The Israeli Media during the Gaza War: Insights from the First Weeks after the Disaster

Abstract

Since the tragic launch of the Israel—Hamas war (Gaza war) on October 7th, 2023, the role of Israeli media in shaping public discourse and national sentiment has been a subject of intense scrutiny. This article delves into the intricate relationship between media coverage and societal perceptions during the initial weeks following the terrorists’ invasion. It explores how Israeli media navigated the complex terrain of war reporting, balancing the duty of factual reporting with national security concerns and the psychological impact on the civilian population. The study highlights the media’s efforts to construct a narrative that not only informed the public but also fostered a sense of national unity and resilience. Through a comprehensive analysis of various media outlets, the article sheds light on the dynamics of media coverage in times of crisis, examining the interplay between journalistic practices, government policies, and public sentiment. This inquiry into the Israeli media’s coverage of the Gaza war provides valuable insights into the power of the press in shaping public opinion during periods of national upheaval and the ethical challenges inherent in reporting on conflict and terrorism.

1. Introduction

Media coverage plays a pivotal role in shaping public opinion about terrorist events. Some scholars emphasise the significant influence of media in forming societal perceptions and setting the public agenda. They argue that the media is a major force in moulding public opinion [1, 2, 3]. Likewise, Bruhn states that since major terrorist attacks such as those on September 11, as well as those in London, Madrid, and Oklahoma, the media, has significantly influenced the public’s perception of terrorism [4]. Numerous academic studies have demonstrated that television coverage, particularly following the September 11 and Oklahoma attacks, leads to post-traumatic stress disorder and depression among civilians. Wilkinson views the media-terrorism relationship as symbiotic [5]. In alignment with Wilkinson, Burke also acknowledges the evident connection between the media and terrorism, noting that terrorist groups often gain popularity through mass media exposure [6]. Michael Jetter’s research indicates that suicide missions garner substantial media coverage, which may account for their growing appeal among terrorist organisations. Jetter advocates for the media to refrain from offering a platform for terrorists’ propaganda [7]. Similarly, Yonah Alexander believes that the media serves as an effective tool for the propaganda and psychological warfare of terrorist groups [8].

This exploratory study embarks on a critical examination of the Israeli media’s role during the Gaza war that launched on October 7, 2023. Despite extensive scholarship on the media’s influence on public perceptions of terrorism and its symbiotic relationship with terrorist activities [ 5, 9, 10, 11], there remains a scarcity in understanding the nuanced role of media in shaping national sentiment amidst conflict, particularly within the Israeli context. The literature underscores the media’s potent capability to shape public opinion [2, 3, 4], amplify terrorist agendas [6, 7, 9, 12], and navigate the complex interplay between reporting responsibilities and national security imperatives [13, 14, 15]. However, what emerges as a critical lacuna is an in-depth analysis of how Israeli media, amidst the harrowing backdrop of the Gaza war, managed to recalibrate public trust, foster a sense of unity, and navigate the ethical quandaries posed by war reporting. This study, therefore, seeks to perform an interpretive analysis of the traditional media content illuminating the intricate dynamics of media coverage during the Gaza war, exploring its contributions to national resilience, the strategic manoeuvring between factual reporting and support for national defence and its role in the broader discourse on terrorism and media ethics.

2. Literature review: media at war, coverage of terror incidents, trust in the news media

2.1 Physical terrorism

Physical terrorism is categorised into three distinct types: suicide attacks, lone wolf attacks, and coordinated attacks, based on their impact. Many experts in terrorism studies contend that suicide attacks are currently the most lethal form of terrorism. These attacks are not only cost-effective but also garner significant attention. Mroszczyk concurs, noting that suicide bombings are particularly deadly and adversely affect civilian populations [16]. Presently, terrorist groups are focusing on enhancing the destructive power of suicide bombings while simultaneously striving to lower their operational costs, aiming to increase their visibility and impact.

Some scholars place greater emphasis on coordinated terrorist attacks than on other forms of physical terrorism. Avdan and Webb argue that these attacks have a more profound psychological impact compared to other types of terrorism, making them seem more threatening [17]. Their research suggests that attacks involving simultaneous strikes on multiple targets are perceived as more dangerous than those targeting a single location. Avdan and Webb also highlight that fear is a key aspect of terrorism, and understanding how terrorism induces fear is crucial for recognising its political ramifications. The actions of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) serve as examples of such coordinated attacks. For instance, in 2015, terrorist incidents occurred in three different countries on the same day, all orchestrated by ISIS. Gilsinan believes these attacks significantly impact civilians’ psychology and daily lives as they create a pervasive fear that anyone could potentially be a terrorist [18].

The influence of physical terrorism and its portrayal in the media significantly shapes public opinion. In the aftermath of terrorist incidents, individuals frequently seek out media sources for comprehensive details, trusting their informativeness. The media’s role in shaping public understanding of terrorism, highlighted by the coverage of the September 11 attacks, has been pivotal in moulding perceptions.

Some scholars focus on the influence of acts of terror per se. Rubin, Brewin, Greenberg, Hughes, Simpson, and Wessely, for example, highlight that terrorist attacks cause psychological effects on civilians, inducing increased stress and leading to decreased security and behavioural changes [19].

