Open access peer-reviewed chapter

CSR Reporting and Blockchain Technology

Written By

Pattarake Sarajoti, Pattanaporn Chatjuthamard, Suwongrat Papangkorn and Piyachart Phiromswad

Submitted: 01 May 2022 Reviewed: 23 May 2022 Published: 23 June 2022

DOI: 10.5772/intechopen.105512

From the Edited Volume

Corporate Social Responsibility in the 21st Century

Edited by Muddassar Sarfraz

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Abstract

Blockchain technology is a public ledger that stores data in a chain of blocks which can radically improve the quality of our records from “records that might be trustworthy” to “records that trust is absolute”. This chapter explores one area that blockchain technology can radically transform but has not yet received significant attention. We evaluate the suitability of applying blockchain technology for corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting. We demonstrate that blockchain technology is suitable in the context of CSR reporting since there is a strong need for an immutable common database shared among various stakeholders with potential trust issues. We also argue that blockchain technology does not completely eliminate existing trusted third parties such as governments, international organizations that provide CSR reporting standards, major CSR reporting assurance companies and major CSR infomediaries. In particular, blockchain technology can be used as a platform that integrates all traditional trusted third parties, transforms their functions, and reduces their drawbacks for advancing CSR reporting. We also demonstrate that a permissionless public blockchain would be the most suitable structure.

Keywords

  • blockchain technology
  • CSR reporting
  • immutability
  • anonymity
  • transparency
  • smart contracts
  • decentralized autonomous organization

1. Introduction

Blockchain technology has the potential to radically transform most, if not all, sectors. Blockchain technology has been considered one of the pillars of the Fourth Industrial Revolution by the World Bank [1]. At its core, blockchain technology revolutionizes the way we record data. Since the dawn of human civilization, our ability to “record” something from drawing in caves to important writings has been considered one of the most important inventions in human history. The ability to record something allows us to store and pass on knowledge and information from generation to generation. Blockchain technology will be considered another major milestone in human civilization since it will allow us to radically improve the quality of our records from “records that might be trustworthy” to “records that trust is absolute”.

In this chapter, we will explore one area that blockchain technology can radically transform but has not yet received significant attention which is the application of blockchain technology for corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting. The main objective of this chapter is to answer the following research question: Is blockchain technology suitable for CSR reporting? With the growing interest in blockchain technology, people are interested in applying blockchain technology for CSR reporting. A growing number of articles produced by top international accounting firms such as EY (Ernst & Young Global Limited) and PwC (PricewaterhouseCoopers) as well as international organizations such as the World Economic Forum (WEF) and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) advocate the use of blockchain technology for CSR reporting [2, 3, 4, 5]. Examples of benefits discussed in these reports include enhancing trust and auditability, standardizing CSR reporting, reducing cost, improving speed and efficiency as well as real-time monitoring of CSR performance. For scholarly research, there are only a few studies that examine the role of blockchain technology in CSR reporting. Nikolakis et al. [6] developed the Evidence, Verifiability, and Enforceability (EVE) framework to demonstrate how blockchain technology can enhance sustainability in global value chains by algorithmically enforcing hard law and soft law. Bakarich et al. [7] used exploratory content analysis to examine the role of blockchain technology in enhancing CSR reporting and CSR assurance. They argue that blockchain technology improves sustainability by incorporating traceability (“tracking”) and immutability (reliable “custodial support”) into existing CSR reporting, which is largely done in a voluntary manner.

However, it is still an open question regarding the suitability of applying blockchain technology for CSR reporting. The reason is that even if it is possible to apply blockchain technology for CSR reporting (anything that is associated “recoding” can be done via blockchain technology), it might not be “suitable” as existing CSR reporting methods might be more suitable (or only slightly less suitable) to perform this activity. The application of blockchain technology for CSR reporting will likely to happen when there are clear and impactful benefits when blockchain technology is being used over existing methods. This issue has not been examined in the existing literature. To fill this literature gap, this chapter will answer the above research question by using the ten-step decision path of [8]. Pedersen et al. [8] proposed a decision path which can be used to investigate whether blockchain technology is suitable for a certain application as well as providing a concreate rational on the suitability or unsuitability of a blockchain application. A previous study that is close to own work is [9]. Pizzi et al. [9] used the idea journey framework of [10] which can be used to trace and evaluate a journey of an idea from inception to adoption. It can also be used to examine “how and when” an idea might get stuck at a certain phase or “looping” between phases and never reach the idea implementation phase. They used this framework to trace and evaluate the journey of using blockchain technology in sustainability reporting based on a case study of a major Italian bank. Thus, this work complements our work in filling the above literature gap from a different perspective.

We found that blockchain technology is suitable in the context of CSR reporting as there is a strong need for an immutable common database shared among various stakeholders with potential trust issues. We also argue that blockchain technology does not completely eliminate existing trusted third parties such as governments, international organizations that provide CSR reporting standards, major CSR reporting assurance companies and major CSR infomediaries. We argue that blockchain technology can be used as a platform that integrates all traditional trusted third parties, transforms their functions, and reduces their drawbacks for advancing CSR reporting. We also demonstrate that a permissionless public blockchain would be the most suitable structure.

