Cyber-Terrorism: An Appraisal of the Dimensions of the New Face of Terrorism in a Post-9/11 Period

Abstract

There is no gainsaying that the threats posed by terrorists have not abated since the declaration of a Global War on terrorism following the September 11 attacks. Instead, terrorism has gradually metamorphosed into something more sophisticated that can cause even more significant destruction on a massive scale. Over the last 20 years, terrorist attacks have assumed a new and worrisome dimension with States and major international corporations being victims of cyber-terrorism and online attacks. This new face of terrorism is gradually replacing the traditional hostage-taking, suicide bombings, and kidnappings etc that followed the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). This paper, therefore, critiques the GWOT particularly the threats posed by cyber-terrorism in the post-9/11 period. Whilst detailing some of the recent cyber-terrorism attacks and other preparatory acts committed by terrorist organizations, this paper appraises the effectiveness and coherence of the mechanisms put in place by the West and its allies in addressing cyberterrorism under its so-called GWOT. This systematic appraisal of the GWOT will contribute immensely to the field of social sciences, by providing objective answers to controversial and much-disputed questions arising from the war. Further studies on the implication(s) of the disagreement between world ‘super-powers’ on a global strategy for cyberterrorism is needed.

1. Introduction

…Terrorism has become the systematic weapon of a war that knows

No borders and seldom has a face.

— Jacques Chirac [1]

It has been over 20 years since the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) was declared by President Bush following the 9/11 attacks. The term ‘war on terrorism’ was first used by President Bush in his address to the United States (U.S) Congress on the 20th of September 2001 as a rallying call for a global campaign against Al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Since then, terrorist organizations have gradually changed their modus operandi and style, especially in the way they launch their threats or attacks against States, organizations, and even the public. In recent years, we have seen a complete shift away from the traditional suicide bombings, hijacking of aircraft, use of explosives, kidnapping of diplomats etc. usually by state actors to non-state actors as perpetrators of terrorism. We have also seen less sporadic and unplanned attacks, with a shift towards a more sophisticated, coordinated, and institutionalized attack being carried out, especially online. Although encouragement of terrorist acts through inciteful comments and extremist teachings on the internet is not a new trend, what is new is the online attacks that are gradually replacing the traditional hostage-taking, suicide bombings, and kidnappings that were hitherto commonplace.

This new face of terrorism raises serious concerns, especially when one considers the magnitude of destruction that could be caused by one online attack. Terror groups and violent extremists now use cyberspace for communicating, coordinating their attacks, spreading propaganda, fundraising, radicalization, and recruitment, providing them with an unprecedented opportunity to access a wider global community. To put this into context, imagine the catastrophic events that could happen if a terror group remotely gains control of the flight control systems of a country or shuts down the entire network system of public health providers like the United Kingdom’s (U.K) National Health Service (NHS). With heavy reliance on the internet by most agencies, the denial of access to critical online services could have devastating economic consequences and negatively affect the safety and well-being of citizens.

In 2007, the world watched in shock as the Estonian government computer systems were attacked and completely shut down [2]. This politically motivated cyber-attack which lasted 22 days resulted in the degradation and complete loss of government servers including public websites, emails, online banking, and Domain Name System (DNS). The cyber-attacks ranged from manually launching pings to botnet DDoS to exploiting specific vulnerabilities in router software. Many of the detected attacks were described in detail on various Russian language forums and websites, which were easily available to those interested in finding a way to participate in the attacks [2.1]. Although the Russian government has consistently denied direct involvement in the attacks. No organization or group has claimed responsibility for the cyber-attacks [1.2]. Following the Estonian attack, other countries have experienced similar cyber-attacks that have negatively impacted their citizens. These include the 2012 ‘Flame’ attacks on Middle Eastern countries where audio, skype conversation, and keyboard activities were recorded; Canada in 2011; India in 2012; and Israel in 2012 amongst others [3].

A report published in 2021 by the European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation (Eurocontrol) highlighted the increasing challenge of keeping the European aviation industry safe from cyber-attacks [4]. Although no impact on flight safety has been reported yet, the report revealed that cyber-attacks (especially ransomware attacks) on European aviation management systems rose by 530% between 2019 and 2020 alone. The report also stated that the price of ransomware mitigation measures is expected to cost global companies over 20 billion EUR a year going forward [4.1].

