Spain’s Democratic Crisis (2008–2023): Territorial Conflict and Resistance to Democratic Decline

Abstract

This chapter provides an interpretation of Spain’s democratic crisis (2008–2023) in which two issues, namely, territorial conflict and democratic decline, conflate. The chapter approaches these two issues as correlated because territorial conflict, as the argument proposes, triggers an initial process of democratic decline; however, in a later period, this very same conflict is used to resist democratic decline. Interpreting democratic decline as a process that in Spain starts with a growth of party fragmentation and electoral volatility that leads to political polarization, the chapter considers party realignment as a critical factor in resisting democratic decline in Spain. This chapter analyzes critical events that punctuated Spain’s democratic crisis—Catalonia’s declaration of independence, difficulties of forming minority governments, emergence of new political parties, and the “amnesty pact” for Catalan separatists, among others. This narrative provides propositions such as the need to theorize on the role of multiple cleavages, namely, territorial conflict and ideological divide, on democratic decline and resistance.

1. Introduction

This chapter examines the democratic crisis in Spain that is a period that encompasses the rise of party fragmentation, the increase of electoral volatility and polarization, and the formation of unstable minority governments. The chapter contends that these features are associated with critical events such as the Catalan unilateral declaration of independence in 2017 and the amnesty pact for the separatists in 2023, which comprise the democratic crisis in Spain.

The chapter explores the main characteristics of the crisis of democracy and makes propositions on how it might have been consequential to democratic decline and the resistance against such decline.¹ Democratic decline refers to the gradual erosion of democratic institutions and the deconsolidation of institutional power [1]. The curtailment of civil society, political liberties, and the freedom of expression is part of this process, and it is often accomplished through assaults on freedom of the press, the nullification of political opposition and institutions, and the implementation of new regulations that undermine democratic elections. In contrast, democratic resistance refers to the efforts to counteract the deviation from democratic intuitional dynamics and restore democratic governance, which is characterized by principles such as separation of power and institutional accommodation along constitutional parameters.

This crisis of democracy in Spain occurs through the disruption of democratic institutions that show difficulties in fulfilling their mandates. The Spanish case exhibits both exogenous triggers, such as the 2008 Great Recession, and endogenous triggers, such as the Catalan unilateral declaration of independence. The crisis has a prolonged duration, with gradual changes, and political actors and institutions have been actively trying to shape this period of change, resulting in tensions and the emergence of new political dynamics.

The 2008 Great Recession is considered a critical juncture in the contemporary history of Spain provided that it represents a rupture from previous patterns of institutional development having a considerable social, economic, and political impact. In concrete terms, the Great Recession impaired economic growth and generated fiscal imbalances [2], increased youth unemployment [3], changed migration flows [4], motivated young people to be more engaged in politics [5], sparked anti-austerity and anti-retraction welfare state attitudes [6], and centralized territorial politics and finance [7], among others. This recession had a slow and a lagged effect on the Spanish political scenario, when compared to Italy and Greece [8]. As such, the analysis here focuses on the period that depicts the political effect of the 2008 Great Recession. In effect, Rama et al. ([8], p. 14) considers that Spain starts a new electoral cycle in 2015.

The main proposition that this chapter brings forward is that the territorial conflict between Catalonia and the central state has at first been one of the triggers of a lasting political crisis in Spain. This crisis reactivated the territorial conflict in Spain through political parties [9], as well as through polarization within Catalonia [10, 11], leading to political and institutional instability in the country. One of the signs of this instability has been the likelihood of formation of short-lived fragmented minority governments since 2018,² [12] breaking certain patterns such as the investiture of prime ministers of the most voted party and the formation of single party minority governments.³

In Spain, shifts in the election dynamics—which are increasingly marked by electoral volatility and polarization—are also linked to political instability. Polarization happens with the increase of electoral volatility in the following manner: rising electoral volatility forces politicians to respond to the increase of electoral competitiveness by hardening their positions on salient issues for voters. This hardening of positions means that politicians place themselves away from the ideological center. Consequently, heightened volatility results in heightened polarization. Starting in 2015, the arrival of two political parties—Podemos and Ciudadanos—as electoral alternatives to the main established parties substantially increased electoral volatility and polarization, which further augmented in 2019 with the election of the ultraright VOX deputies in the National Congress.⁴

The reinforcement of political stances of political parties provoked attitudinal changes (e.g., antagonizing the opposition, capitalization on anger, acrimonious political debates). An example of how polarization effects institutional dynamics in Spain is the surge in the frequency of no confidence motions in the Spanish National Congress. Between 1980 and 2022, a total of seven motions of no confidence were proposed, five of them occurring primarily between 2017 and 2020. One of these motions succeeded in the ousting of Mariano Rajoy (2011–2018) in 2018.

