Global War on Terrorism in Mali

Abstract

The early war on global terrorism had a significant impact on Mali in the 1980s. The French-led Operation Barkhane aimed to eradicate terrorism in the country, especially in the North. However, in February 2022 despite some military achievements, President Macron decided to withdraw French forces from Mali. This war has left Mali grappling with ongoing concerns and internal instability, which allowed the Wagner group to consolidate its grip in the security sector under its leader Prigozhin, who seemed to return to Russia.

1. Introduction

The French Operation Barkhane (2014–2022) was let to eliminate of terrorism in Mali. In 2018, Prigozhin and its Wagner mercenaries expanded their presence in Sudan, Mozambique, Madagascar, Central Africa and Mali. This article tries to understand the war of terror in Mali. Starting on 23–24 March 2019, several massacres were committed by armed groups in Mopti, central Mali.

The term ‘Global War on Terror’ was used internationally for the first time by President George Bush in September 2001. Its relation to the Malian situation or its spread to one of the poorest sub-Saharan countries is an indication of persistent security threats with several tension zones worldwide. It is appropriate, also, to define the present situation in West Africa, particularly in Mali.

In Mali as of 2023, the total population is 23.3 million and 10.3 million Malians are less than 14 years old; Mali has poor rating in terms of the Human Development Index, it is one of the poorest countries in the world, and ranks low in terms of health, income and education, and development in general and, in particular, made minimal advancement in efforts to eliminate the worst forms of child labor. In Mali, 48% of the population is less than 15 years old and only 54% of them go to school; in the north from Gao to Timbuktu, the majority of the schools are run by religious clerics who teach the Quran to the local youth.

The origin of the war on terror in Africa and in particular in West Africa and Mali started slowly after the death of Muammar Gaddafi on 20 October 2011 (see Figure 1 below).

Figure 1.

Sahel, west and central Africa map.

In Mali, the war on terror was a nightmare for France. It started with NMLA (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad). In mid-2023, France had to reinvent its relationship in Africa, with China developing things like the global Belt and Road Initiative at the same time, and Russia taking advantage of an increasingly strained relation between Mali and its former staunchest ally in its war against terrorism.

2. War of terror and events in Mali

Azawad includes NE Mali, Southern Algeria, Burkina Faso and Niger. The problem is to judge the role of terror in the 1980s and at present. But before the crisis in 2012, Mali was considered in Africa as a ‘model of democracy and respect of plurality’ ([1] p. 7). The Azawad region includes in particular Tuareg and Arab people.

In particular in 2016, violence in Mali was not relegated only to Timbuktu but in the region of Mopti and in the central region of Macina—limited by Ségou in the West and Ténenkou in the East—where the ‘men on motorcycles,’ mostly Peuls, and Bambara—who were animist—were jihadists. Hamadoun Koufa is ‘preaching jihad’ and on 4 May 2015, men from Hamdallay used explosives to demolish the mausoleum of Sékou Amadou [2].

The war of terror cannot stop for the moment in Mali, Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso. Fortunately for them, the last two countries share their knowledge of the jihadist movements [3, 4]. The death toll in Moura in May 2022 was between 300 and 400 according to conservative estimates, with most of the victims being depicted as civilians.

Long ago, France knew the importance of Timbuktu to reduce violence, so it is not a surprise that French president Hollande and Malian president Dioncounda Traoré visited Timbuktu in 2013 and it was very emotional for the president of Mali.

Prigozhin and Wagner forces may help also Mali to reduce the problem of violence in Africa, but they will take huge amount of money as compensation. Early July 2023, Yevgeny Prigozhin was said to be in Belarus, but we do not know if he will return to Africa. To survive, after recovering 10 billion rubles (U$111 million) in St. Petersburg, he seems to have no time to travel. The war in Ukraine continues in early July 2023 and Prigozhin is said to be in Russia. Prigozhin is particularly interested in the importance of Syama mine in Kadiolo Cercle, Sikasso Region in Mali (mindat.org). According to Global Data, Mali is the world’s eighteenth-largest producer of gold in 2023, with output down by 3.83% in 2021. Over the 5 years to 2021, production from Mali increased by a CAGR (Compound Annual Growth Rate) of 7% and is expected to drop by a CAGR of 1.06% between 2022 and 2026.

2.1 Why conflict and violence in Mali?

The conflicts between nomads and pastoralists – Bambara and Peul communities – have deep historical roots in Mali. Historically, these groups have competed for resources such as land and water, leading to periodic tensions and conflicts. However, in recent years, these conflicts have taken a new dimension due to the influence of radical Islam and the activities of extremist groups in the region.

Nomadic groups, such as the Tuareg and Arab people, have traditionally relied on livestock herding as their primary means of subsistence. Pastoralists, on the other hand, are settled farmers who depend on agriculture. The competition for land and water resources between these groups has often led to clashes and violence. The proliferation of weapons and the increased presence of extremist groups have further escalated these tensions, turning them into security threats.

