Abstract
This chapter discusses Amartya Sen’s capabilities approach to human development from the standpoint of the concept of happiness. It locates Sen’s work against the background of the recent capabilities versus happiness debate. Sen’s version of the capabilities approach is commonly regarded as a critique of the happiness approach to development ethics. It is sometimes assumed that he attaches no importance at all to the value of happiness. I argue that this view misrepresents what Sen has to say about the value of happiness in his writings. A distinctive feature of Sen’s views on this subject is that he agrees with the view that happiness is nothing more than subjective mental state and rejects the idea of objective happiness. This distinguishes his version of the capabilities approach from the ethical eudaimonism of both Aristotle and John Stuart Mill. The chapter concludes by suggesting that Sen could and should have taken this idea more seriously than he does.
Keywords
- Amartya Sen
- capabilities approach
- happiness
- well-being
- Aristotle
- eudaimonia
1. Introduction
A great deal has been written by and about the Nobel Prize winning economist Amartya Sen in the last two or three decades. In that time much has also been written about the capabilities approach in development studies, including Sen’s version of it. Indeed, there is now an academic journal devoted to it, the
Similarly, a great deal has also been written in the same period about the concept of happiness and its relevance for students of economics. Not all of the contributors to this literature are enthusiasts for the value of happiness, or for a happiness approach to human well-being and development, although many of them are. Here it should be noted that there are, broadly speaking, two different versions of it, based on the notions of objective happiness and subjective happiness respectively. The difference between these is that for proponents of the former one can be mistaken about one’s own happiness, whereas according to proponents of the latter one cannot be. On that view, individuals are the best judges of what their own happiness involves.
Again, this burgeoning literature on the economics and politics of happiness has led to the creation of a new academic journal,
Given the above, it is not too surprising that some scholars have attempted to bring these two different bodies of literature together. In the last 15 years or so, a number of conferences and workshops, and associated special issues of academic journals, have been devoted to this theme. These include symposia in the
This chapter has five parts. In part one I offer an account of the subjective happiness approach to development studies. In part two I turn to consider Amartya Sen’s version of the capabilities approach, which was initially put forward by him as a critique of the subjective happiness approach. In part three I consider what Sen has to say about the value of subjective happiness and his understanding of part which the concept has to play in the capabilities approach as he understands it. In part four I scrutinise the efforts which have been made by some scholars to synthesise the capabilities approach and the subjective happiness approach into a third approach, which is claimed to have the strengths of each and the weaknesses of neither. Finally, in part five, I consider some possible criticisms of Sen’s own understanding of the concept of happiness and its significance, when assessed from the standpoint of Aristotle’s ethical eudaimonism and its notion of objective happiness.
2. The happiness approach to human development and well-being
The happiness approach comes in two significantly different forms, namely the subjective happiness and the objective happiness versions respectively. The contributors to the capabilities versus happiness debate usually (though not always) have in mind the notion of subjective rather than that of objective happiness. On that view, happiness is identical with subjective well-being. It is a matter of having pleasurable sensations or experiences, which might be characterised by the expression ‘feeling good.’ As such, it is something that is veridically self-reported. For those who think in this way about happiness, it is not possible for any individual agent to be mistaken about their own situation, so far as their happiness (or otherwise) is concerned. This way of thinking about happiness runs counter to a very old view, which can be traced back at least to the writings of Aristotle, if not before, according to which happiness (or eudaimonia) is at least in part an objective state of affairs. On that view, individual agents can indeed be mistaken as to what will make them really or truly happy. I shall say something about Sen, eudaimonism and the notion of objective happiness in part five.
I shall follow Amartya Sen and take Richard Layard and his
The third assumption that is made by Layard is that happiness is entirely a subjective affair. Contrary to the view that is associated with ethical eudaimonism, Layard holds that there is for them no such thing as objective happiness. There is no more to happiness than a subjectively experienced ‘feeling.’ In Layard’s words, ‘happiness is feeling good and misery is feeling bad’ [1]. On this view, if somebody ‘feels’ happy then they are happy. For there is no more to happiness than having a feeling of a certain kind, or being in a certain psychological state. On this view, as Shakespeare’s Hamlet says, ‘there is nothing good or bad, but thinking makes it so.’ Consequently, one cannot be mistaken about one’s own happiness.