A major contributing factor to this rapid upsurge in online attacks by terror groups is the COVID-19 pandemic. The lockdowns and restriction of movements imposed by many countries created an avenue for terror organizations to re-strategize. But even before the COVID-19 pandemic, cyber-terrorism had gradually replaced the traditional hostage-taking, suicide bombings, and kidnappings adopted by terror groups. Equally, advancements in technology, especially the increase in the use of artificial intelligence have no doubt improved the capabilities and reach of terror groups and further worsened the cyber-terrorism landscape. It has therefore become increasingly difficult to ignore the threats posed online by terror groups. It will be safe to conclude that cyber-attacks have emerged as the new battleground for the war on terrorism.

As its central question, this book reviews the effectiveness of the GWOT that has been in effect since 2001 and assesses whether the GWOT narrative is still appropriate or needs to be revised. This chapter therefore appraises the effectiveness and coherence of the mechanisms put in place by the U.S. and its allies in addressing cyber-terrorism under its so-called GWOT. This chapter also assesses some of the challenges created by the GWOT to the promotion of global peace. Although extensive research has been carried out on the GWOT, particularly from the Watson Institute of International & Public Affairs, Brown University. This Centre has published research on the consequences of the U.S. and NATO’s wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. However, very little has been published on the threat of cyber-terrorism and how this has been addressed under the GWOT.

Before appraising the effectiveness of the GWOT, it is important to provide a context for the scope of cyber/online terrorism for this study. This contextualization is particularly imperative as terrorism is a broad phenomenon that could mean different things to different people in different situations. First, it is important to note that the controversy about what is considered terrorism has raged on for many years. This problem is further compounded by the absence of an international court or tribunal with specific jurisdiction over terrorist offenses. States are then left to define what constitutes terrorist acts within their jurisdiction. Hence, the phrase one man’s terrorist is another freedom fighter has become commonplace. The debate about whether cyber-attacks should be regarded as an act of terrorism has further compounded this definitional controversy. The question then is – will online/cyber-attacks against unarmed civilians, a State or an organization constitute an act of terror?

The answer to this question will largely depend on the aim of the attack. Without addressing the fraught question of what will constitute terrorism, if the cyber/online attack aims to ‘influence,’ ‘intimidate’ or ‘spread fear’ for political, religious, or ideological reasons then it will be considered terrorism. To put it simply, if it can create fear of terror or further a terror group’s agenda online, then it will be terrorism. This conclusion is premised on the fact that most national governments regard terrorism as an act intentionally perpetrated to influence, or intimidate the government, organization or the public to advance a political, religious or ideological cause etc. [5]. There is, therefore, no doubt that cyber-terrorism (also known as digital terrorism) could be defined as ‘disruptive attacks by recognized terrorist organizations against the computer systems with the intent of generating alarm, panic, or the physical disruption of the information system’ will fall under the ambit of terrorism [6]. If there was any doubt about the place and use of cyber-attacks by terror organizations, the U.S. discovery of an Al-Qaeda safehouse in Pakistan during a raid in 2002 devoted to solely training for cyberwarfare and computer hacking [7]. The U.S. officials referred to the suspects arrested in the safehouse as ‘electronic jihadists.’

For the current purposes, if the purpose of the attack on the computer systems of a State or an organization is to further some ideological, religious, or political objectives, it will be considered terrorism. It is also important to note that the focus here is on non-state actors and terror groups. Since the GWOT encompasses all terrorist acts that fall outside the traditional classification of war, it would be expected that cyber-terrorism is included within the scope. It is also important to note that the focus here is on non-state actors.

This non-empirical assessment has been divided into four parts. The first part gives a brief overview of the significance of 9/11 and the emergence of the GWOT. This is followed by a quick reflection on the GWOT and an assessment of the continued use of the ‘GWOT’ metaphor. The third section reviews cyber-terrorism as the new face of terror. The fourth section assesses the response of NATO, the EU, and the U.S. responses to cyber-terrorism. In so doing, the coherence and the effectiveness of the current binding international instrument on cyber-terrorism is addressed.

