Open access peer-reviewed chapter

A Review on Viral Outbreak in India with Special Reference to COVID-19

Written By

Aishwarya Khamari, Monika Khamari, Akshya Kumar Mishra, Jijnasa Panda, Debashish Gardia and Ratikanta Rath

Submitted: 21 August 2022 Reviewed: 12 October 2022 Published: 13 April 2023

DOI: 10.5772/intechopen.108575

From the Edited Volume

Viral Outbreaks - Global Impact and Newer Horizons

Edited by Shailendra K. Saxena

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Abstract

COVID-19, Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS), and SARS are three severe pandemics linked to novel coronaviruses that have so far impacted people in the twenty first century. These acute respiratory tract infections (ARTIs) are brought on by viruses that are all exceedingly contagious and/or have caused large mortality. On January 7, 2020, a patient in Wuhan, China, with pneumonia-like symptoms had a novel coronavirus found in lung fluid. In 1980, the smallpox disease was formally deemed extinct worldwide. The cause of smallpox is unknown. The discovery of smallpox-like lesions on Egyptian mummies indicates that the illness has existed for at least 3000 years. The Ebola virus, a member of the filovirus family that affects both humans and other primates, causes the severe illness known as Ebola virus disease (EVD). The idea that swine influenza was a sickness related to human flu was originally put forth when pigs were ill during the 1918 flu pandemic at the same time as humans. Because viruses vary in their structural, anatomical, and molecular makeup, distinct viral diseases can be detected or tested using different methodologies, procedures, or diagnostic tools. Viral vaccines come in a wide variety of varieties in the pharmaceutical industry. From a medical perspective, several treatments are used for various viral illnesses.

Keywords

  • COVID-19
  • flu
  • testing
  • outbreak
  • treatment
  • Indian context
  • pandemics
  • Ebola virus disease

1. Introduction

COVID-19, Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS), and SARS are three severe pandemics linked to novel coronaviruses that have so far impacted people in the twenty first century. These acute respiratory tract infections (ARTIs) are brought on by viruses that are all exceedingly contagious and/or have caused large mortality. Another zoonotic novel coronavirus with the name severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 is the cause of the recently identified COVID-19 sickness, a highly contagious viral infection (SARS-CoV-2). Similar to the other two coronaviruses like SARS-CoV-1 and MERS-CoV, SARS-CoV-2 is most likely to have originated from bats, which have long served as established reservoirs for a range of lethal coronaviruses [1]. In December 2019, there were several reports of individuals in the province of Hubei who were admitted to hospitals with a brand-new illness characterised by pneumonia and respiratory failure and brought on by a novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) (China). On February 11, 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) identified this agent as the COVID-19 causal agent. 2019 (Coronavirus Disease). Despite the use of significant containment measures, the disease later spread to other Asian countries, the Middle East, and Europe. On March 11, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, the director general of the WHO, said that COVID-19 was a pandemic [2, 3].

Numerous studies show that after the coronavirus infection (COVID-19) outbreak, anxiety around it has significantly increased. To measure COVID-19 fear, a number of questionnaires have been developed concurrently. The several questions could cover a wide range of subjects, and COVID-19 dread is not necessarily a widely accepted idea. We conducted structural equation modelling and network analysis on four scales in an online convenience sample to examine the underlying structure of COVID-19 fear [4].

It is more crucial to comprehend the organisation and structure of conspiracy theories and misleading information about the COVID-19 epidemic in order to counteract the harm that these dubious claims pose as the pandemic spreads. We found distinct belief clusters when surveying Americans on their views on 11 of these ideas. These belief clusters correlated with various individual-level traits (like support for Trump and mistrust of scientists) and behavioural intentions (like taking a vaccine or participating in social activities) [5].

The rapid development of diagnostics for the novel virus was made possible by the genome assembly and release of the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) in January 2020. Due to this, the largest global testing programme in history was launched and has since tested hundreds of millions of people. The massive amount of testing has stimulated innovation in the techniques, instruments, and theories that direct public health testing [6].

Physical isolation has been recommended as one of the most effective techniques to inhibit the transmission of COVID-19 before a vaccine or efficient therapy is created. How far people can be physically apart depending on both population density and behavioural characteristics. Most models developed to predict the spread of COVID-19 in the US do not explicitly take population density into account [7].

