The Sacralization of Violence in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo: A Predator’s Governance

Abstract

The chapter takes a look at the context in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and how armed violence impacts on the security of the population. It analyzes the dynamics underlying violence and its use as a mode of governance by state and non-state actors. Through events and institutions analysis, it explains the disintegration of state legitime violence in favor of diversified predators who use armed violence as rhetoric and technic both to gain power and mode of conflict resolution in a context of lack or weakened justice system to mitigate the impact of gun violences on populations. The solution to put an end to armed violence should not only be provided by the international commitment as by the United Nations or by multilateral organizations such as the European Union or African Union security policies, but also by promoting criminal justice against predators who abuse their positions in political competition while manipulating ethnic sensitivities and favoring the strategy of violence in order to gain access to natural resources and stay in power.

1. Introduction

“There is no justification for studying, and attempting to understand, the causes of human suffering if the purpose of one’s study is not, ultimately, to find ways of relieving and preventing that suffering.” (Dr David Turton) [1].

Violence, specifically the ones from guns, have been, for about three decades now almost, an endemic issue when someone is talking about the DRC, mainly its eastern part.

The International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) summarized the situation as follows:

“At the end of 2021, the March 23 Movement (M23) reappeared, resuming fighting with the DRC Armed Forces (FARDC). It is not the only armed group in the east: there are reportedly more than a hundred (…) The region has been the scene of the formation, dissolution and re-emergence of armed groups for more than 30 years, without any military operation having succeeded in calming the situation. The population, a victim of this tragedy, has a strong desire for peace, with elections looming at the end of the year.” Human rights abuses, particularly in North Kivu, have lasted since 1993s in a cycle of violence [2].

This cycle of violence started in the aftermath of the genocide of the Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994 when the perpetrators fled to the DRC, leading to their pursuit by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) army [3]. Then, the decline of Mobutu’s dictatorial regime in Zaire, with the arrival in power of Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (ADFLC)- Alliance des Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Congo (AFDL) from 1996 onwards, marking the beginning of armed violence. The presence of foreign forces in eastern Congo has led to the emergence of national armed groups. Their rise has grown with poor governance and corruption, entrenching violence and systematizing human rights abuses.

This contribution is based on the issue to understand why is legitimate gun violence, a sovereign attribute of the Congolese state, shared with other actors active in the DRC.

In order to respond to this major concern, our reflection is based on two assumptions.

Firstly, The State collapse: the political and institutional instability at the end of President Mobutu’s reign, as well as the privatization of the public force including armed violence which enabled the Mobutu system to stay in power, and the conflicts that this entailed, completed the disintegration of the state’s monopoly on the legitimate violence.

Secondly, the Sacralization of violence as a means of conflict resolution: violence has become part of the rhetoric of both political institutions and community leaders, including some members of civil society. It has also become for non-state actors as an alternative to State disintegration. In particular, the constitutional duties of the security and defense forces (Congolese National Police-PNC and DRC Defense Forces-FARDC), which are responsible for public security, the safety of persons and their property, the maintenance and restoration of public order [4], and the defense of the integrity of the national territory and its borders [5].

Furthermore, armed violence seems to have been established as a mode of political and security governance by state and non-state actors [6].

Confronted by the Islamist threat in the North Kivu province, or the resurgence of identity or community concerns, as is the case in Ituri (violent opposition between the Hema and the Lendu communities), and the demands of the Tutsi community formulated in a violent manner by the March 23 rebel movement (M23). The country’s military authorities have shown some tolerance toward some violent non-state actors, as it is for young people gathered in a self-defense group known as “Les Wazalendo”, which literally means “patriots” in Kiswahili, is the name given to these young people who have been meeting in almost every locality in North Kivu since the resurgence of the M23 rebellion in January 2022 [7]. They are free to hold guns openly in towns and villages.

According to a Human Rights Watch report, Congolese army units backed armed groups implicated in serious abuses in the recent conflict with M23 rebel forces in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. Between May and August 2022, the Congolese army with a coalition of Congolese militia as well as the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) fought against Rwandan-backed M23 rebels in North Kivu province [8].

In the attempt to substantiate the answers to the defined assumptions, we thought it is wise to resort to some analytical materials such as the historical method, which is used to constitute history to determine the historical facts and then to group them into a scientific system.

In addition, we need to interpret the rules governing the functioning of the Congolese state considering the political history of the country in order to identify the dynamics that have led to the emergence of armed violence, despite efforts made by both national and international actors, particularly in the east of the country.

To this end, the present study will focus, on the one hand, on the Congolese State’s failure (Section I) which inevitably led to the sacralization of armed violence as a means to access political power and for resolving conflicts (Section II).

2. The DR Congo state failure

The evolution of the political and administrative history of the D.R. Congo since its independence has been marked by various phases characterized by strong moments of political and institutional instability (Paragraph I) which have had the devastating effect of breaking up the monopoly of legitimate violence (Paragraph II) which was once the preserve of the state. The use of guns, as a means to intimidate opponents, was a strategy during the Mobutu regime period.

2.1 The uncontested collapse of the state

In the aftermath of Congo-Kinshasa’s independence, the political situation was marked by jolts linked to the crisis of legitimacy of the political actors who led the country to international sovereignty.

