Gun Violence and Personal Security in Uganda

Abstract

Gun violence involves unlawful acts of aggression by use of firearms. These acts involve causing death, physical or and emotional injuries to the victims. An analysis of the Uganda Police crime reports shows that homicide resulting from gun violence in the last 10 years from 2012 to 2022 averages 206.4 cases per year. Although Uganda is not among the countries with the highest number of murders by shooting, there has been a steady rise in the cases of gun violence. Gun violence never existed in the country until the introduction of firearms in the country in the 1890s through either European hunters or the colonial government. After independence, the country witnessed several internal armed conflicts which resulted in the spread of illegal firearms. In the Northeastern region, the firearms inflow resulted from its proximity to conflict prone neighbouring countries of Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, and the Northwestern Kenya. These factors have resulted in rampant gun violence especially in central and Northeastern Uganda. Although most acts of gun violence in Northeastern Uganda are committed by unregistered firearms, gun violence in central Uganda and other parts of the country are committed mostly by registered firearms from public and private security organisations.

1. Introduction

The Amnesty International describes gun violence as violence committed by use of firearms [1]. This includes any unlawful acts of aggression committed by use of firearms which results in the death, or injury (physical or psychological) of the victim. This covers violence directed at self (self-harm or suicide) and those directed at others. It is estimated that more than 600 people die worldwide everyday due to gun violence [1]. In Uganda homicides by shooting in the last 10 years (from 2012 to 2022) according to the Uganda Police reports stand at average of 206.4 cases per year. This puts the number of homicide cases by shooting per 100,000 people at 0.45 cases. Homicide by shooting in the country is committed by illegal firearm users as well as security personnel in varying magnitude. Suicide by firearm example is mainly committed by security personnel. The number of illicit and unregistered firearms in Uganda is estimated to be 309,844 [2]. In recent times, however, there were several reports of homicide committed by registered firearms in the hands of public and private security personnel.

This chapter aims to contribute to the debate on the impact of small arms and light weapon (SALW) on gun violence and personal insecurity by examining the SALW legislation in Uganda, the conflicts and the spread of unregulated firearms usage, the misuse of firearms by security personnel, and their consequences on personal security.

2. Background and history of gun use in Uganda

The history of gun violence in Uganda is quite recent. The Ugandan society never had guns until the British occupation of Uganda in 1894. By the time of the colonialization, what is now called Uganda was being governed by tribal chiefs or kings who had control over their small tribal communities within the current country Uganda. To gain control over the entire territory, the British made agreements with the king of Buganda, one of the tribal kings within the current country Uganda. That agreement allowed Buganda kingdom to access guns for the first time. With the British in control of the bigger part of the territory they introduced guns as a state weapon of colonial protection and repression of resistance to colonial administration. However, in the North-East region where the natives were warriors known as the Karamojong, the guns are believed to have been in circulation as early as 1890. The region started experiencing the inflow of guns for ivory hunting from Abyssinia [3] and later by European hunters. For example, [4] notes that the region had local hunters who had no guns. He further narrates how he trained some locals to use firearms for protection and hunting. He particularly notes,

Finally, after all kinds of vicissitudes I arrived in Africa and heard of a wonderful new and unexplored country called Karamojo. Elephants were reported by the black traders to be very numerous with enormous tusks, and there was no sort of administration to hamper the hunter with restrictions and game laws. Above all there appeared to be no other person hunting elephants in this Eldorado except the natives, and they had no firearms ([4], p. 27).

By 1900 the British had recruited, trained, and armed the locals as military and paramilitary to form a standing army. This practice continued even after Uganda gained independence. Meanwhile, Karamoja region which borders Kenya to the west continued to experience increased illegal acquisition and use of guns for cattle raids and animal protection. This practice is prevalent across Uganda-Kenya boarder communities for cattle raid and protection [5]. The post-independence Uganda worsened the situation through internal armed conflicts and conflict spillovers from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia. This masterminded the spread of unregulated access and use of the guns throughout the country.

