The Implications of Arab Milieu on Arab-Palestinian Society in Israel

Abstract

Until recent years, the Arab Palestinian minority in Israel was completely absent from the concerns of their surroundings in the Arab world, despite the fact that the Arab surroundings have maintained a strong presence in forming the political consciousness and intellectual and ideological tendencies in Israeli Arab society for the past 70 years. It can be accurately said that Arab society in Israel considered itself a part of the Arab surroundings in every sense of the word, and it still sees its existence as a social, existential, and cultural extension of these Arab surroundings. This communicative situation, at the level of consciousness and sentiments, has cast a shadow on the relationships and positions of Arab citizens in the state, and there have always been views towards the Arab surroundings as a source of moral strength and intellectual inspiration. All of the intellectual and ideological transformations that the Arab world has experienced have reflected on the conditions of Arabs in Israel, starting with pan-Arabism, following through to the reframing of national identities, and ending with the extension of Islamism and resorting to pre-state frameworks against the backdrop of the logic of fragmentation that was brought about by the Arab Spring.

1. Introduction

The conflict between the Palestinian national movement and the settlement enterprise that is represented by the Zionist movement led to the Nakba of the Palestinian people, who have been transformed, due to the war, from a majority into a national minority, after approximately 800,000 Palestinians were expelled, forced out, or displaced, turning them into refugees outside of their country of origin. During this war, 531 villages and population centers were destroyed, and their people displaced, in addition to the emptying of 11 cities and towns during the Nakba, which led to an end to Palestinian cities and destruction of urban society that had been characterized by elites and cultural and economic movements.

In addition, the Nakba of the Palestinian people led to the isolation of the Palestinians who remained in their country, from their Arab surroundings and cultural environment. Israel considered communication between Palestinians in the country and the Arab surroundings an imminent risk that could threaten Israel’s existence. It is important to mention that, because of the Nakba, the Arab minority in the country was left without political, intellectual, cultural, and economic elites, and only with a rural minority living in village population centers in the Galilee, the Triangle, and the Negev. The situation of the Palestinians who became citizens of the state of Israel has been described as being a “body without a head”, as a result of the break-off in development and modernization, the destruction of civic centers, and the displacement of the political leaders and the cultural elite. The Nakba did not stop there, and it has even limited the possibility of getting a higher education in Arab capitals, which was commonplace before the Nakba, and this is due to the conflict between Arab states and the Palestinian national movement on the one hand and with Israel on the other. The number of Palestinian students in universities outside the country has decreased from approximately 1000 students to a few in individuals.

The fact that Palestinians remained in Israel was not accepted by a number of leading forces in the Israeli political community, starting with the founder of the state and its first prime minister, David Ben Gurion. Ben Gurion wanted, it seems, to displace the remaining Palestinians and maintain an exclusively Jewish state, “pure” of non-Jews. On this basis, Ben Gurion considered the Arabs to be a fifth column and dealt with them from a security perspective by imposing military rule on Arab population centers [1].

After the Nakba, Palestinians lived in a state of great contradictions that formulated their consciousness and impacted their political and social behavior. The sense of alienation and besiegement was prominent in their isolation from the surrounding Arab world and they are being cut off from their civilizational and cultural heritage on the one hand and by the policies of military rule on the other. These policies worked in a systematic manner to isolate them in their villages, limiting their movement and trying to paralyze their political and protest movements by persecuting and banning political organizations (like the Ard Movement in 1964 and the Socialist List in 1965).

During that period, contradictory motivations appeared for the political behavior of the Arab Palestinian minority in Israel, and they became more prominent with the rise of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who led the pan-Arab national movement and the Arab unity movement. Palestinians lived in a state of anticipation, in addition to the sense of defeat that had taken control of their political behavior. It had become commonplace for them to gather and eagerly listen to the speeches of Abdel Nasser, who breathed hope into them once again, while, on the other hand, they capitulated to the military rule and went out in droves to vote for Zionist parties and the lists of the ruling party, the Mapai Party.

The Arab population who remained within the borders of the State of Israel after the 1948 war went through abnormal developments because they were still a part of theArab world and the Palestinian people nationally, culturally, and religiously. But at the same time, they were a part of the citizenry of the State of Israel, which was built upon the ruins of the Palestinian people and was still in engaged in a bloody conflict with the Palestinian national movement and Arab states. This can be seen in the crises, the obstacles, and the difficulties facing Arab Palestinians in adapting and integrating inside the state of Israel, which defines itself as being a Jewish state. The political reality derived from the Zionist and Jewish nature of the state is prominent in the lack of equality between Jews and Arabs on all levels of their lives because of distribution mechanisms that are in the interests of the Jewish majority and discriminate against the Arab citizens. As a result, the exclusion and marginalization of Arab citizens continue, and they continue their lives on the margins of Israeli society, unable to achieve full citizenship because of the exclusivity of the state. At the same time, the state has reinforced policies of removing Arabization and eliminating the Palestinian character, which impacts the status of Arab population and their national and cultural identities [1]. This dilemma has led to an acute crisis among Palestinian citizens of Israel, and this had been reflected at three levels. The first level is the internal level, which assumes that there is no consensus among the Arab population on a national agenda and political demands as a national minority inside Israel, a country that defines itself as a state for the Jewish people. The second level is the Israeli level, which assumes that the definition of the state of Israel as a Jewish state gives priority to Jews, and this definition has paved the way for increased marginalization, exclusion, and discrimination against Arab citizens in the distribution of financial and in-kind resources. The third is the Palestinian level, which assumes that the Arab minority has remained on the margins of the Palestinian national movement and has been excluded from its agenda, not receiving enough attention from the Palestinian leadership, some of whom believed that Arabs were an internal Israeli matter. The aggravated development has led the civil identity (Israeli) and the national identity (Arab Palestinian) of the Arabs to be partial and created a hybrid of a national minority belonging to the Arab world and the Palestinian people while, at the same time, being a part of Israeli society because of its Israeli citizenship [2, 3].

