Perspective Chapter: AUKUS Pillar 2 – Technology, Interoperability, and Advanced Capabilities in the Evolving Trilateral Security Partnership

Abstract

The Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) partnership is more than an agreement on nuclear propulsion submarines. In Pillar 2 of the agreement, AUKUS serves as an advanced technological accelerator premised on strategic collaboration, interoperability, and integration in the Indo-Pacific. Pillar 2 prioritizes advanced technologies and defense industrial capabilities in the trilateral partnership’s strategic competition with China. This perspective chapter unpacks eight functional areas that comprise Pillar 2: hypersonic missiles and long-range weapons, artificial intelligence, undersea capabilities, advanced cybersecurity, quantum technologies, autonomous weapon systems, information sharing, and innovation. Measures of success are determined by AUKUS partners applying these to balance China. However, bureaucratic impediments and export controls, protecting information, intelligence, and communications, and future expansion of AUKUS challenge the trilateral partnership. However, AUKUS Pillar 2 has strong potential to strengthen interoperability and build confidence and trust in innovative solutions to emerging threats. Pillar 2 represents a new form of alliance-building with its focus on technological innovation and information sharing, flexibility, integration, and interoperability. The perspective in this chapter is that AUKUS is a strategically significant alliance that furthers collaboration, integration, and interoperability in advanced defense technologies and capabilities in deterring China and projecting international order.

1. Introduction

The Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) defense partnership is more than a nuclear submarine deal. AUKUS has strategic significance in strengthening technological and security cooperation in maintaining a “free and open Indo-Pacific” in response to China’s rising influence in this vital strategic environment [1]. Pillar 1 is a major investment in Australia’s nuclear submarines and will be built in Australia and designed by the U.S. Pillar 1 boosts Australia’s maritime capabilities and enhances power projection in the Indo-Pacific region in response to China’s military modernization. AUKUS is much more than a defense alliance premised on warfighting and deterrence; rather, AUKUS is a partnership designed to advance next generation defense capabilities and technologies in the intense geopolitical competition with China [2].

With Pillar 2, AUKUS partners will collaborate and invest in developing advanced military technologies to boost their own capabilities in ways that maintain their advantage over China’s expanding military and technological assets. Pillar 2 expands the trilateral partnership into eight advanced technological areas ranging from hypersonic weapons to advanced autonomous systems and quantum technologies [3]. Put simply, the Pillar 2 focus on developing advanced technologies complements the Pillar 1 emphasis on supplying Australia with nuclear-powered submarines. Pillar 2 embraces the idea of an intense military and technological competition with China by investing dollars and pounds into next-generation military capabilities to ensure that the Indo-Pacific region is shaped by the open and rules-based international order. Pillar 2 transforms the trilateral partnership into a significant alliance premised on technological, military, and intelligence cooperation and collaboration.

However, AUKUS is not a formal treaty alliance with binding security commitments like NATO. There is nothing in AUKUS like an Article 5 collective security provision in the North Atlantic Charter [2, 4]. AUKUS is a flexible and informal defense arrangement centered on developing and sharing nuclear submarine capabilities (Pillar 1) and advanced technologies and defense capabilities (Pillar 2) [5]. AUKUS is not an Indo-Pacific NATO. Rather, it is a strategic alliance that places a premium on integration and collaboration on defense capabilities and technological advancements and information sharing in response to security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region that will restructure geopolitical dynamics well into the twenty-first century.

The purpose of this chapter is to assess the goals and objectives in Pillar 2 of AUKUS, identify consequences and challenges, and highlight areas of success and technological transformation. The success of Pillar 2 depends on trust and solidarity of the trilateral partnership in the implementation of capabilities [6]. Challenging mindsets on interoperability, communication, integration of weapons systems, and sharing advanced technological capacities is essential. As former Prime Minister of Australia Kevin Rudd stated, Pillar 2 should be a “seamless integration between defense industries” [7].

It will also depend on the extent to which the already close defense relationship between Australia, the U.K., and the U.S. can transform into a collaborative strategic and intense with China over the future of security in the Indo-Pacific region [8]. The development of a shared strategic culture and like-mindedness will facilitate this transformation. The three partners are taking China’s rise seriously and committed to strategic competition; however, they must follow through. Pillar 2 is consequential in the race between AUKUS members and China over who gets to set the rules in the Indo-Pacific region [6]. That is, Pillar 2 is a technological accelerator for integrated defense capabilities that will maintain stability, deter China’s expanding capabilities, enhance technological and defense cooperation, and boost industrial capacities in the production of defense-related technologies.