2. Sept 9/11: the turning point

There is no gainsaying that terrorism is a global phenomenon which transcends every continent. Cyberterrorism is classed as one of the highest security threats in the world, thus it is always top of the security agenda for most countries. States put in place counter-terrorism strategies to deal with terrorist attacks even before they happen. A typical example of this is the United Kingdom’s (U.K.) CONTEST strategy which is built around for main strands – ‘Pursue,’ ‘Prevent,’ ‘Protect,’ and ‘Prepare’ against terror attacks.

One could argue that there was no holistic approach to fighting terrorism on the international front before the 9/11 attacks. That event single-handedly changed the United States (U.S.) and its allies’ attitude to fighting terrorism. On September 11, 2001, nineteen members of Al Qaeda (an international terrorist organization) hijacked four American commercial aircraft and attacked the World Trade Centre in New York and the Headquarters of the U.S. Department of Defense (Pentagon). These attacks resulted in the death of nearly 3000 people with many more severely injured. It should be noted that Al-Qaeda had in the past committed several terrorist attacks against the U.S., its allies, as well as civilians, and military targets in other countries before the 9/11 attacks. However, 9/11 was the deadliest terror attack on U.S. soil which marked a significant turning point in the U.S. approach to fighting terrorism. President Bush, buoyed by overwhelming support from Americans and its allies, announced a comprehensive plan to go after Al-Qadea and every terrorist group of global reach. That declaration is now commonly referred to as the “global war on terrorism.” The declaration is ‘global’ in the sense that, for the first time in its history, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) an intergovernmental military alliance between twenty-nine European Union Countries, Canada and the U.S., invoked Article 5, which provides for its members to respond collectively in self-defense when one of them is attacked. One month after 9/11, the U.S. and its allies began an extensive military campaign against Al-Qadea in Afghanistan marking the beginning of a combined effort by international forces against terror groups which spanned more than two decades. The initial war aimed at Al Qaeda and militant Islamists in Afghanistan and Pakistan later extended to other militant groups such as the Taliban, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or IS) and their affiliates in countries like Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Niger.

The primary goal of the GWOT is to coordinate a single multinational force that is aimed at fighting terrorists as well as international cooperation of nations and intelligence sharing for countering -terrorism. This involved large-scale military deployment to countries perceived as harboring terrorists. Another important aspect of the GWOT is the combined international efforts at tracking and intercepting terrorist funds and the prevention of all forms of terror attacks.

2.1 A quick reflection on the GWOT and continued use of the metaphor

As we pause and reflect on the GWOT, questions have been asked about the effectiveness of the war. One of the most significant discussions on the GWOT over the past two decades is whether the campaign was a success or a complete failure. The U.S. and its allies’ sudden withdrawal from Kabul further ignited the question of whether the aim of the war was achieved.

The answer to this question depends on who you ask. On one hand, we have proponents who will argue that the war has gone a long way in bringing peace to the world. This belief is premised on the successful prevention of large-scale terrorist attacks on U.S soil and other countries, the toppling of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the dispersal of terror cells and networks, tracking and intercepting terrorists’ financiers, the arrest or elimination of senior members of terrorist organizations, as well as collective international collaboration in fighting terrorists.

On the other hand, we have critics who argue that the GWOT was a monumental failure that did not achieve the desirable result. Other critics argue that failures recorded in the fight against terror outweigh its successes. As emphasized by Richard Jackson, the GWOT military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have greatly increased deep-rooted hatred for America within the region and the Muslim world at large thereby strengthening the message of militant Islam. The attacks have also fostered a common cause amongst divided terrorist groups thereby encouraging more terrorist acts [8]. Another interesting argument put forward by critics is that the GWOT is an excuse for the pursuit of a larger U.S. agenda for controlling global oil reserves, expanding U.S. and allied forces’ military presence, and curtailing some regional powers and repressive regimes within the Arab world. Those who argue that the GWOT was a monumental failure often cite the civil war and sectarian clashes that followed the overthrow of the regime of Saddam Hussein in 2004. The U.S. had misjudged the power exercised by Saddam Hussein in holding the country together, albeit through repressive means. The chaos and civil war that followed the overthrow of the Saddam regime with thousands of Iraq killed further enunciates the failure of the GWOT. In addition, the hurried withdrawal from Kabul and the rate at which the Taliban took back control of the country after 20 years ultimately confirmed the failure of the war campaign. Some top politicians from NATO member countries criticized the hasty withdrawal from Kabul as “the biggest debacle that NATO has suffered since its founding” [9]. The UK Defense Secretary, Ben Wallace, described the speed at which the Taliban took over Afghanistan as the “failure of the international community.” Wallace explained that the mission in Afghanistan was not finished, even after over 20 years [9.1].

