Open access peer-reviewed chapter

Enacting Happiness from Emotions and Moods

Written By

Éric Laurent, Kévin Bague, Colin Vegas and Jonathan Dartevelle

Submitted: 26 July 2022 Reviewed: 04 August 2022 Published: 22 December 2022

DOI: 10.5772/intechopen.106954

From the Edited Volume

Happiness and Wellness - Biopsychosocial and Anthropological Perspectives

Edited by Floriana Irtelli and Fabio Gabrielli

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Abstract

The pursuit of happiness has been an important component of philosophical thought for a long time. Traditionally, happiness could be viewed as the result of rational thinking and personal project management. We review the literature in cognitive biology and psychology revealing why happiness could complementarily be conceived as an emerging feeling, anchored in daily emotions and moods. Finally, we propose a framework in which happiness builds on distributed and dynamic bodily processes with which abstract thought interacts. Data coming from complexity science, neuroscience, psychopathology, and cognitive behavioral therapies are gathered in this chapter in order to account for the coordination between “bottom-up” and “top-down” happiness geneses.

Keywords

  • affective science
  • cognitive science
  • complexity
  • coordination
  • emergence

“Felicity is a lasting state of pleasure”.

Leibniz (c. 1690)

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1. Introduction

Happiness has a very special place in intellectual life. Happiness has been the ultimate goal of occidental philosophy for centuries. In Aristotle’s philosophy, a critical distinction was proposed between pleasure and happiness. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle distinguished between the ultimate means (“eudaimonia,” or happiness) and multiple intermediate goals (e.g., pleasure, money). This distinction is critical for two reasons. First, different temporal scales are respectively associated with happiness and with other affective events. While pleasure tends to refer to short-term experience, happiness is related to a judgment that would encompass the entire life. Second, it generates hierarchical relationships between happiness and any other affective experiences. While pleasure can be an end, it is also a means (to reach happiness). In contrast, happiness is the end of many means, but the means of nothing else [1]. Then, philosophical wisdom and virtue would consist in searching for happiness through truth.

While Western philosophy generally acknowledges a potential filiation between accumulated affective experiences and happiness, it mainly emphasizes the central role of knowledge and reasoning in reaching eudaimonia. For instance, in the Banquet, Plato reported that generally what is desired is what we do not have, while what we have got could be what we once desired (i.e., in the past, not in the present). Schopenhauer stated that all our life oscillates between suffering (when we do not have what we desire) and boredom (when we have what we desire). See [1] for an analysis of these philosophical trends and their comparison with the Chinese tradition, which is beyond the scope of this chapter. Therefore, there should be a “mindset” favoring happiness. For instance, Spinoza points out that enjoying what we get is a condition of happiness. The responsibility of rational thought in affective experience has been specially underlined by Stoicists according to whom our thoughts are like a filter of external events, which gives rise to meaning and passion regulation. More generally, the dissociation between body and soul largely shared in Western philosophy has placed strong responsibility on thoughts in happiness development. This is what we would name today a “top-down view” on happiness development.

However, how emotions, moods, and other affective experiences are coordinated with “happiness” (viewed as higher-order affective experience) is still unclear. Is happiness regulated by rational thought and other “high-level” cognitive processes, or is happiness more “embodied” and related to everyday life affective events? Those questions are far ancient, but the frameworks offered by cognitive science related to how information circulates in the brain and the body and interacts with other information in the environment, could contribute to refine our understanding of happiness. We will first provide some landmarks about top-down and bottom-up processing in humans, and then successively discuss evidence coming from psychology and neuroscience for bottom-up and top-down influences on happiness. Finally, we will share a perspective combining those influences in order to contribute to a cognitive approach to happiness.

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2. A cognitive science background: “Top-down”, “bottom-up”, and complexity-oriented conceptions of behavior and phenomenal processes

The development of cognitive psychology has been largely based on the computational metaphor (e.g., [2]) (i.e., the [abusive] assimilation of the human mind to a computer) (see [3] for a recent and parsimonious approach to computationalism; and [4, 5, 6] for discussions about limitations of computationalism). The subsequently associated dissociation between “hardware” and” software” in the study of cognition was consistent with most dualist philosophical approaches. Cognitive psychology has mainly been concerned with the “software” and highlighted the role of “knowledge” and its relationships with memory, learning, reasoning, perception, and decision-making. As mentioned by Petersen and Sporns, “Most accounts of human cognitive architectures have focused on computational accounts of cognition while making little contact with the study of anatomical structures and physiological processes” [7]. Yet, a large part of the dynamics (i.e, change with time) that characterizes humans is related to biology. Physiological needs, for instance, reflect the state of the organism, including at the cell level. These needs are modified with time and have non-anecdotal effects on cognition: they introduce complexity and nonlinear behaviors [8]. Mainstream cognitive science, generally a bit far from these later issues, has developed models where dynamical systems are not the reference. It has generally relied on top-down processes. “The basic notions of top-down and bottom-up processing […], may be broken down into the differences between an idea that emerges from the mind and one that emerges from the senses. One is based on thought, and the other is based on direct experience”. Bottom-up would refer to lower-level, often sensory-guided, activity, while top-down would be employed to account for higher-level cognitive activity. Beyond the level of processing, authors may refer to a sense of information circulation (from the bottom to the top or from the top to the bottom). In the current chapter, we will employ the distinction between those processes for both of their meanings simultaneously.

This distinction can have important consequences for our understanding of happiness since the latter could either principally emerge from direct experience and emotions related to our immersion in the environment, or be mainly conceived as a result of a cognitive mindset. In any case, emotions and moods appear to be tied to happiness, with different roles played in its “cognitive architecture” as a function of the theoretical proposal. In the next section, we will first review evidence for bottom-up, emerging happiness from the field of psychology.

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3. Emerging happiness: evidence from psychology

Through a critical review of psychological models of happiness determinants and other related empirical studies, this section reports the arguments in favor of emergent (affective) sources of happiness. That is, affective factors, such as emotions, which would modulate happiness in a bottom-up rather than top-down manner.

3.1 Initial scientific pessimism

In the field of psychology, happiness measurement is commonly operationalized by the self-reported measure of “subjective well-being” (SWB), which is defined by frequent positive affect (prevalence of pleasant emotions and moods), high life satisfaction, and infrequent negative affect (prevalence of non-pleasant emotions and moods [9]). Even though happiness is associated with several advantages such as better self-control [10], superior work outcomes [11], and a strengthened immune system [12], research about sources of sustainable SWB improvement has been neglected until the early 2000s. This neglect has been even stronger for the study of bottom-up sources of happiness. According to Lyubomirsky et al. (2005), this neglect was due to a “scientific pessimism” about the ability of individuals to increase their happiness over time [13]. The three main well-documented causes of this pessimism are strong genetic determinism of happiness [13, 14, 15], temporal stability of the two personality traits more strongly associated with happiness (i.e., neuroticism and extroversion; [15, 16]), and the hedonic adaptation process (also known as the “hedonic treadmill”). This process represents the automatic tendency of humans to readjust their happiness to its initial level after a short-term positive or negative change of personal experience [17, 18]. Despite these three impediments, researchers have recently accumulated findings indicating that happiness is a complex multi-determined concept that can be sustainably increased. Interestingly, these findings have not been restricted to top-down processes. They also indicate that the sustainable increase in happiness can be underpinned by emergent (bottom-up) sources.