It is true that Layard thinks that mental experiences or of this kind, or psychological states of mind, can be connected to the physiological activity of the human brain, and that this is something which increasingly we are able to objectively measure [1]. Once that is done, we can go on to explain a person’s underlying level of happiness,’ the ‘quality of his life as he experiences it’ [1]. Nevertheless, according to Layard and other advocates of this view, this should not be thought to imply that the concept of happiness is objective in any other sense of the term, especially not the sense according to which individual agents might possibly be mistaken when making a judgement about their own happiness. For those who subscribe to a subjective or subjectivist understanding of the notion of happiness, to talk in that way would involve a contradiction in terms.
Layard’s fourth assumption is that there is, therefore, no significant difference between ‘happiness’ and ‘well-being.’ These two terms are synonyms. They are simply two different ways of talking about or referring to the same thing. His fifth assumption is that, just like happiness, so also well-being is entirely a subjective affair. This implies that those like Layard who make this assumption should not really talk about ‘subjective well-being’ at all, and would not do so if their thinking was entirely consistent. This is so because for them, given their understanding of the concept of well-being, the term is a pleonasm. It really only makes sense to speak in that way if one also accepts that there is such a thing as objective well-being as well as subjective well-being. However, this is something which Layard denies.
3. Sen’s version of the capabilities approach
Sen is a critic of what I have called the happiness approach to human development and well-being, especially Layard’s subjectivist version of it. He rejects most of its assumptions, though not all of them. With one important exception, his version of the capabilities approach is based on a very different set of beliefs. First of all Sen rejects Layard’s monism, or the view that there is only one thing which really matters, or only one core value in ethics and politics, either for private individuals or for policy makers. Sen rejects Layard’s utilitarianism, ‘on the grounds that well-being,’ whether understood by Layard or in some other way, ‘is not the only thing that is valuable’ [4]. There is disagreement over the issue of what Sen’s proposed alternative to monism is, specifically whether he is a pluralist who maintains that there are many values, which are of equal importance to one another or, alternatively, a dualist who maintains that there are in fact two core values rather than just one. For present purposes, I shall present Sen as a dualist. His version of the capabilities approach attaches importance to just two core values, not one or more. These two core values are well-being and freedom. Unlike Layard, far from being
There is evidential support for a dualist reading of Sen’s views. For example, in
This conceptual dualism between the value of freedom and that of well-being runs throughout Sen’s work. It is expressed in different ways at different times. Sometimes Sen distinguishes between thinking about individual human beings as either ‘agents’ or as ‘patients.’ Elsewhere, when talking about the actions of individual agents, he differentiates between ‘processes’ or the process side of things, on the one hand, and ‘achievements’ or ‘outcomes’ on the other. The same dualism is also implicit in his distinction, which is central to his version of the capabilities approach, between ‘capabilities’ and ‘functionings.’ When Sen talks about capabilities he has in mind realistic opportunities for the successful achievement of certain outcomes which are preferred and freely chosen by individual agents. The concept of ‘functionings,’ on the other hand, has to do with whether or not the intended outcomes, or the associated ‘beings and doings,’ are in fact successfully achieved.
Sen holds that there is no guarantee that an increase in freedom, understood by reference to the notion of capabilities, will lead to an increase in well-being. This is so for a variety of reasons. For example, this may not be what the agent chooses. Alternatively, the agent may choose to promote her own well-being and yet, for some reason, decide not to not act on that choice. Also, Sen suggests at times that the well-being of the agent might actually be reduced for some reason. This might be either intentional or unintentional. In the first case, as with Mohandas Gandhi, this would happen if through an act of commitment the agent freely chose to act in a way which they know will lead to a diminution of their own well-being. Alternatively, they might choose to pursue their own well-being and act accordingly, but unsuccessfully. An unintended outcome of their action might be that their well-being actually falls, despite their efforts to increase it.