Others, however, research the effects of both physical acts of terrorism and the media. Huff and Kertzer note the challenges in studying public perceptions of violence, emphasising the media’s role in framing incidents as terrorism using language tools [20]. Spencer advises careful media language use. He suggests that even simple, seemingly trivial linguistic instruments, such as metaphors, can be used to convey certain meanings cognitively and reduce terrorism-related anxiety [21].

Proximity to terrorist attacks also shapes threat perception, according to Avdan and Webb [17]. The location of attacks and the victims’ race and nationality influence how people perceive the threat. The perceived vulnerability to terrorist threats increases when attacks occur nearby and when the victims’ identities closely resemble those of the observers.

Yeniçeri and Dönmez try to explain terrorism with ‘lay theories’. Their research, based on a poll they conducted in Turkish universities, found that religious terrorism is perceived as more dangerous than ideological or ethnic terrorism [22]. Demirçivi’s survey revealed that women are more concerned about terrorism because they tend to follow news regarding the attacks after the incident takes place [23]. Overall, terrorism had a negative influence on the participants’ psychological state, which showed in their word choice in describing it: ‘fear’, ‘violence’, ‘threat’, etc.

International surveys echo these findings, showing similar public sentiments. Brouard, Vasilopoulos, and Foucault’s study indicate significant shifts in French public opinion post-2015 Paris and 2016 Nice attacks, with some left-wing sympathisers leaning towards right-wing parties and an overall increase in security concerns [24].

2.2 Terrorism and the media

The relationship between terrorism and the media manifests in two principal forms: one is the engagement with traditional mass media, as discussed by Wilkinson [5], and the other is the interaction with social media platforms, as detailed by Dauber et al [25]. The media’s quick interpretation and presentation of events enable individuals to easily understand and frame the narrative of terrorist incidents [26]. The way news is presented in the media aids the public in developing their expectations and opinions regarding terrorist events [4]. Given the widespread availability of various forms of mass media today, they undeniably play a significant role in influencing public agendas and shaping societal perceptions [2]. Some researchers believe that the media’s impact on public opinion is more substantial than previously assumed. Bruhn [4] and Madhumitha [27] emphasise that the media has played a crucial role in shaping the public’s understanding of terrorism, particularly following major incidents such as September 11, 2001, attacks in the US, the London bombings on July 7, 2004, the Madrid train bombings in 2004 and the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995. Ahern et al. found that television coverage, especially of the September 11 attacks and the Oklahoma City bombing, has led to post-traumatic stress disorder and depression among civilians [28]. Shah and Faiz suggest that terrorist groups aim to gain immediate attention and propagate their message while also demoralising the public and law enforcement agencies [29]. Media coverage of their activities helps them achieve some of these objectives. Wilkinson [5] asserts that such coverage increases terrorist groups’ following, a view shared by Burke [6], who notes that media reporting elevates these organisations’ profiles. This rise in the popularity of terrorist groups is attributed to the increased media focus on them, as observed by Paust [11].

Nacos further argues that terrorist organisations escalate their violent acts to attract press attention [9]. Terrorists intensify their attacks, following media coverage, viewing it as a means to publicise their actions, beliefs and goals.

This correlation between media coverage of terrorist activities and a surge in terror attacks is further reinforced by Doward [12]. As a result of using the media to promote their agendas, terrorist groups increased the number of casualties from terror attacks around the world from 3387 to 15,396 between 2000 and 2015.

To show exactly how media attention results in more terror attacks, Jetter [7] studied the impact of media coverage on terrorists’ suicide attacks. His findings indicate that the media inadvertently provides a platform for terrorist propaganda. Alexander [8] also sees the mass media as a tool for terrorists to spread their propaganda and conduct psychological warfare.

Research indicates that modern terrorist groups use social media, propaganda, fake news and videos for disseminating their ideology, recruiting members, and instilling fear without physical force, such as through an army [30]. By leveraging social media for publicising their acts and exploiting the news media’s coverage, these organisations can recruit globally [10, 31]. Najem [10] highlights a mutually beneficial relationship between mass media and terrorist groups, where the media gains viewership from reporting terror attacks, while terrorists use this coverage to amplify their ideology and expand their influence.

2.3 News coverage of domestic conflicts

Research on how the media reports political disputes reveals that the news agencies are deeply affected by the political conditions in their own countries [32]. Additionally, despite globalisation’s impact, the range and character of media coverage often reflect the news outlet’s ties to its country, be they geographical, political, or cultural [33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38]. Thus, the media’s approach to reporting events varies based on whether the conflict is internal, pertaining to their own nation (‘ours’), or external, unrelated to their nation (‘theirs’) [13, 14, 15]. This disparity in treatment ultimately challenges the notion of media objectivity.

Studies demonstrate that when a conflict is domestic, media coverage tends to support national foreign policy goals, especially when the national interest is threatened, thereby acting as a source of ‘national integration’ [39, 40, 41] or the unifying force behind government decisions and actions [42, 43]. The so-called national interest is frequently a construct of the government, which is then shaped and propagated by the media. This process often leads the public to adopt and affirm beliefs that align with these constructed interests.