The political instability (A) since General Joseph-Désiré Mobutu took power as the head of the Congo-Zaire was characterized by the use of legitimate arms violence to stop insurgency and civil war in the country, also to impose a dictatorship system. The political instability period will be followed by institutional instability (B) during the Second Republic (1965–1997) until the fall of the Marechal Mobutu in May 1997.

2.1.1 Political instability: The rise of dinosaur’s dictatorship

2.1.1.1 The chaos of independence

Few months up to independence, the Congolese elected a President, Joseph Kasavubu, a prime minister, Patrice Lumumba, a senate and assembly, and similar bodies in the Congo’s numerous provinces. The Eisenhower administration had high hopes that the Republic of the Congo would form a stable, pro-Western, and central government. But those hopes vanished as the newly independent State descended into chaos and violence [9]. At that time, the Cold War was shaping geostrategic policies around the world.

In fact, disagreements appeared on how to administer this country: Moïse Tshombé and Joseph Kasa-Vubu argued for a federal state that leaves great power to the regions. Patrice Lumumba (unionist) defends a strong central state and, in fact, diminishes the influence of the territories outside the capital. From July 1960 to January 1961, the newly independent state plunged into chaos and violence as Congolese soldiers demanded a pay rise against a backdrop of conflict between the country’s leading figures: President Kasa-Vubu and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba [9].

During the same period, ideological divisions materialized on the ground. Katanga, a rich mining province in the south of the country represented by Moïse Tshombe, seceded and declared its independence from the Congo, followed by Albert Kalonji, the president of the Movement National Congolais (MNC)-Kalonji, removed from the central government, who proclaims the secession of the State of South Kasai [9]. And Lumumba’s death on January 17, 1961, did not put an end to political rivalries. Meanwhile, the U.S. Department of Defense supports the Congolese National Army-Armée Nationale Congolaise (CAN-ANC) through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), to oppose Lumumba’s supporters (allegedly supported by neighboring African nations, the Soviet bloc and Chinese Communists) insurgency against the central government in Kinshasa threatened national unity by taking Stanleyville (Kisangani), the largest city in eastern Congo on August 4, 1964 [9].

From these events, the Congolese post-independence crisis’s causes can be summarized as follows: the inexperience of the political leaders of the time (mismanagement of defeat and success, which continues to this day); Unpreparedness for independence, lack of initiation into the exercise of power, and the management of public affairs; The greed of foreign powers to recover lost ground; Lack of nationalism and jealousy among politicians; Tribalism and the sacrifice of competence.

What’s more, the race for power will overshadow the resolution of serious issues such as the inter-ethnic struggles in Kivu, where the nationality of the so-called “Banyarwanda” populations and refugees from Rwanda were already paving the way for future crises.

This situation led to a coup d’état by the military high command on 24 November 1965, which gave power to J.D. Mobutu for five years.

2.1.1.2 President Mobutu’s power personalized for the benefit of his clients

When he came to power in 1965, General Mobutu took the reins of power in a country divided by political and even ethnic violent confrontations consecrated by political actors. Mobutu highly centralized the Congolese state in the image of the colonial administration, governing by decree. His absolute power had been ratified by the 24th of June 1967. Constitution which made him the head of three powers: executive, legislative, and judicial [10].

The arrival of General Mobutu at the head of Congo-Zaïre put an end to the post-independence violence. Nonetheless, the use of armed violence by public authorities, and even by the President himself through his security services, has often been recognized as a legitimate means of maintaining order and political power.

In fact, from 1965 onwards, the Congolese population celebrated a period free of war and armed violence. This means that the use of weapons was reserved solely for the security forces and the army, thus formalizing the principle of the legitimacy of violence proper to public authorities [11].

Also, Administrative institutions under Marechal Mobutu, as in the colonial period, were highly centralized. All the central authorities (with the exception of the Governor General) lived in Brussels and ran the Belgian Congo from there. Professor LOHATA TAMBWE asserts that these colonial administrative institutions influenced the administrative structures of the Second Republic, and we add that the effects are still visible today, 22 years after the fall of Marechal Mobutu’s regime [12].

In order to consolidate his power, the use of armed violence by the security services has therefore become a tool for intimidating and even eliminating political opponents, despite the authorization to resume political life.

Indeed, the 1967 Constitution determines that no more than two political parties may be created in the Republic [13] (Article 4). In accordance with this constitutional provision, President Mobutu created the M.P.R. on 20 May 1967 on behalf of the government. He thus declared himself in favor of the creation of an opposition political party but, he said, “the second opposition party must be the movement of those who do not share our way of conceiving things (…), the party of those who have another program opposed to ours” [14].

Furthermore, political power based on violence was reinforced by a clientelist system that willingly used the violence of army and security force structures to perpetuate the holding of power [15].

According to Jean Claude Willame, this clientelist system is organized as a pyramid. “The different levels of this pyramid do not necessarily coincide with institutions based on a shifting, fluid reality. The MPR, the ministerial departments and the administration are merely labels concealing much more subtle hierarchies [16].

At the head of this patrimonial structure, there is a presidential clan made up of leading men who often belong to the same region, Equatorial Province. Attached to this clan are a number of major international “adventurers” who play a more or less permanent role as “advisors” to the president (he cites the American Mr. Tempelsman and the Frenchman de la Tribouille, etc.) [16].

Below them, a host of businessmen, administrators, and courtiers who owe their privileges to their ethnic or regional affiliation, or to “faits du prince.” [15].