3. Firearms regulations; firearms ownership by private security groups and civilians

Uganda has ratified both international and regional conventions in respect of the arms control. This includes Protocol against the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against transnational organised crime, and the Nairobi protocol for the prevention, control and reduction of small arms and light weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa. Uganda’s National regulations also conform to most of the provisions of the regional and international agreements on small arms control relating to civilian possession and use of small arms [6]. The firearms Act of 1970 for example restricts the manufacture, sale, and use of firearms [7]. Meanwhile the Uganda Peoples Defence Forces (UPDF) Act bars anyone from illegal possession of ammunition or arms. See for example Section 22(2) of the Act [8]. The UPDF Act provides for a very stringent penalty includes death for illegal possession of defence stores.¹

Acquiring firearms for personal or other uses are allowed under the firearms Act. The Act requires one to obtain a firearms licence or permit. Despite these provisions very few individuals find it necessary to own firearms under this arrangement. Most of the non-public firearms official users are private security organisations (PSO) which is controlled by the Uganda police under the Control of Private Security Organisations Regulations, 2004 which replaced Control of Private Security Organisation Regulations, 1997. Uganda has over 100 PSO [9], each of which uses firearms in providing security services to their clients. The regulations require that private security companies train their personnel in accordance with guidelines issued by the Inspector General of police [10]. The Uganda police issues training instructions for private security organisations. It also controls the nature and type of arms used by private security companies. For example, private security companies are not allowed to use automatic rifles. However, there seems to be no monitoring mechanism for the recruitment, training, deployment, and remuneration afforded to security guards. These factors have been jointly blamed for gun violence by private security guards. Private security guards have been implicated for the rise in robberies, violence to workmates, and suicide. Following rampant gun violence in the country between 2019 and 2023, the police department in May 2023 suspended 39 private security companies over the misuse of firearms [11]. This was not the first time several private security firms have been suspended. In 2019, the Uganda Police suspended 40 PSOs [12]. While this move provides some stop gap measures, it does not address the underlying factors for gun violence by private security guards. On this issue, I argue that the major reasons for gun violence by private security guards are both the legal framework and implementation of the current legal regime. On the legal framework for example, the law neither provides for any professional codes nor qualifications for the guards. As a result, each security company sets its own codes of conduct and recruitment criteria. Non universal codes and qualifications result in varying levels of training, performance, and behaviour. Worst still, PSO training does not seem to include psychological training to withstand insults and difficult people they interact with in the course of their duty. Their inability to deal with such psychological threats results into immediate discharge of firearms. In recent years for example, many cases of gun violence meted against the public have risen from simple altercation between the victims and private security guards. Unless the PSOs have fully undertaken psychological training and proper recruitment procedures to include mental health evaluation for the candidates, gun violence committed by private security guards is expected to increase given the rising cases of mental illness in the country.

Employees of PSO are registered with the Uganda Private Security Organisations Association (TUPSA) [10]. According to TUPSA twitter account, the association had over 320 members employing over 60,000 guards as of June 2023. Although the association was formed with the aim of fostering collective bargain, standardisation of training and remuneration of the employees of its members, there has been zero adherence to minimum payment and training standards [10, 13]. For example [13], notes that some security companies train their guards for up to 3 months while others train their guards for only 2 weeks. A security guard who trained for only a couple of weeks poses a very serious danger when presented with a firearm. He is not only a danger to others but also a danger to himself. Due to shallow training security guards have been the leading perpetrators of gun violence against fellow security guards and other members of the public. Besides, lack of adherence to the minimum standard wage for the guards allowed most security companies to pay their guards as little as 100,000 Uganda Shillings (equivalent to about $28) per month. Due to poor remuneration, the guards have been frequently involved in robberies which furthers gun violence in the country. Thus, addressing gun violence by private security guards require a holistic approach which includes amendments in the regulations regarding private security organisations, setting and adhering to minimum standard for recruitment, training, remuneration and code of conduct. In addition, the office of the Inspector General of Police (IGP) should consistently exercise her role of monitoring the performance of these private security organisations to avoid being reactive.