This chapter proceeds as follows. First, we provide a brief review of CSR and CSR reporting. The purpose of the review is to highlight the limitations of current CSR reporting. Next, we will discuss the basic concepts of blockchain technology as well as its benefits. Next, we discuss our research methodology to determine the suitability of blockchain technology in CSR reporting in which we use the ten-step decision path of [8]. Then, we present our findings. Finally, we present our discussions, limitations, and conclusions.

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2. What is CSR and CSR reporting?

In this section, we review literature related to CSR and CSR reporting to highlight the limitations of current CSR reporting which will play an important role in determining the suitability of blockchain technology in CSR reporting.

Having an agreeable definition of CSR is an important step to advance scholarly research which will provide directive guidance to corporates on what they should do (CSR activities), how to measure their progress (CSR performance) and what they should report (CSR reporting) in order to advance social responsibility. There are several attempts to define CSR. According to Carroll [11], the work of Bowen [12] in 1953 has been considered as the “Farther of Corporate Social Responsibility”. Bowen [12] defined CSR as the “obligations of businessmen” to do things that are consistent with desirable “objectives and values of our society”. This definition has laid down the foundation that corporates must focus on their effects on society rather than focusing only on profit. A work by Johnson [13] further elaborated the parties that corporates are responsible for which includes “employees, suppliers, dealers, local communities, and the nation”. This idea has latter become consistent with the stakeholder approach of [14] which postulated that corporates cannot exist without the support from their stakeholders which consist of customers, governments, suppliers, creditors, communities, investors, managers, employees, shareholders, and more. Davis [15] highlighted that responsible corporations are those that accomplish social benefits beyond “the minimum requirements of the law”. Eilbirt and Parket [16] is one of a few early works that suggested that CSR is associated with many different types of activities which laid down the foundation for subsequent works that attempt to advance the classification of CSR activities. Carroll [17] defined CSR as “the social responsibility of business encompasses the economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary expectations that society has of organizations at a given point in time”.

Still, after years of development, an agreeable definition of CSR has not yet been established. There are four reasons why having a precise and universal definition of CSR can be extremely difficult, if not impossible according to Sheehy [18]. First, there is no universal agreement on what exactly is constituted as “all harms” that are socially irresponsible or “all good deeds” that are socially desirable. Our society might have consensus about “some” of the harms and “some” of the good deeds. But having a precise and universal definition of all harms and all good deeds might be impossible. Furthermore, these harms tend to arise together as components of a basket that consists of things that are socially desirable. For example, producing electricity or driving on the road can damage our environment from their carbon emissions but we (society) need electricity and transportation to further advance our society.

Second, there is no universal agreement on which harms should be addressed (or which good deeds should be promoted) as well as by “how much” they should be addressed. It is still a debatable matter whether all socially undesirable things (assume that we are able to define them) must be addressed or if it is “socially desirable” to address only some of them. For example, there are many production activities that emit carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. Which of these activities do we need to address? Do we need to address all of them or only some of them? Furthermore, another question that complicates this issue is how much do we need to address them. Do we aim for absolute zero carbon emission for a specific production activity or some small level of carbon emission?

Third, there is no universal agreement on who should be responsible for addressing each harm (or promoting each good deed). One of the most controversial but extremely influential statements against CSR was from the Nobel laureate Milton Friedman [19]. He argued that the main responsibility of corporates is to produce excellent products and services to deliver the highest return to shareholders. Even though this view (the view that corporates should focus only on pleasing shareholders) has already lost its strength, but the idea that corporates might not be the most efficient agents to address some socially undesirable matters is still very much valid. There could be some matters that should be addressed by governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or nonprofit organizations.

Fourth, there is no universal agreement on who should define CSR. An entity that has the power to define CSR or CSR’s agenda will have a great deal of opportunity and power to shape the global business landscape to be whatever this entity desires. These problems in defining CSR will further complicate researchers in their attempt to define and advance CSR reporting.

CSR reporting is an activity of companies that attempt to communicate the impact of their business operations on social and environmental issues to stakeholders [20]. CSR reporting is a subset of non-financial reporting (NFR) which includes integrated reporting, Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) reporting, Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) reporting, Greenhouse Gas (GHG) reporting, and others [21]. Recently, there has been increasing pressure from various stakeholders demanding firms to release information beyond their financial information both on a voluntary as well as on a mandatory basis [22]. Several countries (such as Australia, China, South Africa, United States, and the European Union) have started to require some companies (usually listed companies) to disclose information regarding their social and environmental impact [21].