3.2 Emerging sources of happiness according to the hedonic adaptation prevention model (HAP model)

Factors promoting a sustainable improvement of happiness have been progressively revealed through the development of successive empirically supported theoretical models. The Sustained Happiness Model (SHM) has been the seminal modeling of happiness determinants [13]. It posits that SWB is determined by three general factors: genetic basis, intentional activities (i.e., activities or practices that people deliberately decide to engage in, requiring effort to be achieved, e.g., trying to be generous with other people), and circumstances (i.e., stable and incidental events such as life changes that occur by themselves in an individual’s life, e.g., getting a new apartment).1

Circumstances are a particularly relevant determinant regarding emergent happiness. Indeed, it suggests that it is possible to achieve a sustainable increase in happiness from the daily life changes that are experienced, that are not related to a volitional pursuit of happiness. This bottom-up route to happiness was conceived and experimentally tested by Sheldon and Lyubomirsky (2012) as part of the empirical validation of the Hedonic Adaptation Prevention model (HAP model; Figure 1; [18]).

Figure 1.

Hedonic adaptation prevention model and its two main routes. Notes. Model adapted from [Sheldon, K. M., and Lyubomirsky, S. (2012). The challenge of staying happier: Testing the Hedonic Adaptation Prevention model. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 38(5), 670–680. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167212436400]; [18]. Original figure p. 671 (“Figure 1”), in Sheldon & Lyubomirsky (2012). Copyright © 2012 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc. Adapted with Permission of Sage Publications. A = well-being initial boost. WB = subjective well-being, T = measurement time. = bottom-up route (marking added in this chapter), = top-down route (marking added in this chapter), (+) = positive effect on, (−) = negative effect on.

3.2.1 Variety

This HAP model includes a non-affective emergent source that promotes the persistence of an initial SWB boost from a positive life change by limiting the hedonic adaptation process. This emergent source of happiness is variety. In two experiments, Sheldon et al. (2012) showed that rating or practicing varied experiences derived from a positive life change was associated with long-term persistence of the initial increase in SWB [19]. Conversely, repeated exposure to the same experience derived from a positive life change was associated with a decrease in SWB, consistent with the hedonic adaptation process [19, 20]. The more we are exposed to the same derived life experience, the more its effects are understood and anticipated, and the less the associated pleasure will be, resulting in happiness returning to its initial state [21]. Thus, regardless of a particular state of mind oriented toward happiness pursuit, happiness could be sustainably increased through a bottom-up process. The first source of this emergent happiness is variety of daily life experiences that contributes to generating pleasure from positive life changes [22].

3.2.2 Positive life events and emotions

The global empirical validation of the HAP model has been conducted by Sheldon and Lyubomirsky (2012; [18]). In a longitudinal study based on the reports of 488 students, SWB was measured three times (T1, T2, and T3) at 6-week intervals. At T2, students were asked to indicate the most important positive life change since T1 (referred to as “original life change”). They were also asked questions related to the amount of positive “thought-events” derived from the original life change (“Amount of Positive Events”), positive affect experienced from the original life change (“Amount of Positive Emotions”), variety, appreciation of the original change, and aspiration (i.e., the qualitative and quantitative contentment level of the original change).

Path analyses validated the HAP model, consisting of two routes influencing SWB maintenance over time: one referring to a bottom-up process (boxed in red in Figure 1) and another referring to a top-down process (boxed in blue in Figure 1). Both routes originate from a positive original life change that occurs, independently of a volitional pursuit of happiness [18].

Interestingly, the bottom-up route highlights two new related emergent sources of happiness: the number of positive events derived from the original life change and the number of positive emotions associated with that change. Indeed, results showed that the more participants reported frequent positive thought-events related to the original life change, the more they derived (in intensity) positive emotions from that change (i.e., happy, pleased, joyful, relaxed, and cheerful emotions), and the more the SWB at T3 was important. In addition, the authors found that variety was an enhancer of this relationship. The more participants reported frequent varied experiences derived from the original change, the greater the effect of positive emotions derived from the original change on the sustained increase in SWB [18].

However, the positive effect of this bottom-up process on the sustained increase in SWB can be diminished by a top-down process that corresponds to the second route of the HAP model. The results showed that the more participants reported positive thought-events derived from the original life change, the more they aspired to an even better change and the less the initial SWB gain was maintained. But the data also indicated that the more participants continued to appreciate the original positive life change, and reported various experiences derived from that change, the less they experienced aspiration. Thus, this detrimental top-down process on sustainable SWB increase can be inhibited to favor the positive effect of the bottom-up process. This can be achieved thanks to appreciation and variety, two moderators that inhibit aspiration, i.e., the desire to “want more”. High-level processes are particularly complex because they can lead, depending on the direction of thoughts, to either a decrease or a sustainable increase in happiness [23, 24]. Later in this chapter, we will embrace a more sophisticated view on these top-down processes and see how they can be used to support a sustainable increase in happiness.

3.2.3 Summary and criticisms of the HAP model

In sum, the empirical work on the HAP model supports the existence of an emergent pathway to happiness. This emergent pathway is based on the idea that in everyday life we experience positive life changes regardless of a volitional pursuit of happiness. These life changes lead to a short-term gain in SWB that can be sustained by various factors embedded in daily life experiences derived from these changes, referred to in this paper as “emergent sources,” which will prevent the hedonic adaptation process. Considering the results obtained by Sheldon and Lyubomirsky (2012), the emergent source that most directly promotes sustainable SWB increase has an affective nature, namely the positive emotions derived from the original life change. The more positive the derived emotions, the more limited the hedonic adaptation process, and the more the initial gain in SWB (due to the initial life change) can be maintained in the following months. Two other related non-affective emergent sources more indirectly contribute to the sustained increase in SWB: the number of positive events and the variety of life experiences all derived from the original positive life change. The most important source of both is variety, as it promotes positive emotions and inhibits aspiration, while the quantity of positive events (which increases aspiration) “only” promotes positive emotions derived from the original life change [18, 22].

It can be noticed that in the HAP model, the so-called “top-down” route to happiness is supplied by the bottom-up route. While the bottom-up route of the HAP model incorporates the one and only input of the model (i.e., positive life change independent of a volitional pursuit of happiness), the “top-down” processes are only a secondary reaction caused by the bottom-up processes and cannot exist without them. Indeed, appreciation and inspiration would not occur without the life events derived from the original change. This empirically supported organization of the HAP model reinforces the relevance of its integration in the proposal of an emergent approach to happiness. However, this should not lead to the general conclusion that bottom-up processes predominate over top-down processes in enhancing happiness. Several data suggest that rather than being two independent routes, bottom-up and top-down processes may have a circular relationship, discussed later in this chapter.