The Centres for Illness Control and Prevention developed and conducted the initial test as a result of the novel coronavirus severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 producing coronavirus disease 2019 cases in the United States. The Centres for Disease Control and Prevention had to use the Emergency Utilization Authorization to allow both university and commercial labs to develop assays for determining the virus’s existence as the number of cases increased and the necessity for testing increased. Several nucleic acid assays were developed on the basis of RT-PCR, each with its own techniques, specifications, and turnaround times. The pandemic-like spread of the illnesses made testing even more crucial. Prioritisation was required in accordance with instructions because the test supply ran out before it could satisfy demand [8].

Due to the breakdown of global cooperation and a lack of international solidarity, several low- and medium-income countries have been refused access to clinical tools in the COVID-19 pandemic response. Despite the availability and scalability of fast immunodiagnostic testing, knowledge of the dynamics of the immune response associated with infection is lacking [9].

The US has given ongoing emphasis to the value of testing in decreasing and suppressing the spread of the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). Due to problems with test validation at the Centres for Illness Control and Prevention, testing was put off after the first case of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) was identified in the US in mid-January 2020 [10, 11].

The coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic has shifted the focus of the global discussion about how to end the epidemic to the clinical lab and SARS-CoV-2 tests. Clinical laboratories have developed, approved, and used a variety of molecular and serologic assays to look for SARS-CoV-2 infection as a result. This has been essential for identifying cases, directing isolation decisions, and controlling the transmission of disease [12].

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2. History

2.1 History of COVID-19

On January 7, 2020, a patient in Wuhan, China, with pneumonia-like symptoms had a novel coronavirus found in lung fluid. On January 10, 2020, the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) assembled reference genome was revealed, and the first diagnostic tests to detect the virus were made available 2 weeks later. Since hundreds of millions of people have been tested for SARS-CoV-2, there has been a great deal of interest in and debate regarding diagnostic theories and procedures. In Wuhan, China, the first SARS-CoV-2 infections were found. It is still uncertain how the virus initially infected humans and if it turned into a pathogen before to or following the spillover incidence. The fifth known pandemic since the 1918 flu pandemic was caused by the uncommon human coronavirus disease of 2019 (COVID-19), which was originally discovered in Wuhan, China, in 2019. More than 200 million confirmed cases and more than 4.6 million fatalities had been reported as of September 2021, around 2°years after COVID-19 was first discovered. In this article, we present a thorough examination of the development of COVID-19, from the first case ever reported to the most recent efforts to stop the disease’s global spread through vaccine campaigns. The World Health Organization (WHO) in Wuhan, China, received reports of pneumonia episodes on December 31, 2019, and as a result, the first COVID-19 cases were found. On January 7, the Chinese government determined that these instances were brought on by the 2019-nCoV, a brand-new coronavirus. A few weeks later, on January 30, 2020, the WHO deemed the fast expanding COVID-19 epidemic a Public Health Emergency of International Concern. The new coronavirus wasn’t officially given a name until February 11th, when COVID-19 was assigned. The first instances of COVID-19 were discovered after reports of pneumonia episodes were received by the World Health Organization (WHO) in Wuhan, China, on December 31, 2019. The rapidly spreading COVID-19 epidemic was classified as a Public Health Emergency of International Concern by the WHO a few weeks later, on January 30, 2020. On February 11th, COVID-19 was given as the novel coronavirus’s official name [1, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17].

2.2 History of smallpox

The cause of smallpox is unknown. The discovery of smallpox-like lesions on Egyptian mummies indicates that the illness has existed for at least 3000 years. The first written account of a disease akin to smallpox was produced in China during the fourth century CE (Common Era). India saw one of the worst smallpox epidemics of the twentieth century in 1974, 3 years before smallpox was completely eradicated. More than 15,000 people contracted smallpox and died as a result between January and May 1974. West Bengal, Bihar, and Odisha are three Indian states where the majority of the fatalities occurred. There were many thousands of people who were still alive but were either blind or deformed. India reported 61,482 smallpox cases to the World Health Organization (WHO) during these 5 months. In 1974, India was home to over 86% of all smallpox cases in the globe, primarily as a result of this pandemic. On May 24, 1975, a smallpox patient was found in India, and by January 1975, an operation known as “Target Zero” had been started in an effort to eradicate all remaining cases. In 1980, the smallpox disease was formally deemed extinct worldwide. Despite the fact that this programme was first introduced in 1958, it did not move swiftly because of disagreements between the WHO and the Indian government on logistics. Progress was only truly accomplished after the WHO was reorganised in the middle of the 1960s in India. Donald Henderson, a U.S. Public Health Services Officer in New Delhi, said that “If this attention and concern can last for the foreseeable future, smallpox will be eliminated. Everything seems to be in working order, though we don’t think we’re being overconfident. By June 1975, we hope to have eradicated smallpox in Asia” [18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23].

