Formation of New Approaches to the Fight against Terrorism and Separatism in the Context of Increasing International Tension on the Eurasian Continent

Abstract

The chapter will consider the main problems of modern terrorist threats in Europe and Asia. As part of the analysis of the European anti-terrorism policy, special attention will be paid to legislation in the field of digital counter terrorism, as well as specific policy measures of the European Union states to overcome the problem of terrorism. In addition, the possibility of effectively confronting the Central Asian countries with terrorist and separate threats, which are traditional for the region, will be considered. At the same time, regional trends in the formation of a new anti-terrorist policy, in the conditions of international tension, as well as the policy of the new Afghan government and its place in the system of ensuring the stability of the region will be outlined.

1. Introduction

The increase in the activity and diversity of modern terrorism is a serious problem that is crucial for ensuring stable and secure state development. Eurasia is the largest continent in the world and is often the target of terrorist attacks. In this context, the activities of major organizations in ensuring counterterrorism security become particularly important. Studying and analyzing the methods and institutional foundations of counterterrorism activities will allow for a better analysis of existing programs and the development of more advanced methods to combat terrorist devices in the future.

Accordingly, this work will examine the activities of Eurasian states in regulating the issue of terrorism and its derivatives through normative and instrumental means. The main features of regional regulation will be analyzed, as well as the factors that may influence the further development of the situation. Eurasia, in this work, is understood to include the continent encompassing the territory of modern Europe, Russia, Central Asia, and partially China. Other parts of Asia, such as South or Southeast Asia, which are formally located on the Eurasian continent, are excluded from this list because their counterterrorism systems differ significantly on a purely regional level, and comparing the abovementioned parts of the continent can provide a clearer and more systematic analysis.

Broadly, this research can be divided into two parts: Eastern and Western. The Western part refers to the system of sociopolitical and legal norms with a clear system of control and a unified hierarchy, within which the EU member states regulate their counterterrorism activities. The western part of Eurasia in its development involves an analysis of the activities of the EU as a common exponent of pan-European political unity. At the same time, the Eastern part refers to several interconnected but independent structures that regulate the structure of counterterrorism activities on the territory of Russia, Central Asian states, and China. It is worth noting that the mutual influence of these structures and large states forms a unique environment for countering terrorism. Within this environment, its own system of “checks and balances” is being formed, which outlines not only the general contours of counter-terrorism policy in the region but also the system of interstate interaction.

2. West Eurasia

European legislation concerning counterterrorism activities began to develop in the 1990s, but it was not until the twenty-first century that the system reached its peak. The catalyst for this development was the events of September 11, 2001, in the United States. It is worth noting that the entire system of normative and legal regulation in this area, like many others within the EU, has its specific characteristics. These include a focus on international law as the preferred approach, harmonization of legislation among all member states of the organization, the establishment of special collective bodies to prevent terrorist threats, and the specificity of national-level regulation of terrorism issues.

After September 11 and the issuance of the UN resolution on September 28 aimed at creating the Counter-Terrorism Committee, the European Council adopted several resolutions concerning the prevention of terrorism on European territory. In 2002, the EU developed the Strategy (Plan) for Counter-Terrorism Activities. This plan became the institutional foundation for the organization’s counterterrorism activities, as it outlined the key measures to combat terrorism, defined the concept of “terrorism” itself, and laid the foundations for harmonizing the laws of member states regarding this phenomenon. Following a series of terrorist attacks in 2014–2015, the EU adopted a new counterterrorism strategy. This strategy primarily focused on strengthening surveillance of users’ personal data, such as the creation of a biometric database for passports, the establishment of a special law enforcement network, enhanced control of terrorist activities on the internet, and the retention of telephone call records for up to 6 months, among other measures. These steps were crucial in enhancing the EU’s protection against terrorist attacks.

In the same year, the European Council adopted a directive aimed at combating money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism, which complemented the Common Position of the European Council No. 2001/931/CFSP, regulating the funding of terrorism. The 2005 directive further normalized the system established by the 2001 Position by creating two lists for the financing of foreign terrorists and terrorists on EU territory, making the work of special services more complex. Subsequently, there was gradual modernization and harmonization of European counterterrorism law.

After the terrorist attacks in 2015–2016, systemic documents aimed at adopting more coordinated measures to combat terrorism were introduced. However, the documents adopted during this period had limited impact, as they largely reiterated previous agreements.