2. Overview of Pillar 2 objective and goals

The objective of Pillar 2 is to remain ahead of China in the strategic competition over advanced technologies and military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region [3]. Issued through a joint declaration on September 15, 2021, AUKUS is designed to develop capabilities to “promote a free and open Indo-Pacific that is secure and stable” [9]. In the near term, Pillar 2 seeks to improve efficiencies in interoperability in command and control and electronic warfare. In the long term, the pillar commits the trilateral partnership to integrating eight functional areas in hypersonic weapons, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, quantum technologies, undersea capabilities, electronic warfare, information sharing, and innovation [10].

Working groups will monitor and coordinate advancements in the eight functional areas. Working group members are comprised of ministerial officials, legislative representatives, defense contractors, and researchers from leading universities, among others, in the three member states [11]. The effectiveness of each group is premised on developing public-private partnerships and collaboration as well as research and development initiatives focusing on advanced defense capabilities. The challenge will be overcoming barriers to collaboration, intelligence sharing, and adjusting export controls and regulations that could inhibit integration of technological capacities and weapons systems [12].

Each government is committed to supporting the defense capabilities and national security posture of the other by enhancing existing trilateral military capacities in the Indo-Pacific region [13]. Activities are coordinated through each working group. Developments in functional areas will be determined by combining intelligence sharing and partnerships, technological collaboration, innovation and scientific capacities, and integration of procurement, supply chains, and defense industrial bases [12].

While empirical research and theory on AUKUS is emerging and evolving, the academic literature focusing on Pillar 2 remains underdeveloped. Scholarly assessments of Pillar 2 are crucial to understanding technological and military competition with China as the race for critical technologies is fast becoming a pivot point for innovation in artificial intelligence and machine learning, semiconductors, and biotechnology. Fraser and Solomon explain that ad hoc alliances like AUKUS and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad) function as “minilaterals” that have the potential to reshape the “Indo-Pacific security architecture” given their focus on collaboration in “defense-technology” [14]. Taylor further develops this approach by observing that the parameters of Pillar 2 rest on concepts of integration, collective deterrence, and innovation power advanced defense technologies undergird AUKUS as “a minilateral institutional arrangement” [15]. But as Cheng maintains, the as technological and military advancements unfold, AUKUS is likely to provoke China as it “will have no choice but keep elevating their military levels” [16].

Leoni and Tzinieris argue that the strategic focus on technological elements allow AUKUS to function as a coalition-building project through a world order studies perspective [17]. Koga takes this one step further by observing that coalition-building efforts made possible by AUKUS, and the Quad reflect “tactical hedging,” in which the three like-minded partners share similar interests in coordinating efforts to contain China’s rising military and economic influence [18]. Another study suggests that AUKUS Pillar 2 should be understood as central to upholding a “free and open Indo-Pacific” that can include additional partners like Canada, New Zealand, Japan, and India [19]. However, Tzinieris, Chuahan, and Athansiadou argue that contrary to U.S. efforts to align with India more closely, New Delhi has no intention of ceding its “strategic autonomy” [20].

The methodological or conceptual perspective of this chapter is premised on integration, interoperability, and collaboration in the prioritization of advanced technological assets among the three AUKUS partners in Pillar 2. Australia, U.K., and U.S. are sharpening their focus on applying advanced capabilities and maintaining their technological edge in response to major power adversaries, especially China. President Biden has described China’s rise and investments in military technologies as a challenge to the “current strategic environment” [1]. Therefore, Pillar 2 is designed to develop solutions for this competition over who gets to set the rules in the Indo-Pacific and determine regional security. While China objected to AUKUS an effort to contain its rise and influence in Asia, most states in the Indo-Pacific region have quietly, cautiously, or enthusiastically supported the defense arrangement or have not expressed an objection or opinion [21].