However, CSR reporting is still in its infancy, especially when compared to financial reporting [23, 24]. Tschopp and Huefner [23] provided a comparative analysis between CSR reporting and financial reporting which can be used to identity several limitations of current CSR reporting. A major issue with current CSR reporting is the lack of comparability of CSR reports as companies have discretion to choose their preferred reporting standards as well as what to be included in their reports [21, 23, 25]. The lack of comparability of CSR reports reduces the value of CSR reports because stakeholders will find it more difficult to use information from CSR reports for decision making. It is important to note that major progress has been made towards resolving this issue by the GRI who created and popularized the GRI standards which are considered the most widely used sustainability reporting standards in the world. According to the Survey of Sustainability Reporting from KPMG [26], 73 percent of the world 250 largest companies use GRI standards. Still, it is evident that this practice is common only for very large companies since, according to the same report, nearly half (46 percent) of the largest 100 firms in 52 countries do not use GRI standards or do not report on their sustainability performance at all. Furthermore, companies tend to use GRI principles only vaguely as well as use them to report only favourable information [27]. There are several studies that examined and found “greenwashing” which is an attempt that companies use NFR such as CSR reporting to manipulate stakeholders’ perception about non-financial activities [22, 27]. Finally, several studies found that weak governance such as small board size, a lower percentage of independent and female directors, and frequency of board meetings is associated with a lower quality of CSR reports [28, 29, 30, 31, 32].

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3. What is Blockchain technology?

Blockchain technology is a public ledger where transactions (i.e., digital data) are stored in a chain of blocks [33]. What makes storing transactions in a chain of blocks special is the immutability property that will be created once transactions are structured in this way. To see this, let us compare blockchain technology with the traditional way of storing data. Traditionally, data is stored separately and independently. For example, transaction A will be stored in folder A while transaction B will be stored in folder B. An obvious problem with storing data this way is that someone could tamper with data in each folder (e.g., replace transaction B with transaction B* and store it in folder B) and there is no way to know about this.

Blockchain technology will store data in a radically different way. First, transaction A which will be considered as the first transaction will be stored in block A (for blockchain technology, folder will be called “block”). The first block is usually called the genesis block. Next, a unique “fingerprint” or “digital signature” of transaction A which is called a “hash” value will be created. A hashing function is a function that transforms input data of any arbitrary size (e.g., transaction A has 20 words) into an output with fixed size values (e.g., 64 digits of numbers). Next, this “fingerprint” of transaction A is being stored together with transaction B in block B. This process will continue (fingerprint of transaction B will be stored together with transaction C in block C and so on and so forth) as long as there are new transactions to be recorded. An obvious advantage of storing data using blockchain technology is that tampering with recorded data is (almost) impossible. Suppose someone replaces a recorded transaction B with a false transaction B (e.g., B*), this tampering can be detected because the fingerprint of transaction B that has already been recorded together with transaction C will be different from the fingerprint of transaction B*. This is the immutability property that will be created once data are being stored using blockchain technology. To further enhance this immutability property, data recorded in the chain of blocks can be distributed over a large network of computers (i.e., making multiple copies instead of keeping the data at a centralized storage location) which also verifies the authenticity of each new block (i.e., mining) before being added to the network. The more the data is recorded in the distributed and decentralized chain of blocks, the stronger is the immutability property. This is the key reason why blockchain technology will radically improve the quality of our records from “records that might be trustworthy” to “records that trust is absolute”.

Other than the immutability property, blockchain technology can be structured to provide other benefits. First, blockchain technology can be structured such that the identities of people who participate in the blockchain network (senders, receivers, and validators) are concealed. Anonymity can have several benefits especially in the context of CSR reporting. First, anonymity makes it impossible for dishonest external entities to interfere or manipulate the actions of anonymous agents in the blockchain network. Second, anonymity makes it impossible for agents in the blockchain network to collude together and act dishonestly for their personal benefits beyond the reward they receive from the blockchain network.

Second, blockchain technology can be structured to allow smart contracts. A smart contract is a self-executable computer program stored in a blockchain network for executing terms of a contract [34]. The fact that a smart contract is a self-executable computer program allows it to perform various automation activities. A notable feature of smart contracts is that it allows the existence of decentralized autonomous organizations [34]. Participants in a decentralized autonomous organization are anonymous and perform tasks according to a pre-specified smart contract recorded on a blockchain network. Once certain conditions of the tasks are met (e.g., tasks are completed), smart contracts will reward the participants for their services (e.g., by automatically sending cryptocurrency to the participants).

Third, blockchain technology can be structured as a public blockchain (permissionless public blockchain) in which anyone can participate or a private blockchain (permissioned public blockchain) in which only the selected participants can participate. A major advantage of the public blockchain is that it can leverage the power of the “crowd” effectively either for strengthening the immutability property of the blockchain network or for gathering a large number of people to perform some common tasks as in “crowdsourcing”.

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4. Methodology: the ten-step decision path

Blockchain technology has several drawbacks and might not be suitable for all applications. Technically, as blockchain technology is a new way of recording information, any existing database can be converted to a blockchain database. However, as argued concretely by Pedersen et al. [8] every database is not suitable for converting into blockchain databases. Thus, Pedersen et al. [8] developed a ten-step decision path which can be used to determine the suitability of any blockchain technology application. They argued that they developed this framework based on years of consulting experience in both the public and private sectors. They validated their framework by conducting interviews with representatives from a Danish maritime shipping company as well as the Danish Maritime Authority which regulates the shipping industry of Denmark. Below, we discuss the ten-step decision path in more detail.