At the bottom of the power pyramid, there is a sizeable mass of elites who form the power’s “recruitment pool” - senior civil servants, intellectuals, state or people’s commissioners, etc. - and who can overnight be the subject of a major scandal. - They can be promoted to high office overnight, or just as suddenly dismissed, beaten, tortured, or imprisoned [15].

In the final analysis, the armed violence of the Mobutu era was more a struggle for power than a civil or inter-ethnic war.

“It is within this layer that there are signs of discontent, of a desire to revolt, as witnessed by the case of the thirteen Kasai deputies, representatives of regional groups politically (but not necessarily economically) outnumbered by the dominant ethnic group of the presidential clique” [16]. At the beginning of the 90s, the narrow clientelism, strongly limited to the president’s ethnic group and based on plundering, which was really at the heart of the political dynamic, was succeeded by a strategy of resistance on the part of the dictator and his clan to maintain power, despite the wind having changed with the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Indeed, the appearance on the world scene of the policy of “Perestroika-Glasnost” (Perestroika means restructuring, while Glasnost means transparency) [17]. In this new international order, it is problematic that a dictatorship as obscurantist as it is bloodthirsty can remain in the heart of Africa.

The eminent Congolese history professor notes that “in Zaire’s past, change has almost always been accompanied by a climate in which state violence, following in the footsteps of popular violence, has often metamorphosed into armed violence” [15, 18].

2.1.2 Institutional instability: The rationality of the dinosaur’s resistance (transition period from 1990 to 1997)

Following the rapid pace of change in the international environment, and the extent of the deterioration in the country’s social, political, economic, and security situation, on January 22, 1990, the President announced the organization of popular consultations and created the National Office of Popular Consultations, headed by Mr. Mukolo wa Mpombo. This change was enshrined in the President’s speech, delivered on April 24 1990 at the Party headquarters in N’Sele to a large gathering of delegates from the country’s various political forces.

Thus began a new page in our country’s political history, with the reintroduction of a multiparty political system and, later, with the convening on August 7, 1991, of a National Sovereign Conference (CNS) bringing together all the country’s leaders to prepare a new social project and a new Constitution.

The 1991–1992s period recalled the Congo of 1960: “a tragi-comedy played out by actors politically monopolized by the struggle for power, the content of which is simply the method of management. The mobilization of internal and external political energies, undoubtedly justified by the current phase of the struggle for democracy, unfortunately evacuates not only reflection and debate on the crisis, but also on the political, economic and social content of democracy. The transition period towards the Third Republic is a kind of crossroads that raises questions about the direction of transition, both in terms of prospects and alternatives.” [19].

Due to the President’s Mobutu resistance against democratization, violence, including armed violence occurred and changed the political and security perspective of the country.

2.1.2.1 The resistance and the fall of the dinosaur (1990-1997)

On April 24, 1990, President Mobutu put an end to the single party and the Second Republic with many contradictions:

Contradiction in two 2 presidential speeches which both spoke on a three-party multiparty system and of an integral multiparty system; Firstly, contradiction between the President and the opposition: Hence the creation of the presidential majority;

Secondly, contradiction between the opposition itself Moderate opposition and radical opposition of Etienne Tshisekedi; Contradiction between ethnic and provincial groups: Therefore, during this period, the crisis had deepened in the country: the destruction of key infrastructures, economic meltdown, the forced deportation of civilians in Katanga, ethnic violence in North Kivu and increased tribalism. Violations of human rights also became commonplace across the entire country [20].

Against this backdrop of institutional cacophony, a Christian march was organized by lay Catholics on February 16 and March 1 in the streets of Kinshasa to protest against the stalled work of the CNS. This march was attended by all religious denominations: Catholic, Protestant, Kimbanguist, Muslim, and Orthodox, and shook the whole of Kinshasa. Mobutu’s army reacted vigorously and violently by using arms against the demonstrators. Officially, nine people were killed and 50 wounded. Pressured from within and without, President Mobutu gave in on April 06, 1992, and the CNS resumed its work. With the adoption on July 31, 1992, of the global political compromise and that of August 04, 1992, of the Act on constitutional provisions relating to the transition period, one might have thought that the constitutional situation had been definitively settled [21].

As a consequence of political instability, violence has gained ground and reached proportions of serious human rights violations and inter-ethnic conflicts including armed attacks.

Competition for power raised in North-Kiv u province, and had become more intense as the “indigenous” communities had begun to contest the political and land rights of the Banyarwanda more openly. Against the provincial authorities dominated by the Nande and Hunde, some members of the Hutu-Banyarwanda farmers’ mutual association, the MAGRIVI, became more radical and set up small armed groups. At the National Sovereign Conference (CNS), Nande and Hunde delegates pressed for the Banyarwanda not to be allowed to take part in future elections. On the other hand, young indigenous people gathered in tribal self-defense militias (the Ngilima for the Nande and the Mayi-Mayi for the Hunde and Nyanga) tried to counterbalance the militiamen from the MAGRIVI provincial [22].

From 1992 onwards, conflicts relating to land ownership and ethno-political murders by guns became more common and every community started to live in fear of attacks by other communities.