Progress will be determined by investments made in joint projects in the eight functional areas. For example, in quantum technologies, an “AUKUS Quantum Arrangement” was created boost “generation-after-next quantum capabilities” in defense integration of navigation, positioning, and timing technologies by 2026 [22, 23]. A “Trade Authorization Mechanism” will modernize collaborative efforts in “technology sharing and defense trade among only the AUKUS partners” [24]. While Pillar 2 makes significant investments in military partnerships for AUKUS members, success will be determined by overcoming standard operating procedures in defense and established mindsets on sharing advanced technologies as well as the geopolitical realities of competing with China in the Indo-Pacific.

3. Functional areas

Pillar 2 has targeted eight areas in which member states will invest and advance military and technological capabilities. This section will explain each area and assess challenges and opportunities.

3.1 Hypersonic missiles

Pillar 2 supercharges research and development and deployment of hypersonic missiles that close the reaction times of air defense systems and threaten targeted sites. Integration among AUKUS members means that the three members will carry tremendous and decisive advantages in the Indo-Pacific and serve as a major deterrent to China in the region [25]. Given that these weapons fly at the speed of Mach 5 or higher, the potential to alter the complex balance of power in the Indo-Pacific by checking China’s prompt acceleration of these technologies [26].

The incredible speed, maneuverability, and precision of hypersonic missiles make them a priority weapon in the AUKUS arsenal. Put simply, the development of hypersonic missiles and integration within trilateral defense will provide AUKUS with a decisive strategic advantage. The accuracy of these weapons, high precision capabilities, and advanced platforms will minimize collateral damage and offer flexible response [27].

The dedicated working group on hypersonic missiles focuses on research and development, technology transfers, and information sharing. Facilitating joint projects depends on integrating existing hypersonic programs [21, 22]. Australia’s High-Speed Projectile hypersonic project is currently being developed by BAE Systems Australia as “Project Javelin” under the supervision of Defence Australia and aligned with the 2020 Force Structure Plan that dedicates $30 billion in high-speed weapons systems and other programs [28]. The U.S. is investing in hypersonic glide vehicles that utilize kinetic energy to fly at high speed and cruise missiles powered by scramjets [29]. The U.K. will likely purchase glide vehicles through its partnership in AUKUS as well as investing in advanced hypersonic development projects as it does not possess a program [30, 31].

Over the next several years, AUKUS partners will test and assess the effectiveness of these programs and accelerate development and deployment. While AUKUS is committed to program integration, these projects are costly and could pose logistical hurdles [23]. Ensuring a steady stream of public and private R&D investments and overcoming technical and operational difficulties in the weapons systems will challenge partner states [22]. More important, while hypersonic weapons are a powerful deterrent against aggressors, long-range capabilities may complicate arms control initiatives and lead to weapons proliferation in the Indo-Pacific with China, Russia, and North Korea pursuing and sharing their own capabilities [27]. The risks are apparent and the prospects for escalation are high as hypersonic capabilities increase.

3.2 Artificial intelligence

Given the complexities and rapid change in artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies, AUKUS has prioritized infusion of AI systems within defense capabilities. The goal is to apply AI in ways that enhance targeting across conventional military, information, and cyber domains in a responsible fashion [32, 33]. Effective AI can process and assess data in rapid and efficient ways and assist with integrated assessments of patterns and trends in the threat landscape [34]. Furthermore, it can enhance procurement and supply chains, training on weapons systems, and logistics [22]. AI will also improve autonomous weapons like drones, covert operations, and reconnaissance as well as AI-enabled tools for improving critical infrastructure protection of integrated defense industrial bases [35, 36].

Before AUKUS was announced in September 2021, Australia, the U.S., and U.K. had already developed comprehensive AI-powered security tools and autonomous systems [22]. The U.S. Joint Artificial Intelligence Center manages AI applications in each military branch with “mission initiatives” in health and business processes, joint logistics, joint force protection, joint information warfare, academic/industry engagement, and joint command and control [22, 37]. In 2023, the U.S. defense budget allocated $5 million for an “Artificial Intelligence development Hub” under the category of “AUKUS Innovation Initiatives” [38, 39, 40, 41]. In 2021, Australia released “Australia’s AI Action Plan” and one year later the U.K. Ministry of Defence developed a “Defence Artificial Intelligence Strategy” [41].