With the onset of the migration crisis in the EU from 2014 to 2019, the risk of terrorist acts also increased due to the arrival of many individuals from impoverished African and Middle Eastern countries. Considering this issue, the European Commission prepared a special document in April 2015—the European Security Agenda. Within this Agenda, decisions were made to implement criminal law and criminal procedural tools to combat terrorism, including a revision of Framework Decision No. 2002/475/JHA [1]. In December of the same year, the Commission prepared a draft directive on counterterrorism, which was approved on March 15, 2017. The main goal of Directive No. 2017/541 [2] was to align EU legislation on terrorism with international legal norms and adapt it to new challenges and realities [3]. This Directive also regulates the activities of EU citizens traveling abroad to engage in terrorism, the protection of victims of terrorist acts, and additional criminal liability for financing terrorism.

The terrorist attacks after the start of the migration crisis significantly worsened the situation for European domestic tourism. Many tourist centers in Europe, such as France, Belgium, and other countries, suffered greatly from ISIS and similar organizations. Tourists are often targeted by terrorists because it leads to media coverage and the spread of information about the attack [4].

Europol also carries out additional measures to counter terrorism. Its goal is to facilitate cooperation and coordination among EU member states on issues related to illegal drug trafficking, migration, terrorism, and international crime. While this organization is not analogous to the FBI, Europol currently performs extensive information and analytical functions and provides support in conducting investigations. A similar function is performed by Eurojust, but in the legal and regulatory domain.

In 2015, work in the digital sphere also intensified. A group for information sharing on the internet was created to reduce the level and consequences of terrorist and violent extremist propaganda online. In this area, the EU faced significant technological challenges. It was difficult to cover the entire internet space, and the rapid growth of technology added to the complexity. Tracking direct propaganda among young people on the internet was also challenging, as it was often difficult to machine-distinguish between extreme political views and terrorism propaganda. The EU was unable to establish a unified approach in this direction. However, by 2020, an Anti-Terrorism Plan was developed, which aimed at countering radicalization online, conducting cultural work with various segments of the population, and protecting residents from the consequences of terrorist acts. Additionally, after a meeting with major technology companies in 2019 following the Christchurch tragedy, an agreement was reached to regulate extremist content on the platforms of these companies, which helped to better control the online environment.

In recent years, there has been significant collaboration between special law enforcement agencies and digital platform representatives and digital service providers, including operators of major online platforms (including social networks). Europol has taken a leading role in coordinating the activities of online platforms and national authorities of EU member states through its Internet Referral Unit and the EU Internet Forum, which includes representatives of key companies (YouTube/Google, Facebook, Microsoft, and Twitter). The coordination with the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism, which brings together the same private sector entities and the EU, along with 29 other countries and the United Nations, has significantly reduced jihadist propaganda [5]. The primary tool is a database of hashtags that records identified terrorist materials and provides cross-platform blocking.

A similar project within the EU itself is the Regulation on removing terrorist content from the Internet. The regulation allows for better control of terrorist activity and timely removal from the Internet. Nevertheless, difficulties still exist in removing information hosted on the territory of another EU country. Another challenge is the upcoming deployment of 5G technologies. Given the need for internet segmentation and increased user anonymity due to encryption when using 5G, Europol and national control agencies may find themselves in a situation where it will be impossible for them to track terrorists. To address this issue, some politicians want to require providers to collect unencrypted user data as a mandatory measure, but this approach faces various human rights issues regarding privacy [6].

It is important to note that at the national level, a series of laws and regulations are also enacted to expand or refine the pan-European directives related to counterterrorism. For example, in Germany in 2021, the Law on Combating Right-Wing Extremism and Hate Crimes was passed, amending several laws and requiring major companies involved in social media to report suspected illegal content to the authorities. On September 22, a law was enacted to protect politicians under threat and individuals targeted due to their national, racial, religious/ethnic origin, ideology, disability, or sexual orientation. In July, the German parliament passed a law to enhance surveillance capabilities by the domestic intelligence service. The increased use of encrypted communication poses challenges to targeted surveillance. In March, the parliament passed the Foreign Intelligence Act, which regulates and enhances oversight of Germany’s foreign intelligence service [7]. Considering the specific architecture of security in Germany, it is worth noting the strong limitations of its security services due to the strict separation of law enforcement and intelligence agencies, which hampers cooperation, and restrictions on collecting personal data of German citizens.

In 2021, France also enacted a series of important laws to control terrorist activities. Given the high level of jihadist terrorist threat, on August 24, France adopted the “Respect for the Principles of the Republic” law, also known as the “Anti-Separatism” law, aimed at dispelling concerns that radical Islamists have created parallel societies that instill ideas contrary to French values. This law aims for the gradual integration of Islamic migrants into French society and combating the formation of a “parallel society,” which is a problem for the country. On July 30, the Law on Combating Terrorism and Espionage was enacted, which allows for more effective measures to control suspects of terrorism, including conducting searches and closing “suspicious” religious institutions that promote radical Islam [8]. At the same time, a special armed contingent of 7000 people remains in the country as part of Operation “Sentinel,” which is aimed at promptly responding to terrorist threats.