2.3 History of Ebola

History of the disease. The Ebola virus, a member of the filovirus family that affects both humans and other primates, causes the severe illness known as Ebola virus disease (EVD). The illness almost simultaneously spread to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Sudan in 1976 (now South Sudan). An EVD outbreak was reported in the Beni Health Zone in North Kivu Province on October 8, the DRC’s Ministry of Health reported. Three suspected cases were later discovered in September 2021, and other cases in the same health zone were eventually confirmed. Sequencing results revealed a connection to the outbreak that struck the same area in 2018–2020, demonstrating that an EVD survivor’s chronic infection was most likely the root cause of this outbreak. On December 16, 2021, 42 days after the final confirmed patient was removed from care, the 13th EVD outbreak in the DRC was ruled to be over legally. The Democratic Republic of the Congo’s Ministry of Health (MOH) revealed on February 7, 2021 that an Ebola virus disease (EVD) case had been identified in North Kivu Province’s Biena Health Zone. Later incidents were verified. EVD was present in North Kivu prior to the largest Ebola outbreak in the DRC’s history, which occurred from 2018 to 2020 and was declared over on June 25, 2020. According to sample sequencing, cases from the 2018 to 2020 outbreak are connected to patients in this pandemic. It is likely that these cases resulted from sexual transmission of the virus or from a survivor who relapsed with a chronic infection. On May 3, 2021, the outbreak was determined to be over. On June 1, 2020, the DRC government announced a fresh Ebola outbreak in Mbandaka, Equateur Province of western DRC. The DRC government received technical support from international partners including the CDC to aid in response operations. This outbreak, the eleventh to hit the DRC, started as the tenth was still rapidly expanding over the east of the country. The DRC government announced the 10th Ebola epidemic on August 1 in the nation’s eastern North Kivu province. Instances were also reported in the provinces of South Kivu and Uganda. In order to coordinate efforts and offer technical advice regarding laboratory testing, contact tracing, infection control, border health screening, data management, risk communication and health education, vaccination, and logistics, the CDC worked with the DRC government, neighbouring nations, local and international partners. A number of probable Ebola virus disease (EVD) cases were reported in the Likati health zone in the province of Bas Uele on May 11 by the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s Ministry of Public Health, which also alerted other international public health organisations to the situation. Eight suspected instances, including two fatalities, were listed in the original report. On May 12, there was word of a third fatality. Two samples proved positive for Ebola Zaire during testing by the Institute National de Recherche Biomédicale (INRB) in Kinshasa. Health’s epidemiologic, diagnostic, clinical, and communication efforts to contain the outbreak were supported by teams from international organisations like the CDC, WHO, MSF (Doctors without Borders), and others. The outbreak solely impacted the western province of Equator, even though it spread to several villages close to the town of Boende. The Ebola virus strain that caused it, meanwhile, was quite similar to the one that was responsible for the outbreak in Kikwit in 1995. This outbreak had nothing to do with the significant outbreak that was happening concurrently in West Africa. The probable death of an EVD patient was reported by the Uganda Ministry of Health on May 6, 2011. The Uganda Virus Research Institute’s newly created CDC Viral Haemorrhagic Fever lab quickly identified the Ebola virus in a blood sample (UVRI). This outbreak was contained in part by the ability to quickly confirm the presence of the Ebola virus through laboratory testing carried out in-country, the clinical staff’s early, strong suspicion of hemorrhagic fever, the appropriate use of personal protective equipment and barrier methods to safeguard hospital staff, and the ability to quickly stop the spread of the virus [24, 25, 26, 27, 28].

2.4 History of swine flu

The idea that swine influenza was a sickness related to human flu was originally put forth when pigs were ill during the 1918 flu pandemic at the same time as humans. The first influenza virus was found to be the cause of illness in pigs around 10°years later, in 1930. The World Health Organization (WHO) categorised the 2009 swine flu pandemic, which was brought on by the H1N1 influenza virus and lasted from June 2009 to August 2010, as the third recent pandemic caused by the H1N1 virus (the first being the 1918–1920 Spanish flu pandemic and the second being the 1977 Russian flu). According to two separate US investigations, the first two occurrences were discovered in April 2009. A prior triple reassortment of human, swine, and avian flu viruses combined with an additional Eurasian pig flu virus to produce what initially looked to be a novel strain of the H1N1 virus, giving rise to the term “swine flu” [29, 30, 31, 32].