However, AI presents many challenges. Integrating three AI systems in three militaries will be difficult especially as it relates to developing pipelines of talent into defense departments and ministries and retaining personnel [42]. Another challenge will be to ensure that AI-systems are not subject to biases that can infect data processing, collections, and analysis [23]. In addition to responsible use of AI-enabled tools, instilling transparency into military systems will be consequential for integration and interoperability. As much as integration is a challenge in AI capabilities, concerns about oversight and lack of human control are considerations in building a trilateral culture of responsible use of autonomous systems [43].

3.3 Quantum technologies

This functional area puts forth an “AUKUS Quantum Arrangement” that invests in quantum computing in communications and cryptography. The Arrangement coordinates American, Australian, and British innovation and research and development in navigation and timing for global positioning systems across domains [44]. These initiatives are designed to secure communications and enhance critical infrastructure resilience activities through cryptography, cybersecurity, and encryption [45]. Quantum sensors will enhance precision timing and positioning for targeting and navigation in operations, computer simulations, wargaming, logistics, and weapons, and improve signals and imagery intelligence collections [23].

Initiatives developed through the arrangement are based on the U.S. Defense Quantum Information Science and Technology Research and Development Program [46]. This initiative came into effect in 2019 to invest in R&D for quantum science R&D and promote interagency communication within the Department of Defense. Similar measures have been undertaken in Australia and the U.K. to boost collaboration in R&D in quantum technologies [22].

The Quantum Arrangement presents both opportunities and risks for AUKUS [43]. The arrangement is expected to enhance intelligence collections and sharing, attract talent through recruitment and research investments, and collaboration on networks, cryptography, and sensors [47]. However, if investments are not sustainable over the long term, technological challenges are bound to arise. Expert talent could be lost to other industries with higher compensation and regional security could be at risk if a quantum arms race with China and Russia ensues. Moreover, in the absence of strong governance and ethical guidelines, data leaks, and misuse of simulations and wargaming could destabilize the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific [22].

3.4 Advanced cybersecurity

Increasing collaboration on cyber defense measures and integrating and boosting offensive cyberwar capabilities and threat intelligence is a key element in Pillar 2 [22, 23]. The importance of integration and information sharing in multi-domain operations in an irregular warfare context will shape strategic competition with China and Russia. The ability to wage contemporary cyberwarfare against these adversaries depends on secure IT systems and critical infrastructure in key sectors like energy, defense industrial bases, telecommunications, financial institutions, health care, and transportation [48].

Cyberattacks from malicious state or non-state actors could disrupt networks and spread through critical sectors, crippling financial systems, destabilizing governments, and dislocating social life. The SolarWinds Hack in 2020 was a devastating supply chain attack and the Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack disrupted U.S. energy distribution as did the Microsoft Exchange attack [49]. Australia suffered several damaging cyberattacks such as the platform Canva, Optus telecommunications, and the data breach at Latitude financial services [50]. Devastating cyber incidents against the U.K. targeted the Manchester police in a series of ransomware attacks in 2023 [51].

AUKUS partners have relatively robust national cybersecurity strategies that put forth similar goals and objectives in cyber defense and critical infrastructure protection [22]. The 2023 U.S. Cyber Security Strategy advances five priorities: securing and protecting privacy in America’s 16 critical infrastructure sectors; dismantling malicious threat actors; public-private partnerships for recovery and resilience; research and development in cyber technologies; and building international partnerships and arrangements [52].

Australia and the U.K. have similar strategic goals that highlight the importance of resilience and collaboration between national defense agencies and commercial entities. Australia’s National Cyber Security Strategy of 2023 to 2030 advances similar themes of protecting businesses and citizens, protecting technology, threat sharing, critical infrastructure, sovereign capabilities, and global leadership. This was supplemented with an action plan highlighting the importance of collaborating with the private sector to develop new and advanced cyber technologies for critical infrastructure resilience [53]. Similar to the U.S. and Australia, the U.K.’s 2022 national Cyber Security Strategy rests on making investments in industry and universities; data protection and digital prosperity; industrial capabilities and secure cyber technologies for critical infrastructure; shaping international cyber norms; and public-private partnerships [54].