The second assumption which Sen makes follows on immediately from the first. It is that,
Sen’s view that happiness is not the only important value is clear from the emphasis which he places on the value of freedom. However, it is also clear from the fact that the value which he contrasts with that of freedom is in fact well-being and not happiness. According to Sen, there is a significant difference between ‘happiness’ and ‘well-being’ [5, 8, 9]. In
A third assumption that is made by Sen is one which he shares with Layard and with classical utilitarianism. This is the assumption that happiness is entirely a subjective affair. In other words, Sen rejects outright the notion of objective happiness, which is one of the core assumptions of ethical eudaimonism from the time of Aristotle to that of John Stuart Mill. So far as he is concerned, happiness in the strict sense of the term is necessarily or inherently subjective. For Sen also, therefore, the expression ‘subjective happiness’ is a pleonasm. Given his understanding of what the concept of happiness involves, for Sen to characterise happiness as ‘subjective’ is unnecessary. I consider Sen’s capabilities approach from the standpoint of ethical eudaimonism and its notion of objective happiness in part four.
A fourth assumption of Sen’s version of the capabilities approach is that well-being is at least in part an objective affair. Sen insists, therefore, that although one cannot be mistaken about one’s own happiness, nevertheless one can be mistaken about one’s own well-being. According to one commonly held reading of his views, Sen holds that far from being a pleonasm, as Layard argues, on the contrary the notion of ‘subjective well-being’ is in fact an oxymoron. If he is read in this way, Sen rejects Layard’s view that happiness subjectively understood is a sufficient condition for well-being. At the same time, however, he does not think that it is a necessary condition either. I shall discuss an alternative reading of his views on this subject in part four.
What Sen says about the phenomenon of adaptation is relevant here. This has to do with the case of how extremely deprived individuals adapt to their situation. In his contribution to the
Sen insists that what matters most is not happiness but, rather, well-being. This raises two interesting and related questions. The first is whether Sen considers well-being to be
4. Sen on the value of happiness
In this part I consider what Sen has said about the value of happiness over the years. I should emphasise at the outset that I do not think that Sen’s views have altered significantly. In particular, he did not change them in response to criticisms he received from the various contributors to the
There are two issues here. The first is Sen’s understanding of what happiness is and involves. The second is his assessment of the value which should be attached to happiness as he understands the term. So far as the first of these issues is concerned, it is important to note that Sen consistently assumes that happiness is indeed a subjective matter and not an objective one. He endorses rather than rejects the hedonistic understanding of the notion of happiness that is to be found in the writings of Layard and other contributors to the happiness literature.
Tadashi Hirai, Flavio Comin and Yukio Ikemoto have rightly suggested that Sen’s understanding of the concept of happiness is ‘hedonic.’ That is to say, he endorses the view that happiness is a ‘mental state’ which is associated with such things ‘pleasure and desire’ [10]. Sen never argues that there is more to happiness than subjective experiences of that kind. In Sen’s theoretical framework, it is not happiness but rather well-being that is considered to be more than a hedonic feeling. It is a distinctive feature of Sen’s version of the capabilities approach that he endorses Layard’s view that happiness itself is indeed a purely psychological condition, or a state of mind. In agreement with Layard and utilitarianism, Sen has rejected outright the idea, associated with ethical eudaimonism, that there might be such a thing as objective happiness. I shall examine this view in part five.
However, the fact that Sen thinks about the concept of happiness in this subjectivist way is not to say that he approves of hedonism, or that he attaches importance to the pursuit of happiness in this sense. On the contrary, there are times when Sen gives his readers the impression that he strongly disapproves of those, like Layard, who maintain that human existence has solely to do with the pursuit of happiness in that hedonistic sense of the term. On the issue of Sen’s assessment of the value of subjective happiness, there are two contrasting readings of his views. I shall consider them in turn.