In Majid Al Haj’s analysis of the reality of identity and its transformation in Arab society in Israel, Al Haj believes that the identity of Arabs in Israel is dynamic and changing and that it is in a constant process of evolution and development. Based on this approach, the changes in the identity of Arab citizens in Israel are influenced by four main spheres. The first is the local sphere, and it is linked to the internal structure and benefits of the Arab population, as well as the changes that have occurred over time in the value systems and ways of life. The second sphere is related to the national dimension of the condition of Arabs in the Jewish state and its policies towards them, in addition to their relationship with the Jewish majority. The third sphere is the topic of this study, which has not been given enough attention in past studies, and it is linked to the regional dimension and political developments in the Arab region. Finally, the fourth sphere is linked to the religious dimension referring to the ethnic and religious identity of Muslims, Christians, and Druze [2]. Another theory believes that the identity of Arabs in Israel is affected by changes in and interaction with the three main spheres. In this theory, the spheres are the internal sphere, or the changes inside Palestinian society in Israel itself and the political consensus that has been formulated, the Israeli sphere, confirms the system of relationships that provides preferential treatment to the Jewish majority over the Arab Palestinian minority, and the general Palestinian and Arab sphere, which reiterates the political development in the Palestinian field, in addition to changes and transformations in the Arab world, especially Israel’s neighboring countries. It should be noted that this theory has ignored the international sphere, which has impacted the formation of a civil society that focuses on the rights of national minorities and indigenous peoples.¹

The analytical framework that this study is based on confirms that the identity, consciousness, and political behavior of Palestinian citizens of Israel carry different forms of content. Their identity has been affected for years by the wider Arab-Israeli conflict, and it has been fed by it. It has not been insulated from being affected by various changes and events in the Arab world, and it is still subjected to the influence of various changes and fluctuations in the Arab world, despite the fact that the level of this influence has changed from one time to another, as we can see in this section. The political reality of the Arab minority in Israel is described as being a reflection of a “dual consciousness”. The Arab minority is developing a national and emotional link with the Palestinian people and the Arab surroundings, but, at the same time, it is practically and rationally linked with the Israeli reality [5]. This assertion by Amal Jamal is supported by the main hypothesis of this study, which is summarized that the Arab minority in Israel is greatly aligned with the Arab world, despite its rational link with the Israeli sphere. In addition, the Strategic Report that was recently published by the I̕lam Center, which was drafted by a number of Arab researchers and academics, confirms the organic link between Arab society in Israel and the regional surroundings, even considering it a national and rational phenomenon. It also considers this link vital to Arab society, as the sense of belonging in their surroundings is part and parcel of the Arab minority’s political, cultural, and social identity. In addition, there is a rational explanation for adherence to affiliation with the Arab surroundings, and this is the relentless pursuit by the Arab minority to be rid of the shackles of structural weakness that are created by its status as only a national minority in a Jewish national state. In this definition, the report states: “The Arab Palestinians in Israel have a political, cultural, and civilization link with the Arab and Islamic surroundings of Israel, which, at times, removes the label of minority from them and includes them with the majority within the Middle East in general and the cultures, history, and affiliations in it” ([6], p. 19). Identifying with the surroundings, that is, the Arab world, or reiterating affiliation to them, is an attempt to break the shackles and the feelings of inferiority resulting from discriminatory politics and exclusion created by the state of Israel against the Arab minority. This model will be a starting point to attempt, in this regard, to study the impact of the “Arab Spring” on the Arab society in Israel.

The socio-political history of Arab society shows consistent progress, and there is historical continuity for the harmony of Arab society with its surroundings, not only in everything relating to forms of political behavior and identity politics but also at the level of political rhetoric and intellectual and ideological discourse. In all of these aspects, Arab society in Israel responds and is impacted by its Arab surroundings and practically embodies the fact that it considers itself a part of these surroundings. The political world of the Arab citizens is not limited to the towns that they live in or the borders of the state, and they are affected by developments taking place in the Arab world, which is considered a part of the “broader self-identity” that they have. This is contrary to what some research in this field have argued, which is that the nature of the state as a factor forms the political reality of Arab citizens in Israel, while they ignore the impact of the Arab surroundings on their forms of political behavior.²

The Arab minority, as is the case with many minorities around the world, is also impacted by neighboring countries and regional conflicts, even international ones, in addition to internal factors, with regards to political leadership, the relationships between majorities and minorities, the authority of the state, and social and demographic benefits for the minority group.

2. The political space

2.1 Under Nasserism

The 1948 war left its mark on Palestinians in Israel and created feelings of fear, isolation, defeat, and humiliation among them. The Palestinians, who had become a minority as a result of the war, found themselves in a new political framework that not only did not recognize them as a group, with their own national rights but also was hostile towards them and tried to dismantle them. In addition, for two decades, they were limited to specific spaces that were mentioned by a strict system. The shock of defeat was a decisive factor in the formation of the political behavior of Arab citizens during the first decades. At the same time, the ruling elites in Israel were successful in implanting a state of existential fear among the Jewish majority for the purpose of external propaganda and internal recruitment and mobilization.

The feeling of fear and defeat among the Palestinians in Israel led to the adoption of reconciliatory politics with regard to the state of Israel and finding a balance between their political, social, and economic survival in the Jewish state and the attempt to maintain the features and characteristics of their collective identity. As an expression of the balance between their integration in the new political framework and preserving their individual identity, they participated in the Knesset elections of 1949 and voted for Zionist parties and parties affiliated with them, which were extensions of the Mapai Party (during that period, the ruling and dominant party) and were following its orders. At the same time, they maintained an emotional and rational relationship with the Arab space, not withdrawing from it, despite the formation of a new reality that was hostile to this space. The Arab public lived with the feeling of being in a temporary situation that could change at any moment, as it hoped that the Arab armies would mobilize in a new campaign that would curb the new political system. The pan-Arab ideology of the Egyptian President, Gamal Abdel Nasser, was dominant in the Middle East, and its impact did not exclude The Arab citizens of Israel. At the time, Palestinians would gather around radios, in their homes, and in cafes, always listening to Radio Cairo, which would broadcast speeches by Nasser, who was a popular and well-loved leader among many in the Palestinian public in Israel [7]. Therefore, on the eve of the elections to the Fourth Knesset in 1959, the Arab media encouraged Arab citizens to boycott them and not grant legitimacy to the ruling system in Israel.

As part of the desire to survive and avoid the fate of Palestinian refugees, the Arab public created a “strategy of resilience” (resilience in the homeland). At the core of this strategy, the Arab residents maintained an emotional and symbolic relationship with Arab nationalism, while they strived, at the individual level, to maintain their personal interests and daily needs. Over the years, the Arab minority in Israel embarked on a struggle to survive and exist, and it struggled gradually to integrate into the state on equal footing [8].

The defeat in the 1948 War had a considerable impact on the political behavior of Arab citizens during the first decade of the state’s existence, as this decade was characterized by very limited political protest as a direct result of the 1948 defeat and the fear of Palestinians who remained in Israel from having a fate similar to that of the towns that were destroyed and whose residents were evacuated. In 1956, the relationship between the political developments in the Arab world and political developments among Arabs in Israel was strengthened. The modest protest movement that followed the Kafr Qasim massacre might be the best illustration of the feeling of defeat and fear that dominated the political consciousness of Arab citizens in Israel. Here, it should be noted that the massacre took place after a curfew was imposed on the residents of Kafr Qasim, and the town was declared a closed area, while some of the residents were still working outside of the village. Upon their return from work, security forces opened fire, killing 49 of them.

As is the case in other parts of the Arab world, the Arab minority in Israel did not remain indifferent to the Arab nationalist ideology that was launched by the Egyptian President, Gamal Abdel Nasser. As noted above, Abdel Nasser’s speeches were received with great emotion among the Palestinian citizens in Israel. His words also aroused national pride among them, and they were a counterbalance to the political and military defeat that the Arab armies had sustained during the 1948 War. There is a lot of evidence that Abdel Nasser’s speeches gained special popularity and attention, and that he was considered an undisputed leader who would be able to curb divisions among the Arabs and achieve the dream of pan-Arab unity, helping Arabs overcome the crisis-filled reality that they had experienced since the establishment of the Jewish state [9].