Regarding specifically the bottom-up route of the HAP model, the emotions derived from life change must be positive to promote sustained increases in happiness. This suggests that if these emotions are not positive, such as hatred, then they will not favor the maintenance of the initial gain in SWB. In their paper related to the “secret of happiness,” Tamir et al. (2017) obtained intriguing results that question the bottom-up route of the HAP model [25]. Indeed, their results suggest that it is not enough for the emotions derived from life changes to be “merely” positive to promote a sustained increase in SWB. In their study, more than two thousand students first indicated the emotions they wanted to feel. Then they performed an unrelated, emotionally neutral word-generation task for five minutes, and reported their current emotions and SWB. The results showed that participants’ SWB was positively related, not to the positive emotions experienced, but rather to the equality between the emotions experienced and those desired. In other words, the happiest participants were those who were able to experience the emotions they wanted to experience, whether they were pleasant (e.g., love) or not pleasant (e.g., anger). Thus, it is likely that to achieve a sustainable increase in SWB, the important thing is not to derive positive emotions from the life change, but rather to derive emotions more generally consistent with the ones that we want to experience. However, the structure of the HAP model has not yet been reconsidered according to this possibility [22].

3.3 Environmental stressors

Studies on the empirical validation of the HAP model have not been the only ones to provide arguments in favor of a bottom-up modulation of happiness. Individuals’ stress level is a critical component of their affective state. In everyday life, we may be confronted with external events that can generate stress and thus modify our affective state in a bottom-up manner. These events fall into the category of “environmental stressors” [26], which include daily hassles (e.g., traffic congestion, disruptive students), ambient stressors (e.g., car noise, dust in eyes), stressful life events (e.g., bereavement, child’s birth) and cataclysmic events (e.g., major storms, heatwave). Within this framework, several studies have shown that environmental stressors have a significant impact on SWB.

3.3.1 Daily hassles

Feist et al. (1995) asked 160 students to complete a battery of self-reported scales every 1 month for 4 months to better understand the causal influences of happiness [27]. They obtained results indicating that daily hassles (considered as a bottom-up factor in the model), such as financial inadequacies or time constraints, do not directly but indirectly decrease SWB level, through the degradation of constructive thinking (i.e., developing coping strategies from life experiences). More recently and specifically, Udayar et al. (2021) showed, using data from 1170 individuals living in Switzerland, that daily hassles (e.g., financial inadequacy, having an illness, family problems) negatively predict life satisfaction, one of the three components of SWB [28].

3.3.2 Ambient stressors

Numerous studies have highlighted that noise annoyance decreases one or more components of SWB, with a preferential deterioration of affective state [29, 30]. Based on cross-sectional data from 15,010 participants, Beutel et al. (2016) showed that negative affect (i.e., anxiety and depressive symptoms in the study) increased significantly with the overall degree of daily noise annoyance (among different annoyances, such as road traffic, aircraft, or railways). For the extreme annoyance group (i.e., participants who responded with the highest intensity on a 5-point scale), the prevalence ratios were 1.97 and 2.14 for depressive symptoms and anxiety, respectively [31].

More recently, in their meta-analysis and systematic review, Gong et al. (2022) found that noise-annoyed people had a, respectively, 55% (6 studies) and 23% (8 studies) increased risk of anxiety and depressive symptoms compared to people with low noise annoyance [32]. This detrimental effect of noise annoyance on affective state (and thus on SWB) would also be devoid of a habituation effect [33] and would also concern children [34]. Low air quality in offices would also increase negative affect, such as anger, sadness, and anxiety [35]. Conversely, some noises would improve SWB, such as natural sounds (e.g., the sound of water; [36]).

3.3.3 Stressful life events

In the literature, it is well established that stressful life events have a significant influence on SWB [37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43]. Luhmann et al. (2012) conducted a large meta-analysis in which they analyzed the consequences of 8 commonly studied stressful life events (i.e., marriage, divorce, bereavement, child’s birth, unemployment, reemployment, retirement, relocation/migration), from longitudinal data of 188 publications (65,911 participants). Overall, they showed that most of these 8 life events had different effects on affective state and life satisfaction, the latter component of SWB being the most strongly and consistently influenced [44]. These effects were independent of the presumed desirability of the stressful life events, contrary to what has been proposed previously [45].

More specifically, the detailed analyses of Luhmann et al. showed that marriage causes only a short-term increase in life satisfaction, with no significant affective change. Divorce causes on average an increase in life satisfaction and pleasant affect in the months following the event, after an initial moderate decrease. Bereavement causes a strong initial decrease in SWB, especially for life satisfaction, followed by a rapid hedonic adaptation. Child’s birth is associated with a mild initial increase in life satisfaction, which decreases in the following months. Nevertheless, this event is also associated with a minor increase in pleasant affect in subsequent years. Unemployment causes a strong initial decrease in life satisfaction, which then increases over time. Unemployment would also cause, on average (with very heterogeneous results), a decrease in pleasant affects without significant change in the following months. Reemployment would cause a weak initial and long-term increase in pleasant affects. Surprisingly, the latter event causes an initial decrease in life satisfaction, which then increases in the following months. Retirement causes an initial decrease in life satisfaction, and then an increase in both life satisfaction and pleasant affect in the following years. Finally, relocation and migrations, according to the data of only 5 studies, would cause both an initial and long-term increase in life satisfaction and pleasant affects [44].

3.3.4 Cataclysmic events

A variety of cataclysmic events negatively impact SWB. With cross-selected data from 7110 urban and rural Indonesians, Rahman et al. (2022) found that climatic disasters (e.g., floods, landslides, droughts, wildfires) degrade SWB of rural residents (life satisfaction and affective state), contrary to urban residents for whom SWB remains stable. Thus, residents living in rural areas would have a SWB level particularly vulnerable to climate disasters [46]. The negative relationship between climate disasters and SWB decline has also been found in Japanese [47], American [48], German [49], Asian [50], and French individuals [51]. Compared to storms that would cause a short-term decrease in SWB, the effect of floods would persist much longer, up to 4−5 years after the event occurred [49, 50, 51, 52].

In another context, Danzer and Danzer (2016) estimated the long-term consequences of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster on SWB, with a survey including about 24,000 Ukrainians (20 years after the disaster). They used radiation exposure as a proxy for disaster impact. Their results showed a sustained bottom-up deterioration in happiness, as Ukrainians unwillingly affected by the disaster that occurred had lower life satisfaction and higher rates of depression than Ukrainians not directly affected by the disaster [53].

3.4 Discussion

The objective of this section was to provide empirical arguments from the field of psychology that support “emergent happiness” (i.e., that contribute to a bottom-up modulation of happiness). Happiness was operationalized through the concept of SWB (frequent positive affect, infrequent negative affect, and high life satisfaction [9]).

Recent empirical arguments were drawn from two different fields of the literature: the empirical validation of the HAP model and the investigation of environmental stressors’ effects on SWB components. Studies focusing on the empirical validation of the HAP model have highlighted three emerging sources that contribute to a sustained increase in happiness despite hedonic adaptation. These sources are (1) frequent positive emotions derived from an original positive life change (i.e., a trip), (2) amount of positive events derived from the original life change, and (3) variety of positive events derived from the original life change [18, 19, 22].

Regarding environmental stressors, their effects on the components of SWB have been extensively studied in psychology. Through a non-exhaustive review of this literature, we have shown that the 4 main categories of environmental stressors, namely daily hassles, ambient stressors (especially noise annoyance), stressful life events, and cataclysmic events (especially floods), are associated with short and in some cases long term degradation of SWB, especially through the decrease in life satisfaction [28, 32, 44, 46].