The overlapping themes in cybersecurity strategies among AUKUS partners shows that modern warfare is interconnected and reliant on secure critical infrastructure and information technology/operational technologies. Collaboration within AUKUS is focused on sharing compliance guidelines and best practices, joint protocols for incident response, and enhancement of offensive cyberwarfare techniques [43]. Protecting critical infrastructure sectors from cyberattacks against electrical grids, transportation systems, banks, hospitals, wastewater treatment, commercial services, defense production, and mobile networks are now national security priorities. Cyber defense integration within AUKUS means collaboration and merging approaches to attracting and retaining professional cybersecurity talent, cyber professional development, training, and public awareness about data protection and privacy [35]. Successful integration involves holding joint cyber exercises, vulnerability scanning, penetration testing, risk mitigation, sharing real-time threat intelligence and information, and partnerships with private sector businesses and academia.

AUKUS confronts several challenges in integrating cyber defense measures. The trilateral partnership should consider developing and uphold cyber norms that hold malicious threat actors accountable and focuses on attribution of cyber incidents. Merging vulnerability scanning, risk assessment, and threat intelligence to delineate trends in the threat landscape will involve integration of artificial intelligence and machine learning capabilities [43]. This raises the possibility of new vulnerabilities that could be exploited by malicious threat actors. The focus on integrated cyber defense suggests that cybersecurity is crucial to defending battlespaces and critical infrastructure through workforce development, talent recruitment and retention, collaboration with the private sector, and R&D [22, 23].

3.5 Undersea capabilities

Within AUKUS, undersea capabilities refer to unmanned high technology military systems which operate underwater for robotic and other purposes. For the U.S. Navy, the focus is on R&D efforts on procurement and operation of unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) and other advanced systems that differ in size and capability and have intelligence collections capabilities, advanced sensors for tracking movements, reconnaissance, anti-mining capacities and countermeasures, anti-submarine and anti-surface capabilities, and can maintain communications networks [55]. The U.K. Royal Navy purchased and acquired REMUS unmanned vehicles and the Royal Australian Navy has partnered with defense corporations for larger Speartooth undersea vehicles and systems [55, 56, 57, 58].

Coordination and integration of undersea capabilities among the U.S. Navy, Royal Navy, and Royal Australian Navy takes place through the AUKUS Undersea Capabilities Working Group [23]. The group established the AUKUS Undersea Robotics Autonomous Systems initiative, which is developing small to larger and long range autonomous undersea vehicles [59]. According to the White House, the initiative will serve as “a significant force multiplier for [AUKUS] maritime forces” with $10 million allocated to for unmanned undersea mission payloads and another $25 million for “AUKUS Innovation Initiatives.” Australia partners with the American defense technology company Anduril Industries for delivery of extra-large autonomous undersea vehicle prototypes to the Royal Australian Navy [60, 61].

To maintain a free and open waterways and maritime security through key chokepoints, advanced unmanned undersea robotic capabilities are of vital strategic importance to AUKUS. Integrated unmanned underwater vehicle systems will enhance interoperability, communications with submarines, and early detection of threats [62]. China’s development of undersea capabilities and technologies could alter the balance of power in the Indo- Pacific and threaten the underwater environment [63].

However, new investments and developing undersea capabilities come with several challenges and risks. Advanced underwater military and intelligence technologies are complex, sophisticated, and come with a hefty price tag in national R&D budgets [62]. These are highly sensitive vehicles that operate in tough and challenging underwater environments and will face China’s rapidly advancing undersea vehicles [64].

A strong AUKUS undersea presence can serve two purposes. First, unmanned underwater vehicles function as an effective deterrent to China and other adversaries threatening naval operations or commercial shipping. Second, AUKUS could enhance scientific progress in civilian oceanographic research and undersea exploration [22, 23].

3.6 Electronic warfare

Development of advanced technologies to attack or undermine adversary communications and radar comprises electronic warfare (EW). EW systems present AUKUS with considerable tactical advantages as next-generation capabilities allow partners to exploit the electromagnetic spectrum to blind radars, disrupt GPS navigation and deceive adversaries, and, should it become necessary, launch attacks on targeted sites [65]. Strong countermeasures also allow AUKUS partners to build critical infrastructure resilience in civilian and military systems [66]. Also, EW systems allow more effective and covert intelligence collections using electronic and communications signals, boosting early detection and threat intelligence of adversary patterns and trends over time [67]. Moreover, AUKUS’s EW capacities will help counter China’s EW systems.