Although the law allows civilians to own firearms, very few Ugandan civilians own firearms. Several factors are attributed to this. Firstly, civilian ownership of firearm is not a culture in Uganda. Therefore, even prominent businessmen and politicians rarely own firearms but prefer employing services of either private or public security personnel. Secondly, the procedure for acquisition and ownership of firearms in Uganda is so laborious that the applicant is likely to lose interest in the process. Despite the small number of registered non security personnel firearms, the few private civilian firearms users have been implicated for intimidations by use of firearms, arrogance at police check points and occasionally shooting at others who pick up quarrels with them. See for example the incident involving former labour minister Mwesigwa Rukutana who thoughtlessly fired an AK47 at his opponents’ supporters during political party primary elections in September 2020 leading to the injury of 3 people [14], the murder of child rights activist Kenneth Akena by Kanyamunyu when the victim’s car scratched on the perpetrator’s car in a public place in 2016 [15], among others. These incidents are not quite many perhaps due to the small number of firearms in the hand of civilians.

Holding a firearm requires self-control and self-restraint. These characteristics are built during the training of security personnel. However, civilians who own firearms do not have these conditionings and are therefore very likely to discharge firearms at the slightest pinch. The United States for example has the highest civilian owned firearms and it has one of the highest rates of gun violence world over. However, Brazil tops the log for gun violence generally. This could be because of high number of illegal firearms in Brazil. Thus, while more gun violence is committed by use of illegal firearms in countries such as Brazil, India, and Mexico, in the USA, more gun violence is committed by registered firearms in the hands of civilians. To this end, I argue that the more civilians have access to firearms whether legally or illegally, the more we experience gun violence and personal insecurity owing to lack of self-control which is something normally inculcated in the security personnel through rigorous training.

4. The armed conflicts and the spread of unregulated use of firearms

4.1 The armed conflicts and gun violence

The history of Uganda and indeed the Great Lakes Region is not short of armed conflicts. Internal conflicts have been ongoing in Uganda right from the onslaught of colonial rule [16]. The country has witnessed several armed resistances and four forceful changeovers. For instance, shortly after the country gained independence, an altercation between the executive prime minister Dr. Apollo Milton Obote and the then ceremonial president led to an armed conflict which later became known as the Kabaka crisis of 1966. This resulted in the deposition of the Kabaka, and the prime minister assumed office of the president. The altercation left tens of people dead. Four years later the army overthrew the government and the Army General Iddi Amin took charge for more than 8 years until he was overthrown by the combined forces of Tanzania and the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF). This was a joint military force formed by Ugandans in Tanzania to resist the dictatorial regime of Iddi Amin in 1979. In 1980 UNLF now Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) organised the first democratic election in over a decade, election in which Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) claimed victory. The Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM) which came last in that election disputed the results and formed a rebel group called the National Resistance Army (NRA) which launched a guerrilla warfare against the government. In 1985, another army commander General Tito Okello Lutwa capitalised on an internal rift in the government and the pressure mounted by the rebels of the NRA and stagged a successful coup. His government however was too shaky since part of the military joined NRA in the bush while others either disserted or joined the fleeing forces loyal to the former president Dr. Apollo Milton Obote. This allowed the NRA guerrilla fighters to easily defeat the UNLA in January 1986 leading to the establishment of the NRA government. The establishment of NRA government led to the rise of more than 10 rebel groups, the most notable being the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) of Alice Lakwena, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) of Joseph Kony, and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) which later metamorphosed into a terrorist group. The last two mounted a protracted armed resistance which lasted for over two decades.

The rise of several rebel movements and the coups led to the increase in the number of people militarily trained, many of whom abandoned their military organisations but fled with firearms. Also, the proximity of Uganda to conflict neighbourhood allowed the proliferation of SALW in the country. As the National Focal Point notes,

Illicit small arms proliferation is attributed to past political instability, civil wars and armed conflicts, poor management and control of weapons, inflows from conflicts in the region, as well as illicit transfers and trafficking from other regions of the world due to inadequate regulation of international arms trade and transfers ([17], p. 4).

These internal conflicts and the conflict neighbourhoods made Uganda to have one of the largest stockpiles in the region [10]. Illegal arms have been blamed for several armed robberies and gun violence involving settling personal or family disputes. They have also been identified as the underlying factor for constant armed rebellions, the recent being the Rwenzururu rebellion of 2016 in which the small kingdom of Rwenzururu attempted to rebel but were brutally suppressed by the national army. That clash is said to have caused the death of over 60 Rwenzururu fighters and 41 police officers [18].