At the end of the 1950s, it became clear that pan-Arab ideology had become dominant in the Arab Middle East. The Arab unity project was achieved for the first time at the beginning of February 1958, when Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Egyptian President, and Shukri al-Quwatli, the President of the Syrian Republic, announced the establishment of the United Arab Republic. The unification of Egypt and Syria, as a reflection of Arab nationalism and a revival of Arab nationalism and unity, affected the identity, consciousness, and political behavior of the Palestinian minority in the state of Israel. The establishment of the Popular Front in 1958, and the Al Ard Movement a year later, was, to a large extent, a direct reflection of the intensified resolve of revolutionary pan-Arabism in the region. One way or another, the Israeli establishment compared the “Al Ard Family” with the expansion of revolutionary pan-Arabism and it was thus proclaimed an illegal movement, and at the end of 1964, Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Levi Eshkol, signed an official decree banning its activities [10].

The establishment of the “Al Ard Family” movement in 1959 had come as a clear response to the expanding pan-Arab revolutionary movement after the rise of Nasserism following the Suez War in 1956. Among the effects of this transformation was the emergence of the national hero, Abdel Nasser, who was able to challenge the will of the traditional-colonial powers and their aggression and realized the latent potential of pan-Arab emotions, seen during the aggression by the overwhelming protest of all over the Arab world in solidarity with Egypt. Despite the state of isolation and separation that had been imposed by realities and reinforced by the Hebrew state, Arab society did not remain indifferent to the transformations happening around it during the 1950s, characterized by the Suez War, the rise of Nasserism, and the first attempt at unification in modern Arab society when Syria joined the unification project with Egypt under the leadership of Abdel Nasser. This was also the period of the first Lebanese civil war and the fall of the Hashemite monarchy (in Iraq) which had been allied with the West and had been a founding member of the Baghdad Pact. The establishment of the Al Ard Movement cannot be viewed separately from the revolutionary spirit in the Arab Mashreq region at the time [11]. What also confirms this is the resolute and non-lenient response by the Israeli authorities, as Israel considered, at the time, that the rise of this entity was a threat to national security and dealt with it on this basis. As mentioned, the government did not hesitate to declare it an illegal organization and prohibit its activities as it was considered an extension of Nasserism, which Israel considered an existential threat that had to be dealt with in any way possible.

The influence of the Arab space on the Arab public in Israel became prominent during the Six-Day War in 1967 as well, the war that ended with Israel’s victory and the defeat of the Arab armies. That defeat led to Israel occupying what remained of Mandatory Palestine, in addition to territories of other Arab countries, like the West Bank, Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, and the Sinai Peninsula. As a result, communication between Palestinians in the occupied territories and Palestinian citizens in Israel resumed after two decades of disconnection.

2.2 The renewed start of the Palestinian national movement and its internal implications

The resumption of meetings between Palestinians in Israel and Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip had important effects on the Arab Palestinian public in the state of Israel. The meetings between Palestinians in Israel and Palestinians in the West Bank took place at the same time as the rise in the profile of the Palestinian resistance and the strengthening position of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which led to momentum in expressing the latent Palestinian identity among the Palestinians in Israel. This also took place at the time of the decline of pan-Arab expansion in the Arab context, and renewed legitimacy for the existence of a national state. As a response to the political developments in the Arab sphere, Palestinians in Israel developed, during those years, “resistance poetry”, whose pioneers were members of the Communist Party in Israel. The most prominent of these were Mahmoud Darwish, Tawfiq Ziad, and Samih al-Qasim. The poetry reiterates the resilience of the Arabs in their homeland and that they are a part of the Palestinian people and the Arab world. The resistance poetry reflected the culture of the Arab and Palestinian struggle, and, through it, these poets resisted the domination and high-handed actions of the Jewish majority [12]. In addition, the October (Yom Kippur) War, in 1973, came to somewhat change the feeling of defeat and humiliation that the Arab armies had suffered during the Six-Day War. These changes, from defeat to destroying the myth of the invincible army, breathed renewed hope among the Arab citizens in the state of Israel and rehabilitated their self-image. It also quickened the process of creating their Arab and Palestinian sense of belonging, which had been decreasing after the 1948 War.

The sequence of events and trends from 1948 shows a clear harmony between political developments and transformations in the Arab space and political developments among the Palestinian citizens in the state of Israel. It is no exaggerating to say that the rising status of the Palestinian resistance after the 1967 War, and the Yom Kippur War in 1973, formed a background for the changes that characterized national politics of Arab society at the beginning of the 1970s, especially the establishment of the national organizations in 1974 and 1975. We can clearly see the process of resurrection of Palestinian nationalism, which also led to the establishment of national institutions for the Arabs in the state of Israel. For example, in 1974, a national committee was established for Arab local authorities. In 1975, communist student councils were formed in secondary schools, Arab student committees in Israeli universities, and the Land Defense Committee, led the protests of Palestinian citizens of Israel against government policies [13].

During the period between the establishment of the National Committee for Arab Local Authorities in 1974 and the events of Land Day in 1976, there was a significant increase in the importance and status of the national committee, despite the political coup that took place in Nazareth in 1975. The Communist Party was able, in that same year, to create real change in Arab politics in general, and the politics related to the local authorities specifically. This was done through the establishment of the Democratic Front in Nazareth, a local coalition with the Communist Party at its core, in addition to other local national forces. The Front achieved a landslide victory against the nominee of the “ruling party” and other traditional forces in Nazareth. During these elections, more than 75% of electors in Nazareth voted for the Communist Party, which captured 11 of 17 possible seats, in addition to winning the leadership of the municipality. The victory of the Front in Nazareth in 1975 was considered a transformation in local and national politics, and this victory was a representation of the renewed national uprising and the collapse of the old traditional leadership, with new national leaders appearing. The victory of the Front was also affected by the transformations and changes that were having an impact on both the Palestinian and Arab spheres. The fall of the traditional leadership, which was considered linked to the authorities, and the victory of national political leadership, was seen as a real change in the work of the National Committee of Heads of Arab Local Authorities. It went from an entity that exclusively dealt with local issues into a representative organization involved in national issues towards Land Day and the establishment of the High Follow-Up Committee for Arab Citizens of Israel [14].