In these countries, a significant part of European counterterrorism policy is based on the British “Prevent” strategy, which has become the basis for similar pan-European and national programs. The foundation of this program is to prevent the “cultivation of radical views through education and full employment.” In this system, there are special educators who regularly work with children and adults and constantly regulate their understanding that terrorism is a dangerous and destructive phenomenon [9].

It is also worth noting the several peculiarities of European terrorism. First and foremost, according to Europol and Statista Research Department, religious terrorism poses the greatest threat [10]. In 2019 alone, about 436 cases of terrorist attacks were recorded in the EU. For comparison, the second-largest number of attacks comes from left-wing and anarchist organizations, with 111 incidents for the same year. Although the global COVID-19 pandemic led to a significant decrease in terrorist acts (only 260 cases of terrorist acts were recorded in 2021), this is only temporary. According to Europol’s data, the most complex situation with religious (jihadist) terrorism exists in France. This country experiences the highest number of terrorist attacks each year [11]. The situation is also challenging in Germany. These countries are targeted by terrorism due to the difficulty of adapting a large number of migrants to European conditions, resulting in cultural conflicts, a high prevalence of radical Islamic ideologies, and more.

There is also a relative isolation of other terrorist movements. While religious terrorism is widespread in many EU countries due to increased migration flows, the second-largest movement (left-wing radical) is generally confined to Italy, partially Greece and Spain, and separate terrorism in Spain, France, and Ireland, but to a much lesser extent. From this, it can be concluded that religious terrorism is currently the main problem for Europe. Although many politicians understand this issue, effective solutions have not yet been proposed. Educational work with youth and regulating propaganda on the internet remains the common practice, but considering the entrenched Islamic communities, especially in France and Germany, control over such areas is physically challenging. In 2016, within the European Parliament, a proposal was made to “instill European values” in Muslim imams, but this proposal was immediately rejected because it implied the imposition of one’s culture and a violation of human freedom of choice, as well as the practical impossibility of secular authorities legally controlling the activities of religious figures. Thus, the EU still retains the prerogative of using traditional methods to influence the prevention of religious terrorism.

Moreover, the primary source of radicalization, which serves as the foundation for terrorism and extremism in Europe, remains largely unexamined, according to several studies [12]. Significant knowledge gaps persist regarding effective platforms for dialog within society in several EU member states, preventing the effective implementation of preventive measures against terrorism. At the same time, a relatively high level of bureaucratization exists not only within the EU as an organization, as previously discussed, but also at the national level. This weakens police control over suspicious activities and contributes to the corresponding increase in terrorist acts.

Currently, an important part of the EU’s counterterrorism strategy is the Strategic Agenda for 2019–2024. The key feature of the Agenda, adopted by the European Council in June 2019, is the protection of societies from threats aimed at the information that the European administration operates on. In its conclusions, the European Council called on “EU institutions together with member states to work on measures to enhance resilience and improve the EU’s security culture against cyber and hybrid threats from beyond the EU, as well as to better protect the EU’s information and communication networks and its decision-making processes from malicious activities of all kinds.” In addition, as part of the fight against cyberterrorism in 2020, a new Cybersecurity Strategy was formulated. The EU Cybersecurity Strategy is a key component of the “Shaping Europe’s Digital Future” plan, the formation of a European security platform, and the EU Security Union Strategy. This position leads to the improvement of collective resilience of European states to cyber threats and ensures that all citizens and businesses can fully utilize secure and reliable services and digital tools. The Cybersecurity Strategy also allows the EU to strengthen its leadership in shaping international legal norms and standards in cyberspace and enhance cooperation with partners worldwide to promote a global, open, stable, and secure cyberspace based on the rule of law, fundamental human rights, and democratic values. The Strategy emphasizes the need for further development of digital sovereignty in the context of increasing competition in the provision of digital services and technologies on the global stage. The document contains prerequisites for the formation of a pan-European “cyber shield” based on the creation of AI and self-learning algorithms that will anticipate hacker attacks on critical information infrastructure, as well as the integration of national cyber incident response teams into a single network (Joint Cyber Unit).

3. East Eurasia

The Eastern space of counterterrorism security has several distinctive features that significantly differentiate it from the European space. First and foremost, segmentation should be noted. Unlike the well-structured and hierarchical security space within the EU, Eurasian security structures are formed in parallel by different states and organizations. Many states can simultaneously be part of several similar organizations with similar goals and maintain a relatively stable course in countering terrorism, as seen, for example, within the framework of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) and the EAEU (Eurasian Economic Union). The second important characteristic of the region is the influence of major states. Countries like Russia and China possess significant resources and influence to establish necessary security structures, primarily based on their own interests, while taking into account the international policies of other states.