4.2 The Karamoja conflicts and gun violence

While other parts of the country experienced rebel activities, the Northeastern part of the country which is also kwon as the Karamojong region experienced a rather unique form of gun violence. Their proximity to the conflict prone countries such as Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, and the poorly governed Northwestern Kenya region of Turkana aided mass entry of small arms and light weapons in the area especially for livestock raid and counter raids. The rampant possession of firearms by the people in Karamoja has not only worsened the personal insecurity situation in Karamoja but the whole of Northern and Eastern region of Uganda. The possession of domestic animals especially cattle for the people within Karamoja or districts neighbouring Karamoja subregion is an invitation for violent raids by these warriors. As a result of rampant cattle raids, the residents live in constant fear of gun violence. Thus, gun violence in Karamoja has not only affected personal security but it has also affected the economic way of life of the people of these regions. The urge for raids and the government’s effort to militarily and forcefully disarm these communities resulted into three forms of conflict: the inter-tribal conflicts, the intracommunity conflicts, and the conflict between the state and the Karamoja society [19].

4.2.1 The inter-tribal conflicts in Karamoja

Karamoja subregion of Uganda is inhabited by the Karamoja people. The Karamoja people can be largely categorised into three based on their linguistic dialect and territorial presence. The Jie occupies the central Karamoja, the Dodoth to the North and the Karamojong to the South. The Karamojong are further subdivided into three territorial groups, namely, the Matheniko, the Bokora and the Pian. There are also other smaller groups such as the Tepeth, Ik, and Nyangia. Along the border with Kenya are the ethnic Pokot who inhabit the District of Amudat. The biggest part of this group is found in Western Kenya [20]. Although each of these groups speaks a common language, they do not look at themselves as one. Furthermore, the social, economic, and political order in Karamoja has for long depended on armed raiding. Armed raids are conducted by one tribal community against the other within the region, or against tribes adjacent to the region or across the borders. It is also conducted by the tribes from Kenya especially the Turkana and Pokot against the people of Karamoja. This has resulted in perceived and actual threat to those within and adjacent to the region [20]. The intertribal armed raids have been devastating on either community contributing to the largest scale of gun violence in the region. More than a hundred lives are lost every year due to attacks by these warriors against the neighbouring ethnic communities during cattle raids. In 2021 for example, a total of 160 people were killed by the Karamojong cattle rustlers [21].

4.2.2 The intracommunity conflicts

The intracommunity conflict in the area is generally conflict at individual or family or clan level. The Karamoja people are strongly aligned along clan lines. Their strong clan politics creates another layer of conflict at the community level. These conflicts often include raids and the battles for territorial control. Although intracommunity raids are moderate, intracommunity gun violence in the Karamoja region is common. Guns are used as a weapon of revenge or settling family or personal score with adversaries. However, the use of guns in settling scores is not only common in Karamoja. It is a common trend in nearly all parts of the country as was witnessed in the spate of gun murders in the country between 2015 and 2023 [22]. This is well beyond the illegal possession of firearms. It can be explained by frustration aggression theory. Groups and individuals frustrated by lack of employment, marginalisation, poverty, and lack of inclusion in the politics have embarked on gun violence to either communicate their message or clear their frustration. I will use Berkowitz’s argument “that the blocking of goal-directed activity can create an instigation to aggression” regardless of whether or not further provocation or aggression was experienced by the frustrated group or individuals [23]. The current government has been at the helm for about four decades. This has left the affected communities or individuals frustrated.

Intracommunity gun violence seems to be fueled by socioeconomic conditions such as inequalities, extreme deprivation, distribution of resources, land rights, and population pressure which itself is responsible for land wrangles. Karamoja subregion has remained with the highest poverty level in the country. See for example Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) 2022 report [24]. While poverty and other socio-economic hardships are known for fueling conflict, the access to firearms as the tools of violence, and the ineffective government approach for disarmament are the major root causes of intracommunity gun violence in the area. In addition to tackling deprivation, a careful approach should be undertaken to disarm this population by introducing alternatives to survival that disincentivizes the need for firearms bearing in mind their need for survival and security against other warrior communities from the neighbouring states.