However, as mentioned earlier in psychological studies, the measurement of happiness is operationalized by the self-reported measure of SWB (with scales related to life satisfaction and/or experienced affect, e.g., the satisfaction with life scale, [54]). Thus, the evidence in favor of emerging happiness that has been outlined in this section is all restricted to a single macroscopic level of observation (i.e., self-reported subjective judgment). The use of a multi-level approach, i.e., the aggregation of arguments from different levels of observation (from the macroscopic to the microscopic), allows for greater validity and better understanding of phenomena [8, 55]. Thus, emerging happiness is likely to develop manifestations at other levels than that which is accessible to consciousness through self-reports. For this reason, the following section focuses on the neuroscientific (i.e., often more microscopic) approach to happiness.

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4. Bottom-up and top-down routes to happiness: insights from neuroscience

It is only recently that neurosciences and psychiatry have contributed to systematically studying happiness [56]. For a long time, research had focused on the emotional processes underlying pathologies. In the literature, terms such as “happiness,” “well-being,” or even “satisfaction” are often associated or confused [57]. Moreover, it is difficult to measure such variables otherwise than by using self-reported scales [54, 58]. The direct study of these dimensions is, therefore, hardly suitable for the classical methods used in neurosciences. As explained above (Section 3), the experience of positive emotions and their accumulation is a key element for happiness emergence. Seeking and experiencing positive affects corresponds to hedonia, an essential contributor to happiness and well-being [59]. Significant progress has been made in understanding the emergence of affects and positive emotions and their relationships with brain function. Studies in neuroscience focus on hedonia because the latter is correlated with and participates in, the emergence of happiness and well-being (see [60] for a proposed conceptual model). The purpose of this section is to provide a summary of current knowledge about the emergence and processing of positive emotions and affect and how they contribute to happiness since the former is often considered as a “proxy” for the latter. A classic standpoint in neuroscience consists in the attribution of the responsibility of the responses based on the perceptual processing of emotional stimuli to subcortical regions (like amygdala, ventral pallidum, or thalamus). Therefore these “low-level” structures have been identified as supporting “bottom-up” processing. By contrast, “high-level” processes based on integrated cognitive processing of emotional stimuli are preferentially attributed to cortical structures (such as the prefrontal lobe), which are thought to underlie “top-down” processing [61, 62, 63]. This dissociation (subcortical regions = “bottom-up” process/cortical regions = “top-down” process) will be discussed in the last part of this section but has also been taken as a landmark to organize this section.

4.1 Specific regions associated with positive emotions

George and collaborators (1995) were among the first to study brain activation as a function of stimulus valence in order to evaluate the specificity of brain coding for emotional valence [64]. The authors used H215O positron emission tomography (PET) to study changes in regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) on a sample of 11 women when happy, sad, or neutral states were induced. In this study, happiness was considered as a transient emotional state induced by self-generated positive emotions via memory and by showing positive emotional faces with the instruction to feel the corresponding emotion. According to their results, transient happiness was associated with a reduction in rCBF in the right prefrontal and bilateral temporal-parietal regions. Sadness was associated with bilateral activation in the cingulate, medial prefrontal, and mesial temporal cortex but also in thalamus and putamen. These data suggest that there are different neural substrates activated depending on stimulus valence. Using the functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), Pelletier and collaborators (2003) challenged this conclusion. They reported that neutral, happy, or sad states were associated with similar activation in the orbitofrontal, left medial prefrontal, and left and ventrolateral prefrontal as well as left anterior temporal pole. But, in those regions, loci of activation were situated in different sub-regions. Their conclusion is that happy or sad states activate similar brain areas but different neural circuits [65].

In a substantial review, in the framework of the Human Affectome Project, Alexander and collaborators (2021) have identified different key brain regions involved in the experience of positive emotions and affect. Cortical regions including prefrontal cortex (PFC), orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and subcortical regions like insula or amygdala were considered. Although these regions may have different cognitive functions regarding the evaluation of emotional stimuli, the regulation of affective states, or decision making; they contribute to the emergence, processing, and maintenance of a positive emotional state and to the emergence of well-being and happiness [60]. In sum, the experience of positive affects is associated with a vast neural network distributed throughout the brain, which involves both cortical and subcortical regions. In the next part, we are discussing the specific role of subcortical regions, often associated with bottom-up processes.

4.2 Bottom-up influences on positive emotions

Beyond the key brain areas identified in the processing and experience of positive emotions, hedonic hotspots have been identified in nucleus accumbens, ventral pallidum, forebrain, limbic cortical regions, or brainstem [66]. Based on Kringelbach et Berridge, these hedonic hotspots are said to cause the pleasure reaction in increasing “liking” feeling and are associated with hedonia. Experimentally studied using microinjections of opioids, endocannabinoids or other neurochemical substances, these areas measure approximately 1 cubic centimeter in humans. Hedonic hotspots do not work according to an on/off mode. For example, stimulation of hedonic hotspots by opioids in the nucleus accumbens amplifies “liking” but this same area stimulated by dopamine amplifies “wanting” reactions. However, “wanting” a salient reward does not necessarily mean that this reward is appreciated [67]. Authors suggest that “liking” is a component of pleasure in connection with a reward and can lead to a subjective feeling of happiness.

These hedonic hotspots make salient a stimulus and allow an approach motivation through the processes of “liking.” Ventral pallidum is a region involved in the implementation of this motivated behavior. This subcortical structure is part of the reward system and its activation increases stimulus attractivity [68]. Ventral pallidum is essential to the production of behaviors adapted to reward but is also involved in the phenomena of drug dependence [69]. Studies in nonhuman animals also indicated that injury of ventral pallidum abolishes the pleasurable reaction to a stimulus, which corresponds to a state of anhedonia [70, 71]. Activation of hedonic hotspots and ventral pallidum participates in the emergence of pleasure through the evaluation and search for reward. Reward is simply made salient and attractive, and this evaluation is independent of “high-level” cognitive processes. These are “bottom-up” processes based on the perception and evaluation of a stimulus leading to a motivated, approach behavior. Seeking reward and pleasure is an adaptive behavior participating in the experience of positive emotions [66].

The insula is a region that makes the interface between cortical and subcortical regions, and also contributes to adaptive behavior. The links between the insula and positive emotion remain largely unknown. In a review, Uddin and collaborators (2017) reported on functioning and connectivity of this region [72]. The insula is connected to many cortical (frontal cortex, temporal and parietal lobe, or somatosensory cortices) and subcortical (hippocampus, amygdala, or thalamus) regions [72, 73]. From a functional point of view, the insula participates in the processing of viscero-somatosensory information, essential for interoception (ability to evaluate physiological activity; [74, 75]). Insula is fundamental in emotional experience and subjective feelings [75]. Emotional stimuli cause physiological changes and these bodily sensations (processed in particular by the insula) are essential to the subjective experience of emotions and decision-making [72, 76]. Through the visceral experience of emotions, the insula allows the implementation of emotional regulation strategies [77, 78]. By processing physiological information induced by the characteristics of a perceived valenced stimulus, the insula contributes to the “bottom-up” processes underlying positive emotions. On the other hand, it allows —by these connections with the frontal regions and the conscious access to visceral sensations— the cognitive processing of valenced stimuli and is involved in “top-down” processes.