In 1993, Hunde and Nyanga groups in the Walikale territory believed that an attack by the Hutu Banyarwanda was imminent. In March 1993, Governor Jean-Pierre Kalumbo (of Nande origin) called on the FAZ to help the Ngilima and the Nyanga and Hunde militias to “exterminate the Banyarwanda.” On 18 March, Vice-Governor Bamwisho, from the Walikale territory, delivered an inflammatory speech against the Banyarwanda in the village of Ntoto [22].

It was against this background of crisis that the so-called war of liberation took place, bringing about Mobutu’s downfall and putting an end to the 1st transition.

Preoccupied with their own internal problems, the Zairian political class failed to realize in time that the war that had been raging in Rwanda since 1994 could, at any moment, spill over into the national territory, which had not only served as a retreat for the defeated army of the former Rwandan regime but was also home to numerous Hutu refugee camps protected by France’s Operation Turquoise.

These Rwandan Hutu refugees, for security reasons, had fled the theater of war, and the spillover of the Rwandan-Burundian war, which was feared, finally came to fruition in October 1966, soon to become the war of liberation.

There were several reasons for this war, the most prominent of which were:

• The Rwandan government’s intention to challenge the borders between Rwanda and Zaire as historically belonging to them. The Rwandan government called for a new Berlin Conference.

• A security problem for Rwanda. The genocidaires who have taken refuge in Zaire and are preparing to destabilize the Rwandan government must be prosecuted [23]. An economic problem behind this lay the United States of America, which was financing the war on the Rwandan side [24].

Thus, the armed opposition replaced the unarmed opposition and changed the political landscape of Zaire. The Rwandans capitalized on the Banyamulenge (Zairean Tutsi) revolt to give this war of foreign invasion a Zairean flavor under the label of the Banyamulenge rebellion which claims still fueling the instability and refugee outflows due to changes on nationality issues.

Indeed, ethnic Tutsis and some others of Rwandan origin have contributed to the continued instability and refugee outflows. Changes in the law and in the application thereof related to eligibility for nationality for Rwandophones who moved from Rwanda to DRC between 1930 and 1954 [25]. Related legislation includes the Congolese constitution of 1 August 1964, the subsequent Decree-Law (décret-loi) of 18 September 1965, the Order (ordonnance-loi) No. 71/020 of 26 March 1971, Law No. 72/002 of 5 January 1972, Law No. 81/002 of 29 June 1981, and Law No. 04/024 of 12 November 2004 on Congolese Nationality. Academic and legal experts have been cited as indicating that application of laws even when they may provide for the grant of nationality may be influenced by political bias [25].

A coalition of four politico-military movements was formed on October 18, 1996, in Lemera (South Kivu) under the name of The Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFLC)- Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre, or AFDL for short. ADFLC set itself its objectives: to dismantle fascist rule in the Congo; to establish a democratic regime; and to bring the country back from the brink of war [26].

Finally, Kinshasa fell without a fight on May 17, 1997, just hours after President Mobutu fled the country on May 16, 1997. The transition of Kinshasa to the power of L.D. Kabila thus marked the end of the Mobutu regime and of the first transition, which was the prelude to the advent of actors with heterolytic profiles.

3. Sacralization of armed violence as a means to access to the political power and for resolving conflicts

The socio-political and security context in the DRC’s eastern provinces, for instance, those of Ex-Kivu (following the territorial division of 1989, this region was subdivided into 3 provinces: North and South Kivu, Maniema) remains a challenge for the institutions of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as armed violence has become a mean to access to both power and mineral resources.

Indeed, actors in conflicts fall in at least four broad categories on a peace war continuum, as we have already pointed out. At the peace end are the peacemakers; these are mainly victims of the conflict with everything to gain from its resolution. They are actors whose interests are affected negatively by the conflict or who are likely to enjoy a peace dividend. These include civil society, internally displaced people and refugees. They form the backbone of any peace negotiation and should be embraced and encouraged.

At the war end of the continuum are the conflict entrepreneurs. These are actors who deliberately precipitate the formation of conflicts to create situations of chaos upon which they scheme off dividends. They are in the business of instigating and fueling conflicts for personal gain [27].

Arms trafficker Victor Boot was considered one of the major suppliers of weapons used by the various rebellions that sprang up in the DRC, and even in Rwanda during the 1994 genocide [28].

Both before and after the advent of the AFDL, the problems of security and the restoration of State authority in this part of the country are the result of a combination of several factors: the lack of State authority in all or part of Eastern DRC, the presence of armed groups, both national and foreign, identity-based claims, as well as to the legitimate or supposed ambitions of Rwandan and Ugandan neighbors, and even of certain economic interest groups ranging from arms traffickers to multinationals attracted by the natural resources. Furthermore, these factors meet with a favorable context induced by a high level of corruption which gangrene the structures of the State.

However, we should point out that the current situation is nothing new, or at least not the result of recent political maneuvers. It has its origins, we believe, in the historical chronology of events that saw the birth of this country, renamed the Democratic Republic of Congo, with the advent of Laurent-Désiré KABILA as head of state in 1997.

In recent years, the region has been subjected to an unbridled rush of predators of all kinds: mining, forestry, and agricultural resources have all been plundered to the detriment of a population that is bloodless, undernourished, massacred, and dispossessed of its land by violent and cynical predators, sometimes with Congolese complicity.