4.1 Sen attaches no value to subjective happiness
I have said that for Sen there are just two core values, neither of which is happiness. These two values are freedom and well-being. It might therefore be thought that Sen attaches no importance at all to the value of happiness, subjectively understood. That is how some of his critics understand his views. Some of the contributors to the capabilities versus happiness debate have criticised Sen along just these lines. The broad thrust of most of the contributions to this debate is to argue that this is a weakness in Sen’s thinking and that his version of the capabilities approach would be improved if he were to attach at least some importance to the value of happiness. These commentators are of the opinion that ‘the capabilities approach’ and ‘the happiness approach’ are both partial and one-sided. They suggest that each of these approaches provides valuable insights for those who are concerned with issues in development ethics, which are overlooked by the other. Moreover, each is open to possible criticism from the standpoint of the other. Consequently, they argue, there is scope to provide a theoretical synthesis of them both. For those who think in this way, the core assumptions of the happiness approach and Sen’s version of the capabilities approach are compatible with one another and may fruitfully be combined. I shall survey these contributions, before offering a critique of them.
For example Flavio Comim, in an article entitled ‘Capabilities and Happiness: Potential Synergies,’ which he contributed to a special issue of the
Andre Hoorn, Ramzi Mabsout, and Ester-Mirjam Sent also argue along similar lines in their contribution to a symposium on ‘Happiness and Capability’ in
Jose M. Edwards and Sophie Pelle also refer to ‘two different, and even opposed, programs: the economics of happiness; and the capability approach’ [16], which they associate with the names of Tibor Scitovsky and Amartya Sen respectively. These two approaches, they argue, ‘represent two major attempts to renew normative economic analysis’ [16]. They differ from one another because they possess two ‘different concepts of well-being,’ namely, ‘the “joy” of satisfied consumers for Scitovsky; and the “capabilities” of deprived individuals for Sen’ [16]. More recently, Maurizio Pugno has also argued that ‘in the study of human welfare and progress, two prominent approaches stand out,’ which at first sight ‘appear to have opposite perspectives and even opposite weaknesses’ [17]. The first of these is ‘the capability approach’ which was ‘founded by A. Sen.’ According to Pugno, this approach ‘focuses on the objective factors that contribute to human welfare.’ The second approach is the ‘happiness approach,’ which ‘focuses on subjective well-being.’ Pugno states that his paper ‘attempts to go beyond the critical comparison’ that has been offered of the two approaches so far, by ‘integrating’ them [17], in order to ‘avoid the just mentioned and other weaknesses’ [17]. Pugno states that, in so doing, it attempts to link the objective with the subjective evaluations of individual welfare’ [17].
Finally, Martin Binder, also, has maintained that ‘two of the most prominent measures of well-being come from subjective well-being research and the capability approach respectively [18]. He too suggests that ‘both approaches have significant weaknesses when considered on their own’ [18]. And he too asks ‘to what extent’ can these two approaches ‘profit from each other? Is there a way to enrich one with the insights of the other?’ [18]. Like the other contributors to the debate, Binder sets himself the task of considering ‘to what extent a fusion between both approaches can overcome the weaknesses’ of each of them considered separately [18]. In the conclusion to his paper Binder maintains that while both approaches seem
It is clear from the above survey of the capabilities versus happiness debate that the idea of combining the happiness approach and the capabilities approach is well-established in the literature. However, if these two approaches are to be combined in the way proposed, it is necessary for these commentators to assume that the capability approach, as Sen understands it, attaches no importance at all to the value of happiness or subjective well-being. In order for this theoretical synthesis to be possible, it is necessary to present the capabilities approach in a certain way. According to this understanding of its core assumptions, the capabilities approach is partial and one-sided. Adherents of this approach such as Amartya Sen must be regarded as attaching no significance at all to the value of happiness, or to subjective well-being. Against that view, however, it is arguable that Sen’s version of the capability approach is not guilty of doing this. To attribute such a position to Sen, as the commentators cited above do, involves a misrepresentation of his views regarding the value of happiness.