4.3 Top-down influences on positive emotions

From a “top-down” perspective on positive emotion processing, high-level cortical structures have received particular attention. Perhaps the most studied region is the prefrontal cortex (PFC). In this area, the experience of positive affects is lateralized in the left PFC whereas negative affect is lateralized in the right PFC [79]. Recently, Mendez and Parand (2020) documented a clinical case of a patient who suffered significant brain injury. Following a suicide attempt by gunshot, medical imaging examinations of this 63-year-old man showed significant volume loss of the right frontal and right anterior lobes and injury in left orbitofrontal. Clinically, this brain injury led to a significant personality change. The patient was described as permanently “happy” and scoring 28/28 on the Subjective Happiness Scale (Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 1999), despite his many sequelae and the fact that he was imprisoned [80]. This clinical case suggests that the emergence of happiness could be related to the left PFC, while the right PFC would participate in regulating a positive biased default mode [81, 82]. Similarly, studies based on electroencephalography (EEG) have shown that activation of the left PFC is associated with positive affect and activation of the right PFC with negative affect [79]. Interestingly, this activation of the left PFC does not only occur when processing positive information but is also related to dispositional mood, temperament, and well-being [83]. Left PFC being associated with dispositions toward positive emotional states, it is a good candidate for a top-down moderating process of happiness.

However, this lateralization of the PFC is far from being as strict as it may seem. Indeed, bilateral activation of the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) has been observed during hedonic processing [84]. OFC, and more specifically, the mid-anterior subregion is involved in the subjective experience of pleasure, an important component of hedonia [66, 85]. This brain region is also associated with optimism, a dispositional trait, and an optimistic explanatory style (i.e., how an individual reacts to a positive or negative event), underlying well-being [86]. OFC allows the subjective attribution of a hedonic valence to a stimulus and contributes to the emergence of judgment and hedonic-motivated decision-making [85]. Subjective access to the hedonic evaluation of a stimulus is associated with the deployment of “high-level” processing and “top-down” processes. Hornak and collaborators (2003) have shown that lesions of the OFC can cause a deficit in emotional voice or face recognition and produce changes in behavioral and subjective emotional states. Their work also emphasized the importance of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and its links with the OFC in human emotions [87].

Classically, ACC is considered to be recruited in attentional control tasks (i.e., tasks largely involving “top-down” processes [88, 89]). Several studies also emphasize the importance of ACC in emotional regulation mechanisms [90, 91, 92]. Brassen and collaborators (2011) suggested that ACC activation is related to an attentional bias toward positive stimuli [93]. When an individual is in a positive emotional state, this attentional bias manifests in order to preserve this state. It is a motivated behavior involved in emotional regulation. Their work has thus indicated, in an elderly sample, that an increase in the activity of ACC (more particularly in the rostral part of the ACC) is correlated with this positivity bias but also with the feeling of well-being. On the other hand, ACC is involved in compassion, a trait associated with the production of positive emotion and happiness [86]. It is accepted that dysfunction of ACC contributes to certain cases of major depression [94]. Thus, it is assumed that through attentional control directed toward positive stimuli, the ACC contributes to the regulation and maintenance of a positive emotional state and is, therefore, a key structure in the emergence of happiness [60]. Beyond specific brain areas brain networks have been studied in relation to happiness. In particular, the default mode network (DMN) has been identified as a key component for the emergence of happiness [61]. DMN consists of low-intensity activity that can be recorded when the participant is at rest; it is inhibited when they are engaged in cognitively demanding tasks and not self-oriented. This is composed of bilateral cortical area located in the frontal, parietal, and temporal lobes [95]. The DMN includes medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate cortex, and inferior parietal lobule [96, 97, 98]. This has a central role in the happiness experience [98]. Luo and collaborators (2016) demonstrated that increased DMN connectivity in PFC and cingulate cortex is associated with lower levels of happiness. Greater functional connectivity of the DMN is associated with more self-reflection based on negative content and ruminations leading to unhappiness [97]. These results are consistent with previous studies in the context of psychopathology [99]. Thus, when the networks involved in cognitive tasks are dominated by the DMN, there is a greater tendency to rumination and, therefore, to lower levels of happiness [100]. The default-mode network activation may interfere with positive task implementation by preventing the activation of neural networks involved in planning, preparing, and selecting appropriate behaviors [101].

4.4 Discussion

The data gathered in this section support the idea that positive emotion emergence and processing cannot be related to one single dedicated brain area. It is rather supported by a complex network involving cortical and subcortical regions. Although much progress has been made, the processes associating the activation of this network with a subjective sense of happiness remain unclear and require further research [60]. It is also necessary to avoid any simplistic shortcut consisting in considering that the activation of a key brain area in the processing of positive emotions is enough to cause a subjective feeling of happiness. Indeed, the same brain area can process emotions of different valences through different neural networks [65].

As first mentioned in the introduction of this section, the classical approach in neuroscience is to assimilate responses based on sensory or perceptual processing of stimuli with “bottom-up” processing. While cognitive processing of stimuli is associated with “top-down” processing. Thus, “bottom-up” and “top-down” processing are often associated with subcortical and cortical regions, respectively [61, 62, 63]. This view has two main limitations. On the one hand, it has been shown that tasks that are supposed to require bottom-up or top-down processing mobilize both subcortical and cortical regions [63, 73]. This element is consistent with the state of current knowledge in the field of emotions. Relatively complex processes such as hedonic evaluation of stimuli, approach behavior via decision-making or emotional regulation are underpinned by many cortical and subcortical areas [60, 66, 73, 77, 102]. Consequently, viewing bottom-up and top-down processes as strictly competitive or exclusive presents limitations. An approach integrating these processes in a “circular” perspective seems more coherent. Both the perceptual characteristics of the stimuli and the elements resulting from higher-level cognitive processing should be taken into account. Moreover, a significant part of work in neuroscience is based on functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). This technique allows a good spatial identification of cerebral activations but is generally less adapted in studies requiring high temporal resolution, which is offered by electrophysiology. It has been reported that the cerebral processes involved in evaluating positive stimuli take place more slowly than those that involve negative stimuli [60]. Esslen and collaborators (2004) have shown that the presentation of happiness face activates the frontal regions as well as the ACC according to different temporal segments [103].

Finally, we are aware that this literature often refers to various concepts. Well-being, happiness, hedonia, positive emotions, mood, or affect can, depending on the authors, be almost interchangeable notions or refer to completely different concepts. We chose to focus on studies that tried to link positive emotions to happiness despite differences in definitions offered or positive emotion induction protocols and measurement tools used. This does not prevent us from taking a certain distance from this literature, which has not yet succeeded in providing a strict and consensual conceptual framework. It is necessary to be aware of this element when discussing the notion of happiness in neuroscience.

In neuroscience, the importance of frontal regions in the processing of positive emotions is clearly established. These are key brain areas in emerging happiness. Beyond the processing of positive affect, they are the seat of “high-level” functions such as “executive functions.” It is therefore necessary to take an interest in these “high-level” processes in order to understand their role in the emerging happiness. Finally, work in neuroscience teaches us that positive emotions, fundamental parts of subjective feeling of happiness, are supported by a large cerebral network. This network is flexible and its activation depends on both “bottom-up” and “top-down” processes.