Catalonia’s declaration of independence in 2017 contributed to the crisis of democracy in Spain. First, the event represents a deviation from the established constitutional principles that govern territorial politics in Spain. Second, this rupture attempted to establish an alternative institutional framework to redefine the center–regional relations. Third, because Catalonia’s independence garnered popular support and adversaries who construct opinions about public institutions, there are frictions in state-society relations. Fourth, being a pivotal event in Spain’s modern history, it made the territorial conflict more salient in Spain having lasting consequences to the political landscape.

Several years passed since Catalonia’s unilateral independence took place, and the same political parties that were responsible for the constitutional rupture in 2017 contribute, as the chapter argues, to the resistance against democratic decline in Spain. After the national snap elections of 2023, the efforts to agree on an amnesty pact between a separatist political party in Catalonia, Together for Catalonia (Junts per Catalunya – JxC), and a nationwide party, the Spanish Socialist Party (Partido Obrero Socialista Español – PSOE), have been aiding in the formation of a coalition government, and preventing the rise of a strategic coalition between the conservative party and the ultraright party.

After almost 4 months of efforts to form government, Spain’s parliament appointed Pedro Sánchez as prime minister for a third term on November 16, 2023. This is the outcome of an election in which the center-right Popular Party (Partido Popular – PP) won 136 parliamentary seats and Sánchez’s PSOE received 122 seats, making it the second most voted party [14]. The amnesty pact was directly negotiated between JxC and the PSOE with the goal to achieve Sánchez investiture in exchange for an amnesty for those being prosecuted for illegal actions related to Catalan separatism.⁵

The amnesty pact, despite becoming a subject of great controversy, represents a shift of strategies of parties—regional parties of Catalan nationalists and nation-wide leftist parties—in the formation of a contextual coalition that transcends territorial divisions to meet diverse preferences. The chapter conceptualizes this coalition as a type of realignment in which parties representing social groups strategically choose new political partners to advance their interests. The unintended consequence of the amnesty pact is at least for the time being, impeding the establishment of an alternative coalition government comprised conservative and ultraright parties, a configuration linked to democratic decline [15].

This argument is explored in eight sections, including this one. The next section presents a brief review of the causes of democratic decline across the world. Section 3 describes the current state of democracy in Spain using V-Dem indicators and citizen polls, which reveal that Spanish democracy is indeed in crisis. Section 4 focuses on two factors of Spain’s democratic decline: party system change and executive empowerment. The section that follows outlines the backdrop, particularly the territorial dispute and the realignment of parties, that promoted the creation of a resistance to democratic decline. Sections 6 and 7 narrates the amnesty pact as manifestation of a political reconfiguration that inadvertently serves as a countermeasure against democratic decline. The last section concludes with propositions on how to approach democratic decline and resistance.

2. Democratic decline

Democracy spread worldwide in a nonlinear manner, and the development of democracy in many countries has shown paradoxes. Despite the expectations that democracies have become a widely adopted regime, democracies have been declining since the 2010s. Starting in 2022, the overall count of nations categorized as liberal democracies was restricted to 34, which is the identical number recorded in 1995 [16].

The democratic decline stems from various reasons, including the tendency of democratic institutions to inadvertently facilitate the rise of autocratic leaders. Political parties serve as crucial mechanisms to safeguard against the ascent of autocratic-minded leaders through democratic channels [17]. Undoubtedly, the fall of democracy has been anticipated by the absence of response from moderate political parties to populist mobilization and the subsequent electoral collapse of these moderate parties [18].

Institutional factors that have contributed to the decline of democracy include the increase in the authority of the executive branch; [19] the manipulation of courts for political gain, such as court packing; [20] and the corruption-driven takeover of the state to attain and retain power [21]. The menu of options available to leaders in this institutional setting bears resemblance to what has been referred to as the “menu of manipulation” [22].

Democratic institutions have proven insufficient in halting the ascent of politicians with authoritarian tendencies; however, this is not the sole cause of the collapse of democracy. Populism has emerged as a force that distorts democracy [23] and has the capacity to undermine the legitimacy of democratic systems. An instance of this process of delegitimization might occur when meritocracy is misused. The erosion of meritocracy has facilitated the rise of populist leaders who have launched assaults on democracy [24]. The celebration of talent and achievement in developed democratic societies has validated the triumph of a select few while disregarding the inclusion of numerous others, thus fostering the false perception that they deserve their exclusion [25].

The dissemination of false information and the division of society into opposing factions have played an important in the deterioration of democracy [26]. The former undermines trust in institutions by the direct participation of governments in spreading false information, while the latter exacerbates political divisions and polarization, compromising democracy and favoring certain citizens. Polarization is not solely linked to misinformation, but it can also be connected to structural problems such as ethnic conflict, profound social divisions, racial segregation, and other related problems. The promotion of ethnic conflict has contributed to the phenomenon of polarization [17]. Alternative perspectives on polarization as an independent factor can lead to political realignments among parties, resulting in increased political influence of elected autocrats in parliaments that enables them to disregard the rule of law and to antagonize political opponents [27].