The first step is to determine whether there is a need for a shared common database. It is important to recognize that not all databases are needed to be shared. For example, private information does not need to be shared. Proprietary information or a trade secret (which might be discussed and recorded intentionally or unintentionally in a meeting minute) is a clear example of information that companies do not want to share. Another important factor to be considered is the demand for a shared database. For some information, there is a low or infrequent demand. This kind of information does not need to be shared. Another important aspect of the first step is the need to share “the same” data. This will be important when consistency of data is crucial for using this database. For example, medical records of patients that can be shared among hospitals must be exactly the same in order to prevent misdiagnosis which could result in serious injuries, illnesses, or even death.

The second step is to determine whether there is more than one party that needs to engage with the database. In some contexts, several parties, rather than one, are needed to interact with the database to enhance the value derived from the database. For example, financial transactions recorded in cryptocurrency such as bitcoin need one party to create the data and another party to validate (i.e., miners) the data. In some cases, the party that creates the data is one party, and the party that uses the data is another party (e.g., companies create CSR reporting to be used by potential investors). A benefit of blockchain technology in this context would be to use the decentralized feature of blockchain technology to distribute work to the right parties to enhance the value derived from the database.

The third step is to determine whether different parties have conflicts of interests which could create trust issues. According to the trust triangle model [35], there are three factors which are the determinants of trust. The first factor is third-party enforcement, which includes laws and regulations. The second factor is related-party enforcement, which includes market forces and reputational capital. The third factor is first-party enforcement, which includes ethics, integrity, and culture. Thus, in a situation when all three factors in the trust triangle are missing, the benefits of blockchain technology can be significant as blockchain technology can be a third-party enforcement that can completely transform a trustless system into a trustful system.

The fourth step is to determine whether it is possible and desirable to avoid using a trusted third party which normally arises to reduce or eliminate the trust issues discovered in the third step. As blockchain technology uses a decentralized network to record data, it can eliminate the need to use a centralized third party. In some situations, it is not possible to avoid using a trusted third party, such as when it is required by laws or regulations that a certain trusted third party must be used (e.g., applying for a VISA or work permits). In this case, it is not possible to use blockchain technology. Also, in some situations where a centralized trusted third party can effectively reduce or eliminate the trust issues better than using blockchain technology (since blockchain technology does have several drawbacks such as high energy usage, damaging the environment, and high latency such as in bitcoin), using blockchain technology will not be suitable in this case.

The fifth step is to determine whether the rules for accessing the database by different parties are the same or not. If all the parties have the same access rights, then blockchain technology is not suitable because a typical relational database such as MySQL would be enough to develop a shared common database among different parties with potential conflicts of interest. However, if it is desirable to give different parties different database access rights such as one party creates the data, one party validates the data, and one party uses the data, then it is suitable for using blockchain technology.

The sixth step is to determine whether the rules for transacting are frequently changed in a way that these changes cannot be anticipated or not. As blockchain technology is algorithmic in nature, all transactions are executed automatically by preprogramed codes. When changes to the rules for transacting are frequent, the costs for commencing these changes can be significant. Furthermore, some types of rules are not possible to be changed. An obvious example is a set of rules in a smart contract that have already been recorded on the blockchain.

The seventh step is to determine whether there are significant benefits from having an immutable database. Immutability occurs when it is impossible to change the recorded data. There could be several benefits from having an immutable database. First, an immutable database enhances the auditing process by ensuring that the data used for auditing is the original recorded data. Data tampering is a frequent problem that can arise in various contexts ranging from tampering with survey data [36], medical data [37], and even officially announced data [38]. Second, an immutable database can be used to encourage desirable behaviors. A study by Piza et al. [39] who conducted a systematic review using meta-analysis of 40 years of research relating to the effect of closed-circuit television (CCTV) on crime prevention found a compelling support that CCTV works. If people know that they are being watched and their actions will be recorded, it is less likely that they will act in an illegal manner. Thus, if immutability adds significant benefits to users of the database, then blockchain technology is suitable. However, if the benefits are small or negligible such as when small errors in the data are acceptable (e.g., for calculating statistical averages), then blockchain technology is not suitable.

If a blockchain application passes through the seventh step, then blockchain technology is suitable for this application. The eighth to tenth steps are intended to determine what kind of blockchain architecture is the most suitable for the current application. The eighth and the ninth step determine whether public access to the database is required or not. The eighth step focuses on the write eligibility (i.e., who can write to the database) while the ninth step focuses on the read eligibility (i.e., who can read from the database). If the public is required to write and read from the database, then a permissionless public blockchain is required. Finally, the tenth step is used to determine whether a permissioned private blockchain or a permissioned public blockchain is required. If the decision regarding who is eligible to read or write to a database is decided within an organization, then a permissioned private blockchain is required. Otherwise, this blockchain application requires a permissioned public blockchain architecture.

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5. Findings: is Blockchain suitable for CSR reporting

In this section, we use the ten-step decision path [8] to determine the suitability of blockchain technology for CSR reporting.

5.1 Do we need to have a shared common database for CSR reporting?

Yes, we need to have a shared common database for CSR reporting. The main purpose of CSR reporting is to communicate the CSR performance to all the stakeholders of a company. Thus, there needs to be a common database that serves this purpose. According to a report by EY [2], 78 percent of investors use information from CSR reporting (in the form of ESG disclosure) to make investment decision which is a clear and strong indicator that investors need to have access to CSR reporting. In a similar manner, O’Rourke and Ringer [40] found that consumers also use information related to the sustainability of companies to make purchasing decisions. Bai and Sarkis and Khan et al. [41, 42] argued that as the global demand for sustainability increases, companies are increasingly searching for sustainable suppliers.