4.2 Sen does value subjective happiness
In
In his contribution to the capabilities versus happiness debate, in the
Similarly, in
For present purposes what is significant about the remarks cited above is Sen’s acknowledgement that subjective happiness is indeed an important value for human beings. On this reading of his views, Sen does attach at least some importance to happiness, understood in the way in which Layard understands it, as a psychological or mental state. In his opinion, being happy in that sense, is a component part of well-being, in the fullest sense of the term, which necessarily takes account the mental as well as the physical aspects of persons and their well-being. For individual persons evidently do possess minds as well as bodies, and due consideration needs to be given to their mental as well as to their physical health. Sen argues that, for this very reason, subjective happiness is a necessary condition for well-being, even if it cannot be said to be a sufficient one (because of the adaptation issue).
In short, Sen’s considered position is that well-being, as he understands it, necessarily possesses an objective component, whereas happiness does not. This view is compatible with the belief that well-being also possesses a subjective component, which should not be overlooked, or its significance dismissed. From this standpoint, Sen’s objection to Richard Layard’s subjective happiness approach is that it identifies happiness and well-being, and thereby collapses these two things into one another. According to Sen, Layard thinks that being happy is not only a necessary condition for the presence of well-being, it is also a sufficient condition. It is that view, and that view only, which Sen rejects.
If his ideas are understood in this way, Sen holds that the value of happiness, subjectively understood, should not be dismissed out of hand as morally irrelevant. He does not claim that self-reported happiness is of no value at all. Rather, he argues that although it is indeed of some value, ethically speaking, nevertheless it is not by any means the most important value, as Layard and utilitarian thinkers mistakenly claim. Sen’s conclusion in his contribution to the
When engaging with the views of Richard Layard in
L. W. Sumner, in his
Sumner refers to ‘hybrid’ theories in this connection [21]. Advocates of a hybrid theory, as he understands the term, maintain that ‘something can contribute to a subject’s well-being’ (directly or intrinsically) only if (1) the subject finds it satisfying or fulfilling, or endorses it as an ingredient in her life, and (2) it is independently valuable’ [21]. He suggests that hybrid theories in this sense have emerged ‘in response to’ Amartya Sen’s discussion of the adaption problem and his criticisms of extreme subjectivism. In Sumner’s words, ‘some philosophers’ who have engaged critically with Sen’s views ‘have embraced a kind of hybrid theory, which combines subjective and objective components’ [21]. Sumner does not appreciate that such a view might be attributed to Sen himself. He wrongly assumes that Sen subscribes to an entirely objectivist understanding of the notion of well-being.
Des Gasper and Rebecca Gutwald have also stated that Sen’s version of the capabilities approach is a ‘hybrid’ theory [22, 23]. They suggest that Sen and his ideas do not represent the capabilities approach in its pure form. This idea is problematic, given that Sen is usually thought to have initiated the capabilities approach. Indeed, his version of it might be said to be a paradigm example of it. It could not therefore be plausibly argued that Sen’s version goes beyond the capabilities approach in its pure form, by combining its central insights with those of the happiness approach. For the belief that subjective happiness is an important functioning, is already a core component of the capabilities approach as he understands it. Sen’s version of the capabilities approach, understood in just this way, should itself be regarded as the pure form of that approach.
Johannes Hirata, in his contribution to the
In conclusion, if the role which the concept of subjective happiness has to play in Sen’s thought is properly understood, it becomes clear that Sen’s version of the capabilities approach is not at all one-sided, as is suggested by some of the contributors to the capabilities versus happiness debate. Indeed, it is the understanding of the capabilities approach that is offered by Sen’s critics, rather than that of Sen himself, which is subject to this particular objection. Consequently, there is no need for a theoretical synthesis of the capabilities approach and the happiness approach along the lines they propose. Sen has already integrated the value of happiness into his own theoretical system and he has given this value what he considers to be its due. It is just not one of his two core values. Sen evidently thinks that there are things which matter more than subjective happiness. However, that is not the same as holding that happiness is of no ethical value at all.