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3. Structure

3.1 Corona virus composition

The lengthy RNA polymers that are tightly packed into the centre of coronavirus particles are encased in a protective capsid, which is a lattice of repeating protein molecules called the coat or capsid proteins. In coronaviruses, these proteins are referred to as nucleocapsids (N) [33, 34].

3.2 The smallpox virus’s structure

The variola virus, a large double-stranded DNA pathogen with a shape akin to a brick, is serologically reactive with other members of the poxvirus family, including camel pox, vaccinia, cowpox, and ectromelia. Unlike other DNA viruses, the variola virus replicates in the cytoplasm of parasitized host cells [35, 36].

3.3 Ebola virus’s structure

The Ebola virus (EBOV), a member of the family Filoviridae and genus Ebolavirus, has seven genes in its non-segmented, single-stranded RNA: (a) nucleoprotein (NP), (b) viral protein 35 (VP35), (c) VP40, (d) glycoprotein (GP), (e) VP30, (f) VP24, and (g) RNA polymerase (L) [37, 38].

3.4 The swine flu virus’s structure (H1N1)

The RNA genome of the H1N1 influenza virus is around 13.5 kb in size, and its virions range in size from 80 to 120 nm. Hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase, two envelope proteins (NA), are the 11 different proteins that are encoded by each of the eight segments that make up the swine influenza genome [39, 40, 41].

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4. Spreading

4.1 How is the Corona virus transmitted?

When an infected person coughs, sneezes, or speaks, droplets or microscopic particles known as aerosols are emitted from their mouth or nose, dispersing the virus into the atmosphere. Anyone within 6°feet of that individual can breathe it into their lungs. Communication by air. The virus can hang about in the air for up to 3°hours, according to study [42, 43, 44].

4.2 The smallpox virus: How does it spread?

Smallpox spreads via contact with infected individuals. Smallpox is frequently spread from person to person by prolonged, direct face-to-face contact. Smallpox can also spread by contact with contaminated objects, such as contaminated bedding, clothing, or human fluids [20, 45, 46].

4.3 How does the Ebola virus circulate?

The only method to get Ebola is by direct contact with blood or other bodily fluids (such vomit, diarrhoea, urine, breast milk, sweat, or semen) from an infected person who is displaying Ebola symptoms or has recently passed away from Ebola [47, 48].

4.4 H1N1 spreads in what way?

The H1N1 virus spreads similarly to seasonal flu, according to the CDC. Droplets from an infected person’s cough or sneeze, as well as touching something they recently touched and then contacting your eyes, mouth, or nose can all spread the flu [49, 50].

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5. Testing

5.1 The COVID-19 test

If you are currently infected with SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, a viral test will look at samples taken from your mouth or nose. The two main types of viral tests are nucleic acid amplification tests (NAATs) and antigen testing. Depending on the circumstance, one test type may be recommended over another. All tests should adhere to the FDA’s regulations. A laboratory setting is used for the majority of NAATs, including PCR-based testing. They are frequently the most reliable tests, regardless of whether a person has symptoms or not. These tests identify virus genetic material, which may stay in your body for up to 90 days after a positive test result. As a result, you should not utilise an NAAT if you had a positive test within the past 90 days. Antigen test results are available in 15–30 minutes. They are less reliable than NAATs, especially for people who do not show symptoms. A single, negative antigen test result cannot exclude an infection. For the best probability of identifying infection after a negative antigen test, the test should be repeated at least 48 hours later (known as serial testing). On rare occasions, a second NAAT may be suggested to confirm the outcomes of an antigen test [6, 51, 52].

5.2 How is the small pox identified?

Smallpox can be identified based on the patient’s clinical signs and symptoms. The condition can be positively identified by extracting the virus from lesions or blood and by checking for viral-specific antibodies in the blood [9, 53].

5.3 Virus testing for Ebola

After symptoms manifest, blood can be tested for the Ebola virus. Up to 3 days after the initial signs and symptoms arise, the virus may not be visible. Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) is one of the most often used diagnostic procedures because it can detect extremely low amounts of the Ebola virus [54, 55, 56].