The events of March 30, 1976, which was known as Land Day, had a clear effect on strengthening national sentiments among Arab citizens in the state of Israel. The impact of both the rise of the National Palestinian Movement, which was positioned outside the Arab sphere and the crisis in Israeli self-confidence after the Yum Kippur War, enabled the Arab citizens to face the Jewish majority on the issue of land. The main cause of the events of Land Day was a state plan to confiscate around 21,000 dunams of land in the area of Al-Batuf, considering it part and parcel of the policy of Judaization which had targeted the Galilee after the establishment of two Jewish cities, Nazareth Illit and Karmiel. The involved confiscation of the lands of Arab citizens in these areas. The purpose of the plan to confiscate Galilee lands was to change the demographic makeup by increasing the Jewish population in the area, and at the same time, putting a Jewish wedge into the heart of the geographic expanse of Arab towns in Galilee [15]. In response to the government action and thanks to the increased influence of the Communist Party and its political leadership and the reinforcement of Arab nationalist and Palestinian elements in the identity of Palestinian citizens in Israel, a general strike was announced on March 30, 1976, to protest the land confiscation policy. At the same time, the government tried to break the Arab protest by recruiting local authority heads to defeat the general strike and pressure other heads of local authorities to isolate the Israeli Communist Party and its local authority allies. When this step failed, security agencies moved in to break up the strike by force, with units of the police, the border police, and the army being stationed in the middle of the Arab towns. As a result, six Palestinian civilians were killed, around 50 were injured, while 300 were detained [16]. This event was a point of transformation in the image of Arabs in the eyes of the state and the Jewish majority, as, for the first time, the Arab public had clashed with Israeli security agencies without fear or regret. This was the first time in history that Arabs in Israel had influenced the general Palestinian sphere and “exported” it as an ideology of resistance. This shows that the events on Land Day changed the self-image of the Arab public in Israel, from a small and weak minority that had lost the ability to do anything, to the self-image of a strong public with influence. Therefore, Land Day became a national holiday in different countries, including many Arab states, among the Palestinians in occupied areas, and in the Palestinian refugee camps [15].

In addition, the victory of the Democratic Front of Nazareth in the local elections in 1975 had implications for other political arenas. The Communist Party adopted the local model in Nazareth, establishing the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (Hadash) as a national political movement in order to expand its support base, and it included new activists in its ranks. The Democratic Front for Peace and Equality became the most prominent party among the Arab public in national and local elections in the 1970s and 1980s, as it succeeded, in 1977, in winning the support of 51% of Arab voters in the Knesset elections. Furthermore, the local elections that were conducted in 1978 witnessed a noticeable change in local politics in Arab communities after the success of the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality in establishing local coalitions and winning the leadership of some local authorities in Arab population centers in the state of Israel. Moreover, there was, at the same time, a great change in the discussions of the local councils, which went from relating to local issues of service provision by local authorities and the basic needs of the population, to discussions that were clearly political and national in nature. At the same time as the national revival among local authorities in Israel, the elections in 1976 in the West Bank brought to power a large number of municipality heads affiliated with the Palestine Liberation Organization and supporters of the Palestinian struggle, over candidates affiliated with Israel. After their victory, they started to strengthen the relationship with the national Arab leadership in Israel, especially the leadership of the Communist Party [2].

Alongside the national uprising in Palestinian lands, which led to reinforcing the national identity among the Arab population, and which reached its peak from the 1970s until the mid-1980s, there was also a steady increase in the importance of the religious dimension in the self-identity. Studies that tried to follow the renewed rise and institutionalization of the Islamic identity confirm that the meeting between Palestinian citizens in Israel and Palestinians in the occupied territories in 1967 was an important factor in strengthening the Islamic orientation among the Arab citizens in Israel. This is partially attributed to young Arab men going to study in religious institutes in the West Bank and Hebron, where they received a religious and political education. Upon their return to their local communities at the beginning of the 1970s, they moved on to religious activities (dawah). The rise of political Islam as an ideological alternative to revolutionary pan-Arabism started to find a foothold among the Arab and the Muslim public in the 1970s [17], that is if we look into the Palestinian aspect. However, the rise of the local Islamist movements came in the context of the rise of the Islamist movement in the Arab world as a whole. Therefore, reaction to the Arab surrounding states has also been reflected in the rise of the Islamist movements and the Islamic expansion in the Arab world since the beginning of the 1970s. The establishment of the “Family of Jihad” at the beginning of the 1970s was a preliminary indicator of the effect on local Arab society that the transformation taking place in the Arab surroundings was having and the shift from revolutionary pan-Arabism to Islamist protest, which considered itself an alternative for all that came before it. It based its legitimacy on what was considered the failure of all the ideologies and political behaviors that had preceded it in the Arab world in the 1950s and 1960s.

In 1972, Sheikh Abdullah Nimar Darwish took action by establishing the first form of the Islamic Movement in Israel. Under the leadership of Sheikh Darwish, the “Family of Jihad” worked in secret to gather weapons and military equipment and became a secret religious organization whose immediate objective was to strike at Israeli targets, while its overarching aim was a struggle that would culminate in the creation of an Islamic state in historic Palestine. Sheikh Darwish was detained, along with a number of youths, in 1981, and they were convicted. After their release from prison, they underwent a paradigm shift that made them more pragmatic, and they started their religious activities. They expanded their fields of activities, especially at the local and municipal levels.

During the 1970s and 1980s, the movement established a number of branches in Arab towns, especially in the Triangle. The transformation from religious and social preaching to political activities was a response to the loss of hope by the Arab citizens in the Arab nationalist movement, and reservations about its ultimate ability to lead real change in the fates of Palestinian citizens of Israel. Adding to that, the Camp David Peace Agreement between Egypt and Israel, which was signed in 1978, had taken Egypt out of the circle of the Arab-Israeli conflict and only reinforced the feeling of Arab society moving farther away from secular pan-Arabism. The increasing Islamization in Arab society in Israel was an extension of the spread of political Islamization in the wider Arab surroundings, which was represented by the transformation from religious peaching to political and social activities. It gained clear momentum after the Islamic Revolution in 1979, which reiterated Islamic identity as a motivator and creator of the revolution in Iran and was a source of inspiration to many Islamic movements. In addition to the impact of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, it should be mentioned that the Hajj (pilgrimage) agreement in 1978 enabled Arab citizens, for the first time, to carry out the requirement of Hajj and Umrah to Mecca based on Islamic laws [18].

The first Intifada, which broke out in 1987, was further proof of the relationship between political events and developments in the Arab world in general, and the Palestinian space specifically, and as affecting the political behavior of Palestinian citizens of Israel. The outbreak of the First Intifada in occupied lands led to increased protest activities among the Arabs in Israel through peaceful demonstrations in which they expressed their deep solidarity with the Palestinian people, and also collected donations and basic needs for the Palestinian people. At the same time, the escalation in the occupied lands led MK Abdulwahab Darawshe to resign from the Labor Party, which had, along with the Likud Party, formed a national unity government during the period from 1984 to 1988. Darawshe formed his own party, called the Arab Democratic Party, through which he entered elections and was elected as political representative in 1999. Moreover, during the elections to the 12th Knesset, the political parties that represented the Arab public, including the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality, reiterated their solidarity with the struggle of the Palestinian people, and they accused the activists of Zionist parties of cooperating, being lackeys of the authorities, and believing in fantasies that only served their own personal interests.