4.2.3 The conflict between the Karamoja society and the state

The third nature of conflict is between the Karamoja society and the state. The conflict started in 2002 when the Uganda government decided to forcefully disarm the Karamojong. The government had previously given the warriors 1 month grace period to peacefully hand over the guns after which they would be forcefully disarmed. This followed rampant gun violence against the neighbouring communities of Teso, Lango, Bugisu, and Acholi. This grace period elapsed with less than 20% of the estimated illegal guns recovered. This prompted the government to launch forceful disarmament against the Karamojong warriors [25]. The forceful disarmament exercise involved armed confrontations between the military (UPDF) or paramilitary, Local Defence Units (LDU) and the warriors. The government forced disarmament exercise entailed counter insurgency tactics such as ambushes, cordon and search operations, and instructions to shoot and kill anyone carrying a gun along a road. This exercise led to the recovery of a considerable number of firearms but those who surrendered their firearms quickly became targets of attack by those who managed to retain their firearms [20]. Furthermore, the orders of “shoot to kill” led to the death of hundreds of the Karamoja people [26]. On the other hand, the military, other government officials and members of the civil society organisations became subjects of the attack by the Karamojong warriors. The attacks on the military, civilian communities, other government officials, and the members of the civil society organisations signify a very serious personal and community security issues in the subregion. The attacks on communities and civil society groups in particular makes it hard for humanitarian assistance to be provided in this area.

The gun in Karamoja as well as the communities across the borders is customary. Therefore, sorting the illegal possession of firearms in Karamoja is one of the most complex undertakings since the neighbouring communities in Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia, and South Sudan too have guns. Besides, the porous border of Uganda around this subregion makes the entry of firearms into the region very easy. This has made life in the Karamoja subregion so much dependent on firearms that without it there is literally no survival.

To control gun violence in and around Karamoja subregion, there is need for a joint intergovernmental strategy by Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan, and Uganda. The strategy should include ensuring the safety of those who have returned their guns and offering an alternative survival means that is more attractive than their customary use of the gun as a mean to livelihood. Without an alternative mean to survival and guarantee to personal security and other elements of human security such as food, environmental, economic, community and health security, not much can be done to eliminate gun violence in Karamoja resulting from cattle rustling.

5. The misuse of firearms by public security personnel

The public security agencies in Uganda are categorised into two groups: the armed forces and the civilian police forces. The armed force of Uganda includes the Uganda Peoples Defence Forces (UPDF) which is the national army, LDU which is the government militia, and the national security organisations, that is, the External Security Organisation (ESO) and the Internal Security Organisations (ISO). The civilian police forces are mainly the Uganda police (the national police), the Uganda prisons service, and the special police constabulary (a local police force partially trained and temporarily contracted to support police work). Members of these security organisations are trained and authorised to use firearms in their day today work. These security personnel are charged with the responsibility of providing state and human security especially security of persons (personal security and community security). Both the military and the police have been instrumental in protecting the population against violent crimes and attacks from insurgents, terrorists, and cattle rustlers. The police and sometimes the military are deployed to guard “very important persons” (high level politicians and cultural leaders).

The military in the immediate aftermath of colonial rule and the period before 1986 were notorious for all forms of violence including gun violence against the population. This somehow changed up to 1990s. However, recent statistics show that some gun violence in Uganda are being perpetrated by the security personnel either individually or collectively in the course of their duty. It is estimated that most of the gun violence committed in other parts of the country outside Karamoja region have been committed using registered guns and to a large extent by the security personnel. See for example [27, 28]. Members of the security services have been implicated for crimes by use of firearms such as murders by shooting, aggravated robbery, and careless shooting (especially during crowd control) [27]. Although there has been increased gun violence, mass shooting has been quite rare. The last known mass shooting occurred in 2013 when a soldier fire at a local bar killing 10 and injuring three others [29]. However, systematic, and sometimes unrelated gun violence has been prevalent throughout the country, the highest being recorded within central Uganda. Guns have been used for settling personal scores, robberies, and at times recklessly by security forces. The victims of gun violence by the security personnel variously include businesspersons, local rivals, colleagues at work, and supporters of opposition politicians. I will categorise this gun violence into two, institutional gun violence and individual gun violence. Institutionalised gun violence is violence directed to certain categories of people because of who they are. For the example, the government’s use of security forces to frustrate opposition politicians. Right from 1966, the government has employed military and police to suppress opposition politicians and their supporters. The very first of this appeared when the government of Apollo Milton Obote used the military to attack the Kabaka’s palace in 1966 resulting into the death of several Kingdom guards and the eventual exile of the Kabaka. Between 1971 and 1979 President Iddi Amin widely used the military to eliminate political opposition. The exact number of people killed is not known but it is estimated that about 300,000 people were killed during this time ([30, 31], p. 13). Some sources put the figure at 500,000 victims. See for example [32]. In post Amin era, the police and the military have been used by the ruling party to suppress political opponents. This suppression often involves deliberate shooting into the crowd in the pretext of crowd dispersal which results in death and juries of the victims. See for example ([33], p. 20).