The redistribution of income and the formation of class alliances appear to play a crucial role in the demise of democracy. There is evidence indicating that the formation of class alliances has played a crucial role in facilitating the manipulation of electoral politics in favor of autocrats. Turkey exemplifies a situation where the Justice and Development Party acts as a catalyst for creating a partnership between the affluent business class and the impoverished urban population. This alliance served as a foundation for justifying the preference of a segment of the Turkish political elite to retain power by dismantling democratic institutions [28].⁶

The decline of democracy can also be attributed to structural changes, which highlight the significance of various factors such as the urban–rural divide, the role of universities and think tanks, and the emergence of influential networks of interest groups within governments [24]. Democratic decline can be understood as the result of various circumstances, including as austerity measures in reaction to economic downturns, social inequality, and a large influx of migrants. These variables interact with historical legacies of authoritarian rule, leading to a gradual erosion of democratic institutions [30].

In sum, the literature points out four main factors that favored the wave of global democratic decline: party system changes, aggrandizement of executive offices, adoption of social-political coalitions (e.g., class coalitions and political coalitions), and greater influence of the digital media. Spain fits into this wave as it displays two of these factors, namely, party system changes and aggrandizement of executive offices.

3. State of democracy in Spain

Important indicators on the state of democracy in Spain from the V-Dem indexes and from the Pew Research Center’s and the Spanish Center of Sociological Research (CIS)‘s surveys suggest that over the past decade, Spain’s democracy is indeed in crisis. These indicators provide the extent of the democratic crisis in Spain encompassing the functioning of institutions and the perception of citizens on their role.

Based on the five V-Dem indexes—Deliberative democracy index, Egalitarian democracy index, Electoral democracy index, Liberal democracy index, and Participatory democracy index—Spain over the past decade is operating under slightly different democratic parameters than in previous decades. In these five indexes, Spain shows a downward trend starting in 2013, returning to previous levels in 2019 but re-starting the downward trend again in 2020 [31]. Throughout this period, these indexes show that Spain is badly performing in indicators such as executive and parliamentary oversight, freedom of expression, and civil society participation in public decision-making processes.

Considering public opinion, a strong majority of Spaniards believe that reform of public institution is necessary since these institutions are underperforming in the country. According to a recent study conducted by the Pew Research Center, 54% of respondents have expressed the view that Spanish public institutions should undergo comprehensive reforms, while 32% have said that these institutions require substantial adjustments [32]. Consequently, a significant majority of 86% express a desire for reforms in the nation’s governmental institutions. Figure 1 displays the proportion of citizens’ support for change and maintenance of institutions across 17 democracies.

Figure 1.

Percentage of support for changes and maintenance of political institutions in 2021. Source: Ref. [32].

Based on another survey from the Pew Research Center, Spain stands out among these democracies as having the highest level of support for complete reform of the political institutions. This survey conducted in 2022 reveals that 65% of Spaniards are dissatisfied with democracy, which confirms their discontent with democratic institutions [33]. Together with Italy (65%) and Greece (68%), Spain shows the greatest dissatisfaction with democracy compared to other 14 democracies.

A CIS study reveals the main concerns of Spaniards. The top five concerns among Spaniards, listed in descending order of popularity, are as follows: general political issues (15.4%), the government and specific parties or politicians (10.9%), the economic crisis and related problems (9.1%), unemployment (9.1%), health (3.6%), and immigration (2.7%) [34]. These concerns show that citizens’ skepticism with politics coexists with the need of effective public response to real-life problems—persistent high unemployment and increasingly congested health services— while Spain’s politicians and institutions seem unresponsive to these concerns.

The figures above serve as an indication of the deterioration of democracy in Spain. Also, they show that democracy is unfavorably evaluated among Spaniards and that they possess an awareness of the necessity for institutional improvements in the country.

4. Spain’s democratic decline

4.1 Party system change

In the 2000s, with the growing ideological polarization, there was a political realignment of the center-right parties in several democracies that further tilted them to the right of the ideological spectrum [35]. Between 2011 and 2015, there were changes in the Spanish party system with the increase of party fragmentation, which reconfigured the two-party system at the national level, thereby enabling the entry of new parties in the national parliament. The increase in election competition led to a corresponding rise in electoral volatility, ultimately resulting in heightened levels of polarization.