At the height of the First Intifada, which deepened the renewed revival of the national Palestinian identity among Palestinian citizens of Israel, the regional and international communities witnessed two main events that had important implications for the Arab society in Israel. The first was the Second Gulf War, which transformed the confrontation between the Arab world and Israel into an internal conflict between the Arab states and showed the limitations and weaknesses of pan-Arab ideologies. The second was the collapse in the balance of world powers. These two events had a decisive impact on Arab citizens in Israel and created a sense of frustration among them. Therefore, it can be said that the events had a destructive impact on Arab society in Israel, and even increased the fragmentation and internal conflicts in society, by renouncing the national direction that had characterized the previous two decades and weakening its political activity. We can see an embodiment of this in the Knesset elections in 1992, which reflected the political changes in the world and the region on Palestinian citizens in Israel through the clear decrease in voter turnout, in addition to the noticeable decrease in voter turnout for non-Zionist parties and an increase in voting for Jewish and Zionist parties. There is no need to mention that regional developments deepened the crisis among Arab citizens and clearly showed their state of “compounded marginalization” as expressed by Majid Al Haj.

The Oslo Agreements ignored the Palestinian citizens of Israel and reinforced their place on the margins of the Palestinian national movement agenda and the Palestinian and Israeli leadership. Practically, the Oslo Accords increased the exclusion, isolation, and alienation of the Arab citizens in light of their elimination from the Israeli agenda and the agenda of the Palestinian national movement at the same time. The Islamic Movement went through a political crisis and was divided into two parts: one part in the north and one in the south. It is true that, before the division of the Islamic Movement in the middle of 1990s, there had been disputes over a number of issues and topics, but it was clear that the main and core conflict was around the peace process between the PLO and Israel. At the time when the leadership of the southern branch, led by Sheikh Abdullah Nimar Darwish, had supported the Oslo process, the leadership of the northern branch had rejected the principle of settlement, and had considered the agreement to be a “betrayal”. Practically, the issue of participating in the Knesset elections in 1996 led to a clear division within the movement, leaving it in two parts. The Islamic Movement moved towards Egyptian Sheikh Yusuf Al Qaradawi, who was considered one of the most important scholars on Islam in the second half of the twentieth century and was a jurisprudential reference for many Islamic movements as well as tens, or maybe hundreds of millions of Muslims around the world. Al Qaradawi issued a fatwa that stated that, according to Islamic sharia, it was prohibited for Muslims to participate in Knesset elections because voting, or being nominated, meant recognizing Israel’s right to exist or remain on invaded lands. Sheikh Darwish refused to accept the fatwa, but the two leaders of the radical branch, Sheikh Raed Salah, and Sheikh Kamal Al-Khatib, vehemently opposed participation in the Knesset elections based on this fatwa. They claimed that the mere participation was a recognition of the legitimacy of Zionism [19].

The impact of the surrounding Arab countries was clear in the case of the Islamic Movement, as its political ideology is based on belonging to Islam, as a cultural, religious, and political space, and the Islamic Movement, in both of its branches, could be considered an extension of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt, just like many other Islamic movements in the Arab world. The division that the local movement experienced was, at its core, related to a purely regional issue involving the political process and the resolution of the Palestinian problem. However, the division itself was based on the background of the intervention of the Arab world into the conflicts within the movement, with the fatwa by Sheikh Al Qaradawi being the decisive factor in this division.

The presence of the wider Arab surroundings was also clear in the behavior of the Islamic Movement following the Arab Spring and the political developments in its wake, as it led to the victory of Islamists in elections in Tunisia and Egypt, which aroused motivation for the movement at the local level. In the same context, the military coup that led to the fall of the elected president of Egypt and brought Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to power sparked a campaign of solidarity with the deposed president, Mohamed Morsi. It is clear that the solidarity campaign with deposed President Morsi was a clear indicator of the harmony between the local Arab minority and its wider Arab surroundings because the Islamic Movement in Israel (especially the Northern Branch, which is more ideological) considered the victory of the Muslim Brotherhood in the presidential and parliamentary elections in Egypt a factor that would strengthen its position in Arab society, even at the rational level. By the same measure, the deposition of Morsi and the fall of Muslim Brotherhood rule led to a wave of solidarity and sympathy, especially in the Northern Branch [20].

3. What exceeds the purely national space

3.1 Settlement and exception projections

The political and intellectual elites of Arab society in Israel considered the process in Oslo, and the historic decision of the Palestinian Liberation Organization to accept the principle of dividing Palestine, as excluding the Arab minority in Israel from the framework of a future solution. In this regard, the establishment of the National Democratic Alliance, and the appearance of a discourse of civil and political nationhood that was drafted by Azmi Bishara, along with the later documents of the Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel, were a sort of response to the increasing feelings of besiegement among the Arab minority in Israel and its growing sense that the future settlement of the Palestinian problem would not include them. In other words, the response of the Arab minority to Oslo was to develop a political discourse that challenged the domination of Zionist ideas in Israel and that looked for intellectual and ideological alternatives that would break down Zionist rhetoric and challenge its moral and political legitimacy. The Arabs had reached the conclusion that they must focus on improving their civil status in the state of Israel and managing their struggle in Israeli society within the framework of the law and the Israeli political realities. Any consideration of the surrounding Arab countries as factors that could be relied on to change the political situation of Arabs in Israel had ended. This had become prominent as Arab countries had signed peace agreements with Israel, at the same time as negotiations were being conducted, directly or indirectly, by other Arab countries with Israel. These events showed the severity of the Arab crisis and sped up the process of focusing on the local aspect among Arabs in Israel [9]. In this regard, it should be noted that channels of communication were created by some Arab members of the Knesset after the signing of the Oslo Accords with a number of Arab countries, especially Jordan, Syria, and some of the Gulf countries. These relationships, despite being modest and of limited impact, have brought about mobilization in these countries to support local projects, like the building of the Doha Stadium in Sakhnin, for example, or the establishment of scholarships for Arab students. In addition, some Arab capitals have become destinations for visits by some of the Arab members of the Knesset. In 2010, Libya was visited by a large delegation that included dozens of political, social, and academic figures, where they met with Colonel Muammar al-Gaddafi. Likewise, a former member of parliament, Azmi Bishara, was successful in building stable channels for communication with the ruling regime in Syria, and was received by the heads of the regime, Hafez and Bashar Al Assad. Recently, current MK Ahmad Tibi and former MK Jamal Zahalka carried out a historic visit to the Arab League to present a vision of the position of Arabs in Israel regarding the Jewish nation-state law recently adopted by the Israeli Knesset (Statement by the Knesset member Jamal Zahalka, September 11, 2018: http://www.alarab.com/Article/871212). All of these and others represent continued attempts by the political elites to achieve a breakthrough in their isolation in a clear attempt to use Arab diplomacy to pressure Israel. It seems as though the Arab political leadership in Israel has started to realize that even though some Arab countries are becoming more open to Israel, this is not necessarily completely in the interests of Israel, and it could be used to achieve some gains, even if partial ones.