Another major benefit of having a common database is that it can reduce the inconsistency and ambiguity that can arise when there are multiple databases (which are likely to use multiple standards) for CSR reporting. Pucker [25] argued that, unlike financial reporting that follows strict and common standards governed by a third-party enforcer (i.e., the Securities and Exchange Commission), most large companies can choose at their discretion which CSR reporting standards to be used, which information to be reported and whether to have a third party verify their reports or not. Pucker [25] concluded that the key reason why CSR reporting does not lead to true progress is that CSR reports are “nonstandard, incomplete, imprecise, and misleading. As mentioned above, the adoption of GRI standards which are considered the most widely used sustainability reporting standards in the world by various corporations is a clear indicator that we need a common database for CSR reporting. In reality, there are other CSR reporting standards such as another two major CSR reporting standards from AccountAbility standards (AA1000 Series) and Global Compact’s Communication on Progress (COP) from the United Nations as well as “hundreds of domestic CSR reporting guidelines, principles, regulations, and standards” [23]. Even though blockchain technology does not directly solve these issues (i.e., there could be multiple blockchain platforms for CSR reporting which will not address these issues), it can be designed properly to mitigate these issues.

5.2 Are multiple parties involve in CSR reporting?

Yes, there are multiple and “should be more” parties involved in CSR reporting. Several parties that are involved with the current CSR reporting are as follows. Companies are responsible for producing CSR reports. Various stakeholders such as consumers, investors, suppliers, and regulators are the users of CSR reports. Various international organizations such as the GRI, the International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) and the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) are responsible for developing standards for companies to use in producing CSR reports voluntary. Governments in various countries, such as Australia, China, South Africa, United States, and the European Union are responsible for regulating the CSR reporting of (some) companies. Various CSR reporting assurance services are responsible for ensuring the reliability and credibility of CSR reports made by companies based on certain standards. Various infomediaries such as CSRwire which is a news media focusing specifically on CSR related news and CSRHub which is an organization that provides data about ESG ratings for corporations around the world are responsible for collecting and dissimilating information about CSR activities and performance to all relevant stakeholders. Dubbink et al. [43] defined an infomediary as an informational intermediate organization that acts as a broker of information. The main role of an infomediary is to disseminate information to all involved parties as well as controlling, verifying, and translating information received from companies. Thus, it is evident that there are multiple parties involved in CSR reporting.

Furthermore, there should be more parties involved in CSR reporting which could occur by adopting blockchain technology in CSR reporting. One important party that can be involved with CSR reporting is “the crowd”. According to the work of Ghezzi et al. [44] which provides a systematic review of crowdsourcing literature, a unified definition of crowdsourcing as proposed by Estellés-Arolas et al. [45] is that “crowdsourcing is a type of participative online activity in which an individual, an institution, a non-profit organization, or company proposes to a group of individuals of varying knowledge, heterogeneity and number, via a flexible open call” for undertaking some task voluntary. Crowdsourcing is a form of open innovation. Crowdsourcing leverages the power of the “crowd” to perform some tasks to achieve some common objectives. These objectives can range from information gathering, ideas generating, decision making via voting or producing some goods and services. One of the most evident examples of crowdsourcing is the Wikipedia website which relies on crowdsourcing to create an online encyclopedia that is generally considered as the “biggest” and “best” encyclopedia in the world.

Several advantages can be realized when crowdsourcing powered by blockchain technology is used to perform some existing CSR reporting activities. Unlike traditional crowdsourcing, in which all data related to crowdsourcing activities are recorded and verified by a centralized entity, blockchain crowdsourcing will record and verify crowdsourcing activities through a decentralized blockchain network without relying on a centralized entity. Blockchain crowdsourcing can be a powerful platform that uses the power of the crowd to gather valuable information that can enhance CSR reporting. Blockchain crowdsourcing can be used to collect information about CSR performance from direct observers. People who experience socially acceptable or unacceptable activities firsthand can report evidence of these activities (e.g., taking a photo or recording a video of evidence) to the blockchain crowdsourcing platform for verification. The verification process is done in a decentralized manner by various anonymous individuals. This can significantly enhance the reliability of the verification outcome and reduce the chance that the verification process will be interfered with and manipulated by someone who has the “power” to do so.

5.3 Are these multiple parties have trust issues?

Yes, these multiple parties have trust issues. First, companies that create CSR reports have incentives to use these reports for business benefits. For example, companies might use CSR reports to gain access to financial resources or increase customer satisfaction [46, 47, 48, 49]. Diouf and Boiral [27] found that companies tend to produce CSR reports that use GRI principles only when these principles lead to favourable information. Mahoney et al. [50] found evidence of greenwashing in standalone CSR reports in which companies exaggerate their social and environmental performance in order to be viewed as a “good corporate citizen.”Boiral [51] found that 90 percent of significant negative events were not reported even when companies follow GRI principles. Michelon et al. and Hopwood [22, 52] found that companies use CSR reports for legitimacy or symbolic purposes which is an attempt to create a legitimate “brand image” that can reduce external pressure on other socially undesirable activities. Pérez [53] found that CSR reporting can be used to enhance corporate reputation. Thus, it is evident that companies do have a conflict of interests with other stakeholders when CSR reporting is being considered.