In Spain, electoral volatility, defined as a change in votes from one party to another, has been primarily generated by the increase of electoral competitiveness with the participation of new parties in elections. The increase of electoral volatility contributed to the deinstitutionalization of the party system because, among other consequences, it reduced political predictability [36] and increased voters’ dissatisfaction with democracy [37]. With Spain’s electoral volatility picking in two general elections, in 2015 and in 2019, this period can be considered the most electoral volatile since democracy in the country [38]. As Figure 2 shows, although the year 1982 presented the highest level of electoral volatility, starting in 2011, the level of volatility increases and shows two picks within 4 years.

Figure 2.

Electoral volatility and polarization in Spain since 1979. Source: Emanuele [38] (electoral volatility) and Rodriguez-Virgili et al. [39].

Polarization can be understood as the strengthening of extreme ideological political positions in detriment to moderate positions. In the tendency of politicians influencing voters to embrace extreme positions [40], polarization can be self-reinforcing [41] and deepens divisions among social groups [42]. Often associated with multiple factors [43], here polarization is linked to other political factors such as irruption of new parties due to changing political preferences of voters, which in turn is associated with electoral volatility.

Measuring ideological polarization in Spain, Rodriguez-Virgili et al. [39] observe an increase of polarization over the past years [39]. They measure the ideological identification of voters with a part’s ideological position in the political spectrum and the concentration of votes per party. They obtained varying resulting of polarization over the years based on a scale from 0 to 10.⁷ The higher the index, the higher the degree of polarization. Since 1982, Spain followed a smooth “U” shaped pattern, as Figure 2 shows. Since the transition to democracy, 2019 displays the highest polarization score of 5.43. Polarization slowly starts to increase in 2001 after a downward trend from 1982 to 2001.

It is worth saying that the growing polarization of ideological positioning among politicians and voters affected left- and right-wing parties differently. Voters of right-wing parties are more likely to harden their ideological political stands than left-wing voters [44]. Also, in terms of volatility, there is an important disparity in the level of party affiliation among voters toward the new parties compared to the big political parties, PSOE and PP [45]. The latter have experienced a decrease in voter identification with these parties since 2010. And as such, the political parties belonging to left and right wing faced different levels of electoral competitiveness.

The emergence of VOX is a critical factor that is contributing to greater competitiveness in the right of the political spectrum. Spanish ultraright voters, who are predominantly middle-class and middle-level educated males [46], are politically engaged based on immigration issues, regional independentism, and preference for nondemocratic regime traits while exhibiting strong identification with VOX’s program particularly with issues related to national way of life, law and order issues (which include immigration), traditional morality, and limited welfare state expansion [47].⁸

Figure 3 shows that although the PSOE and the PP reduced their vote share in the national elections since 2011, over time, this reduction was more accentuated in the PP, which from 2016 and 2019 experienced the highest drop in the total percentage of vote in a national election since 1982. Also, Figure 3 displays how between 2015 and 2019 both parties historically had the lowest proportion of votes in elections and the fewest congressional seats. However, it is possible to observe that in the 2023 elections, the vote share of the PSOE and the PP surged, becoming the election since 2015 in which both parties received the highest number of votes.

Figure 3.

Number of elected MPs of the most voted party and vote share by the PSOE and PP in general elections since 1982. Source: Own elaboration based on the Spanish minister of interior.

4.2 Executive empowerment

In terms of expansion of executive powers, Bermeo [19] named “executive aggrandizement” the process in which elected politicians exceed constitutional limits of separation of powers to attack democratic institutions, resulting in an increase of executive powers and the reduction of limitations on it. As political competition intensifies, the expenses associated with establishing governments and governing amidst increased fragmentation result in the expansion of the political authority of the head of government. The way prime ministers in Spain are governing reflects this phenomenon.

The absence of judicial autonomy has been an obvious manifestation of political strife and challenges in upholding the notion of the division of powers. Based on the V-Dem Democracy Index, since 2010, the year in which most indexes plummeted, the indicator “executive respects constitution” has been very stable with a downward tendency since 2016. The other indicator, “lower court independence,” follows a similar pattern but with a substantial downward tendency starting in 2010.

The political use of the Spanish General Council of the Judiciary is the case that best exemplifies the lack of independence of Spanish courts and illustrates the emergence of an intuitional deadlock—one indicator of democratic decline. This institution is responsible for supervising the operations of the judicial system in Spain and selecting judges for the courts. The members of the CGPJ are selected by political appointment for a duration of 5 years. In context of political division as the one Spain is currently undergoing, the dispute has now encompassed the selection of new members of the CGPJ.

Since 2018, when a renovation of the members of the CGPJ was required, the PSOE and the PP have been unable to reach an agreement on the list of appointees. The present composition of the CGPJ mirrors the parliamentary situation of 2013, when Mariano Rajoy, the Prime Minister of the PP, governed backed by a parliamentary supermajority. In 2013, the PP designated nine members of the CGPJ, while the PSOE selected six members.⁹

The PP is obstructing the legally mandated renovation of the CGPJ due to concerns that the existing conservative majority will be replaced with more progressive justices selected by Pedro Sánchez’s left-wing coalition government. Deviating from the established procedural norms for institutional renovation, the PP, to maintain its dominance in the CGPJ, is advocating for the direct selection of council members by magistrates, without the direct participation of the parliament. However, the PSOE does not support this method.