5. Sen, Aristotle, Eudaimonism and objective happiness
Sen’s name is usually mentioned together with that of Martha Nussbaum, who is generally considered to be a Neo-Aristotelian thinker. Sen himself refers to the connection which exists between the philosophy of Aristotle and his own version of the capabilities approach on several occasions. It is true that he does not make a great deal out of this. Rather, he leaves the development of this side of things to Martha Nussbaum. Nevertheless, he does at times maintain that the ultimate origins of his own approach can be found in the writings of Aristotle [4, 6, 19, 24, 25, 26].
For example, in
This association of Sen and his ideas with the philosophy of Aristotle is significant because, as is well known, Aristotle’s ethical and political thought attaches fundamental importance to the notion of ‘eudaimonia,’ a Greek term which has often been translated by the English word ‘happiness.’ Given this, one might expect Sen to follow Aristotle and also attach importance to the value of happiness, albeit objectively rather than subjectively understood. It is not too surprising, therefore, to find that a number of commentators have interpreted Sen views on happiness along these lines. They have drawn attention to the similarities which exist between Sen’s version of the capabilities approach and Aristotle’s ethical eudaimonism. For example, Luigino Bruni has argued that, despite Sen’s criticisms of the hedonic version of the happiness approach, the capabilities approach, as he understands it, ‘is in fact close to the Aristotelian’ notion of eudaimonia [28].
Benedetta Giovanola also explicitly associates Sen with ethical eudaimonism, and therefore with the notion of objective happiness [29]. According to Giovanola, Sen’s version of the capabilities approach presents a ‘critique of happiness as subjective well-being’ and is to be associated with ‘the idea of “flourishing” which ultimately refers to the Aristotelian concept of eudaimonia’ [29]. Giovanola points out that many economists ‘understand happiness mainly as subjective well-being,’ and ‘often related to other notions like pleasure or desire fulfilment, or, more broadly, utility.’ She claims that Sen criticises this understanding of what happiness involves, and argues that ‘one of Sen’s critiques of the notion of happiness addresses precisely this problem’ [29].
According to Giovanola, Sen maintains that in the happiness literature the notion of happiness ‘is interpreted too subjectively’ [29]. Giovanola notes that Sen is a critic of utilitarianism, at least in its classical Benthamite form, for a number of reasons. He rejects ‘the interpretation of happiness in utilitarian terms, i.e., as welfare, satisfaction, and maximization of utility function.’ However, she argues, his criticisms of utilitarianism ‘seems aimed more’ at its assumed ‘equivalence between welfare, happiness and utility,’ than ‘at the notion of happiness itself’ [29].
The point of Giovanola’s claiming that Sen rejects one way of thinking about happiness, but not the other, is to suggest that, like Aristotle and J. S. Mill, Sen is an ethical eudaimonist who endorses the notion of objective happiness. According to Giovanola, this can ‘be proven by the fact that Sen does speak about happiness, but very differently than utilitarian thinkers.’ Indeed, she maintains, ‘he wants to restore happiness to its traditionally essential and broader meaning, linked to the Aristotelian notion of eudaimonia, which is commonly translated as happiness, but which instead is closer to “flourishing”’ [29, 30].
A similar view is also taken by Carl-Henric Grenholm. According to him, ‘in Aristotelian philosophy happiness is taken to be much more than pleasure. It is related to flourishing and integral human fulfilment, which means the realization of the potentials we have as humans’ [31]. Grenholm maintains that the ‘neo-Aristotelian position’ that is set out by both Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum shares with Aristotle’s eudaimonism the view that ‘happiness may be understood in terms of human self-actualization.’ It is for this reason, Grenholm argues, that they ‘reject the utilitarian theory’ that well-being or ‘welfare’ has to do only with pleasure or preference satisfaction’ [31]. Grenholm claims that ‘one argument in favour of the capabilities approach,’ as he thinks Sen understands it, ‘is that it entails a reasonable understanding of what happiness means’ [31]. By this Grenholm has in mind the idea that, unlike Richard Layard, Sen subscribes to an objective or objectivist understanding of the concept of happiness.