When considering specific international actors that influence the security system and counterterrorism efforts in Eurasia, it is essential to discuss both organizations and individual states. From a regional and international structure perspective, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) stand out as the most prominent global actors in implementing counterterrorism strategies. At the same time, countries such as Russia, which often leads counterterrorism initiatives in the aforementioned organizations; China, which has its interests in Central Asia; and to some extent Kazakhstan, which possesses both experience in regulating counterterrorism activities and significant resources for development in this direction should be noted.

It is necessary to primarily examine counterterrorism organizations, as they represent the aspirations of the largest number of states simultaneously. In particular, the activities of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) should be considered since this organization has the most developed legal framework and practical experience in regulating such illegal activities. In the early twenty-first century, precisely in 2001, the SCO Convention established a clear definition of “terrorism,” which implied acts related to intimidating the population and creating a danger to human life and health, causing significant property damage or ecological disasters, or other severe consequences to achieve political, religious, ideological, and other goals by influencing the decisions of authorities or international organizations. This provision became fundamental for the entire development of the Eastern part of Eurasia and the formation of subsequent legislative acts.

Furthermore, this provision was confirmed and supplemented in the 2009 SCO Convention against Terrorism. A significant step toward directly combating terrorism was the establishment of the Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS) of the SCO in 2002, which was intended to coordinate the actions of member states in countering terrorism. With its inception, a regular practice of adopting a three-year action plan was initiated, which proved to be successful in subsequent years. The organization of regular counterterrorism exercises, starting from 2006, created effective practical mechanisms for countering terrorist acts. In 2017, within the SCO, a convention dedicated exclusively to combating extremism was developed and adopted—the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Convention on Countering Extremism. This Convention, on the one hand, maintains continuity with the two aforementioned acts and introduces new elements into the mechanism of countering extremism. On the other hand, compared to the 2001 Convention, the 2017 Convention: (a) expands the notion of “extremism,” which includes “ideology and practice aimed at resolving political, social, racial, national, and religious conflicts through violent and other unconstitutional actions” and (b) introduces a new concept of extremist act: it includes acts specified in paragraph 3 of Article 1 of the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism of June 15, 2001, as well as such actions as “organizing armed rebellion and participating in it for extremist purposes” and so forth [13].

In 2017, within the framework of the SCO, a convention was developed and adopted exclusively dedicated to the fight against extremism—the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Convention on Countering Extremism. This Convention, on the one hand, maintains the continuity of the two acts we analyzed and introduces new elements into the mechanism of countering extremism, on the other hand, in particular, in comparison with the 2001 Convention. The 2017 Convention: (a) expanded the concept of “extremism,”: it refers to “ideology and practice aimed at resolving political, social, racial, national and religious conflicts through violent and other unconstitutional actions” and (b) introduced a new concept of an extremist act: it included the acts provided for in subparagraph 3 of paragraph 1 of Article 1 of the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism of June 15, 2001, as well as such acts as “organizing an armed rebellion and participating in it in extremist purposes, etc”.

In recent years, there has also been a clear increase in the activity of Islamic radicals in Kazakhstan, which was previously considered a much safer state in this regard than Uzbekistan or Tajikistan. The Islamist organization “Soldiers of the Caliphate” took responsibility for the terrorist attacks that were carried out on the territory of Kazakhstan, for example, in 2012 (in large cities, including the regional centers of Aktobe, Atyrau, Astana, Almaty, and Taraz). As it turned out in 2017, it was founded by a citizen of Tajikistan D. Znaliev together with two citizens of Kazakhstan on the territory of Pakistan in the free tribe zone of North Waziristan and included people from Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Arab countries. At the beginning of 2017, D. Znaliev was caught on the territory of Afghanistan and extradited to Kazakhstan, where a trial took place. As a result, D. Znaliev was found guilty of “creating and leading a terrorist group, financing terrorist activities, as well as repeatedly committing actions that create a danger of death, causing significant property damage in order to violate public safety, intimidate the population” and was sentenced to prison imprisonment for a period of 20 years.

In 2020, during the global coronavirus pandemic, the SCO’s activities were significantly limited but did not cease. It is worth highlighting the participation of the SCO RATS Executive Committee in the virtual Counter-Terrorism Week organized within the framework of the UN [14]. In this context, the Executive Committee noted the increasing number of migrants who left the territories of SCO member states to participate in combat actions in Syria and Iraq as volunteers for the “Islamic State.”