The impasse in the CGPJ has a specific repercussion on criminal investigations and legal proceedings against public officials (such as ministers, members of parliament, and senators) who are immune from prosecution by ordinary courts. Consequently, the magistrates of the Criminal Chamber, who are responsible for handling cases related to these specific public agencies and adjudicating high-level corruption cases or those involving leaders of the Catalan independence movement, are subject to political influence. The political side of the CGPJ suffers from executive aggrandizement, although CGPJ’s internal intuitional dysfunctions (e.g., internal political schism and absence of external oversight) contribute to democratic decline [49, 50].

5. Territorial conflict and party realignment

The storyline that follows is stylized as it summarizes important details from complex events related to Spain’s democratic crisis. Thus, this narrative is driven by underlying assumptions. Initially, the series of connected events aid in determining the ways in which the causal factors of the democratic crisis influenced the development of a democratic decline. Furthermore, political dynamics has at least two levels, a national and a subnational level, which are intricately linked, implying that events at one level have an impact on the other level. Finally, there is a correlation between the events and causal factors that result in collective behaviors congruent to the democratic decline (e.g., attempt to sack prime ministers and deadlock in the General Council of the Judiciary) or to the resistance against such decline (e.g., realignment of political parties).

These assumptions help to interpret the relationship among the seven events listed in Figure 4. The seven events are interrelated, and they build a chain of events that encompass the democratic decline. The events from 2008 to 2023 fall under the process of democratic decline. In 2023, the amnesty pact that culminated in the investiture of Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez for the third time marks the beginning of a resistance against the democratic decline. Although there are important doubts in the literature on the beginning and end of democratic decline, and how to measure it [51], this chapter offers a narrative in which a trajectory of critical episodes and the main elements of democratic decline are identified.

Figure 4.

Sequence of events behind Spain’s democratic crisis. Source: Own elaboration.

The fundamental causes behind the events highlighted in Figure 4 are the escalation of electoral instability and polarization, as well as the agrandissment of the executive’s authority in relation to other branches of power. In the series of events that constitute the decline of democracy, there emerges a resistance to this decline that is rooted in a contextual reconfiguration of political parties.

When referring to territorial politics, the chapter alludes to the coexistence of clearly delineated national and subnational systems, each possessing unique aspects that contribute to the overall political dynamics in Spain. Based on Figure 4, it is possible to observe how the territorial dimension played a role in the transformation of the political dynamics since 2009. This figure highlights the critical events at the national and subnational levels. The events involving Catalonia particularly in 2017 and in 2023 are central events that caused transformations in the democratic landscape of Spain.

As already mentioned in previous sections, in 2015, there was an important change in the party system with the loss of political relevance of the main political parties. Under the party system change, a series of events occurred, deepening the effects of such changes. In 2016, the V-Dem indicator “executive respects constitution” suggested the expansion of the executive powers of the Spanish premiership office, which can be interpreted as a disruption of democratic governance.

These factors behind the democratic decline in Spain resulted in important political behavioral changes among political actors. For example, the opposition exercised by the PP and VOX to the PSOE-led minority governments has been unconventional because it has been based on questioning validity of election results, claiming the illegitimacy of a government, blocking regular parliamentary procedures. In this context, the party realignment established between the PSOE and Catalan parties and motivated by the amnesty pact can be interpreted as a counteracting response to democratic decline.

The literature on democratic decline finds that coalition formation across class, social groups, and political parties can be used to attack democratic institutions. Although the proposition that new coalition of actors is formed to increase powers of incumbents exists in some countries, for instance, Turkey, Indonesia, Hungary, and Poland, this argument can be used to interpret the formation of coalitions to preserve the democratic institutions and resist democratic decline [52, 53, 54].

Sánchez has risen to the Spanish premiership in 2018 in unusual times. Since 2011, the Spanish party system has become fragmented with the regional parties having the highest number of seats in the National Congress in democratic history [55], a situation that reduces the chances of single-party majority, and impacting the stability of governments being formed [56]. Although it looks like a transitional situation provided that the regional parties are losing voters per the results of the 2023 general elections, the surge in regional party representation from 2011 to 2023 created political instability. Indeed, higher party fragmentation coincided with the centrifugal pressures for secessionism and polarization [57]. Despite the centrifugal pressures, the territorial dimension provided a widow of opportunity for the formation of a new government.

