliver of the heroine freight from Helmand province to Karachi sea port. The cooperation became very beneficial for the “Taliban” leadership with introduction several types of new technologies, like “Allah’s Tears”.

The “Allah’s Tears” was a “know-how” technology of the leader of so-called “Kandahar’s Jihadist Drug Grouping”, linked with “Taliban”, Mulla Bashir (Jami Bashir Nurzai). From 50 kg is elaborated 1 liter of liquid heroin. It is possible to be smuggled in way of tea and sugar or even liquid soap [38].

It is symptomatic that the “Taliban” and DAESH leadership reached consensus on and made a deal with so-called “Jihad Drug” smuggling transit at the regional level. Therefore, the “Georgian Jihadist Black Transit” case-study clearly indicated, the Jihadist terrorist organizations, on example of the DAESH planned, organized and conducted a sophisticate network not only for promoting “Jihadist Arms and Warrior” but also “Jihadist Drug” transit routes. Exactly, as one of the evident operation affiliated with so-called the “Black Jihadist Transit” was well-known Jihadist warlord Akhmed Chatayev’s and his two lieutenants terrorist raid and act planning attempt in Georgia with DAESH command security structures involvement on 22 November 2017. Later on, the Georgian Anti-Terrorist Center Commando units killed the terrorists [39]. The Jihadist terrorist attack in Georgia had direct linkage with arms and Jihadist warrior illegal transit operations. The terrorist group entered Georgia via so-called “Green Corridor” from Turkey and selected their transit deployment place – Pankisi Gorge in Georgia. Moreover, the group consisted of about nine Jihadist terrorist, including the warlord Chatayev, illegally entered the Georgian territory without any armament, had discovered and armed themselves from the arms cachet that was dug and prepared in advance by the previous Jihadist group transited the illegal armaments of various type from Middle East region to Georgia, in Pankisi Gorge territory. Hence, the arms, mainly small ones, that were smuggling from the Middle Eastern area, notably from Syria that by that time was under control of the DAESH, later were exploited fully by the Chatayev’s terrorist group to commit terrorist attack in Tbilisi and terrified the whole population of Georgia in November of 2017. Having considered the concrete case-study it should be acknowledged how serious asymmetric military threat could cause terrorism toward the whole Caucasus region – for example, so-called “Ahmed Chataev voyage” on November of 2017 to Georgia with a massive anti-terrorist operation in the downtown of Tbilisi is a clear illustration of so-called “Black Jihadist Transit” as one of the asymmetric threat case-study [40]. A case of coincidence of transit routes of “Black Arms and Drug Smuggling” are not occasional and accidental but reflect very well organized and coordinated asymmetric military operation planning pursuing concrete geostrategic missions and goals. Here is concrete map that discovers how namely the DAESH leadership coordinated the asymmetric threat planning, including arms and drug smuggling and terrorist warrior illegal transition schemes.

There is a map indicate how the arms and drug smuggling are transformed as new “weaponry elements” in hands of the Jihadist terrorist organizations (Figure 3).

Figure 3.

Jihadist drug smuggling transit route from Central Asia to Europe and Middle East.

These two cases are vividly demonstrating how the Jihadist terrorist groups are used the routes for pursuing their geopolitical missions.

The other case where these two elements, meant terrorism and arms smuggling were getting used as concrete “weaponry elements” is to be considered so-called “Laphankuri/Pankisi Special Operation” Case-study. In 2012 it was conducted so-called “Counter-Terrorist Special Operation” in Lafankuri mountain village, near to city Telavi, Eastern Georgia, in the Lopota Gorge. The area where the combat operations taken place was very close to the state border between Georgia and the Russian Federation. The tragic human events taken place in the Lopota Gorge at the end of August 2012, sparked many questions that are still in needing of being answered. The questions reflect notions as on whether it was an anti-terrorist operation or a stage ambushed planned to clear up loose ends in the alleged support of the government for Chechen fighters. The Georgian human rights organizations and the whole international community have many questions regarding the operation with yet to be responded questions. It is disputable that those information, formally disseminated by then government of Georgia is controversial and confusing and is very unclear. On July 30, 2013 in aegis of the Parliamentary by the then Georgian Public Defender, Ucha Nanuashvili. The Ombudsman delivered a Special Report on the status of Human Right Protection that was linked with proper conduct the Anti-Terrorist Operation in 2012, providing some reflections on that occasion. A special attention was paid to the Lopota Operation, its implications, and described the unnecessary loss of life. The report has identified that the para-military group being illegally deployed at the Georgian territories, and actually having operated as a (terrorist group), especially established, trained, equipped and armed by the then leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia, under its leadership and direct assistance. This amounts by all standards as state sponsored terrorism and the government having knowingly provided material support to a group considered as terrorist. According to investigation materials, on 28–29 August 2012, the Georgian law enforcement services conducted an operation near the village of Lapankuri located in Lopota Gorge, which, resulted in the loss of lives of seven members of an armed group and three staff members of Georgian law enforcement agencies [41]. Hence, it came out that it was a clear case of Jihadist terrorist armed group presence in Georgia and with assistance of arms illegal transfer transaction taken place in Pankisi Gorge territory, aiming at providing several terrorist attacks in aegis of the South Caucasus Region.