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5. Happiness as a result of higher-order processes: evidence from psychopathology and cognitive behavioral therapy

Two main theories of happiness and higher-order cognitive processes can be found in the literature (Figure 1). They are associated with specific definitions of happiness. The first definition is underpinned by the eudaimonia theory of happiness. It defines happiness as psychological wellbeing. Psychological well-being refers to the development and realization of potential, as well as the conditions of optimal living and their effects [60]. The second definition is underpinned by the hedonic theory of happiness. It defines happiness as subjective well-being. Subjective well-being consists of both a cognitive component and an affective component [97, 104]. Cognitive component refers to cognitive evaluation of life satisfaction [104, 105, 106, 107]. Affective component is related to the experience and maximization of positive affects and avoidance and alleviation of negative affects. Situations and events eliciting pleasure and positive affect are important in happiness emergence [104, 105, 106, 107]. The frequency of positive experiences is a greater predictor of happiness than the intensity of the felt emotion [106]. However, such a bottom-up pathway is incomplete to explain the emergence of happiness (Figure 2).

Figure 2.

Definitions of happiness found in studies dealing with higher-order processes involved in happiness.

5.1 Top-down involvement of higher-order processes in happiness genesis

The sustainable happiness model suggests that events are the factor associated with the smaller influence on happiness level [13, 22]. Intentional activity (i.e., actions requiring some degree of effort) including cognitive activity would better account for happiness variation than would circumstances [13, 22]. Happiness would be generated in a top-down manner and be a result of higher-order processes.

Events favoring happiness do not systematically lead to be happy [108]. First, La Rochefoucauld (1694/1930) wrote “happiness does not consist in things themselves but in the relish, we have of them” (p. 51; [108]). This philosophical statement is supported by the theoretical background of cognitive behavioral therapy. Situations and events do not have a valence and do not elicit positive or negative emotions per se. Rather, it is the cognitive interpretation of the event that elicits positive or negative emotions. Such a statement is also supported by the construal approach to happiness [109]. This top-down theory of happiness suggests that an objective event is interpretated subjectively. Cognitive processes shape the effect of events on happiness. Each individual builds their own reality, which determines specific hedonic outcomes, leading in turn to various levels of happiness. Second, individuals have to be able to perceive happiness-favoring events. Sad mood and anhedonia are core symptoms of major depressive disorder [110]. These symptoms seem to be the opposite of the effective component of happiness in the hedonic theory of happiness. Generally, individuals suffering from depressive disorder are attracted by negative information and avoid positive information [111, 112]. The incapacity to perceive events favoring happiness (also called “anhedonic bias”) could contribute to the incapacity to experience positive affects [111].

Taken together, these data suggest that happiness is the result of higher-order processes in a top-down manner before, during, and after the event. Before the event, higher-order processes can help to detect events favoring happiness. During and after the event, higher-order processes participate in the interpretation of the situation. Higher-order processes can also help to reinterpret an event in a positive manner and elicit happiness. Happy individuals would perceive, evaluate, and think a same event as more positive than unhappy individuals [109]. This section aims to provide a brief critical review of higher processes’ top-down influence on happiness. First, we examine how cognitive style participates in the happiness genesis. Following this, we summarize evidence showing that “executive functioning” plays a substantial role in happiness generation. Finally, we report that metacognitive processes also significantly contribute to happiness.

5.2 Cognitive styles

Information processing styles are associated with mood variations. We review three information processing styles involved in happiness development: the use of probability, global-local processing, and attributional style.

According to the decision affect theory, the expected value of an outcome influences the emotional experience elicited by this outcome [113, 114]. The estimated likelihood to obtain a better alternative is a determinant of happiness derived from an event. We can suppose that winning $500 in a lottery is a happiness-favoring event. But felt happiness will certainly be lower if it is more likely to win $5000 than $500. Conversely, felt happiness will certainly be higher if it is more likely to win $50 than $500. The outcome is the same but the felt happiness is different. Children (> 4 years old) and adults inferred more happiness when the likelihood to obtain a better outcome was low rather than high [115]. Outcomes obtained could compare with a standard established from the use of probability [115]. Satisfaction would result from an outcome evaluation through a comparison process [116]. If a positive outcome is highly likely, then a high standard is established. Happiness and hedonic load of events decrease when the outcome does not reach the expected standard. Use of probability, as a higher-order process, seems to be in happiness genesis. Especially, the use of probability has an influence on the hedonic load of a happiness-favoring event in establishing an expected outcome. Happiness genesis seems to be conditioned in a top-down manner under the influence of this expectation.

It has been often demonstrated that negative mood was associated with local information processing, whereas positive mood was often associated with global processing of information. Ji et al. (2019) have manipulated the style of perceptual processing (global vs. local) to investigate its role in happiness genesis. Through four experiments, this study showed that global processing leads to be happier and in a better mood than local processing [117]. Global processing would be associated with a big picture schema leading to a global perspective. Global perspective would increase the likelihood to detect a positive stimulus and would increase the likelihood to experience positive emotion. Furthermore, global processing would be associated with a more abstracting interpretation of life, regardless of current and minor worries. To summarize, global processing increases happiness level by two hypothetical top-down mechanisms: a) an expansion of attentional focus increasing the likelihood to detect positive stimuli and experience positive emotion (affective subjective well-being); b) a global view of life in which minor concerns are less salient, increasing life satisfaction (cognitive subjective well-being).

Following an event, individuals can process this event either by relating the cause to the self (internal style) or by relating the cause to an external factor to the self (external style). The style adopted is different according to mood variation and event valence. For example, internal style for negative events is a strong predictor of depressive disorder (e.g., [118]). Empirical findings show that the way we attribute cause (internally or externally) of an event (positive or negative) is a determinant of happiness. Internal attributions for negative events are associated with an increase in anhedonia severity in turn associated with a decrease in happiness [119]. There is a direct negative correlation between the level of happiness and the internal attribution of negative events [119]. Internal attribution and “stable” attribution (i.e., judge an event with a high likelihood to occur again) for positive events increase happiness [120]. An attributional style for negative events, in which causes are processed as less personal, less permanent, and less pervasive, improves happiness. The way we process events in term of self-involvement contributes to explaining the genesis of happiness in a top-down manner. Attributional style would be associated with personality. Extravert personality would be associated with an internal attributional style for positive events. Neurotic personality would be associated with an internal attributional style for negative events [120]. Personality influences the attributional style. The latter could in turn determine the experience of happiness in a descendant way. Lyubormisky (2001) searched for a mechanism that could explain the relationship between extraverts/neurotics and happiness/unhappiness, respectively. The attributional style could explain such a relationship. If extravert people attribute the causes of positive event to themselves, then they are more inclined to be sensitive to reward, experience positive effect, and be happy (Lyubormisky, 2001). If neurotics people attribute the causes of negative event to themselves, then they are more inclined to be sensitive to punishment, experience negative affect, and be unhappy [109].

Taken together, these findings reveal that happiness is determined in a top-down manner by the way the information is processed. Information processing seems itself associated with personality and cognitive schema. Such findings suggest that “executive functions” could be a determinant of happiness. As exposed above, global-local processing has been hypothetically associated with attentional focus [117]. Attributional style is associated with “executive functions.” Cognitive flexibility and inhibition (important processes related to “executive functions”) are associated with internal attributions for positive events and “stable” attributions for negative events [121].