Makengo and Xue, in their analysis of the activities of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), point out that this organization is primarily built on the basis of equal cooperation and the potential for real development in various spheres of interaction [15]. In this context, the cooperation between Pakistan and India, which became members of the organization in 2017, becomes an influential factor in maintaining regional stability against terrorist threats. However, the previously mentioned change of government in Afghanistan, as well as unsuccessful attempts by the United States to neutralize the Taliban in Afghanistan, led to an increase in the number of terrorist incidents in Pakistan by almost two times in 2021 [16]. This also activated other Islamist groups in Central Asia. Guvvadi M., who conducts research on counterterrorism activities in New Delhi, largely agrees with Makengo and Xue regarding the necessity of the SCO for maintaining security in East Eurasia. Furthermore, the researcher specifies that the Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS) is essential as a tool for coordinated actions in the region and for terrorism control [17]. In this context, it is worth noting that Iran’s accession to the SCO may contribute to the development of a common concept of peaceful Islamic integration and counter-radicalization, given that most member states have a significant Muslim population. The creation of a concept for harmonious Islamic development could be used for negotiations with the new Afghan leadership and its integration into the global community.

There has been a clear trend of increasing influence of the SCO as a counterterrorism organization in recent years. When comparing the ability of the SCO and NATO to counter terrorist threats, several features stand out. First and foremost is the more comprehensive approach of SCO member states to the criminalization of terrorism. Unlike NATO, which includes a large portion of European states and is oriented toward ensuring the security and stability of the region, the SCO takes a stricter approach to allowing third countries to participate in its military exercises and operations. In this regard, NATO’s counterterrorism operations appear more open to support from the international community and their subsequent deepening. As noted by Sadik and Ispir [18], the SCO has a more centralized structure in counterterrorism due to the existence of RATS and an existing network of informal agreements between member states. In this context, the SCO outperforms both NATO and the EU. Despite all of the above, it should be understood that cooperation between counterterrorism structures is currently impossible. This is justified by both the absence of historical precedents for such negotiations and the political tension between organization members. Unfortunately, this factor can pose a problem in ensuring counterterrorism security in Eurasia.

In turn, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) began actively developing its counterterrorism structures somewhat earlier. The key international act of the CIS in the field of counterterrorism is the Agreement on Cooperation of Member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Combating Terrorism, dated June 4, 1999, which defines the ways of cooperation among competent authorities. Among them, one can highlight information exchange, the execution of incoming requests for operational-search measures, the provision of information and analytical support in assessing the state of the system for the physical protection of objects of increased technological and environmental risk, the development and implementation of measures to improve this system, and so on. In 2000, the organization established the Anti-Terrorism Center. It is important to emphasize the Concept of Cooperation of Security Agencies and Special Services in the Sphere of Information Counteraction to Terrorism and Other Manifestations of Extremism from 2009. This Concept serves as the basis for all CIS countries in terms of data exchange on cyberterrorism, sharing databases, and so forth [19]. However, the Concept has certain shortcomings. The most significant one is the weak conceptual framework for counterterrorism activities. Unlike SCO documents, which provide a clear definition of both ordinary terrorism and cyberterrorism, the CIS Concept lacks the second notion, which complicates data exchange. Several agreements and established rules within the CIS, according to Tarasov and Solodukhina [20], are specifically aimed at protecting strategically important infrastructure of member states of the organization, such as power plants, banks, and other structures. However, it is important to note that the legislative framework of the CIS Anti-Terrorism Center does not include the concept of “strategic infrastructure.” In 2018, the CIS expanded the agreement on cooperation in the field of cyber security and counterterrorism and introduced several new requirements regarding personal data protection, as well as the possibility of criminalizing a range of crimes committed in the digital environment, including the production and distribution of malicious software; destruction, blocking, modification, or copying of information; unauthorized access to legally protected computer information; and so on [21]. Within the organization, joint military exercises are regularly conducted; however, these exercises were suspended with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. At the same time, the nature of interaction between states in the context of counterterrorism has changed. In particular, issues related to information and analytical support have become more prominent during this period. This problem has prompted national states and organizations to accelerate the modernization of their special units and centers for combating terrorism and crime. An important systemic tool in countering terrorism propaganda in the digital space has been the prevention of unverified information in social networks, attempts to artificially create panic, or incitement of citizens to engage in specific forms of behavior and the establishment of social tension. The global situation that emerged due to the pandemic revealed a latent digital layer of activity of international terrorist and extremist organizations deployed on the Internet. The CIS Anti-Terrorism Center began paying more attention to working with young people, specifically countering extremist ideology through propaganda, which marked significant progress in the organization’s development. Overall, it should be noted that the CIS developed more slowly compared to the SCO, but this can be explained by the differences in the development directions of the two organizations. At the same time, the modern legal framework of the organization is at a significant level, and all member states have a well-developed regulatory framework for managing emergency situations related to terrorism.

The CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) is also one of the main structures ensuring stability and counterterrorism resilience. Within the organization, there is a special unit dedicated to counterterrorism (the Working Group of Experts on Combating Terrorism and Illegal Migration). The CSTO has a series of agreements aimed at harmonizing the legislation of member countries in the field of information and analytical work, countering terrorist technologies, ensuring national security, and more. In particular, in 2015, Recommendations for improving the legislation of CSTO member states in the field of countering technological terrorism were adopted, which also applied to the CSTO, leading to the development of response systems to terrorist acts among the member states of the organization. The most effective tool for ensuring security has been the Collective Rapid Reaction Forces of the CSTO (established by the decision of the CSTO Collective Security Council on February 4, 2009), the status of which still needs to be aligned with the provisions of Russian laws. However, the experience of using these forces has shown that one of the tasks that all states share is countering terrorism [22]. Within the framework of the CSTO’s Collective Security Strategy until 2025, several prospective development directions have been identified, including the fight against manifestations of “hybrid wars” in the context of counterterrorism, combating religious extremism, systemic analysis, forecasting of terrorist activity using the most advanced technologies, and more [23]. Special attention is paid within the organization to enhancing security in the neighboring countries of Afghanistan since a significant number of religious extremists and terrorists originate from this country, along with increased drug trafficking. The most effective tool for regulating terrorist activities within the CSTO is the conduct of special operations. In terms of information, there is the “PROXY” protocol aimed at countering cyberterrorism, as well as the antidrug operation “Kanal.” Additionally, the organization conducts monitoring, analytical, and other counterterrorism operations, similar to the activities of the CIS and SCO. At the same time, the CSTO responds promptly to emerging security issues in its member states. For instance, during the anti-government protests in Kazakhstan in 2020, when mass unrest involving the use of weapons occurred in the country’s capital, the peacekeeping forces of the organization successfully quelled the rebellion, demonstrating the effectiveness and mobility of the CSTO’s military structures. When examining the activities of regional organizations in countering terrorism, it is worth noting the peculiarities of a country-level approach to the problem. Russia actively develops its institutional base for countering terrorism. In particular, the Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, the Information Security Concept from 2016, and several other regulatory documents establish the legal framework for monitoring terrorist activities. Considering Russia’s state structure, it is important to note that there are different levels of counterterrorism efforts, including federal and local levels. Within this strategy, Russia ensures a nationwide doctrinal level of countering terrorism, developed in the National Operations Center and the Federal Operations Headquarters, which then pass instructions to local self-government bodies, which regulate these plans in accordance with their specific circumstances.

Since 2016, the activities of Russian counterterrorism agencies have been primarily focused on digital activity and cyberterrorism. To prevent this type of activity, various activities are carried out: preventive (analysis, counter-propaganda, identifying and closing channels for financing terrorism, identifying possible centers of terrorism dissemination, etc.), counterterrorism operations, and regular exercises. Special attention should also be paid to Presidential Decree of the Russian Federation No. 250 of May 1, 2022, “On Additional Measures to Ensure the Information Security of the Russian Federation” [24]. This decree places additional responsibilities on the leaders of state bodies and state-forming enterprises (organizations) to ensure the information security of their respective institutions. Criteria are established to classify an enterprise or organization as a subject of critical information infrastructure. This decree also imposes specific obligations on Russian representatives for protecting critical information infrastructure. Nevertheless, there are still many shortcomings in Russian legislation concerning cyberterrorism and the protection of victims of terrorist attacks. It is also worth noting that the removal of dangerous, extremist, and terrorist content from the Russian internet segment is the responsibility of Roskomnadzor (the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology, and Mass Media). In the fight against terrorism, the organization strives to ban certain anonymizing programs. For example, in 2022, thanks to Roskomnadzor’s lawsuit, a number of VPN services were blocked. In 2023, it became known that the organization is developing a system that will automatically block anonymizer services that allow creating virtual phone numbers without real confirmation, which can be used by terrorists. It is important to mention that according to Russian law, all digital data of users must be stored in Russia and retained by the service provider for reporting and providing this information to the Investigative Committee upon a special request.

It is worth noting that Russia is the most vulnerable country to terrorist attacks in East Eurasia. Ryazanov and Okhrimenko [25] consider that the average frequency of terrorist acts in Russia, from the collapse of the USSR to 2014, was three or more times higher than in other former socialist countries. This is due to the complex internal situation, the Chechen war, the challenging situation in Ingushetia, and more. It is also related to the loss of “Soviet identity,” as many former residents sought self-identification within radical political and religious movements.