More objectively, a cursory look at some of the significant successes recorded by the allied forces during the GWOT campaign includes the killing of top Al-Qaeda leaders and top masterminds of the 9/11 attack like Osama Bin Laden, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah as well as several other wanted terrorists. More important is the reduction in the number of terror attacks by international terrorist groups in the U.S. Another significant ‘success’ is the toppling of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan which protected terrorists and the annihilation of terror cells across the region. On a global level, it can be argued that the GWOT contributed to a more peaceful world by reducing violent acts in many countries/.

However, these successes came at a huge price, both financially and in terms of the number of lives lost during the campaign. It is difficult to provide a precise figure of the total number of lives that have so far been lost because of direct or indirect consequences of the GWOT. Statistics provided by the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, suggest that over 937,000 people have died in the post-9/11 war violence [10]. These figures include U.S. military members, allied fighters, journalists, interpreters, and humanitarian/United Nations (UN) aid workers who were killed because of the war. The Report estimated that about 3.7 million people were killed indirectly in the post9/11 war zones, bringing the total death toll to at least 4.5–4.6 million, so far [10.1].

In terms of the financial cost, there has been no official government estimate on the total cost spent on Post 9/11 military operations. Professor Neta Crawford however estimates that about 8 trillion Dollars have so spent on post-9/11 war-related military activity by the U.S. alone up until 2022 [11]. A huge chunk of this amount is said to have gone to unknown contractors resulting in massive fraud, wastage and abuse [12]. There were also reports of massive corruption around overcharging for the fuel supplied to the U.S. forces by Kellogg, Brown and Root (KBR) [13]. Analysts have said that we will still be dealing with the high societal cost of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq 20 years from now. Another ‘dark side’ of GWOT is the extraordinary rendition of individuals to a third country as part of an extensive interrogation program. Although the U.S. continually deny this, the New York Times reported that about one hundred and fifty people were captured by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and transported to countries where they were tortured [14].

Whilst the debate continues about the effectiveness of the GWOT and why the war took so long, many observers have also questioned the relevance of the ‘GWOT’ narrative and its continued usage.

It is interesting to note that the U.K. government was the first to question the use of the term ‘war on terrorism.’ The UK’s Secretary for International Development, Hilary Benn, in 2007 stated that the UK would no longer use the phrase ‘war on terror [15]. Before this announcement, a memo was leaked to the Parliamentary Committee on Armed Services advising that they should avoid using colloquial expressions like ‘global war on terrorism – GWOT,’ instead, staff are advised to be specific in their references to the ‘war in Afghanistan’ or the ‘war in Iraq’ or simply say ‘ongoing military operations [15.1] The U.K’s position was later confirmed by the Former Head of the UK intelligence M15, Lady Eliza Manningham-Buller, who argued that the 9/11 attacks were a crime, not an act of war, therefore the term ‘war on terror was essentially an erroneous terminology [16].

President Barack Obama rarely used the term ‘GWOT’ throughout his tenure. The GWOT narrative was also questioned by his administration as not the appropriate description of the military campaign against terror. A leaked memo from the White House to the Pentagon Défense Department Office of Review suggested that the Obama administration was not prepared to carry on the use of the term “GWOT’, but rather the use of the term ‘Overseas Contingency Operation’ [17]. This in itself is symbolic. If there were any doubts from that memo, a 2013 remark by President Barack Obama at the National Défense University laid bare a shift in the U.S. approach away from the GWOT. President Obama openly questioned the strategy adopted by the U.S. during the war. He remarked– “I believe we compromised our basic values - by using torture to interrogate our enemies and detaining individuals in a way that ran counter to the rule of law” [18]. Obama stated further that America must define its effort not as a boundless, “global war on terror,” but rather as a series of persistent, targeted efforts to dismantle specific networks of violent extremists that threaten America [18.1]. These remarks signaled a gradual close of the curtain to the GWOT, with a move towards targeted killings carried out by drones.