3.2 Cultural and social communication in light of forced isolation

If the Oslo Accords were seen as being an abandonment of the Arab minority in Israel by the Palestinian national movement, leaving this minority alone to face its fate against Israel, the peace agreements that were signed with Egypt and Jordan specifically had, without a doubt, a positive impact on Arab society, and provided a small possibility to vent that cannot be taken lightly in the cultural, economic, and tourism contexts. Among the clearest examples of the positive effects might be the steady increase in the number of college students who study in Jordanian universities, especially in fields and majors that they cannot, or find it difficult to, study in Israeli universities, especially in the field of medicine [21]. In addition, peace with Jordan provided Arab citizens in Israel with an opportunity to take tourist trips to Jordanian hotels at prices that are affordable for them. The same applies to the situation in Egypt, and it is enough to go to travel and tourism offices during holidays and vacations to see the amount of Arab tourism from Israel to Egyptian resorts in Sharm El Sheikh and Taba, or to Jordanian resorts in Aqaba and the Dead Sea.

There is a clear cultural dimension to the interaction of the Arab citizens with the openness to the Arab world through Jordan and Egypt, and it is represented by the hunger of Arab citizens in Israel to communicate directly with the art scene in the Arab world. Moreover, there has been a recent rise in the phenomenon of organizing musical concerts for famous artists, that are primarily directed toward Arab citizens in Israel. There is also the matter of the social communication that is taking place through Jordan, between those inside Israel and those in the Palestinian diaspora, and Jordan has become something of a meeting point for relatives and families that were separated in the aftermath of the 1948 War. It is implicitly understood that the geographical proximity of Jordan is an important factor in this rush toward the surrounding Arab world, as the Arab citizens in Israel see Jordan as a place to vent and escape their state of isolation, suffocation, discrimination, marginalization, and exclusion that follow Arabs inside the Hebrew state [22]. Cultural communication with Arab states in the Persian Gulf is another benefit stemming from the Oslo Accords and the partial normalization of ties between Israel and a number of monarchies in the Gulf, especially Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.

As mentioned above, relationships between Palestinians in Israel and the Arab world can be seen, in recent years, in the cultural and artistic milieu. Beirut has become a destination for youth, artists, intellectuals, and academics who travel to the city to attend conferences, programs, and various cultural events. Arab society in Israel does not hesitate to use the means available to them to break through the siege and isolation that they were thrown into in 1948. Arab citizens in Israel are trying to breach the cultural barrier in an attempt to enter an alternative cultural space that expresses their identity and internal and cultural worlds, considering their exclusion from the Israeli agenda. They are doing this through the development of cultural, technical, and media relations. Many Arab academics are fellows in various research centers in the Arab world, and many journalists regularly write columns in important and prestigious newspapers that are published in the Arab world. In the past 2 years, a number of young men have participated in television programs that are broadcast from Beirut. The attempts by Arab intellectuals and artists inside Israel to communicate with the Arab world are further evidence of the engagement between local Arab society and its Arab surroundings, and it is also evidence of the Arab society’s diligent attempts to break through the wall of isolation and alienation and become engaged with the larger Arab world.

The political and cultural changes in the Arab region have affected, and are still affecting, the mood, attitudes, perceptions, awareness, and political behavior of Arab citizens in Israel, as they are influenced by and responding to changes and transformations in the Arab space and translating them into political activity. It has also been possible to use the Arab surroundings to create changes in the realities of Arabs inside Israel, as has been the case with the Arab Druze.

The social communications project was launched by the intellectual, Dr. Azmi Bishara, at the beginning of the 2000s, and it made a unique effort to break through the political isolation that had been imposed by Israel on the Druze over previous decades since the link between Druze and other Druze in Syria and Lebanon had been cut off since the Nakba in 1948. Even though some links had developed after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982, these had been limited to the social, familial, and religious aspects, with the exclusion (to the point of prohibiting) of discussion of political issues. The official religious leadership of the Druze in Israel had politicized religion to adapt the members of the Druze community to Israeli politics, and in the name of religion, they prohibited any discussion of politics. What was new in the social communications project was that it was a creative effort to dismantle the walls of isolation by creating a state of social and political communications with Druze in Syria and Lebanon, who were always known for their nationalistic and pan-Arab tendencies. What was more important than this, however, was that, for the first time, a large number of Druze religious men were involved in the social communications project under the umbrella of resisting forced conscription and returning the Druze to their Arab affiliations, an affiliation that Israel has always tried to discourage with the compliance of Druze leaders, military conscription, and finally, with the education program of Druzification that inspired animosity towards the surrounding area. The tangible presence of religious men in the social communications project caused a breakthrough in the monopoly of official religious leaders, who were always in line with the politics of the authorities as they had always expressed their loyalty as a way to avoid participating in politics, service to the group’s civic interests, and an embodiment of the position of the religious community. The social communications project proved that there was no consensus among religious leaders and scholars about taking a position of blind loyalty and that there was a sizeable component who was ready to take up positions that were different from those taken by the authorities. Additionally, there was the fear by the official religious leadership, it seems, of the appearance of alternative leadership under the umbrella of a national project, especially since the communications committee did not conceal its resentment of the fact that the Druze had remained “a tribe at the disposal of the tribal leader.” (Statement issued by the Druze Communication Committee, October 2005. Contained in the author’s archives).

The warm relations that were widespread during this stage, between the Lebanese Druze leader, Waleed Jumblatt, and the Baathist regime in Syria, contributed to support for the communications project. In 2001, in Amman, Jordan, a conference was held and Druze figures and groups from Lebanon that were affiliated with the pan-Arab line also attended. This conference was sponsored by Jumblatt, and there were also Druze delegations from Galilee and Carmel, and the conference resulted in national-minded decisions being made that were not limited to just a rejection of mandatory army service imposed on the Druze. The conference also denounced the phenomenon of non-Druze Arabs volunteering in the Israeli Army (Al Wasat, 514th Edition, December 3, 2001, pg. 26).

The social communications project created a new dynamic for the organization of a protest movement among the Druze, and its most prominent features were the appearance of protest organizations that reiterated the national and Arab identities of the Druze and tried to uncover the injustices that were affecting the Druze despite their service in the military and security agencies. The first of these organizations was the Mithaq al-Marufiyen al-Ahrar (The Charter of the Free Druze). Which as organically linked with the National Democratic Alliance (the Balad Party) and the communications project.

3.3 The “Arab Spring”

The “Arab Spring” revived the debate on the impact of the surrounding Arab states, and this became clear with the appearance of political and intellectual divisions in local Arab society at the level of intellectuals, the political parties, and the public. Specifically, this division has referred to the ongoing war in Syria. Despite the fact that this rhetoric has not had an impact on what was happening in the Arab region, its existence represents the ultimate harmony between the two sides. What is more important is that it shows the significant internalization among the Arab minority of being part and parcel of the Arab surroundings [20].