Russia also actively tries to enhance the combat readiness of Central Asian states against the terrorist threat. Through bilateral and multilateral cooperation, Russian military bases are established, and joint training and education programs are conducted. In Kyrgyzstan, there is the Russian military airbase “Kant,” the 954th test base for anti-submarine warfare; the 338th Navy communication node “Marevo;” and a seismic station. Discussions are underway to open a second Russian military base. In Tajikistan, there is the 201st Russian military base, the Optoelectronic Complex “Okno” (“Nurek”) for space monitoring, and a group of Russian Border Troops. Kazakhstan hosts several Russian military facilities, including the Sary-Shagan state testing range, a range for strategic air defense and missile defense systems, and more.

China’s counterterrorism strategy has specific characteristics. Since China is a member of the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization), it has the opportunity to influence its development. Within its sphere of influence, China has introduced the concept of combating the “three evils”: terrorism, extremism, and separatism. It is essential to highlight the issues of separatism and extremism, as China actively uses these positions to its advantage. In the western Xinjiang-Uyghur region, there is a significant Muslim population dissatisfied with their status and seeking greater autonomy. China often resorts to harsh coercive measures and the use of force against them, citing the provisions of the SCO Charter, making its actions legally justifiable. Moreover, until the early twenty-first century, China did not seek to extend its influence beyond Central Asia and its territory, as indicated by the relatively limited contacts in these directions, except for regular support for UN anti-terrorist conventions. However, this situation changed since 2015 when China allowed the use of its regular army (PLA) and the People’s Armed Police (PAP) outside national borders as part of anti-terrorist missions. This has led to an increased influence of Chinese counterterrorism forces in Eurasia as a whole and in Central and Greater East Asia in particular. Additionally, in March 2019, China’s State Council issued a document regulating China’s use of measures against terrorists in the Xinjiang-Uyghur Autonomous Region. The new document confirms China’s readiness to combat terrorism based on the rule of law and the use of preventive measures, a focus on sharing experiences, and participation in international cooperation.

Russia and China have a unique level of interaction. In the context of their cooperation, a Joint Statement was signed between the two countries in 2004, which solidified their collaboration in the fight against international terrorism. This includes constant contact between their respective counterterrorism units, preventing illegal border crossings, joint efforts to counter terrorist activities, and more.

China’s engagement with other states is not limited to Russia. China also pursues the construction of military bases in Central Asian countries to stabilize the region. Until 2020, there was active implementation of the project to build military facilities in Afghanistan. This collaboration with Kabul was initiated primarily to enhance the fight against terrorism. However, after the change of power in Afghanistan, this cooperation was scaled down, but negotiations between the parties continued to stabilize the situation. Additionally, China regularly conducts joint counterterrorism exercises with Central Asian countries, as well as Russia, which strengthens China’s role as a major regional fighter against terrorism. Moreover, in 2016, the Chinese government successfully initiated the creation of a multilateral mechanism among China, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan in the field of counterterrorism. This group regularly conducted joint exercises, exchanged intelligence, and held special theoretical courses to maintain cooperation among its members. However, this cooperation was partially curtailed due to the change of power in Afghanistan in 2021.

Special attention is given to the issue of Afghanistan. Considering that Afghanistan is one of the major sources of terrorism for Central Asian countries and Russia, the change of power in Kabul, and the withdrawal of U.S. troops, among other factors, have significantly influenced the shifting priorities of Russia and China in terms of countering terrorism. It is worth noting that although the Taliban, which assumed power in Afghanistan, is considered a terrorist organization, according to Russian legislation, Russia has had contacts with this group since 2015, which was related to the deterioration of relations with the United States during that period. However, Russia’s initial response to the change of power in Afghanistan in 2021 was to enhance counterterrorism measures in all post-Soviet countries [26]. In this situation, Russia and China are approaching the Afghan issue from a “passive” perspective. They are monitoring and ensuring the security of the adjacent borders of their states but have no plans to deploy a military contingent. As a result, their relations with the United States and some European countries, which aim to eliminate the Taliban threat, have become more strained. According to Chinese experts, Moscow and Beijing should encourage the Taliban to pursue a clear policy, supported by the international community, in countering several terrorist movements, including ISIS, as well as other organizations like the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, the Islamic Party of Turkestan (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan), and more [27]. It is worth noting that Russian–Chinese cooperation is built not only on bilateral efforts to localize the problem but also within the framework of the SCO and CSTO. Multilateral formats and regular communication among all parties are the foundation for resolving the complex situation. However, Russia and China have different views on the Taliban, which can complicate further cooperation between the two countries. The worsening international situation in 2022 (the Ukrainian conflict, complications in Nagorno-Karabakh, and unrest in Kazakhstan) are additional factors that contribute to the stagnation in resolving the Afghan problem and, at the same time, lead to an increase in terrorist activity.