2.4 Trust in news media

A single universally accepted definition of trust in news organisations does not exist. Trust acts as a bridge between awareness and unawareness [44]. In the context of media, the bedrock of trust stems from past experiences and expectations related to the function of journalism in democracy and its perceived quality [45].

Trust is directed towards an uncertain future, making it intrinsically fraught with risk and ambiguity since the person placing trust (the trustor) lacks control over the one being trusted (the trustee). Consequently, there is a possibility that failing to meet high expectations may result in disappointment [45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53]. Therefore, trust becomes particularly significant in situations where trustors are unable to verify the provided information independently or possess incomplete information. By choosing to trust, individuals do not feel the need to seek out all the details themselves, thereby simplifying complex social interactions and decisions. This is the reason why trust acts as a mechanism that reduces the complexity inherent in social interactions (‘social complexity’) [52, 54, 55, 56].

Trust in news media can be defined as an individual’s willingness to be vulnerable to media, anticipating its satisfactory performance and adherence to prevailing societal norms and values, as described by Hanitzsch et al. [47, 48, 57, 58].

Several concepts are associated with trust such as confidence, credibility, scepticism, distrust, and mistrust [59, 60, 61]. While trust and confidence are often used interchangeably [62], many scholars differentiate them, noting that trust involves an active decision, unlike confidence [53, 63]. Some argue that true trust in institutions, including the media is not feasible due to the absence of immediate reciprocity, which is one of trust’s characteristics. Understandably, this immediate give and take is often absent in the relationship between individuals and large institutions. They suggest that what exists is rather confidence and not trust. Confidence, in this context, implies a belief in the institution’s ability to function or act correctly but without mutual interaction [49, 64].

Trust and credibility have also often been used interchangeably or treated as dimensions of each other [51]. Currently, credibility is seen as a more specific concept than trust. It pertains to the evaluation of media content, focusing on the perceived accuracy of information at a specific moment. Unlike trust, credibility does not encompass expectations about future reliability or actions [45, 59, 61].

Studies also deal with terms describing a lack of trust in news media with a prominent example being Tsfati’s [65] approach to media scepticism. This approach is defined as ‘the feeling that the mainstream media are neither credible nor reliable, that journalists do not live by their professional standards and that the news media get in the way of society rather than help society’ [66]. Scholars make a distinction between distrust and mistrust in the media, though the difference is often blurred [67, 68]. Mistrust is seen as systematic and rational doubt equivalent to scepticism [63, 69]. On the other hand, distrust is linked to negative suspicion and cynicism. It represents a strong belief or conviction, often without the need for evidence or rationale, that the subject is not trustworthy [49, 68, 70, 71].

Our research indicates that prior to October 7th, the Israeli media was afflicted with both mistrust and distrust [72]. This is evident as only approximately 20% of the Israeli public expressed confidence in the main media channels according to surveys.

This phenomenon is not unique to Israel but is indicative of a broader, global challenge facing news media in maintaining public support and credibility.

2.5 Summary

Media plays a significant role in shaping public perception of terrorism. There are a number of research directions that explore this relationship. One of them concerns media coverage and its influence on societal views after major terrorist incidents. As pointed out by Gerbner, Gross, and Bruhn [2, 3, 4], terrorist attacks and how the media frames these events have psychological impact. Another one focuses on different forms of physical terrorism and their effect on public psychology. For example, see [16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24]. Other research critically explores the symbiotic relationship between terrorism and media, both traditional and social, highlighting the potential for media coverage to inadvertently support terrorist propaganda, as indicated by Jetter and Alexander [7, 8]. For example, see [2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31]. Another area of focus is examining the differences in coverage of external and internal conflicts. For example, see Refs. [13, 14, 15, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43]. Finally, there are studies that cover the concept of trust in the news media. For example, see Refs. [44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64].

The aim of our current research is to examine the themes presented in traditional media during the early stages of the Gaza war, evaluating their effectiveness in gaining public trust, steering clear of content that might benefit terrorist agendas and supporting Israel’s foreign policy objectives. This analysis seeks to unravel the intricate dynamics between media coverage, public perception and trust within the context of terrorism.

3. Methodology

From October 7 to October 28, 2023, the first 3 weeks of the war, the researchers, both individually and jointly, watched broadcasts on Israel’s main television channels: Channel 11 (Israel Broadcasting Corporation), Channel 12 (the leading commercial channel in Israel) and Channel 13 (another Israeli commercial private channel) (see Appendix A). Each day, they watched at least 3 hours of broadcast on each channel, covering morning, daytime, early evening and prime-time slots, totalling approximately 200 hours per researcher or about 400 hours combined. They recorded the main themes presented in these broadcasts daily, summarising them at the end of each day and after the observation period, leading to the initial conclusions presented in the following chapter.

4. Results

This chapter delves into the key themes and motifs identified from observing the media coverage.

4.1 Together we will win

Starting at 06:30 on Saturday, October 7, 2023, Israel’s established broadcast media, channels 11, 12, and 13, began an extensive coverage of the tragic events of Black Saturday. This coverage of Hamas terrorism and the ensuing war in Gaza was continuous and comprehensive, spanning from 6:30 a.m. to 1 a.m. daily throughout the period under review.