Unlike in 1970s, the current institutional gun violence does not directly target the politicians but their supporters. The goal is to deny the opponent political support, freedom of association, and political space. This is what Wieviorka calls instrumental violence ([34], p. 9). This type of violence involves rational choice in that it is always chosen and perpetrated for gain of some kind, for example material gains, thrills, and retribution or force compliance ([34], p. 10). Instrumental violence is often a rational choice involving deliberate actions for a predefined goal. While this form of institutionalised gun violence has fewer physical effects on the politicians, the acts of shootings into the crowd gathered by these politicians have dire consequences on the personal security of the supporters. The current institutionalised violence may not have resulted into a big death rate but the number of people either physically or psychologically wounded might be higher than those killed during the reign of Iddi Amin.

The individual gun violence by security personnel have also been too prevalent. The security personnel acting individually have been implicated for murders, robberies, land grabbing, and procuring of threats to members of the public using firearms. It is noted that most of these violences are motivated by either settling personal scores or the urge for other material gains. As previously noted, most of the guns involved in firearms related crimes have been found to be from the members of the public security organisations. There are three major explanations for this. Firstly, the security forces are paid poorly as compared to other government employees who may be holding the same qualifications. This breeds ground for robberies. Secondly, the high rate of mental disability in the population is too reflected in the security forces. This affects the moods of the affected individuals resulting into irrational behaviours which includes unnecessary shooting of anyone who antagonises them. Lastly, poor control of the use of firearms and military uniforms breeds ground for these crimes. Some of these crimes would be avoided if the UPDF properly regulated her personnel against wearing uniforms and carrying firearms when not on duty.

6. Conclusion

This chapter has showed that gun violence is prevalent in Uganda albeit on a lesser magnitude if compared to other countries such as the United States, Brazil India, and Mexico. The perpetrators of gun violence in Uganda range from private security personnel, civilians with illegal firearms to public security personnel such as the police, the military, paramilitary and security services. The illegal guns are the most highly used in cattle rustling especially within and around Karamoja region. However, the rest of the country suffers gun violence mainly from registered guns in the hands of security personnel.

The consequences of gun violence are both physical and psychological. Gun violence is blamed for several deaths, physical, and psychological injuries of the victims. The effects of gun violence have been dire on the human security of persons in general and personal security in particular. In Karamoja and the surrounding areas, gun violence due to cattle rustling has not only resulted to personal insecurity but it has also led to community and economic insecurity. Communities are frequently attacked leading to loss of lives and herds. Additionally, communities live in fear of attacks and cattle raids.

To control gun violence in Uganda, it requires a comprehensive approach that includes revising legislations on the licencing of weapons for civilians and the private security organisations. Additionally, the public security organisations need to restrict their personnel from using service uniforms and or accessing firearms when not on duty. Moreover, the government of Uganda needs to engage the neighbouring countries to have a coordinated disarmament programme which does not leave some communities with firearms which may later be used against the disarmed communities.

Acknowledgments

Data on crime statistics in this work is attributed to the Uganda Police Annual crime report.

Thanks

I am immensely grateful to KMA leadership for affording me time to write this work. I also thank my workmates Charles Aineomugisha and George Nyafwa for constantly encouraging me to complete this chapter. Finally, my sincere appreciation goes to Tonci Lucic, the intechopen Publishing Process Manager who kept in touch with me throughout the process. His continuous engagement and follow up made this work possible.