In the aftermath of the 2023 election, the Catalan independentist parties, faced with an adverse electoral situation, were interested in adopting a new territorial coalition strategy. Since 2017, there has been a shift in support for Catalan independence in Catalonia. Due to the escalation of the Catalan territorial dispute, which turned into a constitutional crisis, Catalan nationalism is seeing a downturn. In 2021, a survey conducted by the CIS indicated that the proportion of Catalans who identify only with the “Catalan nation” has decreased to 15.6%, compared to 21.5% in 2017 and 23.6% in 2015 [58].

The waning adherence to Catalan nationalism is paralleled by a decrease in support for Catalonia’s independence. As of October 2023, the majority of Catalan voters, namely, 52%, oppose the idea of Catalonia gaining independence from Spain, while 41% are in favor of it [59]. Prior to the unsuccessful bid for independence, the anti-independence supporters constituted around 47% of the electorate on average, while the pro-independence supporters accounted for an average of 44% [59].

Catalan separatists are losing supporters [60] in tandem with the decline of Catalanism as a sentiment [61]. The voting outcomes in Catalonia have proven to be disappointing for the main separatist parties, as they saw a decline in both voter support and parliamentary representation as compared to the 2019 elections. The Catalan party that received the highest share of the votes in the 2019 national elections was ERC with 22% of the vote share, which gave the party 13 seats in the Spanish parliament [62]. ERC lost almost half of its votes in 2023 with 13.2% of the vote share and was allocated 7 seats in the National Congress [62]. JxC also lost votes but not as much as ERC: in 2019, it obtained 13.6% of the vote share and 8 seats in the national parliament, while in 2023, these figures were respectively reduced to 11% of the total and 7 seats [62].

Figure 5 depicts the parliamentary representation of regional parties in Spain throughout the years. JxC/PDCat/CiU/CDC saw an important decrease in its participation in the National Congress since the 1980s but regained strength in 2011.¹⁰ Regarding ERC, the party began to acquire significant national political importance in 2004 and experienced a major increase in the number of members of parliament in 2019, then reverting to previous levels of representation in 2023. As more Catalan parties embraced the self-determination movement [63], ERC became increasingly relevant for the formation of the regional government in Catalonia [64].

Figure 5.

Number of elected MPs for the National Congress of the main regional parties in Spain since 1977. Source: Own elaboration based on the Spanish minister of interior.

6. Precedent events to the democratic decline: territorial conflict and Catalonia’s “procés”

Catalonia was one of the first regions to consolidate as an autonomous region of the newly democratic Spain.¹¹ In 1979, Catalonia carried out a consultation to approve the Spanish constitution,¹² which was supported by more than 80% of Catalans [65]. Catalonia as an autonomous region of Spain means that over time the Catalan regional government would be responsible for its own health and educational systems as well as over its own police force [66].

The aspirations of Catalonia to become an autonomous territory is long and traces its origins back to the seventeenth century [67]. In recent decades, Spain’s response to Catalonia’s reaffirmation of its identity has been one of largely decentralized power, although since the 2000s, there is a recentralization trend [66, 68]. Catalonia already enjoys a high degree of self-government compared to other countries in the European Union [69]. However, decentralization of responsibilities to the Catalan government has not prevented the rise of nationalist sentiments among Catalans.

Although democracy has partially accommodated the territorial conflict in Spain [70], since 2005, Catalonia has been actively seeking independence and the center–regional conflict has escalated to a point where the ability of its democratic system to respond to the crisis became questionable [71]. Catalonia’s secessionism started to spiral in 2005 when regional politicians attempted to include the word “nation” in the preamble of its regional statutes to refer to Catalonia [72]. The conflict became acrimonious after the Spanish constitutional court ruled out in 2010 the possibility of Catalonia being referred to as a “nation” [72]. Although there are important cultural and linguistic factors in the deepening antagonism between Catalonia and the Spanish central governments [73], it is possible to say that the constitutional court’s ruling aggravated the crisis, and ever since, several Catalan regional parties have persistently and actively pursued independence. There are other interpretations that emphasize the relevance in the secessionist movement of identity politics [74], the greater role of cultural elites and digital politics [75], and the convergence of nationalist Catalan parties toward populist tactics and discourse [76].

This court ruling triggered what has been known as “procés,” which can simply be defined as the self-determination process that would culminate in the independence of Catalonia from Spain. As part of the “procés,” two illegal Catalan independence referenda were staged twice, on November 9, 2014 and October 1, 2017 [77]. The 2014 referendum was consultative and became formally known as the Citizen Participation Process on the Political Future of Catalonia. Although consultative, this referendum, carried out by the Catalan regional government, represented an action toward rupture from Spain. Catalan officials declared the consultation a success because 80.7% of ballots cast backed independence. However, turnout was low, with around 2.3 million voters out of 5.4 million eligible voters participating in it [78]. Before and after the consultation took place, the central government and judicial institutions adopted sanctions against officials who initiated the consultation [79].