5.4 H1N1 swine flu testing

Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing is becoming more common in many hospitals and labs. This test could be administered to you while you are in the hospital or at the doctor’s office. PCR testing, which is more sensitive than other techniques, can be used to identify the flu strain [57, 58, 59].

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6. Treatment

6.1 Treatment for COVID-19

Turn off the patient in a well-ventilated space. Utilise a triple-layered medical mask, and after 8 hours, discard it (or sooner if it becomes moist or obviously dirty). If a caregiver enters the room, the patient and the caregiver could consider donning N 95 masks. The mask must first be sterilised with 1% sodium hypochlorite before being discarded. Take a rest and drink enough of drinks to maintain proper hydration. Always use appropriate breathing strategies. Use an alcohol-based product to disinfect your hands after regularly washing them for at least 40 seconds with soap and water. Give no access to your personal goods to family members. Ensure that a 1% hypochlorite solution is used to clean the area’s commonly touched surfaces, such as tabletops, doorknobs, and handles. Check the temperature every day. To check oxygen saturation, a pulse oximeter should be used every day. Contact your medical physician right away if you notice any worsening of your symptoms [60, 61].

6.2 Treatment for smallpox

To stop an outbreak of smallpox, health officials would use vaccines. There is currently no known cure for smallpox in humans, despite the fact that some antiviral drugs may help with treatment [62, 63].

6.3 Therapy for Ebola

Delivering fluids and electrolytes (body salts) intravenously or orally (intravenously). taking medication to control fever, reduce nausea and vomiting, stabilise blood pressure, and relieve pain. Treating any further infections that may develop [64, 65].

6.4 Therapy for swine flu

Some of the antiviral drugs used to treat seasonal flu can also be used to treat H1N1 swine flu. The three antivirals zanamivir (Relenza), peramivir (Rapivab), and oseltamivir (Tamiflu) tend to be the most effective ones; nevertheless, oseltamivir is ineffective against some swine flu strains. These drugs might help you recover more quickly [32, 66].

6.5 COVID-19 vaccines vaccination

To avert this pandemic, a large segment of the population must be immune to the virus. The safest method to do this is through immunisation. In the past, vaccines have been a common method employed by humans to lessen the prevalence of infectious diseases that are lethal. A number of research teams stepped up to the plate and developed SARS-CoV-2 vaccines when the pandemic began less than a year ago. The aim now is to make these vaccines available to people everywhere. It will be vital that everyone receives the appropriate protection, not only those in wealthy countries. A COVID-19 vaccination, especially a booster, effectively protects recipients from developing severe illness, necessitating hospitalisation, and even dying. The COVID-19 vaccine is safe—much safer than getting COVID-19 from a person. People who have received the COVID-19 vaccine may benefit from additional protection from the vaccine, such as protection from having to stay in the hospital for a future infection. Similar to vaccines for other diseases, people are most protected when they receive the recommended number of doses plus boosters [67, 68, 69].

The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has approved the smallpox vaccine ACAM2000®, (Smallpox [Vaccinia] Vaccine, Live), a replication-competent vaccine, for use in those who have been identified as having a high risk of getting smallpox. India had smallpox vaccination in 1904–1907 [70, 71].

6.6 Ebola virus illness vaccine

The Ebola Zaire Vaccine, Live, also known as V920, rVSV-G-ZEBOV-GP, or rVSV-ZEBOV, has been licenced by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for use in preventing Zaire ebolavirus disease in adults 18 years of age and older as a single dose administration [72, 73, 74, 75].

6.7 Swine flu vaccine

The use of one dose of the 2009 H1N1 influenza vaccine has been authorised by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for people 10 years of age and older. It is recommended that children between the ages of 6 months and 9 years receive two doses of the immunisation. These two dosages should be separated by 4°weeks. The swine flu vaccine is reliable and secure. Nevertheless, a large number of people who were not at risk of contracting the virus had health problems as a result of the 1976 vaccine campaign. In contrast, the effective 2009 vaccination campaign helped to stop the H1N1 influenza pandemic in 2010 [32, 76].