Second, there could be a conflict of interests among agents in each party. It is possible that agents in each party (such as managers or employees) might commit fraud in CSR reporting for their own personal benefits. Managers or employees in a company that produces CSR reports might receive benefits from committing fraud in CSR reporting which include career advancement, higher compensation, building a personal reputation and avoiding penalties from personal misconducts. Managers or employees in an organization that develops reporting standards might be influenced by some companies or some political parties since any entity that has the power to define CSR or CSR’s agenda will have the power to shape the global business landscape for the benefits of this entity [18]. It could be argued that the presence of various CSR reporting standards globally and especially locally is a result of some influential individuals’ attempt to shape CSR or CSR’s agenda in their own desirable ways [23]. Managers or employees in an organization that provides CSR reporting assurance services might be bribed to produce favuorable assurance reports for some companies. Managers or employees in an infomediary might be rewarded financially for providing favuorable CSR information for some companies. Finally, government officers might be corrupted and neglect their duties for personal benefits.

According to Karpoff [54], corporate fraud should be viewed as an umbrella that includes all kinds of corporate misconduct which can include falsifying (intentionally reporting falsified information), misreporting (intentionally delaying reporting), misrepresentation (intentionally making false statements based on facts), and others. Corporate fraud can have several damaging effects on the fraud firms as well as on society. According to Reurink [55] who examines financial fraud, which is one kind of corporate fraud, the negative effects of corporate fraud are the deterioration of shareholders’ wealth, destroying corporate reputation, reduction in sales and revenue, higher borrowing costs and other negative externalities on employees, suppliers, creditors, non-fraud firms, governments and society. To understand why misconduct occurred, it is common to use the fraud triangle framework (see [56] and references therein). Based on the fraud triangle framework, there are three factors that incentivize people to commit fraud which are i) pressure for committing fraud (economic or emotional incentives), ii) opportunity for committing fraud successfully and undetectably and iii) rational for committing fraud (i.e., how one justifies to oneself why committing fraud is acceptable).

Kurpierz and Smith [57] developed the greenwashing triangle by expanding on the fraud triangle. The three factors that incentivize people to commit greenwashing are i) pressure for being environmentally friendly, ii) greenwashing opportunity in the context of CSR reporting and communication, and iii) rational why greenwashing is acceptable. According to a report by KPMG [58], there has been increasing pressure for corporates to strive for a higher CSR performance. There are both personal and organizational benefits to achieving a higher CSR performance. Personal benefits include higher executive compensation and career advancement of employees who are responsible for the associated CSR performance. Organizational benefits include better financing conditions, higher stock prices due to investors’ preference towards sustainable investing, and improved corporate reputation. As CSR reporting is still in its infancy, has multiple reporting standards, and is produced voluntarily, these factors increase greenwashing opportunity as they allow people who produces CSR reports to exercise their own discretion, may be dishonestly, for their own benefits [23, 57]. Finally, there are two misconceptions that provide rationale for people to think that greenwashing is acceptable. These misconceptions are 1) thinking that greenwashing is similar to advertising and 2) thinking that the financial benefit of greenwashing outweighs its cost. In sum, these strongly suggests that multiple parties who are involved in CSR reporting have trust issues.

5.4 Is it possible and desirable to avoid a trusted third party in CSR reporting?

Several parties including international organizations that develop reporting standards, companies that provide CSR reporting assurance services, CSR infomediaries and governments are multiple trusted third parties that help resolve trust issues for CSR reporting. The companies that produce CSR reports can also be viewed as a trusted third party as these companies are supposed to truthfully collect CSR performance information on behalf of all stakeholders. We think that it is not possible and it is not desirable to completely avoid all these trusted third parties. However, we think that it is possible and desirable to use blockchain technology as a platform that integrates all traditional trusted third parties, transforming their functions, and reducing their drawbacks for advancing CSR reporting.

A major drawback of a centralized intermediary is that the data that it records and verifies is being done by a few identifiable agents which can be manipulated. It is undeniable that having a favourable information in a CSR report can have large financial consequences for some corporations and all individuals involved. Therefore, the pressure to commit fraud in this case can be large. Blockchain technology, on the other hand, relies on decentralized and anonymous agents to record and verify all activities in the blockchain network which makes it significantly more difficult for an agent to commit fraud. A concept in the blockchain technology literature called decentralized autonomous organization (DAO) is relevant for this purpose. According to Wang et al. [59], decentralized autonomous organization is defined as an “organization that can run on its own without any central authority or management”. This organization is run based on rules (i.e., codes and smart contracts) and a consensus group decision-making mechanism operated under a tamper-proof blockchain technology.