These two “Georgian” case-study examples on Jihadist terrorism groups have very precise military planning strategy and based on the one, the groups could pose very serious asymmetric military threats to the international community. The threats could be considered also Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) weapon elements and as the new arms smuggling with CBRN elements involvement serve real massive disaster of global origin. Hence, new modality of disarmament and non-proliferation regime are to be endorsed and developed in order to avoid of the CBRN threat emergence. The threat imposition also is possible concluded via small armaments smuggling and illegal transfer transactions. The tendency has more geopolitical scale and dimension that determines future tendencies in world politics via strategic studies perspectives.

Having said above-mentioned it is possible to identify Jihadist Terrorism organization military operation planning process and components of the geostrategic implications. This is to be new dimension of the warfare doctrine congruent with so-called “Fourth Generation War” (FGW provisions. Here is concluded a chart based on concrete Jihadist terrorist group military doctrine implications, on example of “Taliban” movement case-study demonstrate how Jihadist Military Doctrine operates and how it includes arms smuggling and illegal transfers as an operational component to achieve the global and regional missions (Figure 4):

Figure 4.

Jihadist Military Doctrine – conceptual framework.

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2. Conclusion

The security dilemma regarding asymmetric challenges emergence is very real and undermines the essential provisions of the regional and global security perspectives. The provisions could really subvert basics and principles of the global security and dramatized stability in frame of regional security. A shift transformation takes place in realms of contemporary century warfare doctrinal planning and the transformation has already implicated of identifying new type of warfare strategy – asymmetric war with representation of hybrid warfare that contributing in re-shaping a grand strategy that allows policymakers to steer through the uncertainties of a complex international security environment.

The Fourth Generation War (FGW) concept is congruent in modern geostrategic realities with Jihadist Military Doctrine which one of the main component retains arms smuggling and arms illegal trade cases. Currently new tendency fixed where three main sources of asymmetric challenges – criminal organized groups, terrorist organizations and guerilla para-military formations are getting united and created common network systems impose credible global threat to the international society in 21st century. These convergent interests among these Non-State Violent Actors are main sources of global instability and shatter peace. These actors presence in unstable regional zones, like the Central Asia, could more stimulate creation of so-called “gray areas” and “black hubs of illegal transactions”. Having considered dark side of globalization with incorporation of the terrorist groups and criminal arms/drug smuggler networks pose really huge common asymmetric threat in aegis of the trans-national spaces to contemporary world order.

Namely, the globalization sparks new trend in provoking new type of asymmetric challenges not only military but also non-military dimensions. One of the challenges include, small arms illegal transfers that easily could provoke military conflicts from low intensity ones into high intensity ones with identification of so-called “New War” modality. The new conflict with inclusion of the arms illegal transfers and smuggling was reviewed above in case of the “Pankisi/Lapankhuri Operation” in Georgia.

In accordance to the classical military theory formulations, a war is a real chameleon because it changes its nature in every concrete case and notable the phrase is becoming true definition of what is occurring at regional security level. Exactly, regional security cases are real indications how the asymmetric challenges with non-military origin, with inclusion small arms smuggling and arms illegal transfers, create some deconstructive effects undermining stability and causing new trends of geopolitical fragility and misbalanced games. Suffice it to say, regional security complexity with security dilemma remains main implications for formatting security arrangements in the most vulnerable areas of the world politics. One of such regions is Black Sea region.

The Black Sea regional security reflects indeed realpolitik nature. The regional security is possible to review from perspectives of theoretical framework of international relations and security studies. Currently, the Black Sea region has become one of the world’s most tragic humanitarian, political and economic zone of disaster. The region became in the 21-st century as main fora for fierce geostrategic competition among the great powers. The instability and fragile security in the region also blocks the development of creation of Wider Black Sea Area, incorporating three main regions: Black Sea-Caspian Basin-Central Asia and creating stable geoeconomic and economic axis. Nevertheless, further development of new type of asymmetric challenges – organized criminal networks and arms/drug smuggling could convert the small instability cases into low and high intensity conflicts and completely undermine stable security regime in the region. However, the gravest cause of instability in the region in that respect could be transformed from terrorist threat.

Summarize that those implications have been indicated above, clearly demonstrated of direct correlations of various forms of asymmetric challenges such as: terrorism, drug smuggling, arms illegal transfers and transactions, illegal migration, corruption and ethnic cleansing (as part of human right massive violation tendency) with involvement of new types of actors in aegis of the insurgence combat militias, criminal organized crime network. The Jihadist terrorist groupings, etc. encompassed into common identity entity – Non-State Violent Actors that drastically make plausible ongoing international security system and components of world order.

Having considered that is important that international community should organize new forms of resistance to new type of challenges and notable in case of arms smuggling and illegal arms transfers, is necessary to set up new kind of inter-governmental organizations that coordinate disarmament policy, introduce all party agreed Arms Control Treaty provisions for regional security systems and adopt its on stability and peace promotion development. Moreover, sophistication and codification of the international law principles dealing with military conflicts transformation into peaceful coexistence platform with sufficient arms control and non-proliferation regime system provisions.

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Written By

Vakhtang Maisaia

Submitted: 01 September 2023 Reviewed: 01 September 2023 Published: 13 November 2023