In the wake of Black Saturday, as state institutions, including the police and army in southern Israel, faced a general collapse, the media was the first to regain composure and start functioning effectively. This happened well before the army, police, Shin Bet and other government bodies, many of which struggled to operate properly in the initial days of the conflict, and some continued to face challenges in the weeks that followed.

From the early hours of that Saturday, reporters and broadcasters were on the ground in the area surrounding the Gaza Strip, the epicentre of the Hamas terror. They provided live coverage from there, initiating continuous broadcasts that included news updates, reports and in-studio discussions about the unfolding events (see Appendix A).

Presenters and reporters embarked on an unprecedented professional effort from the first day of broadcasting, continuing throughout the conflict. Their dual objectives were challenging yet crucial: firstly, to provide the Israeli public with reliable, accurate and comprehensive information about the developments on the borders, in the army, on the ground, in communities under attack, within the government and in the health system, including the treatment of abductees and support for residents evacuated from their communities. Secondly, they aimed to address the entire Israeli public, which was considered to be mostly on the home front, but despite being away from the immediate conflict zone, was suffering from continuous missile attacks from Gaza.

The media’s effort aimed to stabilise the situation, providing vital civil defence information to the home front. This effort involved supporting, encouraging and strengthening the public spirit while conveying a sense of optimism, unity and collective effort in wartime. From the war’s outset, motivational captions were displayed on the screen margins, becoming a key broadcast feature. Channel 11 adopted the slogan ‘We are here’, Channel 12 used ‘Together we will win’ and Channel 13 chose ‘Strong together’. These expressions were designed to boost viewer morale, foster a sense of solidarity and mutual responsibility and signify the channels’ commitment to Israeli society’s collective effort against the enemy.

The media undertook the role of unifying and encouraging the people during these challenging times, focusing on the overarching goal of victory. The broadcast media in Israel fully committed itself to the fight against Hamas and to bolster the spirits of those on the home front. This commitment was essential because the impact of war extended beyond those injured, bereaved, or taken hostage; nearly the entire Israeli public faced continuous missile and rocket attacks from Gaza, forcing people to seek refuge in shelters and safe rooms. The enduring and unifying slogan throughout this period was ‘Am Yisrael Chai’ (The Nation of Israel Lives On). All slogans can be found in Appendix A.

In line with our findings, according to a survey conducted by Yifat research and consulting, there has been a notable increase in the credibility of television channels, with Channel 12 emerging as the most trusted media outlet, experiencing an 11% increase in viewership preference and a 14% increase in trust levels. Conversely, the printed press has seen a significant decline in trust, indicating a shift in the public’s media consumption habits and trust allocations. The survey also highlights a decrease in trust towards social networks during the war, with only 31% of respondents expressing trust in the content disseminated through these platforms, a drop of over 20%. Furthermore, the survey reveals that the public’s perception of ‘Israeli-ness’ in media has also undergone changes, with Channel 12 being perceived as the most ‘Israeli’ media outlet for the first time during the conflict [73].

4.2 Criticism of the government

Most media outlets and reporters conscientiously worked to uphold journalistic ethics as they interpreted them, aiming to serve Israeli society. Their goal was to effectively communicate the events taking place in alignment with their commitment to professional integrity and the interests of their viewers.

From the start, there was indication of a significant failure on the part of state institutions and the government, which resulted in the surprise invasion of Hamas terrorists. Additionally, the reports revealed that these institutions were not operating effectively nor were they responding with the necessary speed and urgency to support those affected.

The reports included candid expressions of citizens’ and reporters’ frustration, difficulty, pain and despair. They also featured genuine criticism of the government’s dysfunction, the Prime Minister’s failure to acknowledge his responsibility and the catastrophic failure that precipitated the disaster.

As opposed to the government, members of the defence establishment and the military made statements acknowledging the failure and accepting responsibility for it in the early days of the war.

The Prime Minister’s conspicuous refusal to hold himself accountable was broadly criticised across the media. This attitude stood out remarkably, with the notable exception of Channel 14, which is politically aligned with the government.

In the first 2 weeks of broadcasting, there was a notable absence of government representatives, ministers, Knesset members and pro-government journalists. This lack of their presence allowed for extensive criticism and allegations regarding the government’s incompetence and significant failures that contributed to the disaster. A major point of criticism centred on the government’s pursuit of legal reforms over the past year aimed at weakening the Supreme Court. This agenda faced strong opposition from the nation’s liberal and democratic citizens, leading to a concerning neglect of security issues.

From the onset, editors and managers confronted the challenge of dealing with prominent reporters and broadcasters who, in recent years, had been notable supporters of the government in the studios. These individuals saw a significant reduction in their airtime. For instance, on Channel 12 News’ popular prime-time show ‘Studio Friday’, which traditionally allocated considerable space to supporters of the Prime Minister and the government, there was a noticeable shift in the first weeks of the war. The programme became more critical of Netanyahu and his administration. Similarly, on other channels, the general tone in the studios leaned towards criticism of the government. This was coupled with expressions of support for the nation’s military, the reserves and the resolute fight against Hamas.