Blockchain technology does not have to be used to completely remove all intermediaries and all their functions. On the other hand, and especially in this context, we think blockchain technology can be used to replace and transform some functions of existing intermediaries in order to achieve maximum benefits. Governments, the international organizations that develop CSR reporting standards, major CSR infomediaries, major CSR assurance companies and large organizations (or some combinations of them) could work together to initiate and develop a blockchain platform for CSR reporting. Companies will submit their individual CSR activities to the blockchain network along with proof-of-evidence associated with each activity which will be recorded and verified by decentralized and anonymous agents. Existing CSR assurance companies can incorporate blockchain technology into their existing services by playing a leading role in initiating and managing these decentralized and anonymous agents. Other stakeholders or “the crowd” who experience socially acceptable or unacceptable activities of any companies firsthand can be encouraged to participate and report these activities to the blockchain network along with proof-of-evidence (e.g., taking a photo, recording a video of evidence, or any method that employees in a CSR assurance companies use) to be verified as discussed above. Blockchain crowdsourcing can be used to help advance our development in defining CSR and developing CSR reporting standards by gathering consensus (via voting mechanism) regarding what are constituted as harms (or good deeds), which harms (or good deeds) should be addressed, who should be responsible for addressing each harm (or each good deed), and who should be allowed to define CSR. Various international organizations that develop CSR reporting standards or governments can play a leading role in using blockchain crowdsourcing to gather consensus to advance CSR reporting. CSR information of any company can be accessed by all stakeholders by interacting with the blockchain network with low or zero transaction fees. Finally, the CSR information of any company can be disseminated objectively using smart contracts designed by existing major infomediaries. These smart contracts will make automatic announcements to relevant stakeholders when some conditions are met (such as a significantly negative CSR event has occurred).

5.5 Are these multiple parties have different access rights?

Yes, these multiple parties “should” have different access rights. Companies that are responsible for producing CSR reports will have the right to submit information to the blockchain network. Other stakeholders or “the crowd” who experience socially acceptable or unacceptable activities of any company firsthand will have the right to submit information to the blockchain network. Decentralized and anonymous agents that work under a decentralized autonomous organization structure will have the right to write verified CSR activities to the blockchain network. Any stakeholder (or anyone) will have the right to read information about the CSR activities of any company in the network.

5.6 Are rules for CSR reporting changed frequently?

Unfortunately, yes, rules for CSR reporting are being developed as CSR reporting is still in its infancy, especially when compared to financial reporting [23, 57]. However, several international organizations that develop CSR reporting standards such as the GRI who created and popularized the GRI standards, AccountAbility, who created AccountAbility standards (AA1000 Series), and the United Nations who created the Global Compact’s Communication on Progress (COP) have laid an important foundation for developing and advancing CSR reporting which should make the guidelines and principles for CSR reporting be relatively more stable compared to the past.

5.7 Are there benefits from having an immutable CSR reporting database?

Yes, there are significant benefits from having an immutable CSR reporting database. As discussed above, if people know that they are being watched and their actions will be recorded permanently, it is less likely that they will act in an unacceptable manner [39]. Similarly, as blockchain technology can be used to record CSR related misconducts publicly and immutably, they could be used to deter CSR related misconducts using the same logic.

As sustainability gains more attention among the business community worldwide, there is a growing pressure that everyone wants to look “green”. Greenwashing is an example of CSR reporting misconduct, which is defined as a claim, an implication, or a suggestion from a corporation to make itself appears to be environmentally friendly when it is not [57]. A work by de Freitas Netto et al. [60] provides a systematic review of greenwashing literature to categorize various concepts and forms of greenwashing. First, greenwashing can arise in the form of selective disclosure which occurs when companies withhold negative environmental information and/or promote false positive environmental information. Second, greenwashing could be used to “decoupling” underperforming environmental protection performance of a company. In other words, greenwashing can be used to make people forget or lose attention to negative environmental performance. Third, greenwashing can be used to target the environmental practices of a company and/or a specific product or service of a company. Fourth, greenwashing can broadly be classified into claim greenwashing and executional greenwashing. For claim greenwashing, there are several characteristics of “deceptiveness” of a claim which include its ambiguity, its omission of important facts and trade-offs, and its outright false statement. For executional greenwashing, this is a greenwashing that does not use any claims but “manipulates” the environment to affect people believe. An example would be using a green colour or a picture of nature when communicating about a product or a service to make people think that it is an environmentally friendly product or service when it is not.

There are several ways blockchain technology can be used to discourage misconduct. First, blockchain technology can be used to “demystify” and create permanent and immutable public records that correctly inform people about “the current and past” CSR performance of most (or all, if possible) corporations. Imagine a decentralized autonomous organization that acts as “a truth teller” in which all stakeholders can access and obtain the most unbiased information about the CSR performance of all corporations. In particular, this decentralized autonomous organization can be designed (via codes, consensus mechanisms, rewarding systems, and smart contracts) such that each anonymous agent (i.e., each node in the network) is encouraged to produce CSR claims that are complete (i.e., not half-truth), evidence-based, and unambiguous as much as possible. In fact, the jobs and tasks of these anonymous agents in this decentralized autonomous organization will be quite similar to the current jobs and tasks of workers in traditional intermediaries (such as workers in a CSR assurance company). But unlike the traditional intermediaries in which some of their executives or employees might act dishonestly for their personal or corporate benefits, this decentralized autonomous organization does not have an opportunity (of course, depending on the size and structure of the blockchain network) to do such a thing.