The “Arab Spring”, at its start and during its first stages, created unrivaled enthusiasm in Arab society in Israel, and this was despite the absence of the Palestinian issue and the conflict against Israel on its agenda. This enthusiasm led to the hopes that it would be the beginning of democracy and liberalism in the Arab world, and what this would mean as a way of taking the air out of democratic-elitist Israeli rhetoric and challenging Zionist rhetoric which compares the conditions of Arabs in Israel and the miserable conditions of Arabs in the surrounding Arab world.

With the expanding revolutionary environment in the Arab world, first moving to Libya and then to Yemen and Syria, hopes were undermined by foreign intervention and the militarization of peaceful protests, turning some into civil wars that are still going on today. Still, Amal Jamal believes that the revolutionary environment in the Arab world inspired the Arab Palestinian minority and affected its positions, and political behavior [20].

It is clear that there are differences in the positions of political parties and different views on the revolutionary situation in the Arab world. At a time when the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (Hadash) took a position aligned with the Baath regime in Syria, the Islamic Movement and the National Democratic Alliance (Balad) took a stance supporting the revolution. The differing positions towards the “Arab Spring” could be seen clearly among Arab Palestinian intellectuals in Palestine with discussions, and intellectual and political debates in order to understand the political and intellectual dimensions accompanying developments in the Arab world. In addition, the attempt to explore the themes that came up with the “Arab Spring” at the level of political behavior uncovers forms of political activities and behaviors at both the local and national levels and confirms the civil discourse has overcome nationalistic discourse, in a clear return to the fragmentation and collapse that was widespread in the Arab surroundings. This was a clear expression of the feeling of despair and frustration with these surroundings, meaning that the decrease in nationalistic discourse in the Arab surroundings and the increasing civic discourse had an impact on Arab conditions in Israel. In light of the fragmentation and despair at the “cultural and historical depths” represented by the Arab surroundings, it appeared that the best way to move forward for Arab citizens was to resort to civil discourse and try to oppose the Jewishness of the state through full and equal citizenship. It remains that the state of emphasizing the civil dimension of the public discourse among the Arab public and limiting it to local contexts is a live and constant example of the extent of the effect that the Arab surroundings have on the Arab society in Israel. This surrounding has been always seen by Arab society in Israel as deeper cultural and existential anchor. When this surrounding area relapsed, the response of the Arab society in Israel was identical to its surroundings in its discourse and behavior towards the state.

4. The institutionalization of the clans in the wake of the “Arab Spring”

Arab local elections have always carried more importance than national elections in Israel. Local government is not only regarded as a primary economic resource and source of income and employment but also constitutes a pillar of social and political prestige in the local political tradition in light of the exclusion of the political parties from majority Jewish politics.

2013 witnessed the first elections for local authorities, after the eruption of the “Arab Spring”. This may be called the clan-dominated period. Herein, clanism not only held ground but also unapologetically inserted itself into the political arena. The 2013 Arab local authority elections were also marked by great competition, with 610 lists contesting 620 mandates (one list to every mandate) and 228 candidates (four in every community on average). A conspicuous feature of the municipal elections was the strengthening of the coalition and clan frameworks and the waning of the ideological frameworks. The latter was exemplified in the Islamic movement’s participation in the elections in Um Al-Fahm, its traditional stronghold, and the southern faction’s decision to stand on a small scale. Although Balad proposed candidates for the local elections, it allowed them to stand independently; (Haneen Zoabi stood in Nazareth on a local list, former MK and Balad chairperson Wasel Taha adopting the same approach, and several other members of the political bureau and Balad’s central committee standing independently). Despite the decline in voting percentages in comparison with earlier local elections, the average general voting rate stood at 85%. The clan lists won 85% of the seats—also greater than in previous elections. 82% of all the local authority heads elected that year, however, were party affiliated. Hadash—traditionally the dominant party—lost some of the central communities it had controlled for a long period, Nazareth (the largest city in Israel and Hadash’s stronghold) standing out in particular, together with other important places, such as Arraba, Deir Hanna. The results of the 2013 elections thus indicate a continuation of the trend towards the strengthening of the clan system and weakening of the power of the party lists and candidates.

The 2013 municipal elections were the first sign of what was happening in the Arab space, the internal arena not witnessing any changes, developments, or constitutive events capable of explaining the abrupt decline in the political parties’ status in the local arena. While the Hadash candidates were defeated in its important strongholds in the al-Batuf region—Deir Hanna, Araba, Sakhnin, Shefar’am, al-Rina, and the principal municipal stronghold of Nazareth—the Islamic movement barely participated, withdrawing from its traditional bastion of Umm al-Fahm, Kfar Qassem, Kfar Bara, etc. The candidates that stood on behalf of Balad, such as Wasil Taha, could not defeat their rivals in the party and clan stronghold [23]. This trend, of the strengthening of clan and independent at the expense of the party candidates, accords with voting trends. According to a survey conducted by the Mada al-Carmel Center, 68.4% of Arab citizens vote for family relatives in mayoral elections, 72.8% in council elections. This support for clan frameworks and preference of clan and family over all other frameworks corresponds to some extent with the prevailing trend in the Arab Middle East in favor of sub-state over state frameworks.

Despite the decline of the Islamic movement, Hadash was the primary loser in the 2013 elections. Ayman Odeh, Hadash’s secretary, openly acknowledged that the party had suffered a serious setback at the expense of what he identified as the Establishment, clanism, and sectarianism. Unsurprisingly, in his opinion this was due to the State and security forces, which he maintains have devoted themselves since the establishment of the State to deepening internal Arab divisions [24]. Odeh regards the downturn in the parties’ status as the root of the global political collapse of ideology and weakening of the party framework—a phenomenon Israeli society in general and Arab society in Israel, in particular, have not escaped.

Although Arab scholars in Israel point to a weakening of the parties in favor of clan frameworks, especially over the past two decades, neither academics nor politicians adduce any direct or indirect connection between clan dominance over the internal arena and events in the Arab world ([25], p. 104). The failure of revolutionary ideologies on the one hand and the modern state’s inability to solve the chronic Arab civil issues on the other has turned clanism, communality, and ethnicity into realistic alternatives to revolutionary ideologies, institutional politics, political parties, and national discourse.

The clanization characteristic of the 2018 municipal elections assumed four prominent forms:

1. The first and most obvious was the significant decline in the status of the ideological parties, some of which dropped to 13% in the local councils— that is, 110 seats out of 480 seats across the Arab sector.

2. The almost complete absence of female representation as council heads—despite close to 22 women being elected to the municipal councils and local authorities.

3. 24% of all elected heads of authorities identified or were affiliated with a party—although party affiliation does not necessarily negate affiliation or clan background.