3.1 The rise of motley crew

3.1.1 Laurent-Désiré Kabila and his opportunist allies

The disintegration of the political and socio-economic climate in Mobutu’s Zaire created favorable conditions for the rebellion led by LD Kabila, while at the same time serving as a pretext for Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi to advance security concerns linked to the presence of former Rwandan armed forces on Zairean soil.

An armed insurgency arose from the South-Kivu province. In addition to Laurent-Désiré Kabila Peoples’ Revolution Party-Parti de la Révolution Populaire (PRP), the ADFLC is composed by the National Council of Resistance for Democracy (CNRD) led by André Kisase Ngandu, the Revolutionary Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MRLZ) led by Anselme Masasu Nindaga, and the Democratic Alliance of the people (ADP) led by Deogratias Bugera [29].

After suspending the constitutional provisions, the constitutional act of the transition, he promulgated the decree-law no. 003 of May 28, 1997, on the organization and exercise of power in DRC. Only the ADFLC, was allowed to operate [29].

From then on, the ADFLC gradually became a political group around which power was organized. A rift soon developed between the party and the government. Competition between the ADFLC and the government disoriented the public, who saw the spectra of the single party re-emerge [30].

The ban on political parties further undermined the credibility of the L.D. Kabila regime. The first weeks of the new regime saw the establishment of a monolithic system. Overwhelmed by a fringe group of fighters and opportunists, President L.D. Kabila turned a blind eye to arbitrary arrests and property confiscations.

To force the new Head of State to democratize his country’s institutions, the United States of America and the European Union made their financial aid conditional on the following requirement: “economic assistance is conditional on economic, political and social reforms.” [31].

At the same time, President L.D. Kabila adopted a stance that broke with former Zaire’s traditional partners, namely the France-Belgium-United States troika [29], and revived the sulfurous friendships of the maquis years. His first trips as Head of State took him to China, Libya, and Cuba. The issue of the massacres of Hutu refugees and the revelations of human rights violations committed during the war of liberation made M’zee Laurent Désiré Kabila unacceptable in the eyes of international opinion [32].

Laurent-Désiré KABILA and his Rwandan and Ugandan allies entered the war under the pretext of pursuing Rwandan Hutu genocidaires who had found refuge with their “Zairean Hutu brothers,” who were already engaged in inter-ethnic violence at home in Zaire, and who were to serve as fuel for indiscriminate attacks on civilian populations, under the watchful eye of the international community, led by the UN. The international community’s duty was to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security in the region and to protect civilian populations against massive human rights violations. At one point, however, it remained silent in the face of a rather chaotic scene unfolding in Zaire, which became the Democratic Republic of Congo with the second war of 1998, during which more than six states (Zimbabwe, Angola, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, and Chad) were to wage flagrant war [33].

Relations between the new government and the muzzled internal opposition are not much better. The internal opposition, represented by the UDPS, is calling on the new Head of State to stick to the CNS line and form a broad-based government of national unity [34].

For L.D. Kabila, “the CNS never had total freedom to decide on the country’s future. Its resolutions were therefore biased and never implemented” [35].

Following the decision to send back home the Rwandans, Burundians, and Ugandans who had taken part in the victorious AFDL campaign, the Rwandans, Burundians, and Ugandans joined forces against Kabila to overthrow his regime. Hence the war of “aggression”.

3.1.2 Laurent-Désiré Kabila against his allies

The divorce between LD Kabila and his allies, who brought him to power after the fall of Mobutu in May 1997, is taking place abruptly and with armed violence. Recourse to arms is the only option chosen by the belligerents. In August 1998, Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda invaded the DRC. Their strategy was to back some rebel groups on one hand, and on another hand, the Congolese government was backed by Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia [36].

The Congolese Government and its allies relied on the support of ex-FAR/Interahamawe (the former Rwandan army and its allied militias that perpetrated the genocide), ADF (the Allied Democratic Front of Uganda), and FDD (Forces for Democracy and Development from Burundi) to slow the advance of its opponents [36].

In the first place, a politico-military movement: the Rally for Congolese Democracy-Rassemblement congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD)- claims responsibility for this rebellion led by the Banyamulenges, who reproach Kabila for turning a deaf ear to their demands [30]. But there are also Rwanda’s expansionist ambitions and the covetousness of Congolese soil and subsoil riches by the Western powers under cover of Rwanda and Uganda.

Indeed, some authors have argued that the wars in eastern DRC are more the result of a frantic race for the country’s riches than a struggle for democratic change. According to Euloge Boissonnade, in 1996, the Canadian company Barrick Gold (founded in 1981 by Adnan Kashoggi) financed the AFDL offensive, and George BUSH played a major role in this aggression. As a member of the company’s Board of Directors, the former US President was awarded a concession covering several thousand square kilometers that year, including the Kilo-moto gold mines in Orientale province [37].

Surprised by this war, Laurent Désiré Kabila’s regime almost fell, were it not for the energetic intervention of the Angolan and Zimbabwean armies and the violent resistance of the people of Kinshasa.

At the same time, the rebel coalition is increasingly divided on the tactics to adopt on the ground. A first disagreement arose in November 1998, with the opening of a second rebel front in Equateur province, led by ex-Mobutist Jean Pierre Bemba, head of the Ugandan-backed Mouvement de Libération du Congo (M.L.C.). Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni seems to favor this new faction for one simple reason: its influence over the Goma rebels (RCD) is not as strong as that of the Rwandan army [38].