AUKUS integration of EW systems involves merging defense platforms for drones, warships, warplanes, and fixed ground-sites. To optimize integration and ensure continuous interoperability while mitigating risks, joint exercises will take place simulating coordinated electronic attacks and enhanced electronic defenses [22, 23]. The integration process will be assisted by the fact that Australia, the U.K, and U.S. operate the U.S. Air Force AEW&C E-7 Wedgetail platform [68]. The platform integration advantage boosts battlefield and battlespace dominance while protecting Australian, British, and American forces in the Indo-Pacific [69].

Given rapid advances in communications, radar systems, and GPS navigation, remaining ahead of China demands uninterrupted government and private sector investments in R&D to update EW systems [70]. Cybersecurity must also be regularly updated, and networks patched given that vulnerabilities will be exploited by adversaries. Vulnerability scanning and risk mitigation should be incorporated into integration processes to minimize unintended consequences.

3.7 Information sharing

Collaboration and cooperation on critical information is so important in AUKUS that it has been provided its own specific functional area in Pillar 2. Information sharing is concerned with building secure mechanisms and systems for sharing sensitive data and classified information on military technologies, weapons systems, and interoperability among cleared personnel in the trilateral partnership [71]. Effective information sharing involves maintaining mutual confidence and assurance while also strengthening defense posture in the intensely competitive Indo-Pacific.

Sharing and using classified information and data is the foundation upon which AUKUS will function as a meaningful trilateral partnership. Put simply, confidence and trust undergird AUKUS pillars 1 and 2. Australia, the U.K., and U.S. already have a history of trusted cooperation and information sharing in the Five Eyes intelligence partnership that also includes Canada and New Zealand [72]. The role of advanced technologies in hypersonic missiles systems, undersea capabilities, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, electronic warfare, and innovation rests on enhanced collaboration driving benefits derived from shared expertise among AUKUS forces [5]. Collecting and sharing information drives cooperation on integrated and joint operations in response to threats, risks, and vulnerabilities in the Indo-Pacific [73].

The information sharing working group will develop secure communications to facilitate integration of intelligence and defense capabilities across functional areas. A secured cloud will allow for joint access among cleared personnel to move AUKUS forward on integrated intelligence collections and analysis and information sharing on hypersonic missiles, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, undersea capabilities, innovation, and electronic warfare [74]. Secure sharing of classified intelligence and data exchanges are determined by common security standards and procedures developed in the working group [75].

However, the risks of intelligence sharing are significant as potential vulnerabilities could expose AUKUS to malicious state and non-state actors seeking to penetrate secure systems and gain access to classified information and data [22]. Striking the appropriate balance between sharing information on advanced defense technologies and securing classified intelligence through common security systems to prevent unauthorized access is vital to AUKUS [76]. Also, addressing differences in security clearance processes and data platforms is paramount. Effective information sharing comes down to trust and confidence as well as transparency among the three partners.

Barriers to information sharing, such as restrictive export controls and bureaucratic politics premised on long established standard operating procedures and risk aversion on controlled classified intelligence, will impede integration and interoperability [77]. Some experts including American legislators have argued that existing U.S. export controls could obstruct information sharing about advanced technologies and defense industrial capacities with Australia and the U.K. U.S. defense regulations and procedures could impose undue burdens and prevent defense contractors from pursuing joint defense projects and delay implementation [78, 79, 80].

3.8 Innovation

While trust and confidence are essential for information and intelligence sharing, innovation is consequential for AUKUS to maintain its strategic advantage in the security environment and threat landscape in the Indo-Pacific [81, 82, 83]. Innovation will be driven by collaborative investments and personnel driving joint research and development initiatives in next-generation technologies, diverse software applications, and hardware in support of defense capabilities [23, 71, 76]. Pooled R&D resources will determine the extent of innovation and scientific capacities. Innovation could even stimulate dual-use applications and specific technological advancements for commercial enterprises and consumers [84, 85].

Collaborative innovation among AUKUS partners will also be shaped by a toleration for risk taking and flexibility. Investing and funding in both established multinational corporations and startups will help sustain an integrated and dynamic scientific ecosystem [42]. Incentives for building and maintaining public-private partnerships will encourage knowledge-sharing and extend the defense workforce into other domains. In December 2023, AUKUS defense leaders announced the creation of an “innovation challenge series” that would encourage participation from the private sector on new ways to develop electronic warfare capabilities [86].