4. The primaries within the family or clan.

The novel feature of the 2018 elections lies in the fact that the candidates saw no need for a modern political or partisan framework, clanization no longer being perceived as an unsustainable political process in and of itself. On the contrary: since the outbreak of the “Arab Spring,” clanism has established itself as a viable political structure ([26], pp. 21–23). In this spirit, Said Zeedani published an article entitled “And the Voice of the Tribe remains that of the Hegmon.” In the most recent election, while businessmen and the educated replaced the traditional respected local leaders, this process was primarily channeled through the hamula, which served as both a political framework and a means of political mobilization ([27], p. 25). The establishment of the hamula as an independent political framework reflected a trend that has become increasingly prominent since the outbreak of the “Arab Spring” uprisings. Although the primaries are held before the election, they have become an integral part of local elections in Arab society. While the clans were present and powerful even before the “Arab Spring,” the political parties created mechanisms to come to terms with them, the “Arab Spring”— which inter alia prompted the collapse of the ideological party system and the national discourse—highlighted sub-state frameworks as identity foci and a sense of belonging and solidarity for individuals helpless in the face of the State. Against this background, and as part of engagement with the space, clanization intensified in Arab society, channeled by the educated, middle class, and businessmen as an authentic, uncomplicated, accessible phenomenon free of any political discourse. Hereby, the maximalization of the local and accessible became more effective than imported ideologies imposed from above.

There is a consensus among observers and political factors that the 2018 elections knew two greatest trends, which complement each other. The first is the significant retreat of the political and principled-ideological discourse from the internal political arena of Arab society, while the second trend, which complements its predecessor, is the tribalization of the lists running in the elections. According to Adv. Awad Abd al-Fatah, previous secretary general of Balad, the disappearance of the ideological parties from the local arena only feeds the social, tribal, and even ethnic polarization. Morsi Abu Mokh, on the other hand, claims that there are new variations of tribalization, such as two candidates running from the same family. This phenomenon is repeated in a number of locations. Different candidates from the same family are not a development that will weaken the centrality of the extended family, on the contrary, running within the family only further establishes it as a political-normative framework for all intents and purposes. The withdrawal of the ideological parties is not a consequence of the “Arab Spring”, nor is the tribalization of intra-Arab politics in Israel. However, it is impossible to ignore the fact that the uprisings of the “Arab Spring” undermined the right of all the institutional and normative frameworks in the Arab space to exist, which had parallel echoes in Arab society itself [28].

Despite the modernization of Arab society in Israel, clanism never disappeared from Arab society in Israel—certainly not from the social landscape. Rather than leading to the formation of sub-State frameworks, the “Arab Spring” and its crumbling effect have reinforced the former as sub-States structure in light of the State’s failure to fulfill its central function. It has also signaled the failure of all the collective ideologies and ruling elites. The emergence of these sub-State frameworks has further been regarded as an alternative to official, institutional, and collective State bodies. Its greatest impact has been in the demonstrativeness and independent stance of a political clanism that feels no need to justify itself or accommodate itself to broader, more modern frameworks such as partyism or nationalism. In the wake of the “Arab Spring,” political clanism has begun presenting itself unapologetically on the basis of two moral and public patterns: the failure of the collective frameworks as a whole and in the name of authenticity and connection with social reality. The “Arab Spring” therefore neither gave rise to nor begot clanism. Its biggest impact has rather been clan demonstrativeness and the jettison of any need for accommodation, adaptation, or justification. As the last two elections have demonstrated, the growth in the clans’ power is a consequence of failure and alternativism rather than their inherent inner strength.

5. Conclusion

Until recent years, the Arab minority in Israel was completely absent from the concerns of their surroundings in the Arab world, despite the fact that the Arab surroundings have maintained a strong presence in forming the political consciousness and intellectual and ideological tendencies in Israeli Arab society for the past 70 years. During the period of the Arab-Israeli conflict, until the 1980s, Arab states did not try to use the Arab minority in their interest, nor did they consider this minority a trump card in the conflict. Despite this, it can be accurately said that Arab society in Israel considered itself a part of the Arab surroundings in every sense of the word, and it still sees its existence as a social, existential, and cultural extension of these Arab surroundings. This communicative situation, at the level of consciousness and sentiments, has cast a shadow on the relationships and positions of Arab citizens in the state, and there have always been views towards the Arab surroundings as a source of moral strength and intellectual inspiration. All of the intellectual and ideological transformations that the Arab world has experienced have reflected on the conditions of Arabs in Israel, starting with pan-Arabism, following through to the reframing of national identities, and ending with the extension of Islamism and restoring pre-state frameworks against the backdrop of the logic of fragmentation that was brought about by the “Arab Spring”. While certain political elites believed, the Oslo process and the continuing conditions of normalization were a blockade against them, local Arab society, through its political elites, and cultural, artistic, and media activities, has viewed normalization as a way for them to vent and an opportunity for them to break through the isolation of Arab society.

There is no doubt that the “Arab Spring” revolutions had negative impacts on morale in the public sphere in Arab society in Israel, but at the same time, they strengthened this society’s belief in the importance of developing a new political discourse that did not ignore pan-Arab affiliation and one that actually keeps collective civil rights at its core. Finally, I would like to point out that the relationship between Arab society and the state, and this society’s readings into the status of this relationship, have always been connected with the general situation in the Arab surroundings, and this is something that cannot be ignored, as it has become an influencing factor in the behaviors of local Arab society in recent years.

The United Arab List’s political campaign and joining of the government coalition undoubtedly signify a watershed in Arab politics in Israel and Arab society’s attitude towards the State alike. Giving local interests prominence, the campaign also stressed the need for political realism in regard to the State while putting the national discourse and the Palestinian cause on a back burner. The very fact that an Arab party joined a government coalition set a historical precedent, an Arab party formally becoming an important part of an Israeli government for the first time in Israeli politics. Mansour Abbas’ speeches favoring the civil over the national discourse and deliberate downplaying of the Palestinian issue and National Law that led to this circumstance signal a new trend in Arab politics, evincing the entrenchment of the civil school within Arab society in Israel. This is consistent with the public discourse in Arab society in Israel, public opinion polls, the steep rise in the numbers volunteering for national and civic service, recruitment to the police, and government investment in Arab society, etc. In a certain sense, the United Arab List’s political direction is far more significant than has been recognized, the very willingness of an Islamic movement in Israel to take such a pioneering step demonstrates the power the civil discourse has gained in Arab society in Israel. Representing the first cracks in the hegemony of the national protest discourse, this orientation, without doubt, reflects the influence of the “Arab Spring” and its prioritization of civil over ideological issues.

In recent decades, Arab society in Israel has experienced far-reaching contradictory changes. Along with developments in the field of education and the modernization of traditional Arab society, both clanism and crime have burgeoned, making social characterization difficult. The influence of the “Arab Spring” on Arab society in Israel reinforces these conflicting trends: while the Arab public is growing increasingly alienated under the influence of the Jewish nation-state law, the “Arab Spring” has deepened frustration with the Arab space and heightened the sense of loneliness and need to focus on localism. These circumstances call for an integrative theory to describe and explain the political and social existence of Arab society in Israel against the backdrop of the “Arab Spring.”