To add to that, the U.S. Department of Defense announced in June 2022 that it will stop awarding the Global War on Terrorism Service Medal hitherto given to all military service members for their efforts in the military operations in the war [19]. This medal is now only awarded to service members directly serving in counter-terrorism operations instead of any type of war. These two events signify a new epoch in the GWOT and a shift in focus by the U.S. Although fighting terrorism remains a priority for the U.S. government, more efforts are now being channeled away from the GWOT to the Russian war in Ukraine.

3. Cyber-terrorism: the new face of terror

There is no doubt that technology plays an important role in contributing to the global socio-economic order. For decades now, terrorists have used the online space to promote, propagandize, attack, and even livestream their attacks. Unlike the traditional forms of attack, cyber-attacks could be done with relative anonymity, except the attacker chooses to reveal their identities. More importantly, the internet allows terror groups to spread their message to a bigger audience. As Calafato and Carauna argue, cyber-terrorism has now evolved from being a support strategy to commit an attack to the attack itself [20]. When President Obama declared in his 2013 address that terrorism ‘has shifted and evolved from the one that came to our shores in 9/1,’ he was also referring partly to the increased use of automated attacks by terrorist groups. Cyber-space has become a readily available tool for terrorists to launch their attacks. The increased use of cyber-attacks as a terrorist tool has heightened the need for an appraisal of the place of cyber-terrorism within the GWOT.

It was reported as far back as 2008 that hackers and cybercriminals made alliances with drug traffickers in Afghanistan where their activities and proceeds were used to support terrorist groups [21]. The Increased use of encryption keys for peer-to-peer traffic has made it difficult to track criminality over the internet thereby creating a conducive atmosphere to terror to commit their atrocities [22].

Despite the increased use of the internet as a tool for terror attacks, it appears that there was no holistic strategy for cyber-terrorism under the GWOT. In other words, cyber-terrorism was not included in the so-called GWOT strategy. The truth is that cyber-terrorism has simply not been treated the same as other traditional terrorism despite the physical and serious attacks and disruptions to infrastructure that could arise from this. The fight against cyber-terrorism has been restricted within the realm of national and regional responses. This conclusion is premised on the lack of a holistic strategy for cyber-terrorism and the disagreement amongst the nuclear powers which makes the implementation of any international strategy on cyber-terrorism a mere paper tiger. Whilst admitting that the United Nations has put in place several measures to address cyber-terrorism including putting together a global Counter-terrorism Strategy (UNGCTS) and creating the United Nations Office of Counterterrorism (UNOCT) in 2017 to lead and coordinate all U.N. approaches to preventing and countering terrorism and violent extremism. Despite all these measures, there is no consensus definition of cyber-terrorism by the international community making the application of any law difficult to apply in practice. In practical terms, States and regional blocs are left to develop their strategies against cyber-terror attacks. For instance, the UK Cyber Security Strategy presented to Parliament in 2009 refers to the establishment of a cross-government program to address the country’s strategic cyber security objectives which include working closely with the wider public sector, industry, civil liberties groups, the public and with international partners amongst other things [23]. The strategy simply recommends that the UK work closely with its international partners in addressing this menace without a clear strategy as to how this will be done. The Report does not specify in plain terms the strategy it would adopt on the international front in cases of cyber-terrorism. Similarly, the recent UK Government Cyber-security strategy 2022–2030 also mirrors the 2009 strategy, with no mention of any holistic, international strategy for cyber-terrorism. The core of the recent strategy rests on public sector organizations, including government departments, arms-length bodies, agencies, local authorities, and other wider public sector organizations [24].

The reason behind the lack of a ‘concrete’ ‘collective’ strategy for cyber-terrorism like what we see under the ‘GWOT’ by Western countries and the U.S. is simple and not far-fetched. First, cyber-terrorism is an act committed within cyberspace and the ‘battle’ needs to be on the internet which has no limits and physical enemies. The cyber-terrorism methods adopted by most countries are therefore shrouded in secrecy so as not to allow the terrorists or hackers to maneuver their way through the defenses. More importantly, as the global dependency on digital and connectivity continues to grow, new vulnerabilities that threaten the political and economic systems emerge every day. Nations are therefore extremely careful about sharing sensitive information and data, especially about their national security. The implications of releasing national security data also raise questions about national sovereignty and the consequences attached could be far-reaching.