5.3 Executive processes

Depressive disorder seems to be the opposite of happiness, especially when considering depressed mood and anhedonia, which have been considered as core symptoms of depression [110]. Cognitive dysfunctions in depressive disorder support the importance of “executive functioning” in happiness. Some “executive functions” are impaired in this mood disorder [122]. Such impairments could explain the difficulty to experience positive emotion and happiness. Impairment of top-down cognitive control (the set of “executive functions” that flexibly produce goal-directed thoughts and behaviors) could be involved in negativity bias (i.e., the tendency to be attracted by negative stimuli and the interpretation of neutral stimuli as negative). Inhibition and working memory difficulties would impair both the inhibition of negative representations and their update (shift from negative representations to positive ones) [122].

Happiness derived from subjective well-being could emerge from “executive functioning” [123]. Working memory is involved in subjective well-being [124]. People who are better at maintaining and updating (i.e., modifying representation in working memory according to new information) positive stimuli in working memory are happiest [124]. That is they have a higher life satisfaction level (cognitive subjective well-being) and experience more positive emotion than negative emotion (affective subjective well-being). Happiness could emerge from the update of positive information. Update leads to a repetitive activation of positive information in working memory. It would be easier to access positive information and process them, leading to more positive thought eliciting happiness [124]. Concerning the cognitive component of subjective well-being, life satisfaction is associated with goal achievement. “Executive functioning” is involved in goal achievement, for example through strategic planning. Therefore, they support goal achievement, which would be a condition of happiness [123]. Although goal achievement seems to be central to happiness genesis, goal must be realistic and flexible. Sometimes, reaching happiness is an objective per se. However, if expected happiness is extreme (e.g., individuals believe that experiencing happiness is a routine, value experience only if it generates happiness, think that there is something problematic if they do not experience happiness) and people believe that they cannot modify their emotional states, then happiness decreases [125]. This finding highlights the need for mental flexibility and the detrimental effect of rigid and unrealistic goals on happiness. “Executive functioning” could be involved in the psychological well-being component [123]. Eudaimonic pursuit of happiness involves self-control to inhibit and delay immediate reward while staying focused on higher-order goals. Working memory allows considering several action pathways to reach the goal [123].

Goal achievement seems to be very important in happiness because it is involved in psychological well-being and cognitive subjective well-being. However, there are sometimes conflicts between short-term goals leading to immediate but smaller rewards and long-term goals leading to delayed but larger benefits [126]. Such conflicts are also called self-control conflicts [126]. Self-control, notably through “executive functioning”, would be involved when resolving this conflict [126, 127]. When individuals are motivated to pursue affective subjective well-being by imaging a pleasure-eliciting event during inhibition tasks, they activate an interfering short-term goal. Consequently, inhibition performance decreases. Self-control conflict would also involve working memory to maintain an active representation of the long-term goal [126]. Cognitive control (i.e., the set of “executive functions” involved in flexibly producing goal-directed thoughts and behaviors) plays a role in meeting goals while managing conflicting pleasure-favoring distractors [60]. Cognitive control may be divided into proactive control, retroactive control, and evaluative control components. Proactive control allows guiding behavior with a strategy in order to achieve a long-term goal and positive life event. Retroactive control focuses attention toward a reward-eliciting stimulus. Evaluative control consists of monitoring and assessing outcomes of behaviors. Executive control seems important to protect long-term goals leading to happiness and to resolve self-control conflicts. Wiese et al. (2018) showed that self-control predicted subjective well-being. Self-control produces succeeding and thriving, leading themselves to happiness [123]. These long-term benefits preserve happiness because they counterbalance the inhibition of immediate pleasure. Flexibility remains important to prevent unrealistic goals that promote unhappiness. Sometimes, individuals try to stay focused on long-term goals, while enjoying present moment pleasure, to reach happiness. In this kind of situation, top-down control can contribute to reducing dissonance between immediate reward and long-term goal [123].

Executive control of selective attention seems to be a main determinant of happiness. Focusing attention on present information would promote happiness [60]. This process is associated with mental flexibility, which promotes the ability to shift attentional focus, notably on rewarding events and new opportunities [60]. Cognitive control (notably working memory, flexibility, and inhibition) has neural correlates in the executive control network [128]. Activity in executive control network is associated with subjective well-being [128]. Evidence arising from aging research supports these statements. Happiness and emotional regulation could be enhanced with aging [60]. Such an enhancement is sometimes explained by various age-related changes in cognitive processing (e.g., selective attention focused more on positive information than on negative information). Such modifications of cognitive processes could consist in increased focusing on positive information in the elderly [60]. At the neurobiological level, the recruitment of prefrontal cortex is correlated with the modification of cognitive processes that enhance happiness in aging [60]. This cerebral region is included in executive control network allowing cognitive control and is associated with happiness ([128]; see also the previous section for the involvement of prefrontal cortex in top-down genesis of happiness). The role of attentional focus control is also supported by studies on rumination, mind-wandering, and dwelling. Dwelling and rumination are circular and repetitive self-reflection characterized by intrusive thoughts, images, and memories [129]. Self-reflection is negatively associated with happiness [130]. The decrease in happiness related to rumination could be explained by impairment in “executive functioning.” Self-reflection could cause an interference effect [129], monopolize and drain cognitive resources used in executive process [109, 129]. Cognitive resources would be no longer available to control attention, focus on positive stimuli, achieve goal, and solve problems through executive processes. Self-reflection could divert attentional focus from happiness-favoring events and cognitive resources would no longer be available to correct attention focus (e.g., through inhibition or mental flexibility). Self-reflection induced by dwelling or rumination is associated with the default-mode network including medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate cortex, and inferior parietal lobule [96, 97, 128]. The previous section has shown that this cerebral network has a central role in happiness experience notably in relation to self-reflection [97, 128]. The default-mode network disturbs top-down executive processes involved in happiness.

“Executive functioning,” notably through cognitive control, including inhibition, mental flexibility, working memory, and selective attention, has an important role in happiness. Especially, intentions, goals, and expectations would induce a synchronization of “executive functioning” to realize plans and reach happiness in a top-down manner. Furthermore, individuals could try to apply some strategies to modify “executive functioning” (e.g., in the case of rumination, dwelling, and mind-wandering) and enhance happiness. Metacognitive processes could be determinants of happiness. They also reinforce evidence in favor of the processes exposed above.

5.4 Metacognitive emotion regulation

We have reported that cognitive style and “executive functioning” are determinants of happiness. Individuals can use metacognitive strategies to change these cognitive processes in order to enhance happiness and alleviate negative affect. Metacognitive strategies employed to regulate emotion (i.e., efforts to modify emotional response [130]) can be considered higher-order determinants of happiness.