Second, blockchain technology can be used to create permanent and immutable public records that inform people about “the current and past” CSR misconducts of most (or all, if possible) corporations. Even though major corporate misconduct or scandals are regularly highlighted by the news media, blockchain technology can be used to radically revolutionize the traditional “truth-telling” functions of the traditional media. First, the traditional media can be influenced or sanctioned by the government or people with “power”. Suppose there was a CSR misconduct which is done by the government or corporates with strong political and/or financial power. It is likely that the traditional approach to truth-telling might be severely restricted in this case. On the other hand, the truth-telling that is powered by blockchain technology can be significantly more effective depending on the size of the blockchain network and how well it has been structured. For the government or corporates with political and/or financial power to be able to influence the truth-telling entities that are powered by blockchain technology, they need to know who they need to approach (which will be impossible given that people in each node in the blockchain network are anonymous) as well as they need to approach a lot of them (e.g., 51 percent consensus rule). Second, the decentralized nature of the blockchain network allows the power of the “crowd” to be utilized more effectively. Some people might have specific and rare information or evidence that otherwise would be inaccessible using the traditional truth-telling approach. In fact, the current social media (such as Facebook and Twitter) have already started to play this important role for quite some time. The blockchain technology will be a platform that takes the truth-telling function of social media to the next level. Third, as the blockchain network is algorithmic, it can leverage the increasing computational power (of modern CPUs, GPUs, or even cloud-based quantum computers) to collect, verify, and disseminate important information or facts to millions of people in real time.

5.8 Is public access to CSR reporting database required?

Yes, public access to the CSR reporting database is required. Companies will submit their individual CSR activities to the blockchain network. Other stakeholders or “the crowd” who experience socially acceptable or unacceptable activities of any company firsthand will also submit these activities to the blockchain network. Decentralized and anonymous agents will verify and record data on the blockchain network. All stakeholders will be able to access and read CSR information on the blockchain network. Therefore, a permissionless public blockchain would be the most suitable structure.

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6. Discussions and conclusions

Blockchain technology is a public ledger that stores data in a chain of blocks which can radically improve the quality of our records from “records that might be trustworthy” to “records that trust is absolute”. The most important advantage of blockchain technology over traditional ways of recoding is its immutability property. Data recorded in the blockchain network (with a large number of people participating) is almost impossible to be tampered. Furthermore, blockchain technology can be structured to provide other benefits. First, blockchain technology can be structured such that the identify of people who participate in the blockchain network (senders, receivers, and validators) are concealed. Second, blockchain technology can be structured to allow smart contracts. Third, blockchain technology can be structured as a public blockchain in which anyone can participate. Public blockchain can leverage the power of the “crowd” effectively, either for strengthening the immutability property of the blockchain network or for gathering a large number of people to perform some common tasks, as in “crowdsourcing”.

In this chapter, we will explore one area that blockchain technology can radically transform but has not yet received significant attention which is the application of blockchain technology for CSR reporting. Our objective is to determine whether blockchain technology is suitable for CSR reporting or not which is still an open question as blockchain technology will be suitable only when there are clear and impactful benefits when blockchain technology is being used over existing methods. To accomplish this, we use the ten-step decision path of [8]. Pedersen et al. [8] proposed a decision path which can be used to investigate whether blockchain technology is suitable for a certain application as well as providing a concreate rational on the suitability or unsuitability of a blockchain application.

We found that blockchain technology is suitable in the context of CSR reporting as there is a strong need for an immutable common database shared among various stakeholders with potential trust issues. We also argue that blockchain technology does not completely eliminate existing trusted third parties such as governments, international organizations that provide CSR reporting standards, major CSR reporting assurance companies and major CSR infomediaries. We argue that blockchain technology can be used as a platform that integrates all traditional trusted third parties, transforms their functions, and reduces their drawbacks for advancing CSR reporting. We also demonstrate that a permissionless public blockchain would be the most suitable structure.

We acknowledge that there are several limitations to our study. First, we focus on a single framework from [8] to determine the suitability of blockchain technology in CSR reporting. Almeshal and Alhogail [61] provided a review of several suitability evaluation frameworks for blockchain technology. It would be interesting for future studies to examine the suitability of blockchain technology in CSR reporting using multiple frameworks. Second, we provide rationales for determining the suitability of blockchain technology in CSR reporting at each step of the decision path based on evidence and arguments from existing literature. It would be interesting for future studies to reexamine the suitability of blockchain technology in CSR reporting by using the ten-step decision path as an instrument in a focused group of practitioners or CSR experts.

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Acknowledgments

We would like to thank National Research Council of Thailand (NRCT) for providing funding for this research (N42A650683).

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Notes/thanks/other declarations

Piyachart Phiromswad is a corresponding author. This project is funded by National Research Council of Thailand (NRCT): N42A650683.

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Written By

Pattarake Sarajoti, Pattanaporn Chatjuthamard, Suwongrat Papangkorn and Piyachart Phiromswad

Submitted: 01 May 2022 Reviewed: 23 May 2022 Published: 23 June 2022