Australian, British, and American companies will drive innovation among AUKUS partners, allowing it to maintain and expand its strategic edge in the intense competition with China in the Indo-Pacific [23, 87]. With the integration of the three private industries in AUKUS countries there is a strong likelihood for rapid new initiatives in artificial intelligence and machine learning, autonomous platforms, underwater detection, materials science, propulsion, and global positioning [42].

But there are challenges that could withhold the pace of innovation. First, recruiting and retaining qualified personnel and expertise who could obtain higher compensation packages in other industries will be a major challenge [88]. Second, there are questions about guaranteeing ethical and responsible use of new and next-generation technologies, especially those that relate to artificial intelligence and machine learning tools as well as autonomous weapons [89]. Although the advantages of such capabilities include enhanced data analysis, stronger situational awareness, automated defense and intelligence tasks, and improved cybersecurity, lack of transparency and misuse of autonomous weapons for offensive purposes, and privacy concerns could arise. Third, common security procedures and protocols must ensure that rapid advancements in innovative defense technologies do not elevate speed over security. The need to maintain standards, best practices, and compliance should keep up with the rapid pace of innovation in functional areas like AI-enabled defense capabilities [89].

4. Conclusions

AUKUS is a trilateral security partnership developed in response to the rising significance of the Indo-Pacific region and China’s expanding influence. Pillar 2 is important given its focus on integration of defense capabilities and advanced technological collaboration in hypersonic missiles and long-range weapons, artificial intelligence, undersea capabilities, advanced cybersecurity, quantum technologies, autonomous weapons systems, information sharing, and innovation. New and emerging security threats in the Indo-Pacific led to the formation of the functional areas on integration and interoperability in AUKUS Pillar 2 [90]. However, the eight areas are abstract with a lot of programs, products, public institutions, and private entities involved in shaping technologies and defense capabilities. The diverse array of areas and existing export controls could present bureaucratic impediments to joint projects and exercises [91].

Overcoming the challenges of integrating defense technologies and capabilities requires a significant diplomatic effort in the three AUKUS partners [92]. AUKUS partners must put resources into balancing strategic competition with China in the Indo-Pacific while communicating and collaborating with one another. Also, hypersonic weapons and long-range weapons systems risk escalation with China, Russia, and North Korea. Furthermore, information and intelligence sharing of advanced technologies and defense assets among AUKUS partners demands security controls to prevent data leaks, breaches and incidents, and cyber espionage. Supercharging artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, and autonomous weapons should raise serious concerns about privacy, bias, and abuse. AUKUS partners must adhere to ethical principles and responsible use.

Unlike NATO, it is a flexible partnership with less formal impediments for developing partnerships and including new members. Pillar 2 offers considerable opportunities for non-nuclear partners interested in building technological and defense capabilities. Canada and New Zealand are more likely to partner with AUKUS Pillar 2 given they are already in the Five Eyes intelligence sharing compact [93, 94]. New Zealand could be enticed given geostrategic realities. Defence Minister Andrew Little stated, that if New Zealand was offered access to Pillar 2 areas, it was “willing to explore it” [95, 96]. In May 2023, it was reported that Canada may be interested in entering Pillar 2 areas to boost its artificial intelligence and cybersecurity capabilities [97, 98]. Japan is also another potential AUKUS Pillar 2 partner given its defense industrial and technological relationship with the U.S. and concerns about China [99].

AUKUS Pillar 2 is an endeavor premised on developing collaboration and integration. The opportunities for integration of advanced technologies and next-generation defense capabilities are extensive and substantial. The trilateral partnership is serious about pooling R&D and expertise to develop technologies that will provide AUKUS partners with a strategic edge over China in the Indo-Pacific [2, 6, 23].

Deeper integration of cutting-edge technologies will boost joint operations and enhance the ability of three partners to promote a rules-based order in the face of adversaries seeking to upend them [3, 6]. The commitment to responsible use and transparency will be defining features of the partnership. With Pillar 2, deeper connections among the defense assets of the three partners will strengthen collaboration and interoperability. AUKUS is unlike other alliance systems, namely NATO, in that it is a flexible and capabilities-based partnership driven by confidence and trust, accelerated innovation, and knowledge and information sharing [2, 4].