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7. Indian context

The primary causes of morbidity and mortality in both humans and animals continue to be infectious diseases, which has a significant financial impact on India’s healthcare system. The country has had a number of epidemics and outbreaks of infectious diseases. Major epidemic diseases including cholera, leprosy, malaria, and plague have all traditionally been successfully controlled. Due to the country’s varied geography, extreme geoclimatic fluctuations, and unequal population distribution, viral disease dispersion patterns are uniquely displayed. The dynamic interconnections of biological, social, and ecological variables as well as unanticipated features of the interaction between people and animals present additional challenges with regard to the origins of infectious diseases. Understanding the impact of the conditions required for the emergence and developing strengthened surveillance systems that can lessen human suffering and mortality are just two of the significant problems faced in the control and prevention of emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases. The important emerging and re-emerging viral infections of public health significance that have previously been incorporated into the Integrated Disease Surveillance Programme have been reviewed in this article.

The cholera epidemic had a significant impact on British colonial India on numerous occasions in the nineteenth century, including in the years 1817, 1829, 1852, 1863, 1881, and 1899, according to studies. Slum dwellers and the poor in rural areas, primarily in Northern Indian provinces like Punjab, Delhi, and United Provinces, made up the majority of the pandemic’s casualties (current Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand). It gradually spread to nearby provinces, with the Madras presidency in 1877 suffering the most. Instances were noted in 1899 in Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, three important provinces. The virus expanded to a number of countries following each epidemic, including the US, China, Arabia, Persia, and Russia. In 1992, there was a major cholera outbreak on India’s southern peninsula. A cholera outbreak that followed the Orissa floods of 2001 claimed the lives of 33 individuals while infecting 34,111 others [77, 78, 79].

7.1 Smallpox (1974)

A smallpox outbreak struck West Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa in 1974. About 85% of all incidents that were reported globally were in India. In the worst smallpox pandemic of the twentieth century, around 15,000 individuals perished. Thousands of survivors suffered from blindness and deformities. The WHO launched the fight to eradicate smallpox. In 1980, the WHO deemed it extinct [80, 81, 82].

7.2 Influenza (1918–1920)

The H1N1 influenza virus caused the deadly pandemic known as the Spanish Flu or Spanish “Influenza,” which claimed the lives of 20–50 million people worldwide. The flu first came in 1918, and the following year, in the fall, a second, more severe wave of the illness reappeared and swept the globe. The second wave originated in Bombay, India, and afterwards spread to Sri Lanka and the rest of the world. With an estimated death toll of 10–20 million, India served as the pandemic’s mortality epicentre. One of the reasons the outbreak subsided later was the weather in India. In humid settings, the influenza virus cannot survive and cannot spread [83, 84, 85].

7.3 Polio (1970–1990)

India was affected by the polio epidemic between 1970 and 1990. India was the developing country that was most badly damaged till the late 1990s. Post-polio paralysis was widespread in children. Both urban and rural regions were severely impacted. India was the source of 40% of all polio cases that have been reported worldwide. Despite the fact that oral vaccinations were initially given there in the 1960s, India was declared polio-free in January 2011 [86].

7.4 Plague outbreaks (1994, 2002, 2004)

1994 saw a plague outbreak in Surat, Gujarat, however it was over in less than 2°weeks. The amazing panic it caused and the repercussions it had on the entire planet, nevertheless, made it noteworthy. There were only 1000 reported incidents, involving 53 fatalities. Panic and quarantine concern caused a population evacuation and internal migration [87, 88].

7.5 Encephalitis in Japan (2005)

Japanese encephalitis is a flavivirus illness that injures the brain and causes swelling that is transmitted by mosquitoes. The virus that is causing the sickness has genes in common with viruses that cause dengue and yellow fever. 2005 saw 90 occurrences in Bihar and 1145 cases from 14 districts in Uttar Pradesh. About 296 persons, or one-fourth of all those impacted, passed away. Annual reports of encephalitis cases are still common, mostly in the north (Uttar Pradesh) [89, 90, 91].

7.6 Chikungunya (2006)

In 2006, Chikungunya broke epidemic in India. Nationwide, there were almost 15 lakh recorded cases. The southern states of Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands reported the majority of the cases. It was found that Aedes mosquitoes carried the illness. Chikungunya-related deaths were underreported for a number of reasons. The outbreak was contained in part by eradicating mosquito breeding grounds, implementing additional vector control measures, promoting awareness, etc. A dengue outbreak occurred that same year, resulting in 10,344 cases and 162 fatalities [92, 93].