4. Conclusions

Summing up the results of the work, it is worth drawing several conclusions. Firstly, it is worth noting that the active phase of development of legislation on countering terrorism both in the West and in the East of Eurasia began with the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001. The large-scale disaster stimulated the efforts of states in the field of harmonization of legislation in the field of terrorism and also accelerated the adoption of clearer regulations at the external level. It is worth noting that in many respects, the phenomenon of the syndrome itself has remained largely the same as at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The main threat to all of Eurasia is religious, exclusively jihadist terrorism. At the same time, the risks of left-wing radical and anarchist terrorist acts are also sufficiently minimized, as evidenced by the relevant statistics. In addition, unlike the beginning of the twenty-first century, cyberterrorism is now much more dangerous, affecting a larger audience and can spread much more widely than through classical media.

Secondly, there is a big difference in the process of building an anti-terrorist security system in relation to the eastern and western parts of Eurasia. The western part, united by a single political and economic structure (European Union), has a more strict hierarchy. Systematization and progressive, targeted nature of development and relative unity of development legislation in the economic sphere have been implemented. At the same time, such a structure has a number of disadvantages, the main one being the slowness and difficulty of forming a fully coordinated scheme. Considering that European legislation is focused only on drawing up general regulations for anti-terrorism activities, the economic state is also further implementing the adopted recommendations, extending the procedure for introducing amendments and applying common rules for all EU members. In addition, even despite the fact that the level of harmonization of national legislation in the anti-terrorist sphere is relatively high, there are still economic legal conflicts in regulating the lower regions. In particular, the area of digital control and practice maintenance remain relatively underdeveloped. Cyberterrorism, in recent years, has been increasingly controlled through the creation of members of counter-terrorism associations of EU states, and also affects the interaction of the intelligence services of these states, but new technologies, in particular 5G technology, may complicate these processes to a lesser extent. At the same time, the loose multiculturalism policy that underlies the EU makes it very difficult for states to proactively reach out to open parts of society. In general, the problem of internal atomization is typical for the most affluent states of Europe (Germany, France), as a result of which the transition of ethnic and geographical regions to international power is weakly observed.

The eastern part of Eurasia relies on a multilateral approach in the fight against terrorism. This part of Eurasia is characterized by the creation of several international organizations with free functionality, which develop on the basis of national interests. At the same time, countries have a significant influence on all anti-terrorism activities in this direction in Russia. The harmonization of national legislation is often carried out in several stages. At the first stage, within the framework of one organization, the necessary proposals are developed and appropriate agreements are concluded. Since the 1990s, “test zone” for the introduction of a new law is adopted in the CIS. Then, in accordance with a cooperation agreement with another organization, a repeated process of harmonization occurs, due to which the majority of states in the region come to a unified legislation. At the same time, harmonization also occurs at the level of bilateral relations, which partially helps speed up this process. However, reliable practice is also extremely weak. At the same time, Russia, which is part of the majority of organizations opposing terrorism in the East of Eurasia, most often makes proposals for progressive legislation. At the external level, Russia has fairly developed anti-terrorism legislation, as well as progressive control over cyberterrorism. The downside of the Russian system is too strict control over the use of data, as well as the fight against the anonymity of services. China, in turn, pursues a very modest anti-terrorism policy. Recently, wider participation in anti-terrorist activities has become possible, although this activity concerns either bilateral relations or activities in the SCO.

Thirdly, the growing trend toward religious terrorism and the difficulties of finding universal mechanisms to combat it are aggravated by global instability. The events of 2021 in Afghanistan once again demonstrate the complexity of international communication and effective mechanisms of terrorist deterrence. Taking into account the complexity of this problem and the impossibility of solving it by military means, as many years of experience have revealed, it becomes obvious that it is necessary to reconsider the approach to working with terrorism. It is worth noting that effective practices for controlling digital terrorism in Russia can be effectively used within the framework of European legislation. Already in France, there are a number of similar laws that also effectively combat the propaganda of radical movements and terrorist groups. At the same time, one cannot fail to note the effectiveness of small rapid response teams at the national level in individual EU states, as well as the initial results of the digital counter-terrorism unit. Strengthening interaction between organizations in Eastern Eurasia and partially accelerating the harmonization of legislation in the field of countering terrorism could significantly improve control over the situation in a number of states. At the same time, the main areas of development of counter-terrorism legislation should remain the prevention of terrorist propaganda, early warning, and prevention of terrorist acts. Control mechanisms in these areas are currently very limited. It is possible to use more stringent digital control measures, in particular, analysis of the digital activity of individuals based on reliable information using a simplified scheme and so forth. Although current control mechanisms remain imperfect in the East and West, it is worth noting that there are positive trends that may lead to positive results in the future.