4.3 External censorship and internal censorship

Since the onset of the conflict, media coverage has been characterised by a deliberate and judicious approach: thoughtful and balanced. Avoiding sensationalism and the potential pitfalls of live reporting, the media has exercised restraint, particularly in not disseminating images that could cause distress or inadvertently aid the enemy. This policy has been shown in Wilkinson’s study as one of the best in response to terrorism [5]. This cautious strategy stems from lessons learned in previous terrorism-related incidents. While the channel’s senior editorial team and reporters had access to a wealth of real-time information, they judiciously chose what to air. Their reporting aimed to be comprehensive, accurate and expansive, adhering to censorship norms without chasing sensationalist exclusives. This approach has been seen as providing sufficient coverage within the bounds of responsible journalism.

Hamas terrorists arrived at the terror campaign equipped with more than traditional armaments; they also utilised body cameras, broadcasting live on social networks. Accompanying these militants were so-called ‘reporters’ from Gaza who provided real-time updates. Their coverage contained graphics and imagery depicting harsh violence against Israeli civilians, including the killing and burning of children, women and the elderly. These explicit visuals, which extended to the portrayal of acts such as rape and mutilation, were not broadcast on television but were circulated on platforms, such as Telegram (see examples of Telegram channels in Appendix A).

Israeli broadcasters demonstrated significant responsibility in adhering to the country’s military censorship laws. They not only complied fully with these directives but also took extra care to avoid airing content that could potentially aid terrorist groups or enemies, such as Hamas. Additionally, journalists frequently reminded their audience of these censorship practices during their broadcasts (see materials regarding censorship and Dana Weiss and Nir Dvori reports on Channel 12 in Appendix A). This approach was partly to assure the Israeli public, who are deeply concerned about national security and often sceptical about the media’s commitment to stringent security standards.

In this media approach, a consensus emerged across all broadcasting channels to refrain from airing videos originating from Hamas, even those that might provide updates on captives in Gaza. This decision was rooted in a commitment to safeguard the public from distressing content and to prevent inadvertently aiding Israel’s adversaries. The media, thus, positioned itself as an integral component of the national effort and warfare strategy, prioritising public trust and national security over sensationalism. This strategy underscores the media’s role in both informing the public and supporting broader national objectives during times of conflict.

4.4 Competition with the Internet

Channel managers and editorial teams were highly aware that the public’s media consumption extended beyond traditional television and institutional sources, increasingly encompassing social networks such as Telegram, TikTok and Twitter (Reference to poll results is provided in Appendix A). Rather than yielding to the often sensationalist and lower standards prevalent on these platforms, they opted for an elevated approach. Their strategy was to enhance the professionalism and reliability of their content. This commitment was aimed at making their broadcasts more suitable for sensitive audiences, including children and adults, as well as the general public, who sought refuge from the distressing videos, rampant rumours and misinformation that typically flood these social networks.

The objective of these efforts is to rebuild and strengthen public trust in the media, a trust that has declined globally in recent years, including in Israel [72]. This task involves navigating through a landscape marked by widespread cynicism and a profound crisis of confidence between the media and its audience. While this challenge is daunting, especially as even the most cautious broadcasters must confront and dispel rumours, their diligent efforts in doing so play a crucial role in regaining and reinforcing the trust of the public in media sources.

The broadcasting channels that were examined exhibited a measured approach, refraining from hastily echoing every rumour, photograph or disturbing video circulating on social networks, such as Telegram and WhatsApp (see Materials regarding censorship and Dana Weiss and Nir Dvori reports on Channel 12 in Appendix A). Frequently, broadcasters and reporters made it a point to communicate openly their policy of caution. They emphasised their commitment to not broadcasting unverified rumours and deliberately avoided showing any extreme images or videos that could potentially be offensive.

In Israel, broadcasting adopted a distinctive approach in response to the Israeli Air Force’s operations in Gaza, positioning itself as a refuge from the graphic imagery that began to pervade international media. Global media outlets were showing widespread destruction, of children being harmed and of women and families becoming refugees. However, in Israel, such images were seldom broadcast. On the occasions they were shown, they were typically framed within the context of being Hamas ‘propaganda’. This framing was used to highlight perceived biases in global media coverage and to suggest an unfair portrayal of the events unfolding in the region (see Channel 12 news with Dani Kushmaro and Keren Bezalel, world affairs correspondent, in Appendix A).

Israeli broadcasters widely asserted that certain segments of the Arab and Western media displayed clearly anti-Semitic and hypocritical tendencies in their coverage. They criticised these media outlets for focusing predominantly on the damage and casualties in Gaza while allegedly neglecting to adequately report on the vast acts of terror that were occurring against Israel and the 240 individuals abducted by the Hamas terrorists and taken to Gaza on Black Saturday. This narrative from Israeli broadcasters emphasised a perceived imbalance and unfairness in the international reporting of the conflict.