Resolving the tensions between nomads and pastoralists, Bambaras and Peuls, requires a multi-faceted approach. Additionally, the violence resulting from these tensions displaces populations, disrupts livelihoods and exacerbates humanitarian crises.

It necessitates addressing the root causes of the conflicts, such as competition over resources, and implementing inclusive policies that promote equitable access to land and water. Furthermore, efforts should focus on fostering dialog and reconciliation among communities.

Religious issues and particularly radical Islam and leadership play an important role in Mali.

The problem is to judge the role of terror in the 1980s and in the present.

The second Russia–Africa Summit took place in St. Petersburg’s Expo Forum from 27 to 28 July 2023, with leaders from the majority of African countries expected to attend. The Russia–Africa Economic and Humanitarian Forum will take place alongside: ‘it will provide a platform for business meetings and includes a program of more than 30 panel sessions and thematic events’ (African Business, 3 July 2023).

‘Jihad can’t be seen only by the naked eye; this collective mobilization in favor of the jihadists must bring the government to reconsider its relationship with the governed people.’ Is this a new socio-political sort of revendication? ([1], p. 87).

Religious issues and particularly radical Islam and leadership play an important role in Mali.

In 2023, the president of Ivory Coast, Alassane Ouattara, is forced to compose with his neighbors in Mali (interim President Assimi Goita), in Guinea, Conakry (interim President Mamady Doumbouya), and in Burkina Faso (President Ibrahim Traoré).

All the violent social movements in Africa are not influenced by Islamists, and for example, the Burkina Faso popular uprising on 30–31October 2014 does not seem to have been stoked by jihadist activists. The intermediary period between the end of the Compaoré regime seems to reflect only a new regime with profound social aspiration [5].

In 2008, only 54% of the children were attending school, and deprived northern regions such as Timbuktu benefitted from Islamic schools in the absence of social and education infrastructure. Mali is classified as the 178th country among 182 by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and is characterized by extreme, widespread chronic poverty. According to the UNDP, there are some hopes. The Bandiagara region is now witnessing a significant return of displaced individuals, with 74,400 people recorded as having returned in April 2023, doubling the number of returning people from the previous year. It is hoped that peace will return again with peaceful elections being re-planned in 2024. To understand Mali better, it is important to study other countries of West Africa.

The law in Burkina Faso is well defined concerning religious liberty in public services. It concerns, in particular, wearing the veil, which is allowed by the law (article 33). Article 49 in Burkina Faso allows the right to participate in a confessional association. But terrorist Islamism still exists in the country ([6], p. 129).

3. Sufism is important in Mali

The centrality of Sufism in the propagation of Islam in precolonial and later, without necessarily resorting to Jihad, is important in Mali.

Brahma Mustapha [7] demonstrated the popularity of Sufism, its resistance to colonization and the simplicity of the Muslim faith advocated by Sufism in relation to institutional and scriptural Islam. There is only one son who succeeds to the All, that too due to the strong resemblance and hierarchical organization of the family of Sufi called Zaouias, without resorting to Jihad.

For example, the Risāla al-Ghallāwiyya de Sīdī Muḥammad b. Mukhtār al-Kuntī (died in 1241/1828) gives the history of the dynastic nomad from the beginning. Ould Cheikh is quoted in Jeppie and Bachir Diagne in 2008 (pp. 232–233), and Bāy gave a copy to lieutenant Maurice Cortier in September 1909: The Kitāb al-Qal’id wa l-Talā’id is a famous hagiography of the father and mother of the same Sīdī Muḥammad b. Mukhtār with many manuscripts in the ‘Bibliothèque Nationale’ of Paris.

4. Russia and Mali

On 26 June 2023 – concerning Wagener – Sergueï Lavrov, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared nothing is changed (Jeune Afrique). Few days later, the UN Security Council was ready to leave Mali with a force constituted by West African Countries, amounting to 13,000 soldiers before the end of the year 2023. It is terrible information, and nobody knows if Wagner mercenaries will be able to bring back security. According to Brussels Agency Politico, Fidèle Gouandjika, a minister and special adviser to CAR President Faustin-Archange Touadéra, told AFP his country had signed a defense deal with Russia, but Wagner aid comes always at a cost which could be impressive. West African countries have no money, and if Prigozhin provides troops, it will cost a lot to Mali.

We do not know yet how the question of Islamic war of terror can be solved in 2023, in particular in Mali and Burkina Faso. On 19 July 2023, Reuters using Russian sources quoted from Guy Faulconbridge who said that… it is not the end and it will cost a lot to African countries.

5. Epilogue

In 2013, in central Mali, poorer Peuls, in particular in Macina, made a social revolt against Bambaras, who practice animism, but the main reason was economic and politico-social. The government has to reconsider the real needs of rural communities and their protection against plundering, in particular, in regions where the police or ‘gendarmery’ forces are less present.