Also, the complexity and vulnerability of sharing online data as well as the potential scope and reach of online attacks deter countries from collaborating on this issue. In addition, states like China and Russia are viewed by the U.S. and the West as active actors that engage in mining data of other countries to assess their weaknesses, influence the activities within the country, or push out their propaganda and global market strength. Hacking claims by the U.S. against Russia have continued for decades. For instance, it was alleged that Russia executed several cyber-attacks on 21 U.S. states during the last election to help Donald Trump win the election. Russia has repeatedly denied the allegations. The U.S. Department of Justice in 2021 charged four Russians, who worked for the Russian government with cyber offenses including attempting, supporting, and conducting computer intrusions against the global energy sector between 2012 and 2018 resulting in the hacking of thousands of computers belonging to hundreds of companies and organizations in approximately 135 countries. The defendants were accused of planning to disrupt, if not paralyze, the delivery of critical energy services to hospitals, homes, businesses, and other locations essential to sustaining communities. The U.S. Deputy Attorney General Lisa O. Monaco described the accused as “Russian state-sponsored hackers who pose a serious and persistent threat to critical infrastructure both in the United States and around the world” [25]. On the other hand, Russia also accuses the U.S. intelligence agencies of hacking thousands of iPhones belonging to Russian users including foreign diplomats. The ‘cold war’ between Western countries and the U.S. against Russia and China has hurt cyber-terrorism on the international front. That said, there have been several instances where States have joined forces to address cyber-attacks. A good example of this was the joint effort by 13 countries including the UK’s National Crime Agency, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Intelligence, and Germany’s security agency to shut down a prolific ransomware called HIVE. The law enforcement agencies from these countries were able to identify the decryption keys used by HIVE and managed to share them with many of the victims, helping them regain access to their data without paying the cyber criminals. This company had hitherto extorted more than $100 million in ransom payments within 2 years [26]. In a similar operation, the UK’s security agency, in an unprecedented operation involving 17 countries collaborated and successfully took down Genesis Market, one of the most dangerous marketplaces selling stolen account credentials to hackers worldwide. This was the first time a large number of countries were coming together for a cyber/online operation. That operation also resulted in transitional operations across the globe against the users of this platform, resulting in 119 arrests, 208 property searches and 97 knock-and-talk measures [27]. The significance of Genesis Market takedown cannot be over-emphasized. Genesis was a major cyber-criminal that would offer the sale of what is referred to as ‘bots’ that had infected victims’ computers and organizations’ devices through malware or account takeover attacks. Upon purchase of the bots, criminals would automatically get access to the data by using saved login, cookies, and autofill from data. What this tells us is that major collaborative efforts against cyber-terrorism might never be revealed to the public due to the pervasiveness of the internet until, perhaps arrests have been made. This is almost certainly due to the sophisticated nature of cyber warfare, where bombs and gunfire are not used but rather it is a warfare that requires experts and highly trained experts who try to prevent large-scale disruptions of computer networks and systems. Since there is no holistic strategy under the GWOT that encompasses cyber-terrorism, it is therefore important to assess how the U.S., the E.U., and NATO T have responded to this. In so doing, some of the challenges and impediments against a holistic strategy for cyber-terrorism will be highlighted. To be clear, what is discussed below is not included in the GWOT, but they are ancillary to the global war against terrorism. As earlier established the fight and the battlefield for cyber-terrorism take place in a completely different sphere - cyberspace.