4.5 A measured and moderate description of death

The channels balanced their broadcasts, avoiding an overwhelming focus on tragedy, instead intertwining narratives of grief with accounts of bravery, resilience and survival (see Programmes dedicated to the topic of heroism in Appendix A). This approach mirrored the ‘Holocaust and heroism’ motif prevalent in Israel in the discussion of the Holocaust and World War II, where stories of hardship are often accompanied by acts of courage and overcoming. Following each account of a survivor or a bereaved family member, stories highlighting rescue efforts and bravery in adversity were featured, maintaining this thematic balance.

The stories of families, children and women hiding in attics, in safe rooms,and being murdered in cold blood brought to mind in Israel the Holocaust of European Jews during World War II. Hamas was often compared to the Nazis of Germany (see Comparison to Nazi Regime in media coverage in Appendix A). While acknowledging the connection to the Holocaust, the media’s stance was clear; the situations were not the same. The emphasis was on the contrast between the past, where Jews were solely victims, and the present, where the Jews have the state and army and can defend themselves. The focus was not just only on death and suffering but also on the themes of resilience and revival that emerged from these events.

The terrible disaster that resulted in 1200 murders and thousands of injuries in a single day left both the media and the entire Israeli public profoundly shocked. Funerals, although numerous across the country, received limited airtime, with only brief mentions, a couple of sentences from heartfelt eulogies, a swift glimpse of the gathering at the cemetery and nothing more. The sheer magnitude of the casualties made it impossible to dedicate individual screens to each victim; instead, screens displayed around 20 to 30 names at once, with a rapid reading of their names. Many people were reported missing, some remained unidentified and a few had no photographs available. The broadcast aimed to pay tribute to the victims and those abducted without turning into a constant stream of funeral coverage and mourning. As emphasised, the focus was on the initial theme, inspiring the Israeli spirit to confront the trauma and work towards resilience and recovery.

4.6 Open studio and continuous broadcasting

Since the war began, the three broadcast channels have maintained continuous open news studios, staffed with reporters, commentators, retired generals and security and military experts. These individuals rotated throughout the extended broadcasting hours. While this open, nonstop discussion format sustained the broadcasts and provided a platform for regular updates, launch and impact reports and supplemented field reports from professional reporters, it quickly revealed its limitations (see Channel 12 in Appendix A).

Most panellists in these studios were older generals and former senior defence officials who relied solely on media reports for information. Their analyses and discussions, based on past experiences and knowledge, often seemed outdated and misaligned with evolving reality and current events. Noticeably, there was a lack of diversity in the voices on air: very few women, intellectuals, academic experts (not previously affiliated with the defence establishment), foreign diplomats, additional journalists, jurists or citizens from other disciplines appeared.

The channels predominantly treated the event as a military one. In the initial weeks of the war, which the study focused on, other critical aspects—political, social, economic, spiritual, ethical, ideological, cultural and geopolitical—were largely overlooked. These aspects were set aside for coverage at a later time.

4.7 Israel Defense Forces (IDF) spokesperson and government spokesmen

From the onset of the campaign, it was evident that neither the government nor the state had an official spokesperson, responsible for updating citizens, explaining the situation, detailing government decisions, offering reassurance and providing instructions to the home front. This absence was filled by several key figures, most notably the leading broadcasters of the television channels, who voluntarily assumed this role. They were accompanied by spokespeople from the Home Front Command who provided civil defence instructions but were unable to present a comprehensive overview of the campaign’s objectives, the progress of the conflict or the country’s emergency preparedness.

The most prominent figure in this regard became the IDF Spokesperson, Daniel Hagari, a brigadier general in military uniform who delivered daily media briefings on the fighting’s developments (see Official IDF Speaker Announcements across channels in Appendix A).

He became the sole official state representative, addressing the public and fielding questions. Concurrently, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu issued a series of unilateral statements in the form of speeches to the nation—a communication pattern he adopted in the first 2 weeks of the war but has changed since. These addresses, lacking media interaction, did not engage with issues that concerned the public at that time.

5. Discussion

The analysis of Israeli news broadcasts during the initial 2 weeks of the Gaza war reveals several key themes and trends that altogether contribute to the overall effort of the media to establish a higher public trust [73] (also see Overcoming the trust crisis in media in Appendix A). Firstly, there is a pronounced alignment with the State of Israel in its conflict with Hamas, coupled with strong support for the Israel Defense Forces. Besides, the media channels consciously adhere to the constraints of military and self-imposed censorship, striving to create quality material and ensuring the content does not distress viewers and supports the campaign against Hamas. Generally, this trend mirrors past behaviours of the Israeli media during wartime, and it is a phenomenon observed globally [14, 15].

Does this cause an immediate effect on the relationship between the public and media outlets? Based on the recent data summarised above [73], there was, indeed, a significant shift in the Israeli public’s trust in various media outlets following the outbreak of the war, with substantial changes observed before and after the conflict. This shift in trust and viewership patterns suggests a complex relationship between them, highlighting the influence of the current conflict events on media credibility and national identity perceptions in Israel. Further, study is required to explain and analyse this shift comprehensively.