Thanks to these different rebel factions, the Democratic Republic of Congo will be torn into several pieces, and insecurity will be total.

As a consequence of the two wars (1996–1997 and 1998–2003), the AFDL war gave a new meaning to the violence in the country. Whereas under Mobutu, legitimate violence, including the use of weapons, was the prerogative of the State’s security forces, to preserve the power in place and its system, with the advent of the AFDL, inter-ethnic violence would be exacerbated and the use of all forms of weapons, such as sexual violence and child soldiers, would become a technique of warfare.

Under pressure from certain powers, the belligerents and their respective allies put away their weapons, leaving it to diplomacy to find a way out of a war deemed too deadly for the Congolese people.

Thus, summits were held with the allies of both camps under the cover of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (O.U.A.) (Pretoria Summit of August 23, 1998), Victoria Falls Summit of September 7 to 08 of the Congolese government, the R.C.D., the MLC and all Congolese political and civil organizations to organize an inclusive national dialog aimed at achieving national reconciliation and the establishment of a new political order in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the “Lusaka Agreement for a ceasefire in the Democratic Republic of the Congo” was signed on July 10, 1999 in Lusaka, Zambia [36].

The Global and Inclusive Agreement of December 17, 2002, signed between the Congolese belligerents, provided for a two-year transition period during which the country would be under collegial leadership for two years, extendable to three, and which was to be used to draw up the fundamental laws, including the new constitution, and stabilize the country by restoring the authority of the State [6].

North and South Kivu are not exempt from the influence of neighboring countries such as Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi, given that the capital Kinshasa is located 2000 km away, while the neighboring capitals are around 150 km away in the case of Kigali (Rwanda), and 500 km away in the case of Kampala (Uganda), to which almost all the commercial and financial flows of the two provinces converge.

However, more than twenty years on, this cycle of war has laid the foundations for the insecurity that reigns in the country’s eastern provinces. The war also uprooted entire communities and destroyed the economic fabric, not to mention providing many of the weapons and munitions that continue to traumatize civilian populations. Faced with this situation, the United Nations has deployed the largest peacekeeping operation in the world, with 19,815 peacekeepers whose mission is to protect civilians and consolidate peace.

Although the conflicts have eased considerably, allowing, for example, the organization in December 2018 of the third cycle of democratic elections since the 2003 Sun City Agreement, the activities of armed groups, the undermining of gains resulting from political negotiations, the activism of armed groups involved not only in the trafficking of natural resources but also in sexual violence against civilians, and the enshrinement of impunity sometimes as a bonus for peace during negotiations with warlords, remain issues that still seriously threaten the stability of the DRC. To these must be added such pertinent issues as the return of Congolese refugees living in Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi, against a backdrop of denial of the right to nationality, often fueled by rhetoric as violent as it is irresponsible, not to mention the equally precarious and thorny situation of the repatriation of Rwandan refugees from 1994-1998 still present on DRC territory.

Secondly, without claiming to be a panacea, we’ll be suggesting ways out of the conflict.

3.2 The power of spoilers

The power of spoilers manifests itself firstly in the patrimonial conception of power in the Congo, and secondly, in the idea, these spoilers have of democracy.

We can therefore identify the actors involved in this violence, such as the state, the military, and even peacekeeping missions. All of these will serve to manage violence rather than eradicate it.

We borrow from Professor Masako Yonekawa’s argument that, if conflicts persist in the DRC, it’s because of the existence of the “spoiler” phenomenon.

“Spoilers” are defined as “leaders and parties who believe that peace resulting from negotiations would threaten their power and interests, and resort to violence to undermine attempts to achieve it.” [39].

To illustrate this, Mr. Yonekawa points out that as global demand for strategic minerals has grown, so has the exploitation of these minerals, as well as cross-border trade (legal and illegal), and the expansion of looting and the black market. This has opened up new economic opportunities for some of the players involved in the conflicts in the DRC. To secure these economic opportunities, the war effort is now focused on controlling strategic mineral-rich zones. And military operations tend to focus on areas of economic importance, with a significant effect on the geographical location of military deployment [40].

Rebel groups and government forces thus seek to establish permanent strongholds or zones of insecurity and create de facto zones of sovereignty imposed by violence.

3.2.1 The patrimonial conception of power

We’re not going back to Methuselah to talk about Eastern DRC, but instability in the Grand Kivu is due to armed violence fueled by small arms trafficking, and from the interethnic-based disputes that characterize it. These disputes are as much historical as they are inevitable, rooted in the very existence of this important part of the DRC, part of the pre-colonial as well as colonial and political history of this country of over 80 million inhabitants. It is also rooted in the problems associated with the exploitation of the DRC’s rich natural resources.

The report by the United Nations panel identified Congolese and foreign personalities incriminated in the exploitation of the DRC’s natural resources through various organized and unorganized crises. However, it would be dishonest to overlook the repercussions of the Leopold administration and colonization. First, the economic expansion pursued by King Leopold II through the use of terror in the Independent State of Congo - 1884 to 1908 - and then the period of Belgian colonization from 1908 to 1960 [41].

These factors, combined with catastrophic governance over the last 50 years since independence, have revealed the damaging effects of colonial civilization’s mission to civilize, which ignored the sociological realities of the indigenous people in their cultural, political, and economic diversity, have impoverished the people of Kivu today, exposing them to the temptation of easy gain, gratuitous violence, the exploitation of the natural resources of the eastern DRC, and the estrangement of any hope of peace for long-awaited development.