Finally, Tadashi Hirai, Flavio Comin and Yukio Ikemoto have also argued that it is possible to find in Sen’s writings an alternative, though ‘complementary’ view, according to which ‘happiness is not simply a hedonic feeling,’ but rather a ‘manifestation of the things that’ objectively speaking ‘we have reason to value’. It is for this reason, they argue, that for Sen ‘happiness,’ objectively understood, ‘can provide an informational space that can be part of an overall assessment of our quality of life’ [10].
This reading of Sen’s views on happiness, with its attribution to him of the notion of objective happiness, as we find it in the writings of Aristotle and other eudaimonist thinkers, seems to me to be not well founded. In fact, as we have seen, Sen endorses Richard Layard’s view that happiness is a matter of subjective well-being. This is his main reason for insisting that there is much more to the quality of life than happiness. This reading of Sen’s views overlooks the significance which Sen attaches to the distinction between happiness and well-being. For Sen it is not so much the notion of happiness that is to be associated with that of human self-actualization or flourishing, but rather that of well-being. For Sen happiness just is an hedonic feeling and nothing more. It is well-being that Sen thinks has an objective component, not happiness. This is not to say, however, that Sen regards well-being as an entirely objective affair. We saw earlier that Sen does acknowledge the importance of subjectively perceived happiness as an essential component of well-being.
Sen appreciates that the capabilities approach as he understands it has a close connection to the Aristotelian notion of the good life, or human flourishing. However, he is reluctant to characterise such a life as a happy life, or to associate it too closely with the value of happiness. He prefers, rather, to talk about the concept of well-being. There is a similarity between Aristotle’s ethical eudaimonism and Sen’s version of the capabilities approach. However, this has nothing to do with their respective understandings of the notion of happiness. Rather, it has again to do with their conceptualisation of the notion of well-being. As we have seen, Amartya Sen endorses the hedonic or subjectivist way of thinking about happiness that is dominant within the happiness literature today. He is very close to Aristotle on other issues, especially his understanding of the notion of well-being, and the related but not identical notion of the quality of life, but not so far as his understanding of the concept of happiness itself is concerned.
Grenholm may well be correct when he states that there are ‘good philosophical’ reasons ‘to maintain’ that happiness is ‘not limited to pleasure and feeling good.’ Rather, as in the case of ‘an Aristotelian perspective on happiness,’ which might be ‘expressed in terms of functionings and capabilities,’ happiness can and should ‘be understood in terms of human fulfilment and human flourishing’ [31]. Such a doctrine is often rightly associated with Aristotle. However, it would be wrong to attribute this Aristotelian notion of happiness to Amartya Sen. Sen explicitly dissociates himself from any such understanding of his own views. In his opinion it is not happiness, but rather well-being, or possibly the quality of life, which is to be understood in this way. Sen does not consider himself to be an ethical eudaimonist, or a follower of Aristotle in this particular sense, despite the affinities which exist between his ideas and those of Aristotle with respect to other issues. A fuller treatment of this subject would require a consideration of Sen’s understanding of the notion of the quality of life, and how this relates to the idea of well-being. I set discussion of this issue aside for the present.