In addition to the abovementioned trends, a novel aspect has emerged in the media coverage: supporting the state during war no longer equates to backing the government or the Prime Minister. The media has shown the ability to differentiate between supporting the military, civilians and the state, and voicing significant criticism of the government, the controlling coalition in the Knesset and the Prime Minister. The latter is particularly criticised for his refusal to acknowledge responsibility for the war’s outbreak and the tragic event on October 7, where Hamas terrorists killed approximately 1200 civilians in Israel.

The criticism extends beyond the war’s mishandling to the Prime Minister’s lack of public engagement, avoidance of local media and preference for foreign media interviews in the United States. It also encompasses the perceived failures of various government ministries—Education, Welfare, Housing, Labour and Finance—in addressing the needs of war victims, evacuees, refugees and the families of the fallen and abducted to Gaza (see Appendix A).

This critical stance of the media might also reflect the sentiments of a large part of the Israeli public, which, prior to the war, protested against the government’s plans to weaken the Supreme Court’s status and power. In criticising the government, the media may be seizing yet another opportunity to regain public trust, aligning with the public’s discontent with the government.

Our study shows that the traditional Israeli media leans towards distinguishing its approach from that seen on social media platforms (see Appendix A). It strategically engages itself in a campaign aimed at educating, supporting and safeguarding the Israeli public in the face of terrorism. This choice reflects an understanding of terrorism’s primary objective: to sow fear and undermine public morale. Unlike the graphic and often disturbing content circulated on social media, which unflinchingly portrays the atrocities of murder, massacre and rape, Israeli media outlets chose a different path. They opt to concentrate on bolstering the resilience of the Israeli people. This is achieved by fostering a spirit of unity and support for the military, specifically the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and its spokesperson, while also allowing space for criticism of the government.

By focusing on strengthening the community’s resolve and resilience, the media plays a crucial role in mitigating the psychological impact of terrorism [5, 6]. This approach not only helps in maintaining a sense of normalcy and security among the public but also in promoting a collective response to the threats faced by the nation.

According to the recent polls [73], the impact of the Israeli media’s strategy on public perception was significant, leading to noticeable shifts in the public’s trust towards various news outlets. This suggests that the media’s role in shaping public sentiment and resilience in the face of terrorism is both impactful and recognised by the audience. However, the effectiveness and implications of this media strategy warrant further investigation. Such research would offer valuable insights into the dynamics between media practices and public sentiment during times of national security threats, providing a deeper understanding of the media’s power in influencing societal resilience against terrorism.

To sum it up, our observation and analysis show that the Israeli media mobilised for the campaign of informing, supporting and protecting the Israeli public with the understanding that the goal of terrorism is to instil fear and weaken the public’s resilience. It saw itself as another arm of the State of Israel in the war against terrorism, in weakening its effect and in strengthening the resilience of Israeli citizens against it. These actions showed immediate response in the shifts of trust of the public towards various news outlets, and yet need to be studied.

The intricate dynamics between national security and media presentation during the Gaza war underscores a pivotal realm of journalistic responsibility and state interest. The Israeli media, in navigating the treacherous waters of war coverage, demonstrated a conscientious balance between the imperative of factual reporting and the ethical considerations tied to national security. The media’s strategic decision to emphasise national resilience, while carefully managing the dissemination of sensitive information, showcases an evolved understanding of its role as a guardian of both public interest and national security. This alignment, however, does not detract from the media’s critical role in democracy; rather, it highlights the nuanced challenge of reporting in times of crisis. It underscores the importance of a media that, while supportive of national defence, remain vigilant, critical and independent.

In expanding on these connections, future discussions and analyses can further explore the relationship between media practices and national security policies, illuminating the pathways through which media coverage can both reflect and shape the strategic imperatives of state security and public welfare.

6. Limitations of the study and follow-up studies

The current research is qualitative, based solely on the analysts’ interpretations of the broadcasts. Given its nature, further research is essential. This includes a more extensive analysis of the number of broadcasts and their specific characteristics, including the airtime not covered in this study, as well as alternative interpretations of these broadcasts. Expanding the scope to include more broadcast and print media and extending the period of study beyond the initial weeks is also crucial. Moreover, a comparative analysis with coverage of the same conflict on international channels in other countries is necessary as this will likely present a markedly different perspective.

Yet another limitation is that this study does not analyse the themes that were not covered by the Israeli media. This acknowledgement highlights the existence of significant aspects of the event and its aftermath that were not addressed in the public discourse, pointing to areas for further investigation.

This study represents a prompt and localised Israeli response to an extraordinary event that garnered exceptional attention both in Israel and globally. Its significance lies in its ability to highlight the event and the nature of media coverage of a major terrorist attack in a country experiencing unprecedented terrorist aggression. This initial analysis serves as a crucial step in understanding the dynamics and implications of media coverage in such critical situations.

7. Summary and conclusion

The study of the findings collected in the first 2 weeks of the war, documents how, in the face of an unprecedented terrorist attack and subsequent conflict in Gaza, the Israeli media, previously nearing a loss of public trust and its status as a guardian of democracy, navigated the complex landscape of war reporting, reasserting its crucial role in a democratic society. Faced with the dual challenge of maintaining journalistic integrity and addressing national security concerns, the media managed to provide the public with timely and accurate news while also handling the collective psychological trauma of the nation.