4. NATO, the EU, and the U.S. responses to cyberterrorism

4.1 NATO

As a military alliance at the forefront of the GWOT, NATO’s main priority is to protect its members from any form of attack. NATO recognized that all threats, including cyberterrorism, are part of its core assignment of defense and deterrence. In 2016 the organization reaffirmed its defensive mandate and recognized cyberspace as an area of its operations. NATO’s response to cyber-terrorism is also enshrined in its collective defense clause as set out in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty - an attack on one is an attack on all. As earlier mentioned, the only time Art. 5 was triggered was after 9/11. It is almost impossible for Art 5. To be triggered because of a cyber-attack on member nations because cyber-terrorism is much more complex and difficult in comparison to a bomb blast or drone attack. To demonstrate its seriousness and readiness against the growing sophistication of cyber threats against its members, NATO created a Cyberspace Operations Centre in Belgium in 2018. NATO acknowledged that war within cyberspace must be as effective as it is in the air, land, and sea [28]. However, NATO’s response to cyber-terrorism is different from its response to traditional terrorist attacks. Again, this is due to the nature of cyber-warfare which according to the organization requires a comprehensive approach through unity of effort at the political, military, and technical levels [29]. NATO sees itself as a platform for its allies to consult politically, exchange national responses and if possible, consider collective responses for cyber-terrorism attacks. To achieve this objective, NATO works with, the European Union, the U.N, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on cyber defense amongst others. NATO also defines targets for Allied countries’ implementation of national cyber defense capabilities via the organizations’ Defense Planning Process. The defense method and strategy include regular such as annual cyber coalition exercises, crisis management exercises, and provision and training for dealing with cyber-attacks as well as high-level meetings of military decision-makers. NATO also have several practical tools to enhance point of contact in cases of cyber-attacks in all its allied capitals. These contacts are trained in cyber-defense assistance including provisions and response capabilities. Another important strategy used by NATO against cyber-terrorism is that ‘technical information is also exchanged through NATO’s Malware Information Sharing Platform, which allows indicators of compromise to be shared rapidly among Allied cyber defenders, reinforcing the Alliance’s overall defense posture.’ [29.1]. The E.U. and NATO share protected information relating to cyber responses including best practices for each situation. Both organizations also have enhanced cooperation in several areas including training, research, and exercises, with tangible results in countering cyber threats. The Technical Arrangement on Cyber Defense between the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (now known as the NATO Cyber Security Centre) and the Computer Emergency Response Team for the EU institutions, bodies, and agencies (CERT-EU) provides a framework for exchanging information and sharing best practices between emergency response teams.

When Estonia became a target of cyber-attack in April 2007 NATO swung into action. NATO and the U.S. sent experts to the country to help recover data and reinforce their cyber-security capabilities. After restoring access to the internet, NATO in 2008 established a world-class cyber defense center in Tallinn, Estonia. This effort made Estonia one of the top countries in cyber defense and cyber-security [30].

4.2 The EU

It is important to note that the European Union was the first regional body to call for a strategy to address terrorist use of the internet. The European Commission in 2013 approved the creation of the European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) to function within Europol. The primary aim of the European Cybercrime Centre is to have a coordinated approach to cyber-attacks and to support its Member States in establishing operational and analytical capacity for investigating and assisting its international partners in fighting cyber/online attacks. The EC3 is strategically created to become the central point for the EU’s fight against cybercrime including cyber-terrorism attacks that could affect critical infrastructure and information systems of E.U member states.

On the international front, for the first time an international Convention on Cybercrime, also known as the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime or the Budapest Convention came into effect in July 2004. The following year, the Council of Europe’s Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism of 2005 was passed.

It is important to note that the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime was drawn up by Europe. Even though the Convention was drawn up by the Council of Europe, it has been ratified by the United States. The significance of this Convention is that it was the first multilateral legally binding international instrument for the international community to address cybercrime with powers and procedures for computer network searches and interceptions. So far 68 countries have ratified the Convention [31]. However, countries like Russia and China have refused to ratify the Convention. Russia argues that adopting the Convention would violate its sovereignty and the rights of its citizens. Besides the ‘cold war’ earlier alluded to, Russia’s main concern is that ratifying the Convention will give agencies like the FBI covert power to come to the country for searches. President Putin was holding on to the transborder search of Russian computers by the FBI during the investigation of two Russian citizens Alexey Ivanov and Vasily Gorshko in 2001, hence the reference by Russia to its citizens’ rights [32]. Another nuclear power that has refused to sign the Convention is India. India’s main reservation is that they were not included during the drafting process of the Convention and have also raised some concerns about sharing their data with Western countries. Apart from that, the biggest obstacle under the Budapest Convention is the provision of Art Art 32(b) which permits a party to the Convention to only ‘access or receive, through the computer system in its territory, stored computer data located in another party, if the Party obtains lawful and voluntary consent of the person who has the lawful authority to disclose the date to the Party through that computer system.’