Cognitive reappraisal is a metacognitive strategy involved in happiness genesis. It contributes to modifying the interpretation of an event, by proposing a new meaning. Therefore, it allows reinterpreting a situation as being source of pleasure in a top-down manner. This new perception of the pleasant activity increases subjective well-being [130]. Cognitive reappraisal can be used to produce a more optimistic interpretation of future, which increases the experience of positive emotion. Cognitive reappraisal is also useful to reassess the attributional style, which influences happiness [108]. We have discussed above the top-down involvement of attributional style in happiness. Individuals could also reappraise the perceived value of a situation: they experience more positive affect for things with higher value [108]. Cognitive reappraisal involvement in happiness is supported by mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (MBCT). MBCT practice increases the level of happiness (psychological and subjective well-being; [131]). MBCT practice would broaden the identification of experiences enhancing life satisfaction (cognitive subjective well-being). Cognitive reappraisal would allow reevaluating experience as positive, which increases the experience of positive emotion (affective subjective well-being; [131]). The improvement of eudaimonic well-being is explained by the enhancement of subjective well-being that is associated with the meaning of life. This study also suggests the involvement of attentional processes to broaden the attentional focus that identifies events [131].

Attentional deployment (i.e., the way individuals direct their attention; [108]) can be related to metacognitive emotional regulation strategies that influence happiness too. Attentional deployment could increase the experience of positive emotion and happiness by mentally simulating positive events and increasing the saliency of present moments and positive autobiographical memories [108]. Exercises derived from positive psychology suggest that reporting early and recent autobiographical memories increases happiness [132]. Such “positive” exercises could be underpinned by attentional deployment strategy. Mindfulness, including the focus of attention on the present moment, would improve cognitive control and contribute to alter the default-mode network. The decrease in the activity of the default-mode network associated with mindfulness could explain the attenuation of rumination [96]. Considering, the negative relationship between rumination and happiness, the attenuation of rumination associated with mindfulness could increase happiness.

Cognitive reappraisal and attentional deployment are also both metacognitive strategies that could participate in enhancing self-control and increasing happiness. For example, attentional deployment may serve to avoid immediate temptation and stay focused on long-term goals [133].

Cognitive reappraisal and attentional deployment are both top-down determinants of happiness. They play a critical role in influencing cognitive processes toward enhancing happiness.

5.5 Discussion

The goal of this section was to provide a brief critical review of higher-order processes as top-down influencers of happiness. We have reported findings supporting the top-down influence of several higher-order processes (e.g., cognitive style, cognitive control and “executive functions” and metacognitive strategies) over happiness. At this point of our review, we propose to distinguish between two levels of top-down processes involved in happiness dynamics (Figure 3). The first level includes cognitive style (e.g., use of probability, Global-Local processing, attributional style) and “executive functioning.” The second level of higher-order processes is represented by metacognition, personality, intentions, and goals influencing cognitive processes belonging to the first level of higher-order processes.

Figure 3.

Top-down pathway leading to happiness.

Critically, although some experiments have manipulated factors that could influence happiness, numerous other studies are“correlational” in nature. Even when top-down influence could be involved, the influence of bottom-up processes on higher-order processes cannot be excluded. Sometimes, it is difficult to know what is the cause and what is the consequence [109]. A novel pathway of happiness genesis based on a bidirectional influence from bottom-up and top-down processes should be carefully considered.

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6. Epilogue. Enacting happiness: between emergence and integration

6.1 Toward a clearer terminology

Our review on happiness has gathered studies referring to various disciplines. One of the most striking facts is the lack of common theoretical constructs regarding what has been meant by “happiness” across research reports (including within disciplines). Spanning from basic emotion to eudaimonia, the “happiness” notion seems to be difficult to characterize and scientifically study.

The conceptual ambiguity identified is close to that already observed between emotion and mood [134, 135], as if the effective processes were difficult to refer through a unified approach. We propose that this state of affairs is related to i) the similar nature of affective processes that are associated with (positive or negative) valence evaluation whatever the level of processing and ii) the lack of integration of affective processes throughout the spectrum of bottom-up and top-down processing. In the following lines, we consider how this integration could be facilitated and we envisage a few regulatory processes of happiness.

6.2 Time and inertia: an affective momentum?

The different sections of this review have illustrated two main principles. First, bottom-up and top-down processing can be thought of as different levels of processing and/or different information processing pathways. Second, both levels and pathways are required to understand how happiness is enacted. Bottom-up processing creates the “inputs” for subjective well-being (both at “affective” and “cognitive”2 levels) as well as for eudaimonia or “psychological well-being.”3 Complementarily, top-down processes create a mindset to guide attention, interpret incoming information, reappraise the situation, and compare the state of affairs with expectations. Each level of processing and each pathway is supported by corresponding biological structures (among which PFC represents a highly integrative hub).

We suggest that time, cognitive inertia, and increasing resonance all feature the processes that transform several initial affective events into the materials of, and conditions for, happiness. In our opinion, differentiating emotion, mood and happiness cannot be adequately realized without taking into account time dimension. Emotion, mood, and happiness (the latter here considered as eudaimonia) would consist in increasingly abstract and long cycles of subjective experience made of some form of summing of experience cycles pertaining to a lower level (e.g., several cycles of emotions for mood, several cycles of mood for happiness). This “resonance” principle (see also [136]) could be the basis for bottom-up moderation of eudaimonia. Iterative microcycles of effective experience could be integrated, generating an affective “momentum,” the basis for subjective well-being, and the content for interpretative cognition leading to eudaimonia. This bottom-up route is coordinated with the top-down one. Each step of resonance at a higher level of integration (e.g., from mood to eudaimonia) could involve top-down structuration of information, such that apart from the initial affective content that is taken into account, the abstraction process of affective experience is dependent on attentional deployment (large or focused), comparison (or not) with previous expectations (etc.). The two “access doors” to happiness are then related to personal events and associated affective experience on the one hand, and to the ability to organize a nurturing mindset on the other hand.

6.3 Action, frequency, and variety: from bottom-up to top-down and the other way round

Hoping less and acting more” is sometimes a conclusion of philosophical reasoning on happiness [1]. Action is a condition of control over our life and adaptive behavior. The data reported in this chapter also indicate that freeing cognitive resources for action is important for happiness. The analyses mentioned in this chapter concerning brain default mode network suggest that self-oriented thought and rumination interfere with cognitive performance and positive affective experience. Affective regulation is costly. It removes resources that become unavailable for successful goal-directed behavior [137] and can undermine our perception of action opportunities [138]. Perceiving less opportunity for action could then be deleterious for effective action and for a global feeling of achievement and potential realization. Top-down pathways to happiness can be taken into account to prevent the consequences of nonrealistic expectations, broaden one’s standpoint on life experience, and reappraise situations. The education of brain, cognition, and behavior could contribute to help individuals develop strategies namely supported by frontal brain areas, and aiming at i) organizing the conditions of positive experience (e.g., frequency and variety of positive events), and ii) focusing activity on action rather than on hopes.

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Conflict of interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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Notes

  • According to Lyubomirsky et al. (2005), one critical distinction between “circumstances” and “intentional activities” is related to the amount of associated effort: “[…] circumstances happen to people, and activities are ways that people act on their circumstances” (p. 118; [13]).
  • Note that we use here the prevalent terminology, though in our view, there is cognition in effective processing and effects in cognition.
  • In the same vein, psychological well-being dissociated from subjective well-being may logically be questioned. This discussion, however, falls out of the scope of this chapter.

Written By

Éric Laurent, Kévin Bague, Colin Vegas and Jonathan Dartevelle

Submitted: 26 July 2022 Reviewed: 04 August 2022 Published: 22 December 2022