Sen criticises the views of ethical eudaimonists, from Aristotle to John Stuart Mill, whose understanding of what real or true happiness involves is either entirely objectivist, or has a significant objective component. For example, in
Perhaps with John Stuart Mill in mind, Sen also maintains in
It is clear from the above that Sen thinks that it is misleading, to translate Aristotle’s Greek term ‘eudaimonia’ into English as ‘happiness.’ He is of the opinion that what Aristotle has in mind when he talks about eudaimonia is not the same thing as is implied by the use of the word ‘happiness’ today. These are two very different concepts. Nor is Sen alone in this. For example, Luigino Bruni, in his contribution to the
Bruni agrees with Amartya Sen that a subjectivist understanding of the notion of happiness is necessarily built in to the use of the word ‘happiness,’ which cannot therefore, in his opinion, any other meaning [28]. Nevertheless, a number of commentators have taken issue with this view. In their opinion, the notion of objective happiness, which they attribute to Aristotle, makes perfectly good sense, even today. Bruni acknowledges that at least ‘some scholars’ continue to ‘maintain that “happiness,” if qualified, renders the original meaning of
Kraut acknowledges that although ‘it is sometimes correct to call a person happy merely because he feels that way about his life,’ Aristotle ‘never uses
When discussing the disagreement between objectivists and subjectivists regarding the nature of happiness, Kraut asks whether this disagreement is ‘merely verbal?’ Does the objectivist simply differ from the subjectivist because she assigns ‘a different meaning to the word “happiness?”’ Should we say that she would make her point ‘more clearly and effectively’ by using ‘a different word instead of “happiness?”,’ for example the word ‘flourishing,’ so that it might be said that ‘one can be happy,’ subjectively speaking, and yet ‘not flourish,’ and vice versa. Given his subjectivist understanding of what happiness involves, it seems clear that Amartya Sen would have some sympathy with that view. However, Kraut maintains that ‘the objectivist has good reason to reject this proposal’ [34]. For words do matter. In his opinion, ‘happiness is what people want for themselves.’ Moreover, people ‘are unlikely to change’ their lives drastically ‘for their own sake unless they believe that they are not presently leading happy lives.’ Consequently, ‘if we take the word “happiness” away from the objectivist,’ then ‘we take away a strategic tool, which she rightly insists on using’ when engaging in debate with subjectivists [34]. Kraut insists, then, that ‘the objectivist is not simply adopting an arbitrary and misleading way of talking’ [34]. On the contrary, she ‘thinks that the way we talk about happiness’ today, which is the way in which Amartya Sen also talks about it, ‘deceives people into leading what is, from their own point of view, the wrong kind of life’ [34]. In his opinion, therefore, there is a substantive issue involved here and not merely a verbal one. Kraut argues that ‘we would be missing’ her point ‘if we were to look upon’ her ‘way of judging people happy to be nothing but a misuse of the word’ [34].
Julia Annas has also defended this position, in her
Annas acknowledges that the word ‘happiness,’ as it is often used today, including by Amartya Sen, ‘covers some areas that are not covered by eudaimonia’ [35]. However, in her opinion, this is not a sufficient reason to translate the Greek word in some other way, for example by the term ‘flourishing.’ Rather, all that is necessary, is that ‘we remember that,’ for Aristotle and indeed for ourselves, happiness properly understood has to do, no so much with a momentary sensation of pleasure, but rather with ‘a whole life,’ or with an individual agent ‘in respect of her whole life,’ and that ‘it implies that she has a positive attitude to her whole life’ [35]. Unlike Amartya Sen, Richard Kraut and Julia Annas both endorse the eudaimonistic notion of objective happiness. In their view, even if happiness properly so-called is not entirely an objective matter, nevertheless it does at least possess an objective component. This is something which Sen denies.
6. Conclusion
This chapter has examined Amartya Sen’s version of the capabilities approach from the standpoint of the concept of happiness. Sen’s views on this subject have sometimes been misunderstood. Contrary to the view of some commentators. Sen does not follow Aristotle by embracing ethical eudaimonism, with its objectivist understanding of what true happiness involves. On the contrary, Sen agrees with those who maintain that happiness is nothing more than a subjective, psychological state. I have argued that despite its evident strengths in other areas, and because of its endorsement of the notion of subjective happiness, Sen’s capabilities approach is open to criticism from an Aristotelian point of view. Sen does not take seriously enough the possibility that there may be such a thing as objective happiness. His unwillingness to accept that the concept of happiness might be understood in this eudaimonistic way is a weakness in his thinking.
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