7.7 H1N1 flu (2010 and 2015) (2010 and 2015)

About 18,500 people died from H1N1 flu, also referred to as swine flu, in 2010. Over 27,000 confirmed cases, including 981 fatalities, were reported in India. With 30,000 cases nationally and 1731 fatalities, the flu made a comeback in 2015. The worst affected states were Gujarat, Maharashtra, and Rajasthan [94, 95].

7.8 COVID-19

India has tallied more than 18,000 confirmed cases, 600 of which have been linked to COVID-19-related fatalities. As of April 18, 2020, the COVID-19 death rate in India was 3.3%, according to the Ministry of Health. More vulnerable individuals include those who are older and/or have co-morbid disorders [96, 97].

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8. Conclusions

Global social and economic conditions have been considerably disrupted by the pandemic, leading to the worst recession since the Great Depression. Supply chain instability led to widespread shortages of items, particularly food supplies. The resulting practically universal lockdowns resulted in a record-breaking decrease in emissions. The primary causes of morbidity and mortality in both humans and animals continue to be infectious diseases, which has a significant financial impact on India’s healthcare system. The country has had a number of epidemics and outbreaks of infectious diseases. Major epidemic diseases including cholera, leprosy, malaria, and plague have all traditionally been successfully controlled. Due to the country’s varied geography, extreme geoclimatic fluctuations, and unequal population distribution, viral disease dispersion patterns are uniquely displayed. The dynamic interconnections of biological, social, and ecological variables as well as unanticipated features of the interaction between people and animals present additional challenges with regard to the origins of infectious diseases. Two of the major challenges in the control and prevention of emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases are understanding the effects of the conditions necessary for their emergence and creating strengthened surveillance systems that can reduce human misery and mortality. This article reviews the significant emerging and re-emerging viral illnesses of public health importance that have previously been included in the Integrated Disease Surveillance Programme. India is always at danger from newly emerging and re-emerging viral infections that are important for public health because of its great geoclimatic variety. With an emphasis on epidemiology and disease burden, illness surveillance needs to be strengthened across the country. In-depth knowledge of disease biology, particularly that of disease vectors and the effects of the environment on disease, is also urgently needed. It is also necessary to increase emergency preparedness for these diseases and response by focusing on the “one health” idea. India had a gradual rise in the number of cases after the first case was identified on January 30, 2020. However, given that testing approach and skills have progressively improved, India’s meagre testing efforts may reflect an underestimate of COVID-19 circumstances. Additionally, the clear selective policy of only screening symptomatic individuals contributed to the underrepresentation of the genuine case counts. This brought to light the fact that there are incidences in India that go unreported. It is essential to develop a universal testing method for all symptomatic, asymptomatic, pre-symptomatic, and post-symptomatic cases in order to successfully stop the spread of COVID-19, which is on the rise. Given its vast population and high danger of community transmission, this is particularly true in India. India uses the corona virus spike proteins to represent different COVID-19 defence systems (Figure 1). To combat COVID-19, the Indian government has undertaken a number of activities, including testing, vaccination, mask and sanitizer use, genome sequencing, government and public awareness campaigns, research, and the improvement of health infrastructure. With the aid of a large number of tests, including RT-PCR and rapid antigen testing kits, India’s indigenous COVID-19 vaccine COVAXIN, developed by Bharat Biotech in collaboration with the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) - National Institute of Virology (NIV), and the vaccine Covishield manufactured and large-scale production by the Serum Institute of India, played a significant role in inhibiting the rapid spread of the pandemic (UK). There was a severe shortage of masks and sanitizers during the COVID-19’s initial phase, but internal production, large-scale production, and distribution severely damaged the chain. Genome sequencing in India occasionally helped to detect the different altered Corona virus strains. In India, public awareness campaigns and government regulations were key in preventing the COVID-19 virus from spreading. For the COVID-19, which included research labs, institutes, and universities all over India, researchers worked tirelessly to oversee the Research and Development units. Instead of India’s underdeveloped healthcare infrastructure, ongoing work is being done to create appropriate facilities with proper management of healthcare infrastructure, such as converting regular hospitals into COVID-19 hospitals that are specially outfitted and redesigned to meet the needs of patients infected with the virus.

Figure 1.

Different strategies for COVID-19 in India represented as spike proteins of Corona virus.

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Written By

Aishwarya Khamari, Monika Khamari, Akshya Kumar Mishra, Jijnasa Panda, Debashish Gardia and Ratikanta Rath

Submitted: 21 August 2022 Reviewed: 12 October 2022 Published: 13 April 2023