The abundant literature on the actions of the administration set up by King Leopold II informs us that his so-called “civilizing” work was carried out with the sole aim of enriching the sovereign in a European economic context dominated by the discovery of rubber as an essential element for the automobile industry, and without any attention being paid to the socio-cultural and political realities that governed these indigenous peoples [41].

Denis SEMADWINGA pointed out a reality that is mostly concealed by those who deny the right to Congolese nationality to Kinyarwanda-speaking populations living in the provinces of North and South Kivu: “It’s true that dismemberment, however justified it may seem by the desire to secure the natural borders formed by the chain of volcanoes, nonetheless denotes the strict ignorance of local realities displayed by Europe’s chancellors.” [39]. In support of this assertion, which would startle many subjective objectors, he cites the regions of Busanza, Jomba, Bukoma, Bwisha, Bukumu, Kamuronza, Gishari, Mushari, Mokoto, Bwito, etc., as examples. Their incorporation into the Congo does not go back further than the first decade of this century [42].

There’s every indication that racial considerations have fueled prejudice against Africans, who are considered subhuman. The fate reserved for the Venus Noire and the tragedy of the severed hands of workers who failed to meet rubber production quotas speak for themselves [42].

Jean Jacques MAQUET declares that the ideology of race guided the governance of the administration under the EIC. “The reduction of African societies to a set of ethnic cleavages has been general in colonial and post-colonial literature; the particularity of the African lake region is the racial turn taken by this type of analysis. The assimilation of the so-called agricultural and pastoral categories to the meeting of two great races, the Bantu and the Hamitic, is a kind of catechism that cannot be ignored in the great mass of publications devoted to the region. It would be impossible to talk about the region’s culture and history without putting on the spectacles inherited from 19th-century Gobi ideologies” [43].

This vision has had an adverse effect on inter-ethnic relations in the region, already damaged by years of slavery followed by the chaotic administration of Leopold II.

The scandal generated by the reports and investigations of associations defending the rights of the indigenous peoples of yesteryear, such as the Swedish and American missions, demonstrated that the atrocities suffered by the indigenous populations could be prosecuted as crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity [43].

Dr. Motsoko Pheko’s speech on the effects of colonialism on Africa’s past and future, in support of the thesis that colonialism has done great harm to Africa, is based on a statement by Edem Kodjo, author of the book entitled “Afrique de demain,” describing the situation of the African as having been removed from his history, placed in a universe shaped by the outside world that has suppressed his values, silenced by a cultural invasion that marginalizes him. He ends by saying that the African today is the distorted picture of others [41].

Other authors, notably Anglo-Saxon, have denounced the atrocities committed in the name of “Western Christian Civilization” against the indigenous populations under Leopold II. British philosopher Bertrand Russel wrote: “Each village was ordered by the authorities to harvest and bring in a certain quantity of rubber. If they failed to do so, their women were taken and kept as hostages in the harems of colonial government officials. If this failed, police troops were sent in to spread terror, if necessary killing a few men and ensuring that the right hand of every black man shot dead was taken away as a souvenir” [44].

In a study entitled “Gouvernance post-conflit du développement local au Nord-Kivu et Sud-Kivu en République Démocratique du Congo: entre enjeux locaux et nationaux,” Jules Maps BAGALWA Mapatano is more explicit about the situation in Masisi: “In Masisi, land is the fundamental reason for conflicts between the Bahunde and the Banyarwanda, and between the Bahunde themselves. They are having a detrimental effect on the lives of the territory’s inhabitants. This situation is not new. It has its roots in Belgian colonization. For economic reasons, the colonizer decreed the immigration of Banyarwanda to the Masisi territory. He favored the newcomers to the detriment of the natives as part of the colonial “divide and conquer” policy. Furthermore, he failed to achieve the cultural integration of the Banyarwanda in Masisi territory. On the contrary, it has reinforced the gulf it has created between the two ethnic groups to the point of animosity. Hence the difficulty of cohabitation and the lack of socio-cultural integration, a source of conflict including land disputes. The departure of the colonizer in 1960 coincided with the transition from latent conflict to open and even armed conflict between the two antagonists. The fire that had smouldered during colonization was given a chance to explode once the fear of colonial authority had passed and disappeared” [45].

Jules M. BAGALWA is not the only one to have attempted to understand the causes of the conflicts between the Bahunde and the Banyarwanda in the Masisi territory.

Olivier MPIANA Kalombo, who has researched the nationality of Rwandophone populations living in the DRC, presents his analysis as follows: “In Masisi territory, the colonial government created an autonomous chiefdom, Gishari, headed by a Tutsi immigrant, Mr. BUCYANAYANDI Wilfried, who arrived in the Belgian Congo on the wave of the Mission d’Immigration des Banyarwanda (MIB). The Hunde customary authorities protested to the government; they even took steps in Brussels, where they reminded the Belgian authorities that the Rwandans had only been admitted to Congolese lands on condition that they remained under the control of the Hunde customary authorities. Brussels agreed with these authorities, represented by Mwami KALINDA André, and Chief BUCYANAYANDI was deposed and his chieftaincy abolished.” [46].