The implication of Art 32 (B) is that consent must be given voluntarily given. This could engage sovereignty and create a lot of political disputes amongst countries that have ratified the Convention, especially given the risk associated with allowing security agents from another country to access or search the computer system of their country. This provision could also potentially engage the domestic laws of signatories. Another lacuna in the Budapest convention is the lack of a clear statement regarding mutual assistance from signatories. Although the Convention obliges parties to cooperate in the best possible way, it does not impose an immediate obligation to offer information. All these raise questions about the effectiveness of the Convention, especially its enforcement in practice.

4.3 The U.S.A.

As the world leader in the fight against terrorism under the GWOT, the U.S. also play a leading role in the fight against cyber-terrorism. Much of all the cyber-terrorism operations highlighted in this chapter include the direct contribution of the U.S. agents. In addition to spearheading the GWOT as well as cyber-terrorism prevention. The U.S. has made several contributions both domestically as well as on the international front. To better respond to cyber threats, President Obama signed an Executive order that gives the U.S. powers to impose sanctions on cyberterrorism. The Executive Order authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of State, to impose sanctions on individuals or entities that engage in significant malicious cyber-enabled activities that are reasonably likely to result in, or have materially contributed to, a significant threat to the national security, foreign policy, or economic health or financial stability of the United States [33]. On the domestic front, the US Department of Defense (DoD) deals with cyberterrorism and protecting its information grid. For instance, the U.S. created the Air Force Cyber Command (AFCYBER command) in 2008 to assist the DoD in preserving U.S. cyberspace from all forms of cyber-attack. In 2021 President Biden announced a new Executive order to improve U.S. cyber security. The new Executive order has 10 comprehensive strategies for defending the U.S. against cyber-attacks.

The U.S. has also imposed comprehensive sanction packages against more than a dozen Russian-speaking cyber criminals who targeted institutions across the world, including the NHS during the height of the pandemic. As global dependency on digital services and connectivity grows, the U.S. continues to assist countries hit by Cyber-attack. These include improving the detection of Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities and Incidents on Federal Government Networks, and establishing a cyber–Safety Review Board, modernizing Federal Government Cybersecurity amongst others.

Besides the measures, sanctions, and judicial intervention that are shared with the public, much of the details and methods used by the U.S. in countering cyber-terrorists are kept secret for obvious reasons.

5. Conclusion

Having appraised the effectiveness and coherence of the mechanisms put in place by the U.S. and its allies in addressing cyber-terrorism under its so-called GWOT, one of the main findings that has emerged from this assessment is that cyber-terrorism was not included in the GWOT. Cyber-terrorism, unlike traditional forms of terrorism, does not necessarily require any form of violence, however, the result could be catastrophic. The study also indicates that the approach and strategy used in addressing cyber-terrorism have been completely different from those used in traditional warfare against terror groups. Actions are taken on a regional and domestic level without any effort that we can refer to as a global war on cyber-terrorism. Whilst tremendous effort has been made to have an international instrument on cyber-terrorism that was spearheaded by the E.U., ‘great power’ countries like Russia, India, and China continue to frustrate any effort to have an international and holistic strategy on cyber-attacks and cyber-terrorism. Though the curtain on the GWOT appears to have been closed with the complete withdrawal from Kabul. Much of the remaining war on terrorism is done remotely using drones. Nonetheless, the cyber-space remains and will continue to be a hot battleground for terrorist activity with key actors changing from terror groups to States themselves.

As demonstrated in the analysis, international frameworks and instruments on cyber-terrorism are only effective and applicable if a state is a signatory to that instrument. This raises a lot of questions about the application and effectiveness of the instrument in countries that are not signatories. Consequently, there is a need for agreement and harmonization, especially from countries like Russia, China, and India if the international instrument on cyber-terrorism is to have any effect.

Since access to the Internet is relatively easy, cybercrime is becoming more organized and established as a transnational business. Questions around cyber-terrorism will continue to remain relevant in years to come. Therefore, further research on GWOT, with more focus on the challenges posed by cyber-terrorism to global peace and security as well as the implication(s) of the disagreement between the world ‘super-powers’ on a global strategy will need to be undertaken.

Conflict of interest

“The authors declare no conflict of interest.”