Three years later, the October 2017 referendum turned the “procés” into a full-blown territorial crisis in Spain [80]. With a turnout of 42%, approximately 90% voted in favor of Catalan independence and 7.8% against it [81]. This referendum triggered several reactions, including the King’s speech calling for unity [82]. The Catalan pro-independent parties initiated parliamentary procedures leading the Catalan regional parliament after a controversial voting session on October 27 to the unilateral declaration of independence of Catalonia [83]. The central government through procedures in the Senate suspended, as laid out in the Spanish constitution, the rights of Catalonia to function as a regional government until new regional elections were held [84, 85]. This suspension of Catalonia autonomy represented a rupture of the territorial model based on constitutional accommodation, fiscal solidarity, and plurinationalism. Following Catalonia’s unsuccessful effort of independence in 2017, Catalan separatist parties have been fiercely opposing any Spanish government in the national parliament. However, as with the decrease parliamentary seats of pro-independentist parties in 2023 and the difficulty of forming a new national government, the hardline JxC started negotiating with the PSOE an amnesty bill to “forgive” anyone involved in the “procés”. Following the 2023 national elections, Sánchez altered his stance on the issue of pardoning the Catalan secessionists despite having consistently opposed the prospect of negotiating an amnesty with secessionists prior to this year’s national elections.¹³

7. A new critical event: the amnesty pact

After months of negotiations, the amnesty agreement was announced on November 9, 2023 [87], which caused several violent protests in the major Spanish cities, mainly organized by the conservative and ultraright parties [88]. This agreement is controversial as it has a clear motivation: to receive support from separatist parties to Sánchez so that he could form a new government. The amnesty can be considered a mechanism that helps to resist the decline of democracy by preventing a conservative–ultraright alliance in the central government.

The alignment of a regional party with a national-wide party that cut across the ideological cleavage has a potential to be durable for two reasons. First, historically, the PSOE has shown a greater inclination toward accommodating separatist aspirations, due to structural elements of the party such as its defense of the introduction of federalism in Spain and the decentralized structure of the party, which allows the socialists in Catalonia to have their own denomination, namely, the Socialist’s Party of Catalonia (Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya—PSC). Second, the PSOE’s openness to negotiations is evidenced by their willingness to form for the first time after the 1978 constitution a coalition government with a Catalan political party in 1993 [89], the participation of the PSC in a governing coalition in Catalonia,¹⁴ and the transfer of administrative and financial autonomy to Spain’s several regions during the PSOE’s national governments.

Although the PP was the most voted party in the 2023 elections, the party failed to form government despite its attempt. There were several obstacles to the party’s efforts to form a new government. The ultraright party, VOX, with 33 seats, declared its support to the PP’s leader Alberto Núñez Feijó, but this support was not enough to establish a conservative–ultraright coalition government [89].

The right-wing separatist groups refrained from endorsing the PP because of their concerns that VOX [90], which was established in 2013 with anti-secessionist intentions [91], might eventually play a role in a Spanish government. Instead, these separatist parties opted to back Sánchez.

Months before the national elections, the PP and VOX formed coalition governments as a result of municipal and regional elections [92] in several municipal councils and regional parliaments across Spain [93]. The VOX–PP partnership came at a cost: the small separatist parties from Catalonia and other regions (e.g., Basque Country) would not help a coalition with VOX, which has a strong anti-independentist agenda.

It was speculated that the VOX–PP partnership could reverse Spain’s gains over the last 40 years in terms of welfare developments and expansion of rights [94]. While acknowledging that the PP has played a role in these developments, the party is now following the trend of center-right parties’ realignment of their political agendas in polarized contexts [35]. For example, the PP is slowing incorporating a discourse opposing the growth of social services, refugees, and transgender people [95], and it has been closer to VOX, who is known for taking a strong stance on these matters [96]. This is happening although there are signs that the perception of hightened polarization among voters of large right-wing nation-wide parties pushes them to embrace moderation and vote for moderate political agendas; [44] the territorial and the ideological issues are being tactilely revisited by political parties provided that there is an important division among right-wing voters [97].

As VOX and the PP launched their own coalition, Sánchez has known since the results of the snap elections that he would need the backing of the right-wing separatist party JxC to become head of government. Carles Puigdemont,¹⁵ the leader of JxC and currently an elected member of the European Parliament, fled Spain shortly after Catalonia’s unlawful declaration of independence in October 2017 [98]. Ever since, he has been subject to an international extradition order in addition to legal reforms for offenses pertaining to Catalan independence.