It’s clear that for the colonizer, the need for economic expansion as a European power dictated the necessary occupation and exploitation of the entire Congo-Belgium territory, and hence of most of the Congo Basin.

Generally speaking, the troubles that engulfed North Kivu in 1993 seem to have had their roots in colonial society, but were exacerbated during the Second Republic by the calculations of certain political leaders who used and fabricated the ethnic fact to gain or maintain power [47].

3.2.2 The Spoiler’s democracy

3.2.2.1 The use of violence as a mode of political and security governance

According to Thierry Vercoulon [48], the DRC has been diagnosed as one of the world’s most failed States on the planet consequence of three decades of one man in power. The state-building of a country-continent initiated by the international community for the restoration of the state has remained incomplete.

Indeed, in accordance with the Sun City agreement, the restoration of state authority was to lead to convincing results in terms of security (control of borders against foreign infiltration), development (end to the illegal exploitation of natural resources), and the democratic rule of law (an end to massive human rights violations and the participation of the population in the country’s political governance) [6].

In addition, peacekeeping and the organization of elections were to be facilitated by the restoration of state coercion (army and police), guided by “good governance.” In short, a virtuous circle of state building/security/democratization was to be set in motion. However, according to Masako Yonekawa, elections in the poorest countries will not necessarily lead to democracy but rather democracy. It would appear that the Presidential and legislative elections held in DRC in November 2011 turned out to be one such case of democracy by spoilers, in the footsteps of the elections in Kenya in 2007 and Cote d’Ivoire in 2010 [49].

The “spoiler” phenomenon in the post-2005 and decades after in the DRC context can also be analyzed on three levels [49]:

Firstly, there are the “spoilers,” who need to be identified. Masako Yonekawa notes that state actors and the UN tend to qualify as “spoilers” only those rebel groups and former government forces who took part in the fighting, but who became parties to the peace agreements. Once in power, they continue to use violence and propaganda as a means of political and security governance.

Secondly, “spoilers” use both violent and non-violent tactics. Violent to prolong the conflict and benefit from the war economy.

Non-violent tactics can be strategic and far-reaching, and include recognition, time, legitimacy, military and material advantages, and the avoidance of sanctions. For Masako, a peace process can be “spoiled” either to destroy it or to shape the negotiation process.

Finally, we need to identify the sources of funding for “spoilers.” Spoilers may be supported by external actors, including diaspora groups, states, political allies, or multinationals.

3.2.2.2 The rationality of rapacious birds

An overview of the problem of conflict over mineral resources in the DRC corroborates the thesis that the supply of resources by state or non-state actors is in fact financing the recurrent violence observed in this country.

Since 2003, more than ten armed groups have been operating with impunity in eastern DRC, in the absence of the Congolese state. In order to profit from the resources, they exploit in the territories under their control, the armed groups attack the civilians they keep under their control. Serious crimes are committed, including sexual violence and massacres [49].

The UN expert’s report [50] noted the continued presence of domestic and foreign armed groups in eastern DRC and the suffering they impose on the civilian population of the country, including international humanitarian law violations and human rights violations and abuses, and contribute to undermining State authority, the continued illegal exploitation and trade of natural resources, which enable these armed groups to operate in eastern DRC.

Despite this situation of insecurity, the Congolese authorities have not stopped signing mining contracts with external partners, sometimes highlighting the corruption that plagues the process of selecting economic partners.

The personal enrichment of political elites and their clients fuels the country’s scandals.

That is why T. Vercoulon stated that “a presidential election does not make a democracy, and the discontent of the losers added to the legacy of unresolved political, economic and security problems will make the DRC even more fragile.” [51].

Also in the context of clashes between the M23 and FARDC, local auto-defense groups managed to get access to arms to defend themselves and their own communities in the village of Mugogo in order to resist against the armed group’s attack, local population [6].

The proliferation and illicit trafficking of light weapons in the Great Lakes region is one of the main consequences of the wars that have plagued three of the region’s countries, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Burundi, and Rwanda, for over a decade. The political agreements for peace signed on both sides, the transition process in which the DRC and Burundi are involved, and the process of integrating the various armed groups that took part in the war in Burundi and Congo-Kinshasa into unified national armies, have not been enough to put an end to the trafficking of light weapons and ammunition, which still continues in the east of the DRC and in Burundi [52].

Access to arms by the population of the eastern DRC has fueled violent tensions for over two decades. The slightest conflict, land dispute, or dispute between neighbors often results in the use of a firearm. The ease with which weapons can be acquired in North Kivu, for example, corruption and the quality of life of soldiers deployed in the area are all factors that encourage the proliferation of weapons among the civilian population. In addition, the ineffectiveness of the judicial system in dealing with gun crimes contributes to the perpetuation of impunity [53].

4. Conclusion

This study tried to demonstrate how Spoiler’s violent governance has impacted the historical evolution and politics in the DRC, especially in its eastern part. Clientelism and race for power have occulted issues of economic and social development of the populations.

On the other hand, in the context of Eastern DRC, gun violence is a consequence of non-state actors’ activism in the region, as it is a resistance strategy for the population against rebel groups or simply a way to deal with the interpersonal disputes.

Political decision-makers, both national and international, should not ignore this aspect of the country’s history in their attempts to understand and resolve the Congolese crisis, which has lasted for over three decades.