Notably, the media’s efforts went beyond mere reporting; they played a pivotal role in rallying the Israeli spirit, fostering a sense of national unity and sensitively covering the stories of the fallen, wounded, captives and others affected by the events. This nuanced approach underscored the media’s commitment to preserving the interests of national security, highlighting its transformation into an entity that not only informed the public but also contributed significantly to the nation’s resilience in the face of terror.

Furthermore, the research illuminates the media’s strategic pivot towards a more nuanced differentiation between state support and government criticism. While staunchly backing the defence forces and the broader state apparatus in the conflict against Hamas, the media simultaneously cultivated a critical stance towards the government’s handling of the crisis, thereby reflecting and potentially shaping public sentiment.

Moreover, the study reveals a significant shift in public trust towards the media, with marked changes in viewership patterns and trust metrics post-conflict. This shift underscores the impact of media practices on national identity perceptions and the credibility of news outlets in crisis situations. It also highlights the potential for further exploration into the dynamics of media influence on public sentiment and national security policies.

In conclusion, by balancing the public’s need for information with the collective handling of trauma and maintaining a critical yet supportive stance towards the state, the Israeli media reaffirmed its indispensable role in the fabric of Israeli democracy. As this study shows, the media’s actions during the conflict reflect a broader commitment to strengthening societal resilience against terrorism, thus offering valuable lessons for media practices in times of national security threats.

Appendix A. The collection of broadcast channels and media materials

The materials in the collection are taken from the broadcasts aired in the first 2 weeks of the Gaza war, dating between October 7th and October 22nd.

The materials are in Hebrew, and only some of them have English subtitles. In the future research, relevant items should be translated and coded.

The materials are organised in blocks for convenience.

A.1 The official YouTube channels for Israeli broadcasters 11, 12 and 13

Channel 11: https://www.youtube.com/@KAN11

Channel 12: https://www.youtube.com/@israelnews

Channel 13: https://tinyurl.com/2uysa36d

A.2 Slogans adopted by the channels

Slogan ‘We are here’: https://www.kan.org.il/content/dig/digital/p-11412/

Slogan ‘Together we will win’: https://www.mako.co.il/tv-special/win_together-articles

Slogan ‘Strong Together’: https://13tv.co.il/stronger-together/

Slogan The Nation of Israel Lives On: https://www.ynet.co.il/yedioth/article/yokra13647241

A.3 Competition with the Internet and silence of the official media

Emergency provisions: https://www.idi.org.il/articles/51126

On the dominance of the social media: https://www.themarker.com/captain-internet/2023-10-07/ty-article/0000018b-08fe-dc5d-a39f-9efedcc80000

On the elevated Internet ad social media use after the launch of the war: https://www.themarker.com/advertising/2023-11-12/ty-article/0000018b-c321-dea2-a9bf-d3bf22870000

Overcoming the trust crisis in media: Karniel Y, Lavie-Dinur A. War again [Internet]. The Liberal; [cited 2024 Apr 2]. Available from: https://theliberal.co.il/war-again/ (in Hebrew)

A.4 Broadcasts, day by day

• 7.10 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KyElYpQ3MUI

• 8.10 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q69YrUMn4eE

• 9.10 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hYExIh1lsDY

• 10.10 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hgQwqYwifVQ

• 11.10 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NH169yQHrBc

• 12.10 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UcpI4aHQNZA

• 13.10 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wH_PlnexEWw

• 14.10 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5BOVyiXTUWM

• 15.10 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rYAwsYe8Pa8

• 16.10—Special Broadcast https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ziz9tkBk_v0

• 16.10 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A1auuRiC5X4

• 17.10—Special Broadcast https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWoq36M-pQY

• 17.10 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=72vQo-Pf9Z4

• 18.10 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WYtEY_CUJ5M

• 19.10—Special Broadcast https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LBI-WURX8Xw

• 19.10 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lv29Qjm0nKc

• 20.10 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qXQBLtKMxac

• 21.10—Special Broadcast https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qt1ZaViOVPA

• 21.10 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oyF9oO111Dk

• 22.10—Special Broadcast https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lYxqpRg3pPE

• 22.10 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Guyz12dGhc8

A.5 Programmes dedicated to the topic of heroism

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BBqqzKxqCTQ

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=faCl3fYtSjY

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sF77mb7hQOg

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FkDi1gNT8Jw

A.6 Uncensored Telegram channels

https://t.me/Uncensored7_10

https://t.me/massacre7ofoctober

A.7 Samples of criticism towards the PM

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2XvXvOOUl4o

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fCQaWHoeGXw

A.8 Materials regarding censorship

https://www.themarker.com/advertising/2023-11-15/ty-article/0000018b-ce96-dffa-adef-ee96d3410000

https://www.themarker.com/blogs/2023-10-30/ty-article/.premium/0000018b-7f4a-d51e-a3cb-7f6e374f0000

https://www.maariv.co.il/news/israel/Article-1050713

A.9 Comparison to Nazi Regime in TV coverage

https://fb.watch/rbC7ZKjP-E/

A.10 Official IDF Speaker Announcements across channels

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lnUJQNpBCKE