The amnisty law will be initiated in the lower chamber, it will also need to go through the senate, which is controlled by the PP, but as less powerful than the lower chamber, it can only propose a few amendments in the law [99]. Imposing a filibuster procedure, the party already changed the methods for the approval of urgent laws in the senate that will delay in 2 months the approval of the amnesty law [100]. As the PP and VOX already announced, if the law is approved, they will enquire if the EU can halt the amnesty law and they will file a constitutionality challenge against the law with Spain’s Constitutional Court [101].

Once approved, the implementation of the amnesty will be complex provided that it pardons several crimes (e.g., abuse of public functions, embezzlement, disobedience, fostering public disorder, assault against public authorities, and promotion of territorial secession) related to events that encompass a large period, between 2012 and 2017 [102]. As the amnesty will dismiss charges and liabilities against the separatists, it is expected that in total, approximately 400 people, including politicians, public employees, and protestors, will benefit from the amnesty [102].

The statement of reasons of the proposed amnesty law explains that the amnesty is a constitutional instrument used in “exceptional political circumstances” [103]. These circumstances, as expressed in the law’s introduction, are reflected in the citizen’s discontent that creates a schism between public institutions and the citizenry. Based on this reading of Spain’s political context, the drafters of the amnesty law justify it as an attempt to overcome existing conflicts to improve social cohesion.

However, considering the reaction to the amnesty, the law is worsening democratic coexistence, a value the law drafters praise. VOX insists that Sánchez acceded to premiership through a coup d’état [104], and the PP says that Sánchez is an illegitimate premier [104]. The voters of these parties consider the issue of Catalan separatism as decisive to their voter choices [105]. For example, the voters of Sanchez’ socialist party in Catalonia are divided in terms of approval of the amnesty law: 49% approve the law and 41% disapprove it [106]. This approval/disapproval rate is similar to the opinion of voters who do not declare party preferences [106]. Among these voters, 47% are in favor of the law and 38% are against it [106].

8. Final considerations

In this chapter, the democratic crisis in Spain is interconnected with the territorial conflict. The crisis begins in the territorial dimension, provoking a deterioration of democratic governance. Later, the crisis transitions into the ideological dimension with a radicalization of the conservative party and the formation of regional and municipal partnerships with VOX [107]. Amidst increasing conflict among the major political parties, the establishment of stable national governments has become a challenge because of growing electoral volatility and ideological polarization.

In addition to the 2008 Great Recession and the Catalan unilateral declaration of independence, the process of democratic decline includes events such as the election of VOX deputies in the national congress, the ousting of a prime minister through a motion of no confidence, the increased number of executive degrees and the non-renovation of the General Council of the Judiciary.

Resistance against this decline is emerging with the attempt to pacify the territorial conflict involving Catalonia and the central government through the 2023 amnesty pact. Regarding its impacts, this pact bridges the ideological divide in the territorial dimension to avoid the emergence of a conservative–ultraright alliance advocating for policies that limit the rights of minorities, supporting welfare reforms, and radicalizing the political discourse. Furthermore, the pact brought about a realignment of the parties that, at least temporarily, neutralizes the ideological divide in the center–regional relations. This, in turn, is contributing to keeping the democratic process from further deteriorating.

In the process of democratic decline, the narrative built here presents a trajectory with a critical juncture and critical events allowing to identify a sequence of events, their relationship with institutional changes (e.g., polarization and fragmentation), the realignment of actors and institutions, and the conceptualization of democratic resistance in a context of crisis. The identification of a trajectory contributes to the calls for understanding differentiated features of democratic declines [51].

The unilateral proclamation of independence triggered discussions regarding the underlying roots of the crisis, namely, whether it was rooted in issues of democracy or simply constitutionalism [108, 109, 110]. This chapter makes an argument for the idea that a democratic crisis is not limited to institutional factors alone, but involves social and temporal factors that produce a process that can either intensify or abate over time. Stated differently, it is crucial to recognize that the Spanish territorial conflict has diverse ramifications and should not be regarded as limited to a singular dimension, to the extent that it can be interpreted today as a source of appeasement of the ideological divide.

The proposition made in this chapter, which suggests that territorial and ideological divisions may lead to either the weakening or strengthening of democracy during periods of democratic decline, as exemplified by the Spanish case, should be pondered in the context of ongoing events in an uncertain scenario. For example, although Sánchez has received the backing from many parties, enabling him to hold power for 4 years, it remains questionable how he can successfully rule given his fragmented legislative support.

Another doubt about the struggle against the decline of democracy is the type of opposition that the PP and VOX will offer in the upcoming years. Both parties’ voters attach great importance to territorial issues, indicating that they will persist in their disapproval of the amnesty pact. Additional uncertainty in Spanish politics will come from the management of Catalonia’s independence ambitions. Currently, separatist parties have temporarily manifested the intention to pursue separatism within the existing Spanish constitutional framework; however, political circumstances can change, creating a new structure of incentives for these parties to look for alternative paths for independence.